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New Perspectives on *Tawriya*
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II. Transliteration system

N	ن	Š	ش	’	ء
H	هـ	Ş	ص	B	ب
W	و	Đ	ض	T	ت
Y	ي	Ṭ	ط	I	ث
-, T	ة	Z	ظ	Ġ	ج
A	ا	‘	ع	Ḥ	ح
I	إ	Ġ	غ	Ḥ	خ
U	أ	F	ف	D	د
Ā	آ	Q	ق	Ḍ	ذ
À	ع	K	ك	R	ر
Ī	ح	L	ل	Z	ز
Ū	و	M	م	S	س

l’rāb is omitted except in Koran and poetry, initial ء is never transliterated, definite article, monoliteral particles, and suffix pronouns are separated from the noun with a dash (*al-*). ّ is not transliterated except in the case of genitive construction (t). Arabic words commonly used in English are not transliterated (Damascus).

III. List of Abbreviations

- ACFSO *Annali di Ca' Foscari – Serie Orientale*
- AION *Annali dell'Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli*
- BSLP *Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris*
- BSOAS *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*
- EAL Meisami, Julie Scott and Starkey, Paul (eds.) (1998). *Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature*, London and New York: Routledge, 2 vols.
- EALL Versteegh, Kees *et al.* (eds.) (2005-2009). *Encyclopaedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics*, Leiden: Brill, 5 vols.
- EP² Bearman, P. *et al.* (eds.). *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition* [online],
<https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/alpha/j>
- EP³ Fleet, Kate *et al.* (eds.). *Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE* [online],
<https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/encyclopaedia-of-islam-3>
- EQ McAuliffe, Jane Dammen (ed.) (2001-2006). *Encyclopaedia of the Qur'ān*, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 6 vols.
- GAL Brockelmann, Carl, *Geschichte der arabischen Literatur*, 2 vols. And 3 sup.
- IJMES *International Journal of Middle East Studies*
- JAAR *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*
- JAIS *Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies*
- JAL *Journal of Arabic Literature*
- JNES *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*
- JOAS *Journal of the American Oriental Society*
- JSS *Journal of Semitic Studies*

<i>Lisān</i>	Ibn Manẓūr, <i>Lisān al-‘arab</i> [online], http://ejtaal.net/
<i>MEAH</i>	<i>Miscelánea de Estudios Árabes y Hebraicos</i>
<i>MEL</i>	<i>Middle Eastern Literatures</i>
<i>MIDEO</i>	<i>Mélanges de l’Institut Dominicain d’études orientales du Caire</i>
<i>MSR</i>	<i>Mamlūk Studies Review</i>
<i>MUSJ</i>	<i>Mélanges de l’Université Saint Joseph</i>
<i>OED</i>	<i>Oxford English Dictionary</i> [online], https://www.oed.com/
<i>OLA</i>	<i>Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta</i>
<i>Q</i>	<i>al-Qur’ān al-karīm</i>
<i>QSA</i>	<i>Quaderni di Studi Arabi</i>
<i>QSA n.s.</i>	<i>Quaderni di Studi Arabi nuova serie</i>
<i>WZKM</i>	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes
<i>ZAL</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Arabische Linguistik</i>
<i>ZDMG</i>	<i>Zeitschrift der Deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft</i>

0. Introduction

أنواع البديع في الكلام كالملاح في الطعام
والخال في الوجنات والشية في الخيل الموسومات
(الرعيي الغرناطي، طراز، ٩٣)

My aim is to study the figure of speech *tawriya* (double entendre) in depth, with particular reference to: 1. How the theoretical disquisition provided an explanation of the phenomena encountered in literary practice, 2. The close relationship between *tawriya* and the Koran, with particular reference to the ambiguous verses (*mutašābihāt*), and 3. How it was used in poetic texts, in particular in the epigrams of the Mamluk period (1250-1517). The purpose is to implement our knowledge of this figure and to fully understand how it operates on a textual and extra-textual level. In order to combine the two aspects of the composition of the textual structure and the reception of the work of art by the reader,¹ I will propose a semiotic analysis capable of combining these two aspects, in order to highlight how the twofold meaning of an ambiguous word is the source of aesthetic enjoyment in the reader.

Why then a thesis dedicated to a single figure of speech, which is a single drop in a theoretical system that counts more than a hundred?

To answer this question, it is enough to turn our attention to premodern sources. The importance of this figure is proved by the interest that premodern scholars have shown towards it, not only at the level of the theoretical discussion, but also at the level of the literary production. As al-Şafadī (d. 764/1363) (*Faḍḍ*) pointed out, *tawriya*

¹ When in the text I refer to the 'reader', I do not mean an interpretation *ad litteram*, the word reader, rather, means the 'user of a text', be he or she a person who physically reads a text, or who listens to it.

is a figure of speech that will see its greatest flowering in the Ayyubid and Mamluk periods, especially in the regions of Egypt and Syria. About a century later, Ibn Ḥiğḡa l-Ḥamawī (d. 837/1434) (*Kašf*) will devote enormous space to *tawriya* by compiling a treatise which aims to outdo that of al-Ṣafadī. However, the work where he will devote wider space to this figure is his encyclopaedia (*Ḥizāna*). In that work, if one does not consider *ġinās* (paronomasia), *tawriya* occupies the largest space, and Ibn Ḥiğḡa collects about 2,000 loci, especially epigrams. But not only that. Al-Tanasī (d. 899/1494) (*Naẓm*) – also quoted in van Gelder (1992, 85) – will say that *tawriya* is to figures of speech what the pupil is to the eye. This shows how *tawriya* was a device that embraces the entire Arab-Islamic world and was not a phenomenon closely linked to a specific geographical area. What is certain is that *tawriya* from the 12th century permeates poetic compositions up to and beyond the Mamluk era, from east to west of the Arab-Islamic world, without exception. A testimony of the importance that *tawriya* will continue to play even in the Ottoman era can be found in al-Nābulusī's (d. 1143/1731) (*Nafaḥāt*), a treatise in which he dedicates much space to this figure. By this, I do not mean that *tawriya* was the only figure used in poetry and prose. Indeed, many are the figures found in the literature of the epoch, and they reflect the literary taste addressed towards an extensive use of the devices found in the *'ilm al-badī'* (lit. figures of speech). *Tawriya*, however, was not just an artistic habit, a passing fashion to conform to. *Tawriya*, by its ambiguous nature, acts at the level of the text as a pivotal point on which a second or even a third text can create. This is one of the reasons why *tawriya* has become the expressive medium of generations of poets and writers, who have seen in the use of this figure the means to express artistic needs different from those of previous epochs; needs that are rooted in the social fabric and which reflect the culture in which literary production and fruition meet.

In general, the studies on the figure *tawriya* could be divided into two categories: those which focus on the Muslim Spain, and those which focus on the *mašriq*.

On the one hand, Gibert (1962) is the first scholar to devote an article to an author who composed a small collection of *tawriya* poetry: Ibn Ḥātima (d. 770/1369), an Andalusian historian and litterateur. In her article, she briefly summarises the quadripartite classification of *tawriya* based on al-Ṣafadī (*Faḍḍ*) and Ibn Ḥiġġa (*Ḥizāna*), suggesting as a definition for the use of *tawriya* within *taḍmīn tawriya taḍmīniyya*, which, however, is not found in the sources. Subsequently, she analyses Ibn Ḥātima's small collection, proposing the edition and translation of some epigrams which she comments, applying the 'canonical' classification of *tawriya*. It will be only twenty years later that Gibert (1983-1984) will publish a full edition of the Arabic text of this short collection of *tawriya*-poetry, accompanied by a Spanish translation.

This first approach to poetic practice, will be expanded by Del Moral (1985-1986), who aims to investigate how the poets from Granada have also used the beauties of *tawriya* in their compositions during 13th to 15th centuries. This study has the merit of collecting the best examples of western *tawriya*-poetry and is the first which is not focused on theory; rather it provides a picture of the poetic practice, focusing on its authors and themes.

An even more interesting study of the poetic practice in the Muslim Spain is Chakor Alami (1995), who investigates the poetry of the Naṣrid epoch (1231-1491) with particular reference to the 8th/14th century. He maintains that *tawriya* experienced such a diffusion fundamentally for socio-cultural reasons, which played an important role in the reception of *tawriya*-poetry in the readers. This is because, Chakor Alami maintains, *tawriya* is not an easy to understand rhetorical device, since the public to whom it is addressed must have a sufficient culture in order to appreciate its use within a work of art. To explain its functioning, he resorts to the concept of open work as it has been described by Eco ([1962] 2006), and suggests the need for the reader to be able to understand the double isotopy – which he calls allotopy – introduced in a work of art where a *tawriya* is at play. The reason he provides for the use of a *tawriya* is that, in his opinion, it is functional to produce *ġarāba*, i.e. strangeness (Fr. *étrangeté*), in the reader – namely, the perception that there is a deviation from an expected state of affairs. At the same time, however, he posits that *tawriya* is a figure which conveys a less quantity of information than other figure, e.g. metaphor, and it is thus based on the repetition of an already known amount of information from

which the public derives pleasure. That is, the pleasure of *tawriya* lies in the repetition of information already known, without a real new information input. In his opinion, this characteristic of *tawriya* finds its cause in the psychological compulsion of repetition of the public, which reflects the pervasive fear of death in the Muslim Spain at the time of the Christian *Reconquista*. I quote his closing remarks:

Quant à nous, la *tawriya* nous est apparue dans la poésie naşride comme un acte culturel, dans le sens où le poète comme son public trouvait son plaisir dans la rencontre, sans cesse répétée, du déjà connu.

On peut conclure que la poésie utilisée comme acte culturel, parce que destinée à une caste précise, s'est isolée du grand public dont l'ouverture lui aurait apporté un dynamisme profitable à son renouveau. Autrement dit, pour se faire accepter d'une société fermée, le poète s'est vu poussé à exprimer ce qu'il est sûr que son public acceptera, parce que l'expérience lui évite l'imprévisible. Ce qu'il ressent importe peu devant ce que son public veut ressentir, n'oublions pas que nous sommes dans une période où les commentaires et les compilations étaient en vogue. (Chakor Alami, 1995, 270)

It is worth giving attention to Chakor Alami's conclusion. I must admit my ignorance of the poetry of the Naşrid epoch, and the examples quoted in that article, are not enough to provide a sound image of the literature of that part of the Arab-Islamic world. For this reason, I must assume the correctness of Chakor Alami's analysis, unless it will be proven wrong by future research. However, there are some points which I want to highlight. First, Chakor Alami's final statements echo the *inhiṭāt* (decadence) paradigm from which we are freeing ourselves after decades.² If his analysis of a society in decay and plagued by fear of death can be valid in the kingdom of Granada under the pressure of the Spanish reconquest, this cannot be considered valid in the eastern part of the Arab-Islamic world, especially in Egypt and in Syria. As we will see in Chapter 4, changes in society will allow some social classes to be a part of the literary debate, influencing it towards a renewal. Second, I disagree that

² On this paradigm and its influence on the Arabic studies, see Homerin (1997), Conermann and Pistor-Hatam (2003), Conermann (2013), Irwin (2003), Bauer (2005b; 2007b; 2013a, b), Kilpatrick (2009), von Hees (2017), to quote only the most important.

tawriya is a figure with low informational content. *Tawriya*, instead, is a figure with a high informational content. Indeed, it is capable of conveying multiple information, ranging from double reading of a text to the creation of ‘texts within texts’, as we will see in Chapter 5. Third, *tawriya* is not a mere repetition of worn-out concepts; at least, it is not more so than other figures and themes. It is capable of exploiting widespread genres and themes and of adapting them to new social realities; and, at the same time, creating new ones to meet the new needs of the literary taste. Fourth, I agree with the use of concepts such as ‘open work’ and ‘isotopy’, from the literary and semiotic sciences. However, it must be recognised that Chakor Alami does not provide any practical feedback (if not on a single epigram) about how these theories can improve our understanding of the *tawriya* phenomenon, limiting himself at citing some definitions that could be applied indiscriminately to almost any literary phenomenon. Fifth, if the idea of a passive audience can be adopted in the Naşrid Granada, this judgment cannot be adopted in the *maşriq*, where literary creation and fruition are combined together and develop each other.

On the other hand, the first scholar who devoted an entire study to *tawriya*, its origin, its development, and its functioning, was Bonebakker, who published in 1966 a monograph entitled *Some early definitions of the tawriya and Şafadī's Faḍḍ al-xitām ‘an at-tawriya wa-’l-istixdām*. He deserves credit for being a pioneer in the study of this figure in a time when the premodern literature of the Mamluk era suffered from the stigma of the decadence (*inḥitāt*), which prevented a true scientific approach to the literature of that era until a few decades ago. Bonebakker approaches the study of this figure starting from an autograph manuscript and outlines a theoretical framework whose precision has greatly reduced the fields still to be explored. Specifically, he reconstructs with great precision the birth and development of this figure of speech in the writings of al-Şafadī’s predecessors. The first use of the word *tawriya* to indicate an independent figure of speech is to be attributed to Usāma b. Munqid (d. 584/1188), who in (*Badī*, 60) defines *tawriya* as “a word which has two meanings, you intend one of them and you conceal it with the other.” At about the

same time, Rašīd al-Dīn al-Waṭwāṭ (d. 578/1182-1183) proposes in (*Ḥadā'iq*, 135)³ the term *ihām* – to which he associates the term *tahyīl* (image evocation) as a synonym – to define a figure in which the author “mentions some expressions which have two meanings, one near (*qarīb*) and the other remote (*ġarīb*).” Bonebakker demonstrates that these two definitions are those which will subsequently enter the works of literary critics substantially as synonyms. They are found, for example, in al-Sakkākī's (d. 626/1229) (*Miftāḥ*), which reports the word *ihām*, while al-Qazwīnī (d. 739/1338) (*Talḥīṣ; Īdāḥ*) will adopt the word *tawriya*. Bonebakker points out that the real interest in this figure will develop only starting from the Ayyubid era, when *tawriya* begins to be widely used in poems and literary compositions. He shows, then, how the theoretical disquisitions are proportional to the spread of *tawriya* in literary practice, and how *tawriya* began to occupy a wider space in treatises of rhetoric and literary criticism, in which the loci are increasingly taken from the poetry of modern authors, i.e. from the Ayyubid era on. Again, Bonebakker should be recognised for having collected and analysed all the relevant sources, providing an exhaustive picture to which very little can be added. As for the discussion of the Ṣafadian treatise, Bonebakker (1966, 69-98) proceeds following al-Ṣafadī's exposition point-by-point, of which he summarised each section and provided at least an example. Bonebakker closes his work with an overview of post-Safadian authors, who will not develop the theory of *tawriya* except in some small details. The Dutch scholar must be acknowledged to have made an accurate examination of the sources and to have illustrated with precision the theoretical system on which *tawriya* theory is built. He concludes his work by stating that premodern Arab critics were unable to analyse *tawriya* in detail, especially regarding the potential of homonymy / polysemy and the double reading engendered by *tawriya*. He also admits that the work he has done is focused, above all, on theoretical disquisition, without dealing with literary practice in detail.

An accurate review on Bonebakker's monograph is due to Heinrichs (1968-1969), who, while praising Bonebakker's work, postulates three research paths that, in his opinion, deserve exploration. They are: 1) The role of context. With the word

³ The work was originally written in Persian, but I refer to the Arabic translation.

‘context’, Bonebakker and Heinrichs both refer to what I call co-text in this work.⁴ Heinrichs stresses that context is an essential factor for the actualisation of *tawriya*, especially in the *tawriya muğarrada*. That is, in the type of *tawriya* that does not present any correlative in support of one of its two senses (cf. section 1.1.2.2); 2) The difference between theory and literary practice, and how the former describes the latter; 3) The relationship between *tawriya* and the Koran, with special reference to the *mutašābihāt* and the different rhetorical devices used to describe them. On this last topic, Heinrichs underlines that there is a close relationship between *taḥyīl* and *tawriya*, and suggests an in-depth investigation that takes into account al-Taftāzānī’s (d. 793/1390) (*Muṭawwal*) statement according to which the definition of *tawriya* can be explained according to the view of the Ṣāhirite school. I took these three suggestions as the basis on which to build my work of research.

Besides the studies that I have mentioned above, no other scholar devoted a whole article or monograph to *tawriya*. This does not mean that this figure has not received attention in different contexts, and it appears in many studies of leading scholars. For instance, van Gelder (1992) focuses in the second part of his article on the use of *tawriyas* in Abū Nuwās (d. 198-200/813-815), showing how the ambiguity of meaning expressed by the use of a *tawriya* can also be found in early poets, while remaining a distinctive feature of the later epochs.

Neuwirth (2009), in an article devoted to the analysis a *maqāma* by al-Ḥarīrī, provides the only study in which the use of *tawriya* is investigated in a prose context. She demonstrates that in that text, *tawriya* plays a role in creating a double reading of the text, one referring to the legal discourse, and the other to the sexual discourse.

Many are the scientific articles which mention *tawriya*. Almost every scientific work devoted to the literature of the Mamluk period mention at least once the importance of this figure. Providing a list of scholars, who mentioned *tawriya* in their works will be of no use. I limit myself to mention Bauer (2003a), who, investigating an elegy by Ibn Nubāta I-Miṣrī (d. 768/1366), points out that the “*tawriyah* was the rhetorical figure par excellence for the Mamluk period, and Ibn Nubātah was indisputably its

⁴ With co-text I refer to the set of lexemes actualised within a text, while with context I refer to the context of the enunciation, therefore external to the text.

greatest master. It is hardly accidental that the career of the *tawriyah* coincided with the increasing participation of ulama in the system of literature, because in the *tawriyah* the ulama could create consciously the ambiguity they were used to detecting in the sacred texts during their exegetical activities” (2003a, 84). What is all the more surprising is that, despite the wide diffusion of this figure of speech, no in-depth research has been carried out thus far with the aim to describe its use in a representative corpus of literary works. That is why, I agree with Bauer’s (2003a, 84) call to the study of *tawriya*: “many such studies would be necessary, however, to ascertain the proper place of this rhetorical figure, its achievements, and the specific usage made of it by different poets in different poems.”

My research work comes from the considerations expressed in these pages.

Before describing the contents of this work, I would like to point out what the reader will not find in these pages. First, the history of the formulation of *tawriya* in the sources previous from al-Şafadī will not be covered – except the *muġālaṭa ma’nawiyya*, which I will deal with in Chapter 2. This is because Bonebakker (1966, 24-62) has already collected all the relevant sources prior to the ‘canonical’ formulation of *tawriya*, commenting them widely, and providing all the explanations necessary to understand and rediscover the history of this figure. Further analysis would not bring anything innovative to the discussion. Second, I will not deal with the figure of speech *istiĥdām* “pivoting” (Cachia, 1998, 72). Although al-Şafadī (*Faḍḍ*) and Ibn Ĥiġġa (*Kaşf*) combine *tawriya* with *istiĥdām*, these two figures are treated separately in all the works of rhetoric and literary criticism. There is no doubt that a similarity between these two figures exists, as both are based on the homonymy / polysemy of a word or phrase. In this case too, I refer to Bonebakker (1966) for an introduction to the topic. It should be noted that a comprehensive study of *istiĥdām* has not yet been undertaken and therefore remains a desideratum. Third, although *tawriya* is associated with other figures, which are also based on semantic ambiguity, they will not be treated within this work except in a superficial way and only when associated with *tawriya*. Other figures, such as *tawġīh*, *ibhāmī*, *tawhīm*, *iştirāk*

(except in the use that al-Şafadī makes of it), etc., are treated separately in each treatise on rhetoric and stylistics, and therefore are not fundamental in understanding *tawriya* (see, Cachia, 1998). In the selection of poetic texts, I will not consider the poets of the *maġrib*, not because their production is not interesting, but rather because it has already received due attention in the studies that I have mentioned above. We come now to the contents of the research.

This work is divided into two parts. The first (Chapters 1-3) is devoted to the theoretical foundation of *tawriya*. The second (Chapters 4-5) aims at analysing the functioning of *tawriya* in the poetical output with particular reference to the epigram. In the first chapter, I will present what can be called the ‘canonical’ formulation of *tawriya*, as it has been expressed by Şalāḥ al-Dīn al-Şafadī in his work *Faḍḍ al-ḥitām ‘an al-tawriya wa-l-istiḥdām*. Starting from Bonebakker’s (1966) analysis, I will examine in depth some aspects that have not received due attention yet. First, I will discuss the morphology of the word *tawriya* as it has been put forward by al-Şafadī, showing how it represents a mediation between the linguistic theories of his predecessors on letter substitution (*ibdāl al-ḥurūf*). Second, I will move to the analysis of the ‘canonical’ definition of *tawriya*. To do so, I comply with the analysis proposed in al-Ru‘aynī l-Ġarnāṭī’s (d. 779/1377) commentary *Ṭīrāz al-ḥulla wa-şifā’ al-ġulla* on Ibn Ġābir al-Andalusī’s (d. 780/1378) *badī’iyya* entitled *al-Ḥulla l-siyarā fī madḥ ḥayr al-warā*, a source which has not received due attention yet, either on its theoretical system described in al-Ru‘aynī’s commentary, or its poetic contents found in Ibn Ġābir’s *badī’iyya*. Al-Ru‘aynī carefully describes each subdivision of *tawriya* as they were versified in the *badī’iyya*, broadening al-Şafadī’s system by adding two new subdivisions which will implicitly be embraced by later scholars. Third, the chapter ends with al-Şafadī’s discussion about infelicitous attempts to use a good *tawriya* in poetry.

The second chapter takes a step back from the canonical theory of *tawriya* and aims to analyse a figure of speech that is a precursor to *tawriya*, i.e. the *muġālaṭa ma’nawiyya*. The aim is to demonstrate that authors such as Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn Ibn al-Aṭīr (d. 637/1239), Ibn al-Naqīb (d. 698/1298), and al-‘Alawī l-Yamanī (d. 745/1344 or 749/1348) used *tawriya* not as a specific label of a single figure of speech, but rather

as an umbrella term to define a semantic ambiguity. In these authors, the *muğālaṭa ma'nawiyya* is a first attempt to theorise how this figure was dependent on the context and the context of enunciation in order to be able to act on a textual level. An attempt that will be reabsorbed later in the *tawriya* theory.

The third chapter responds to that imperative postulated by Heinrichs (1968-1969) to investigate *tawriya* in the sacred text, and it is also as a link between theory and practice. In particular, I ask the question of when and why *tawriya* was associated with the explanation of some *mutašābihāt*, in particular (Q 20:5), (Q 39:67), and (Q 51:47). The analysis will be carried out on two types of sources: on the one hand, sources of rhetoric to literary criticism, and on the other, exegetical commentaries on the sacred word. The use of both types of sources is due to the deep interconnection and interdependence which bind religious sciences and linguistic-rhetorical sciences in the premodern Arab-Islamic world. The Koran is the absolute example of linguistic perfection, and it is precisely on this perfection and on the dogma of the inimitability of the Koran (*i'ğāz*) that one of the branches of Arabic rhetoric (*'ilm al-balāġa*) will develop, i.e. *'ilm al-ma'ānī* (lit. science of meanings, but which denotes, more precisely, a pragmatic approach to language). The aim is to demonstrate how the study and interpretation of the divine word is of fundamental importance for the development of the theory of *tawriya* and how the application of this figure also responds to theological dictates.

The second part of the thesis responds to the need to investigate the functioning of *tawriya* in literary practice. The mere theoretical discussion as it has been handed down to us by premodern sources is not enough to explain all the nuances of the use of this figure in literature. Obviously, the investigation cannot be conducted indiscriminately on a potentially infinite literary corpus. For this reason, I have introduced two fundamental limitations: one of a chronological nature and another of a formal one. First, I will limit the analysis to poetic compositions written in the Mamluk era, this is because *tawriya*, as evidenced by the sources – e.g. al-Şafadī (*Faḍḍ*) and Ibn Ḥiġġa (*Kašf; Hizāna*) – and by contemporary scholars – e.g. Bonebakker (1966) and Bauer (2003a) – saw its heyday starting from the Ayyubid period and developed even more in the Mamluk age. The second restriction led me to choose the epigram as the textual form to be investigated. This choice is due to

the diffusion of this type of text in the literature of the time, which, although not the only expressive vehicle of poets and writers, increased in its importance as an expressive medium capable of giving shape to the genres and motifs of poetry in an era of social change. I will present, therefore, a reasoned selection of epigrams, translated and commented, in order to demonstrate how *tawriya* is strongly linked to the context of the enunciation and how it needs a 'competent' reader in order to succeed in its aesthetic intent.

In the fifth and final chapter, I will propose a new approach to *tawriya* used in the contexts of intertextuality engendered through *taḍmīn* and *iqtibās*. To better understand how these figures act together, I will resort to the notion of text expressed by Marrone (2001; 2014), to the semiotic theories of textual analysis developed by Greimas (1966; 1970; 1983), and, above all, to the principle of interpretative cooperation of the text found in the works of Eco ([1979] 2006; 1994). The work is accompanied by an index of the Koranic verses, an index of rhymes, an index of names, and a glossary which contains the most important Arabic technical terms with the related translations.

Some practical notes. All translations, unless explicitly reported, are mine. In translating poetic lines, I did not aim to reproduce the stylistic effects given by the rhyme and the metre, nor did I aspire to present a 'poetic' translation, preferring to limit myself at presenting an understandable and clear text. In the translations, I will note the *ma'nà qarīb* in italics, while the ma'nà ba'īd underlined. The translations of the Koranic verses are taken from Droge, Arthur J. (2013). *The Qur'ān. A New Annotated Translation*, Sheffield and Bristol: Equinox. Whenever I use the word epigram in the text, I refer to the Arabic *maqṭū'* pl. *maqāṭī'* as in van Gelder (2012e) and Talib (2018).

1. The received theory of *tawriya*: al-Şafadī's *Faḍḍ al-ḥitām* and al-Ru'aynī's *Ṭirāz al-ḥulla*

1.1 The received theory of *tawriya* according to al-Şafadī

When we talk about the figure of speech *tawriya*, we spontaneously turn our attention to the author who first devoted an entire treatise to this figure. I am referring to al-Şafadī (d. 764/1363)¹ and his work *Faḍḍ al-ḥitām* 'an al-*tawriya wa-l-istiḥdām*. He was not the first scholar who turned his attention to this figure of speech, nor was he the last. Indeed, many later scholars included this figure in their work and broadened the spectrum of analysis, providing additional *loci* and implementing the theoretical basis on which al-Şafadī built his system of *tawriya*. He was certainly the first who recognised in this figure a characteristic sign of poets, prose writers, and literati in general, of the Ayyubid era and of his contemporaries, placing the beginning of the so-called 'golden age' of *tawriya* with the poets and *qāḍīs* al-Qādī I-Fāḍil (d. 596/1200) and Ibn Sanā' al-Mulk (d. 608/1211), who excelled, according to al-Şafadī and to later scholars, in the art of the use of this figure. From then on, *tawriya* became a hallmark of the literary production of the *maşriq* during the Ayyubid and Mamluk ages. Al-Şafadī must also be recognised for his effort of systematisation of the previous material and the desire to give *tawriya* a theoretical

¹ Trying to summarise the profile of a litterateur like al-Şafadī in the few lines of a footnote is impossible. Just to give an example of his productiveness, Rowson (2009, 341-342) lists forty-nine works attributed to him, not to mention the five of dubious attribution. Al-Şafadī, Şalāḥ al-Dīn Ḥalīl b. Aybak Abū I-Şafā' al-Albakī, was born in Şafad in 696/1297, but spent his life between Egypt and Syria, particularly between Cairo and Damascus, where he died in 764/1363. During his travels, he had the opportunity to make contacts with the most important scholars of the time, such as Abū Ḥayyān al-Ġarnāṭī (d. 745/1344), Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umarī (d. 749/1349), and Ibn Nubāta (d. 768/1366), with whom he made a strong friendship, which later turned into open contrast designed to force Ibn Nubāta to denounce the plagiarism of his themes and verses by al-Şafadī, cf. Schallenbergh (2007) and Bauer (2009a, 198). It is difficult to find a field of knowledge into which al-Şafadī did not venture. He was a poet and a fine theorist and critic, he compiled numerous anthologies and his biographical dictionaries are an unquestionable work allowing us to know the literary milieu of his and previous epochs. See for reference Rosenthal (2012b), Lāşīn (2005), and Rowson (2009).

background, on which he could base the analysis he intended as definitive.² Al-Şafadī's *Faḍḍ al-ḥitām* is structured into four parts: an introduction, two *muqaddimas* (premises) ending with a *natīġa* (synthesis) – where he approaches the theory of *tawriya* from many different angles and lists some of what he judges to be the best examples of *tawriya* as well as some infelicitous examples thereof – and finally a selection of his own *tawriya*-poetry, in which he collects some of his best compositions focused on this figure of speech.³ The parts into which his treatise is divided makes it a perfect example of *adab* work, in which theory is discussed with a particular eye oriented to the gathering of good poetic examples and, one must say, with a particular interest in showing off his literary abilities, with that pinch of self-esteem of which al-Şafadī was certainly not devoid. This encyclopaedic work is pervaded by the “philological orientation” which Talib (2019) describes in relation to another work by the same author, *Şarf al-‘ayn*, and which will prove to be applicable in describing the constituent parts of the *Faḍḍ al-ḥitām*, and in particular the first *muqaddima*, in which al-Şafadī approaches *tawriya* from a philological point of view before even explaining its structure and functioning.

1.1.1 The introduction

In the introduction to his work, al-Şafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 39-61) enumerates the aims that made him devote an essay to *tawriya*, describing the causes of its diffusion in the literary outputs of his contemporaries and the reasons as to why they excelled in its use. Since Bonebakker (1966, 69-74) has already summarised the introduction, I will limit myself to a list and add here some essential points to better understand the background upon which al-Şafadī collocates his theoretical system. First, he posits

² It must be remembered that al-Şafadī's project for *tawriya* is not an isolated example, for he devoted the same efforts to three other figures of speech, writing for each of them a single treatise. I refer here to the *ġinās*, or *taġnīs*, commonly translated by ‘paronomasia’, ‘alliteration’, etc., the *al-qawl bi-l-mūġib*, translated by Cachia (1998, 95) with ‘deflection’, i.e. “A retort that alters the applicability of someone else's statement”, and the *taşbīh*, i.e. ‘simile’, ‘comparison’. See al-Şafadī (*Ġinān; Hawl; Kaşf*), Bauer (2003b). For *ġinās*, see Heinrichs (2012d). For a close reference to the term paronomasia and its use and reception, see Diem (2007). For a perspective on the use of this figure in the Mamluk age, see Ismail (2014). For *taşbīh*, see van Gelder (2012d).

³ A kind of anthology that Bauer (2003b, 74) ranges among “Anthologien, die durch ein literarisches Thema definiert sind, in solche eher partikulären Zuschnitts.”

that figures of speech can be ranged in four categories: *mawǧūd* (existent), *mafqūd* (inexistent)⁴, *maqbul* (acceptable), and *mardūd* (objectionable),⁵ for they are not necessary in a speech, and when they are present, it does not mean that they are correctly used to achieve the desired aesthetic effect, leaving the reader with the final judgment on their effectiveness. Al-Şafadī's interest in *tawriya*, which he judges – together with *istiḥdām* – as the best expression of the 'ilm al-badī', is part of this picture, as it foresees a direct effort on the part of the reader in understanding the various facets of the text, and it is precisely through this 'intellectual' commitment and devotion to understanding the hidden implications of the text that aesthetic enjoyment is achieved.

Indeed, interest in the ambiguity of meaning and wordplay is found in Arabic literature of every age. However, al-Şafadī warns against wanting to read the lines of poets prior to the Ayyubid era as real examples of *tawriya*, as the use of this figure, although successful in some cases, does not represent the poet's true and personal will. For this reason, he specifies that for ancient poets (*al-qudamā'*) the use of figures of speech in their compositions is not due to a stylistic research aimed at highlighting the expression through a mannerist language, but is simply the result of properties of language and eloquence, which the people of the desert innately possessed, a real natural disposition at the service of poetic art. The authors who came after (*al-muwalladūna min al-šu'arā' al-umawiyyīna wa-ġayri-him*) lost much of this innate knowledge of their predecessors, but some of them managed to make good use of figures of speech, so as to witness an increasing refinement towards some specific figures by some poets, such as the excellent use of *ġinās* in the work of Abū Tammām (d. 231-2/845-6), to quote only one example. But if this is valid for figures of speech in general, al-Şafadī states for *tawriya* in particular that only later authors (*al-muta'ahḥirūna min al-šu'arā' wa-l-kuttāb*) will be able to integrate this figure into their compositions in a way that is not perfect, but at least satisfactory. One of them

⁴ *Mafqūd* also has legal meaning as a synonym of *ġā'ib*, but suggesting a doubt about the existence of the absent thing. Tyan (2012) defines *ġā'ib* as follow: "Absent, usually means in law the person who at a given moment is not present at the place where he should be. [...] If to this first notion is added that of uncertainty concerning the person's existence, the term used is not *ġhā'ib* but *mafqūd*, although sometimes the state of the *mafqūd* is called also *ġhayba*." See also Yanagihashi (2014).

⁵ These two last descriptions are also applied to *iqtibās* (Koranic quotation), see Van Gelder (2002-2003), and Orfali (2018). About this figure see chapter 4.

is al-Mutanabbī (d. 354/955), from whom al-Ṣafadī quotes two verses taken from a *qaṣīda*.⁶ In general, al-Ṣafadī attributes the success of *tawriya* in the ‘late’ era to the particular needs of this figure. Specifically, he says that the essential basis for creating a good *tawriya* is that the poetic composition as a whole should not be excessively complex from a syntactic point of view, and nor should it be padded with words that are obsolete and difficult to understand. This is why the ‘moderns’ are more skilled in the use of this figure than the ‘ancients’, an affirmation demonstrating the awareness of a different aesthetic taste during the Ayyubid and Mamluk ages – during which, while not forgetting the Arabic literary tradition, that taste deviates from the tradition in search of new means of expression, poetic forms, genres, and motifs.

As previously mentioned, al-Ṣafadī fixes the beginning of the golden age of *tawriya* with two very important figures in the literary panorama: al-Qādī I-Fāḍil and ilbn Sanā’ al-Mulk. These are the two pioneers of the modern use of *tawriya* whose successors will travel the path they traced. Among those named by the author, I quote Sayf al-Dīn b. Qazal al-Mušidd (d. 656/1258), Abū I-Ḥusayn al-Ġazzār (d. 679/1281), Ibn Lu’lu’ al-Ḍahabī (d. 680/1281), Muġīr al-Dīn Ibn Tamīm (d. 684/1285), Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir (d. 692/1293), Sirāġ al-Dīn al-Warrāq (d. 695/1296), Ibn al-Naqīb (d. 698/1298), Ibn Dāniyāl (d. 710/1310), and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ḥammāmī (d. 712/1312).

Al-Ṣafadī strongly recognises in Egyptian and Syrian literati the pioneers and best composers of *tawriyas*. The justification is expressed by al-Ṣafadī through another figure of speech, that is *ḥusn al-ta’līl* (fantastic aetiology),⁷ for which he attributes the merit of the literary success of Egyptians and Syrians to the water of the Nile, which is one of the rivers of paradise, and to the air that people breathe in Syria, which is the same sweet air of paradise: there is no water like that of the Nile, nor air like that of Syria. Whether or not al-Ṣafadī believed this cause is not a matter of discussion; for my part, I can put forward the hypothesis that he wanted in some way to sacralise

⁶ I will analyse these verses in the next chapter as an example of *muġālaṭa ma’nawīyya*, see chapter 2.1.1.

⁷ “In traditional Arabic literary criticism, *ḥusn al-ta’līl* is the term used for the invention of a fanciful, fantastic, imaginary, imaginative or witty cause for a certain phenomenon – a cause other than the true one – by means of a creative reinterpretation of ‘reality’.” van Gelder (2008, 221).

the position of coeval and previous poets as representatives of a new approach to literature which uses different methods and tools than in the past.

1.1.2 The first *muqaddima*

The author then moves into the first part of his treatise: the first *muqaddima*, which is divided into four subchapters (*aşl*) and a conclusion (*tatimma*). As I have underlined above, this treatise is an appropriate example of an encyclopaedic *adab* work with an evident interest in the philological side of the subjects discussed within it.

Since *tawriya* is a figure of speech which plays at the level of the semantics of words in order to create ambiguity, the side of philological research on the poetic text is certainly essential. But for al-Şafadī, the philological interest crosses the limits of the poetic text itself. As already pointed out by Talib (2019) about (al-Şafadī, *Şarf*), the treatise is not limited to the mere enumeration of poetic examples in which the word ‘*ayn*’ is uttered. Instead, it covers a wider spectrum of research in which disquisitions of linguistic, etymological, lexicological, and scientific character – for example, the medical connotations of the word ‘*ayn*’ – are discussed separately and together they merge creating an all-encompassing work. The *Faḍḍ al-ḥitām* is no exception. If we approach the first *muqaddima*, we see that al-Şafadī opens the disquisition with a purely philological approach, discussing the etymology and morphology of the word ‘*tawriya*’.

1.1.2.1 Remarks on the morphology of the word *tawriya*

Al-Şafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 63) opens the first *muqaddima* by analysing the morphology and etymology of the word *tawriya*. Bonebakker (1966) does not address the first of these two topics, namely the morphology and substitution of segments, which al-Şafadī reports having involved the word *tawriya*. Specifically, al-Şafadī posits that the pattern of the word *tawriya* is *taf’ila*, in which we can recognise a mutation of the first segment of the pattern: the original form is not *tawriya* but **wawriya*, having experienced a substitution comparable to this of the words **wawlağ* > *tawlağ*, **wurāt* > *turāt*, and **wawşiya* > *tawşiya*. The author does not provide any comment

or explanation on his statement, which makes us reflect on the morphological change in a word which every one of us would have classified as a *maṣḍar* issued from the second augmented form *fa‘‘ala*. I need to confess that when I first read al-Ṣafadī’s words, I asked myself the reason of such an analysis, without being able to understand his position. Thus, I think it is worth spending some efforts to understand al-Ṣafadī’s view by perusing the relevant sources on morphology. First of all, I shall start from al-Ṣafadī’s opinion:

Know that the original form (*aṣl*) of *tawriya* is **wawriya*, since the first *wāw* has been substituted with *tā’*. This phenomenon is frequent in the language of the Arabs, e.g. they said *tawlağ*⁸ [instead of] **wawlağ*, *turāt*, whose original form is **wurāt*, and *tawṣiya*, whose original form is **wawṣiya*, for the radical (*mādda*) of the first is *w l ġ*, of the second *w r t*, and of the third *w ṣ y*. Its pattern (*wazn*) is *taf’ila* like *tabṣira*, *takrima*, and *taḡkira*. (al-Ṣafadī, *Faḍḍ*, 63)

No other scholar who dealt with *tawriya* prior to al-Ṣafadī had mentioned **wawriya* as a supposed original form of the word *tawriya*. To understand al-Ṣafadī’s theory better, we should consider the two pillars on which it is based. First, the segment /t/ is a substitution for the first radical letter of the word: *w*; second, the pattern of the word is *taf’ila*. The first affirmation sounds dubious to an Arabist ear and seems to be in full contrast with the second affirmation, which, if true, invalidates the first, making al-Ṣafadī fall into a contradiction. For this reason, it is worth providing a brief overview of the phenomenon called *ibdāl al-ḥurūf* (letters substitution)⁹ to understand better what this morphological change is and how it applies to particular words with a weak letter as first and last radical letter.

⁸ I do not provide the translations of those words used by the author as examples of substitution and mutation, for they are quoted only to show a morphological change and not for their meanings.

⁹ This is the case of *ibdāl* called *grammatical ibdāl*; on this topic, see El Berkawi (1981, 27-48), Bohas et Guillaume (1984, 223-267), Hämeen-Anttila (2007). Ibn al-Sikkīt (d. 244/858) devoted a whole work to the issues of *qalb* and *ibdāl*, which is, however, less informative for this investigation than the other sources I will discuss in these pages; see for reference (*Qalb*, 62-63). On the other hand, the lexical *ibdāl* “refers to phonologically and semantically related doublets, triplets, or longer series in the lexicon.” Hämeen-Anttila (2007, 2:280). See also Hämeen-Anttila (1993).

Sībawayhi (d. ca. 180/769)¹⁰ was the first author to mention the *ibdāl* – or *badal* – as a morphological phenomenon involving the substitution of a segment in given words. In his *Kitāb*, he addresses the topic as follow:

Sometimes, they substituted the *wāw* with *tā'* when the first is vowelled with 'u' in the way I have already described, for the letter *tā'* is one of the letters of augmentation (*hurūf al-ziyāda*), and the substitution is like that of *hamza*. In this case, the substitution with *tā'* is not a general rule, therefore they say: *turāt*, being derived from *wariṭa*, as well as *anā* is derived from *wanaytu*, for the woman has been made indolent, as well as *aḥad* is derived from *wāḥid*, *aḡam* from *waḡam* whereas they said *aḡam* in that way, for they substituted the initial *wāw* vowelled 'u' or 'i' with *hamza*. Likewise, *al-tuḥama* for it is derived from *al-waḥāma*, *al-tuka'a* for it is from *tawakka'tu*, *al-tuklān* for it is from *tawakkaltu*, and *al-tuḡāh* for it is from *wāḡahtu*. [...]

Sometimes, when two *wāws* have met, they substituted [one of them] with *tā'*, as they did with *tā'* in the above-mentioned examples. This substitution is not a general rule and it is not as frequent as when the *wāw* is vowelled with 'u', for the *wāw* vowelled with 'a' is compared, thus, with the *wāw* in *waḥad* and it is not as frequent. It could have been substituted anyway despite its rare occurrence as it is the case with *tawlaḡ*, about which al-Ḥalīl (d. ca. 160-175/776-791) affirmed that [its pattern] is *faw'al* and they substituted the *wāw* with *tā'*. He stated that *faw'al* is more suitable than *taf'al*, because you will not find in the language *taf'al* as a noun, while *faw'al* is frequent. Among them, someone says *dawlaḡ* meaning *tawlaḡ*, which is the place in which you enter. [...]

You say *taw'ida* and *yaw'id* in forming the pattern *taf'ila* and *yaf'il* from *wa'adtu*, when they are nouns and not a verb, as you say *mawḏi'* and *mawrika*. Both *yā'* and *tā'* are in the place of this *mīm* and the *wāw* does not disappear as it did in the verb. It is also not suppressed in *maw'id* because in it there is no cause [for its suppression] as there is in *ya'idu*. This is due to the fact that it is a noun and their saying *tawdiya*,

¹⁰ Abū Bišr 'Amr b. 'Uṭmān b. Qanbar, usually known only as Sībawayhi (d. ca. 180/796), a nickname probably meaning 'little apple' (*sēbōe*) or 'apple fragrance'. He is the father of Arabic grammar, which he outlined in his only work commonly known as *Kitāb Sībawayhi* or simply *al-Kitāb*. Many are the works about the importance of Sībawayhi in the foundation and development of the Arabic grammar, as well as his legacy in later grammarians; see, for example, Carter (2003; 2012), Baalbaki (2008), Versteegh (2009), and Marogy (2009).

tawsi'a, and *tawṣiya* demonstrate to you that the *wāw* remains unchanged. (Sībawayhi, *Kitāb*, 2:392-394)

In this extract, Sībawayhi highlights the fact that the substitution of the first radical letter *w* is not a general rule (*ġayr bi-muṭṭarid*) and it is usually applied when *w* is vowelised with 'u', whilst it is less frequent when *w* is vowelised with 'a', *hamza* being preferred in this case. Moreover, when the pattern applied to a root with a weak first radical letter is a pattern expressing a noun, the semivowel *w* is not suppressed, as it is, in contrast, in the conjugation of the *muḍāri'* verb.

About the difference in the morphological changes depending on the type of word – noun or verb – al-Sīrāfī's (d. 368/979)¹¹ *Šarḥ* provides us with an explanation of Sībawayhi's words:

About what he said on the pattern *tafi'ila*: *taw'ida* and *taw'id*, he meant the difference between *taw'id* and *taw'ida* as two nouns or two verbs. For when you conjugate the verb from the root *al-wa'd* on the patterns *tafi'il* and *yafi'il*, you say *ta'id* and *ya'id*, as per the cause which we have explained about the fall of this *wāw* in the verb and its being restored in this very case in its whole original form. About the fall of *wāw* in the verb *ya'id*, its original form is **yaw'id*. The *wāw* is between a *yā'* and a vowel 'i': this is heavy (*ṭaqīl*) and the verb is also heavy making the *wāw* falling. Then, the rest follows the *yā'*: *ta'idu*, *ya'idu*, and *a'idu*.

While when you form a noun, the noun is lighter (*aḥaff*) than the verb and the presence of a *wāw* in a noun between a *yā'* and a vowel 'i' is lighter than its presence between them in a verb. Their words *tawsi'a* and *tawdiya* witness the difference between the noun and the verb; if it were in a verb, you would have said *tasi'u* and *tadī*. (al-Sīrāfī, *Šarḥ*, 5:225)

¹¹ His name was Abū Sa'īd al-Ḥasan b. 'Abd Allāh b. al-Marzubān, he was born in Sīrāf and died in Baghdad in 368/979. He studied religious sciences and acted as a judge; he was also an appreciated copyist. He is especially known as a staunch supporter of the supremacy of grammar over logic, a thesis he defended in a controversy with Mattā b. Yūnus (d. 328/940), and for his commentary on Sībwayhi's *Kitāb*. See Humbert (2012).

Al-Sīrāfi's commentary on Sībawayhi's words explains why the first radical letter *w* falls in the *muḍāri'* paradigm of verbs, putting the verb conjugation into contrast with that of the nouns. The verb is *ṭaqīl* (heavy) as well as the consonant *y* and the vowel 'i' between which the *w* is found. This is why in the third-person singular the *w* falls, mutation happening for analogy in the other persons alike: **yaw'id > ya'id*, **taw'id > ta'id*, **aw'id > a'id*.¹² This is not applicable if the pattern is applied to express a noun instead of a verb, since the noun is lighter (*aḥaff*) than the verb and, even if the letter immediately after the *w* is vowelled with 'i', it does not entail the fall of the semivowel, e.g. *w s ' > tawsi'a (taf'ila)*. If we apply this reasoning to the word *tawriya*, it results that the segment /ta/ is not a substitution for a first radical *w*, contrary to what al-Ṣafadī maintains, since it is but a letter of the pattern, added to the radical letters to derive a *nomen verbi*.

At this point, how can we explain the fact that al-Ṣafadī states that *tawriya* has as pattern *taf'ila* but provides an explanation for the presence of the segment /t/ at its beginning as a substitution of the letter *w* with *t*, while Sībawayhi assigns to the most common words which experienced this *ibdāl* the pattern *faw'al* instead of *taf'il-taf'ila*? The first impression the reader has is of a misunderstanding on the part of al-Ṣafadī, but is this so? I will now try to outline an answer to this question by focusing the attention on some aspects of the substitution (*ibdāl*), of the compensation (*iwaḍ*), and the specific nature of the patterns *taf'ila* and *faw'al*.

Some hints to interpret al-Ṣafadī's statement better can be found in the words of al-Mubarrad (d. 285/898-9),¹³ who in his *Kāmil* states that the reasons for this substitution are fundamentally phonetic:

The *wāw* can be turned into *tā'* when there is no *tā'* after it, for example *turāt* from *warittu*, *tuḡāh* from *al-waḡh*, and *tukā'a*. This has been done because of the aversion towards the *wāw* vowelled with 'u'. The nearest to the *wāw* of the letters of

¹² Cf. al-Mubarrad (*Muqtaḍab*, 1:126).

¹³ Abū l-'Abbās Muḥammad b. Yazīd b. 'Abd al-Akbar al-Ṭumālī l-Azdī, commonly known by his nickname al-Mubarrad (cooled) – probably a joke made of his nickname al-Mubarrid, which Sellheim (2012) reports having the meaning of *al-muṭbit li-l-ḥaqq* (he who affirms truth) – was a leading philologist and grammarian who was born in Baṣra in 210/826 and died in Baghdad in 285/898-9. His works range from morphology and syntax to *adab*, collecting in them prose and poetry as well as linguistic issues and discussions. See Sellheim (2012) and Bernardis (1997).

augmentation and substitution (*badal*) is the *tā'*. Thus, it has been turned into it and it can be turned into it as a substitution (*badal*) also when the vowel is not 'u', for example: 'this is *atqà* than this' and 'I hit him until I made him to fall' (*atka'tu-hu*).¹⁴ When after the *wāw* there is the *tā'* of the *ifta'ala* pattern, the way is the mutation (*qalb*) to obtain the assimilation (*idgām*). (al-Mubarrad, *Kāmil*, 1:100)¹⁵

In these lines, al-Mubarrad sets two conditions for which the substitution of *w* with *t* is possible. First, a *w* can be substituted with *t* when it is not followed by another segment *t*; and, second, when the substituted *w* is vowelled with 'u', to avoid the encounter of the sounds *wu*. The choice of *t* as substitution for *w* is due to the fact that, for al-Mubarrad, this letter is among the *ḥurūf al-ziyāda*, which has the point of articulation closer to *w*. This example helps us to understand why such a substitution occurs in some words and in which cases it is considered mandatory, or just admissible and actualised only in some variants. The case of *tawriya* does not pertain to the phonetic substitution case of *wu > tu*, but, as al-Mubarrad points out, this change can occur also when the vowel of the *w* is 'a'. This seems to be the case of *tawriya* if we believe al-Ṣafadī's words. However, al-Mubarrad adds that in this case the substitution of *w* is more common with *hamza*:

If it were asked of you to build the pattern *faw'al* from the root *wa'ada*, you would say *aw'ad*, being its original form **waw'ad*, because *wāw* is its first radical letter and after it there is the *wāw* of *faw'al*, then you turn the first into *hamza*, as I have described to you. (al-Mubarrad, *Muqtaḍab*, 1:131-32)

In these two passages, we deduce that the substitution *w > t* is a general rule when the *w* is vowelled with 'u'. However, when the *w* is vowelled with 'a', the general rule suggests a substitution with *hamza*, as we have seen in the previous passage from Sibawayhi's *Kitāb*. In this case, the pattern of the word under examination plays an important role in distinguishing whether *t* is a part of the root or not. Certainly, in the word *tawriya* the augmentation letter is *t*, which is part of the pattern of the *nomen*

¹⁴ The radical letters of *atqà* are *w q y*, while those of *atka'tu* are *w k '.*

¹⁵ Cf. al-Mubarrad (*Muqtaḍab*, 1:102-103; 1:129).

verbi, while *w* is the first radical letter of the word. Why, then, does al-Şafadī claim that *t* is but a substitution for an original *w*? Does he consider it as an augmentation letter or a part of the radical? And if the pattern were not *taf'ila*?

To investigate this topic, I will turn my attention to Ibn Ğinnī (d. 392/1002),¹⁶ who provides us with an account of the difference between the letter *t* used as a radical letter and as an augmentation letter:

Another thing shows that in the word *taw'am* the augmentation is the *wāw* and not the *tā'*. This thing is that the pattern *faw'al* is more frequent in the speech than *taf'al*. Do you not see that the category *kawţar*, *ġawhar*, *qarşawa*, *hawqal*, and *kawkab* is more frequent than the category *ta'lab*? What is more frequent is considered the general rule. (Ibn Ğinnī, *Munşif*, 119)

Ibn Ğinnī then continues then with a more specific account of the use of *t* as a substitution for a first radical letter *w*:

Abū 'Uţmān¹⁷ said: "With this they substituted the *wāw* with *tā'* when after it there is no *tā'*. So, they said: *atlaġa yutliġu*, *atka'a yutki'u*, this is *atqà* than this, and *taqiyya*. Its original form is *awlaġ* and *awka'* since they are derived from *tawallaġtu* and *tawakka'tu*, *atqà* is derived from *waqaytu* as well as *taqiyya*, whose pattern is *fa'ila*, but they substituted the *wāw* with *tā'* since it was lighter to them."

Abū I-Fatḥ said: "He says, if they had substituted the *wāw* with *tā'* in these places where there is no *tā'* after the *wāw* is because it is more suitable for their sake of lightening. So that they substitute it with *tā'* in the category *ifta'altu* assimilating the substituted *tā'* with the one of the pattern *ifta'ala* and believing its change of state and accord to the preceding vowels better."

Abū 'Uţmān said: "al-Ĥalīl maintains that his speech

¹⁶ Abū I-Fatḥ 'Uţmān Ibn Ğinnī was born in Mosul in 300/913 and died in Baghdad in 392/1002. He was the son a Greek slave and the pupil of Abū 'Alī I-Fārisī (d. 377/987). He is best known for his works on etymology *iştīqāq* and for having written a commentary of al-Mutanabbī's *Diwān*. See Pedersen (2012) and Grande (2003).

¹⁷ Abū 'Uţmān Bakr b. Muḥammad al-Māzinī, whose date of death is uncertain, probably between 223-249/847-863, author of the *Kitāb al-taşrīf*, of which Ibn Ğinnī's *al-Munşif* is a commentary.

مُتَّخِذًا مِنْ عِضْوَاتٍ تَوَلَّجًا¹⁸

Gaining a hiding place among the thorny trees (?)

it is the pattern *faw'al* from the root *walaġtu* and not *taf'al*, for *taf'al* is rare while *faw'al* is frequent.

However, it is known that if there were in its original form a *wāw*, it must be turned into *hamza* lest two *wāws* meet at the beginning of the word. Therefore, *wāw* is substituted with the *tā'* for the frequency of its use instead of *wāw* in the category of *walaġa*, e.g. when they said *atlaġa*, *mutliġ*, and this is *atlaġ* than this. This use has not been gathered except from the reliable authorities.”

Abū l-Faḥ said: “He says, if they substituted the *wāw* with *tā'* in *atlaġa*, *mutliġ*, and *atlaġ*, and if they produced them, then it would not be mandatory to them the elision (*ḥadf*), nor the mutation (*qalb*). Instead, they substituted it with a letter of this category, of which the mutation is a general rule. If it was not substituted with *tā'*, its substitution with *hamza* would have been mandatory and better. It is *tawlaġ* for if it was not substituted with *tā'*, it would have been mandatory to say *awlaġ* because of the meeting of two *wāws*.” (Ibn Ğinnī, *Munṣif*, 207-208)¹⁹

In these examples, we understand that the pattern of the word with its specific vowels influences the morphological changes that happen to the radical letters when assuming a specific pattern. In particular, although the general rule sees the substitution of a first *w* vowelled with ‘a’ with a *hamza*, the linguistic evidence and different variants (*luġāt*) show a category of words in which *t* is preferred to *hamza* as a substitute for *w*. These words are built on the pattern *faw'al*, which is a pattern used for nouns and which is more common than the patterns *taf'al-taf'il*. But it is also a pattern that is at first sight not connected with the word *tawriya*. Or is it?

To my knowledge, Ibn Ğinnī is also the first author to quote a word formed from the root *w r y* as an example of substitution of the first *w* with *t*: the word *tawrāt*, and he does so when discussing its etymology, for which he proposes an Arabic origin:

¹⁸ The variant *عضوات < في ضوعات* is more convincing. The attribution of this verse is not unanimous. In some sources, such as al-Saḥāwī (*Sifr*, 333), *Lisān*, and *Tāġ al-'arūs* (s.v. *w l ġ*), it is attributed to Ğarīr as a *hiġā'* against the poet al-Ba'īṭ; others have no attribution as in al-Sīrāfī (*Šarḥ*, 5:223), Ibn al-Anbārī (*Asrār*, 23). In Ğarīr (*Dīwān*), Muḥammad b. Ḥabīb (*Šarḥ*), Abū Tammām (*Naqā'id*), and Abū 'Ubayda (*Šarḥ*) the hemistich is not found.

¹⁹ Cf. Ibn Ğinnī (*Taṣriḥ*, 34-36).

As a substitution instead of *wāw*: it is substituted with *tā'* as a proper substitution when *wāw* is the first radical letter, for example: *tuğāh* on the pattern *fu'āl* from *al-wağh*, *turāt* on the pattern *fu'āl* from *wariṭa*, and *taqiyya* on the pattern *fa'ila* from *waqaytu*. From the same root *taqwà* on the pattern *fa'là*, *tuqā* on the pattern *fu'ala*. *Tawrāt* (توراة – تورية) for us is [built] on the pattern *faw'ala* from *wariya l-zand* (the fire stick produced fire) being its original form **wawraya*. The first *wāw* has been substituted with *tā'*. This is due to the fact that, if they had not substituted it with *tā'*, it would have been mandatory to substitute it with *hamza* because of the meeting of two *wāws* at the beginning of the word. The same applies to *tawlağ*, on the pattern *faw'al* from *walağa yaliğ* – as it is the rule for these two letters – being its original form **wawlağ*.

On the other hand, for the school of Baghdad, *tawrāt* and *tawlağ* are on the pattern *taf'al*, but to refer to them as *faw'al* is better because of the frequency of *faw'al* in the speech and the scarcity of *taf'al*. The same applies to *tuğama*, whose original form is **wuğama* because it is *fu'ala* from *al-wağāma*, and *tuka'a* because it is *fu'ala* from *tawakka'tu*. Besides *tuklān* being *fu'lān* from *tawakkaltu*, *taqūr* is also *fay'ul* from *al-waqār*. (Ibn Ğinnī, *Sirr*, 1:145-46)

Ibn Ğinnī mentions *tawrāt* as an example of substitution of *w* due to the pattern *faw'ala* applied to the root *w r y*.²⁰ Some later sources do not bring new perspectives to this discussion. By way of example, I quote al-Zamaḥṣarī (d. 538/1144) *Mufaṣṣal*, who does not add any particular explanation, limiting himself to listing the same words listed in the previous sources:

The letters *wāw*, *yā'*, *sīn*, *ṣād*, and *bā'* are substituted with *tā'*. It substitutes the *wāw* when it is first radical, as in *itta'ada* and *atlağa-hu*. The Poet said:

رُبَّ رَامٍ مِنْ بَنِي نُعَلٍ * مُتَلِجٍ كَفَّيْهِ فِي قُتْرِهِ²¹

Such a marksman of the banū Tu'al introduces his hands in the lurking-places

²⁰ On the word *tawrāt*, see Jeffery (2007 [1938], 95-96), Lazarus-Yafeh (2012), and Adang (2006).

²¹ Imru' al-Qays (*Dīwān*, 123), also quoted in Åkesson (2001, 351).

and *tuğāh*, *tayqūr*, *tuklān*, *tuka'a*, *tukala*, *tuḡama*, *tuhama*, *taqiyya*, *taqwà*, *tatrà*, *tawrāt*,²² *tawlağ*, *turāt*, *tilād*. (al-Zamaḡṣarī, *Mufaṣṣal*, 175)²³

No more explanations are given in Ibn al-Ḥāğib's (d. 646/1249)²⁴ (*al-Īdāh*, 2:415), which does not take into account either the word *tawrāt*, or the word *tawriya*. This is the same as Ibn 'Uṣfūr's (d. 669/1270)²⁵ (*al-Mumti'*, 254-56; *al-Muqarrib*, 536), while al-Astarābādī (d. 686-688/1287-1289)²⁶ in *Šarḡ Šāfiyat Ibn al-Ḥāğib* stresses the fact that *w* is substituted with *t* because of their point of articulation:

Know that *tā'* is close to *wāw* on its point of articulation (*maḡrağ*), since *tā'* is an alveolar consonant (*min uṣūl al-ṭanāyā*)²⁷ and *wāw* a labial (*min al-šafatayn*) and they have the *hams*²⁸ in common. The *tā'* is a frequent substitution for *wāw*, however, it is not a general rule unless in the category *ifta'ala*.²⁹

²² In another edition of the *Mufaṣṣal* ed. Imīl Badī' Ya'qūb, Bayrūt: Dār al-kutub al-'ilmiyya, the editor reads *tawriya* instead of *tawrāt*. I believe that it could be a misinterpretation of the Koranic writing for *tawrāt*: تورية.

²³ Ibn Ya'īs' (*Šarḡ*, 2:1381) provides us with a short explanation in accordance with Ibn Ğinnī: "They called *tawrāt* one of the revealed books, the *tā'* in it is a substitution for the *wāw*, its original form is **wawrāt* [on the pattern] *faw'ala* derived from *warà l-zand*." Åkesson (2001, 351) comments on a similar passage in Ibn Mas'ūd quoting Zamaḡṣarī's and Ibn Yā'īs' commentaries without, however, listing the word *tawrāt*.

²⁴ Ğamāl al-Dīn Abū 'Amr 'Uṭmān b. 'Umar b. Abī Bakr al-Mālikī was born after 570/1174-5 in Egypt and died in Alexandria in 646/1249. He is known for having been a Mālikite scholar and judge, but especially for his works on grammar. The most important are *al-Šāfiya* and *al-Kāfiya*, the former on morphology and the latter on syntax. See Fleisch (2012).

²⁵ Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Mu'min al-Ḥaḡramī al-Iṣbīlī was an Andalusian grammarian who was born in Seville in 597/1200 and died in Tunis in 669/1270. He concentrated his efforts in the fields of syntax, morphology, and literary criticism. See Weipert (2018).

²⁶ Raḡī l-Dīn Muḡammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Astarābādī, was a grammarian whose life is unknown to us. The only works he is known for are the commentaries *Šarḡ al-Šāfiya* and *Šarḡ al-Kāfiya* on the works of Ibn al-Ḥāğib, the second of which was completed in 683/1284-5. Mango (2012) claims that he adhered to the Ši'ite creed. See Mango (2012), Weipert (2009). On his grammatical thought, see Sheyhatovitch (2018).

²⁷ Fleisch (1949-1950, 230-231) points out that al-Ḥalīl calls this consonant *niṭ'iyya*, i.e. postalveolar.

²⁸ Arab grammarians distinguish between letters *mağhūra* and *mahmūsa*, i.e. the manner of articulation. Cantineau (1946, 117-118) maintains that for Arab grammarians "la corrélation *mahmūsa-mağhūra* correspond à une corrélation de pression, les *mağhūra* étant des consonnes « pressées », à forte tension des organes au point d'articulation et non soufflées, tandis que les *mahmūsa* sont des consonnes « non pressées », à faible tension des organes et accompagnées d'un souffle." To this analysis Fleisch (1949-1950, 233-237) replies that "les dénominations *mağhūra*, *mahmūsa*, en elles-mêmes se réfèrent à la voix : « éclatantes », « étouffées » et non à une modalité du travail articulatoire." (233). See also Fleisch (1961, 219-223). It has to be noted, however, that *t* is *mahmūsa*, but *w* is *mağhūra*. See Fleisch (1949-1950, 228-229).

²⁹ To turn *wāw* into *tā'* when the pattern is *ifta'ala* is a general rule: "When they saw that their outcome is to change it (i.e. *wāw*) according to the change of the conditions of what precedes it, they

It happens [in some words], for example *turāt*, *tuğāh*, *tawlağ*, *tatrà* – from *al-muwātara* –, *tulağ*, *tuka'a*, *taqwà* – from *waqaytu* –, and *tawrāt*, which is considered by the Başran school formed on the pattern *faw'ala* derived from *warà l-zand* – like *tawlağ* – being God's book light. On the other hand, the Kūfan school considers them *taf'ala* and *taf'al*. The first of them is more appropriate, for *faw'al* is more frequent than *taf'al*. (al-Astarābādī, *Şarḥ*, 3:80-82)

How has this overview helped us better understand al-Şafadī's statement according to which the original form of *tawriya* is **wawriya* and the segment /t/ is nothing but a substitution (*ibdāl*) for the first /w/? To claim that this was only a mistake is misleading.

Starting from the fact that both *tawriya* and *tawrāt* share – at least for Arabic philologists – the same etymology, I posit that this close connection justifies al-Şafadī's view. First, al-Şafadī continues trying to demonstrate in the same chapter that the original radical letters of *tawriya* are in fact two: *w* and *r*. Combining them with *alif* (and not *y*), he claims to prove that the six possible letter combinations convey a similar meaning (al-Şafadī, *Faḍḍ*, 63-66; Bonebakker 1966, 74-75). In particular, when discussing the combination *w r ā*, he reports the word *tawrāt*, providing the same etymological explanation we have already seen in Ibn Ğinnī, Ibn Ya'īš, and al-Astarābādī. Second, if we look at the Koranic commentaries, we find that the word *tawrāt* seems to have experienced a change, which modified its original form. In Koranic commentaries, the question of its etymology remains open and is located between of the acceptance of its foreign origin and the will to make it be derived from an Arabic root. An enlightening example of this attitude is found in Abū Ḥayyān al-Ġarnāṭī (d. 745/1344),³⁰ who provides all the hypotheses about the etymology of *tawrāt*:

turned it into *tā'* because it is a strong letter, which does not change with the change of the conditions of what precedes it. Moreover, it is near to the point of articulation of *wāw* and in it there is a *hams* compatible with the being *līn* of *wāw* (i.e. soft letter, *w* and *y*) to harmonise its pronunciation with the pronunciation after it. Therefore, it is assimilated and pronounced all at once" (Ibn Ya'īš, *Şarḥ*, 2:1380-81). See also Åkesson (2001, 229).

³⁰ Abū Ḥayyān al-Ġarnāṭī and his *tafsīr* are the subjects of a wider investigation in sections 3.3 and 3.3.2.

Tawrāt is a Hebraic noun, on which the grammarians forced its etymology and pattern. This has been done after the grammarians established that the etymology does not apply to foreign nouns, neither the pattern is applied, forcing an Arabic etymology.

About the etymology of *tawrāt* there are two theories. The first [sees it derived] from *warà l-zand* (the fire stick produced fire) when it has been struck and the fire appeared from it. Likewise, the *tawrāt* is a light against the error. This etymology is the saying of the majority. Abū Fīd Mu'arriġ al-Sadūsī (d. 195/810) was of the opinion that it is derived from *warrà*, as it has been transmitted that [the Prophet] “When he wanted to go on a journey, he concealed it with something else”³¹ because the greater part of the *tawrāt* is an allusion.

About its pattern, al-Ḥalīl, Sībawayhi, and the other grammarians of the Baṣran school were of the opinion that its pattern is *faw'ala*, in which *tā'* is a substitution for *wāw*, as it has been substituted in *tawlaġ* whose original form is on the pattern **wawlaġ*, for they are derived from *warà* and *walaġa*, like *ḥawqala*. On the other hand, al-Farrā' (d. 207/822) was of the opinion that its pattern is *taf'ila* like *tawṣiya*, then the vowel 'i' of the 'ayn has been substituted with 'a' and the letter *yā'* with *alif*, as they said: *nāṣiya* and *ġāriya* becoming *nāṣā* and *ġārā*. Likewise, *tawṣiya* > *tawṣā* is permitted but not attested, said al-Zaġġāġī (d. 337/948 or 339-40/949-50). Some of the Kūfan grammarians were of the opinion that its pattern is *taf'ala*, the 'ayn vowelled with 'a', derived from I kindled (*waraytu*) for you my fire sticks. [...]

Al-Zamaḥṣarī said³² that *tawrāt* and *inġīl* are two foreign nouns, whose etymology has been forced [to derive from] *al-warī* and *al-naġl*, while their patterns are *تفعلة* and *if'īl*. This is true only after considering them Arabic. What he said is true, except that a correction should be made in his speech about *تفعلة*. He did not mention that for the Baṣran school its pattern is *faw'ala* and did not indicate whether the 'ayn was vowelled with 'a' or 'i'.³³ (Abū Ḥayyān, *Tafsīr*, 2:386-87)

Given these sources, al-Ṣafadī's statement about the etymology and morphological mutation of the word *tawriya* is less unclear. To explain it, I propose the following

³¹ For the sources of similar *ḥadīṭ*, see section 2.3, and Zaġlūl (1996, 6:31).

³² See al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Kaššāf*, 1:526).

³³ Cf. al-Ṭūṣī (*Tibyān*, 2:390-91), Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (*Tafsīr*, 7:171-72), al-Bayḍāwī (*Tafsīr*, 1:243), al-Qūnawī (*Ḥāšiya*, 6:7-8).

hypothesis: convinced of the connection between the two words *tawriya* and *tawrāt* and starting from that connection, al-Şafadī gives a similar morphological derivation. Talking about *tawrāt*, he posits that it has a foreign origin (al-Şafadī, *Faḍḍ*, 64), as we have seen in Abū Ḥayyān’s commentary. However, he considers the Arabic derivation as well, embracing the Başran view for which *tawrāt* experienced a letter substitution, which transformed the original form **wawriya* – on the pattern *faw’ala* – into *tawrāt*. This point has to be stressed because al-Şafadī does not affirm that the original form is **wawrāt*. Instead, he says **wawriya* (*Faḍḍ*, 63, 64). This, in my opinion, is a connection with the tradition of Koranic commentaries, which report not only the Başran view, but also the Kūfan view represented by al-Farrā’, according to whom *tawrāt* has as pattern *taf’ila* and experienced a mutation of the vowel ‘i’ of the second radical letter in ‘a’ entailing a mutation of the letter *y* in *ā*: **tawriyat* > **tawrayat* > *tawrāt*. This is all the more plausible if we look at the examples that al-Şafadī gives. He quotes the word *tawşiya* (*Faḍḍ*, 63), saying that its original form is **wawşiya*, which is the same word used in Abū Ḥayyān’s commentary in describing al-Farrā’’s opinion: **wawşiya* > *tawşiya* > *tawşā*. It seems plausible that al-Şafadī mixed these two etymological views, since on the one hand he maintains that the original form of *tawriya* is **wawriya*, as it could be justified if we adopt the Başran position, which explains the change as a letter substitution (*ibdāl al-ḥurūf*). On the other, he states that *tawriya*’s pattern is *taf’ila*, like the words *tabşira*, etc., adopting the Kūfan position, which entails the change ‘i’ > ‘a’ therefore *y* > *ā*. It is but a short step to claim that **wawriya* > **tawriya* > *tawrāt*.

The hypothesis for which al-Şafadī mixed the two theories – Başran and Kūfan – is in my opinion justified if we look at the explanations that the Arab philologists gave about the pattern of the verbal noun of the augmented verb *fa’ala*, to which *tawriya* belongs: *warrà* > *tawriya*. First, the morphological mutation is not a letter substitution (*ibdāl*), but a compensation (*iwaḍ*). Following Ibn Ya’īš

The commentator said: “The substitution is that you place a segment instead of another. It can be necessary or discretionary and approvable. Often, they distinguished between the substitution (*ibdāl*) and the compensation (*iwaḍ*). They said: what substitutes is more suitable than what has been substituted and what

compensates [is more suitable] than what has been compensated. This is why it stands in its place, for example the *tā'* in *tuḥama* and *tuka'a*, or the *hā'* in *haraqtu*. This and the like are what is called substitution and not compensation, for the compensation is that you place a segment instead of another, but in a different position, such as the *tā'* (ة) in *'ida* (عدة) and *zina* (زينة), and the *hamza* in *ibn* (ابن) and *ism* (اسم)."³⁴ (Ibn Yaʿīš, *Šarḥ*, 2:1356)

Second, the pattern *tafʿīl* is not an original form of the verbal noun, for it is *fiʿāl*. An example can be found in Ibn Ǧinnī's words:

Among them, the *tā'* in *tafʿīl* is a compensation for the first *'ayn* in *fiʿāl* and it is additional. It is suitable that the compensation is an additional [letter] too, because [to change] an additional letter with another additional letter is more similar to the original, therefore the first *'ayn* in *qiṭṭā'* is the additional, for *tā'* in *taqṭī'* is the compensation thereof. Likewise, the *hā'* (ه) of the verbal noun *tafʿīla* is a compensation for the *yā'* in *tafʿīl*. The two of them are additional. (Ibn Ǧinnī, *Ḥaṣā'is*, 3:69)

In his words, Ibn Ǧinnī posits that the phoneme *t* in the pattern *tafʿīl* is a compensation for the first *'ayn* of the original form *fiʿāl*,³⁵ which is an additional letter to the primary root *fʿl*. The same reasoning applies to the final segment *h* (ه), which is a compensation for the long vowel *'ī*, especially in the verbal nouns derived from verbs with a weak third consonant.³⁶

It is clear that, in the view of Arab philologists, the word *tawriya* neither represents a case of *ibdāl al-ḥurūf*, and nor has to do with the (forced) Arabic etymology of the word *tawrāt*, for its original form cannot be **wawriya*. Instead, we face a common case of double compensation, which affects the verbal nouns issued from a weak-third-rooted verb. This is to say that in the word *tawriya* the first radical letter *w* has

³⁴ See also Bohas' translation (1984, 223-24). Cf. Ibn Ǧinnī (*Ḥaṣā'is*, 1:265-6).

³⁵ "Moreover, you made the *tā'* of *tafʿīl* being a compensation for the *'ayn* of *fiʿāl*. This is their speech: *qaṭṭa'tu – taqṭī'*, *kassartu – taksīr*. Do not you see that the original form is *qiṭṭā'* and *kissār*?" (Ibn Ǧinnī, *Ḥaṣā'is*, 3:290).

³⁶ "Likewise, *hā'* in the verbal nouns *tafʿīla* is a compensation for the *yā'* of *tafʿīl* or the *alif* of *fiʿāl*. For example: *šallaytu – tašliya* and *rabbaytu – tarbiya*." (Ibn Ǧinnī, *Ḥaṣā'is*, 3:302).

not been substituted, and nor is the *w* and augmentation letter due to the pattern of the word. Thus, there is no case of *ibdāl al-ḥurūf*.³⁷

This overview is certainly not intended to nitpick with regard to al-Ṣafadī's work. The aim is rather to underline how a few pages contain deep philological knowledge, intertwined with different disciplines. This treatise is not a mere collection of poetic examples divided into categories, but represents a broader project. This project represents very well the spirit of the time – that is, the encyclopaedia prototype devoted to a single theme that brings together the best inside of what is offered in the 'humanities', aiming at exhaustiveness on a specific topic.

1.1.2.2 The classification of *tawriya*

In the third part of the first *muqaddima*, al-Ṣafadī deals with what is the main topic of the entire treatise: namely, the definition of *tawriya* and its typological subdivision. In this case, too, Bonebakker's analysis (1966, 9-18; 80-84) is exhaustive and nothing can be added which has not already been mentioned, translated, explained, and commented.

To summarise al-Ṣafadī's classification, we can point out that the essential element for a *tawriya* is a word or a phrase which has at least two distinct meanings, one of which the reader perceives instantly, and the second, subsequently. The first meaning takes the name of *ma'nà qarīb* (near meaning) and it is that which hides (*muwarrà bi-hi*) the second meaning, the *ma'nà ba'īd* (distant meaning) or hidden meaning (*muwarra 'an-hu*). Of these two meanings, only one is what the author of the text really intends. However, and it is fundamental to underline it, although it is only one of the two meanings to be defined as the intended meaning (*al-ma'nà l-murād*), both meanings expressed by the *tawriya* contribute to the success of the figure. This means that, even if one of the two possible readings results in a misleading interpretation, they both equally contribute to the reader's decoding of

³⁷ The only substitution (*ibdāl*) concerns the phonemes *y* and *ā*: "It follows that *yā'* of *tafīl* is a substitution for the *alif* of *fi'āl*, like *tā'* at its beginning is a compensation for one of its *'ayn*." (Ibn Ğinnī, *Ḥaṣā'is*, 3:305).

the text. In this way, the one becomes functional of the other, and the concept of an ‘intended meaning’ is nothing more than a preferential reading of the two possible. This is the less complex version of *tawriya*, i.e. a *tawriya muğarrada* (bare *tawriya*). A second element of *tawriya*, one that is constitutive but not essential for its existence, is a *lāzim* (correlative), i.e. a word or a phrase different from *tawriya* that refers to one of the two meanings of it, corroborating and directing the reader’s interpretation towards one of the two meanings. We can therefore have a text with a *lāzim* referring to the *ma’na qarīb* or a text with a *lāzim* referring to the *ma’na ba’id*. In the first case, *tawriya* is called *muraššaḥa* (prepared *tawriya*); in the second case, it is called *tawriya mubayyana* (explained *tawriya*). The presence or absence of a *lāzim* does not involve the existence of the *tawriya* itself, as it is not the presence of a *lāzim* that necessarily induces the reader to understand the two meanings of the *tawriya*; rather, it helps the reader by suggesting an interpretation.

The last type of *tawriya* described by al-Şafadī is the *tawriya muhayya’a* (supported *tawriya*), i.e. a *tawriya* that necessarily needs a second element in order to be defined and understood as *tawriya*. Unlike the previous case in which the *lāzim* did not affect the existence of the *tawriya*, the *tawriya* in this case relies on another segment of text to realise the potential of its two-fold meaning.

In general, the *loci* presented in support of this classification have survived historical periods practically unscathed and appear in the works of most authors in a sort of pre-established scheme, without significant change over the years, up to the publications of contemporary scholars. That is why, instead of repeating in this section verses already widely analysed in Bonebakker (1966), I will make a detour and consider the work of two scholars coeval to al-Şafadī, who had the opportunity to meet him. I am referring here to Ibn Ğābir al-Andalusī (d. 780/1378), author of the *badī’iyya*³⁸ called *al-Ḥulla l-siyarā* (i.e. *siyarā*) *fī madḥ ḥayr al-warā*, and his colleague

³⁸ “A *badī’iyya* is a poem illustrating the various figures of speech and stylistic embellishments collectively known as *badī’* and usually takes the form of an ode on the prophet Muḥammad. Many of these poems were composed in specific emulation of the *badī’iyya* by the Iraqi poet Şafī al-Dīn al-Ḥillī, who also set the trend of providing a commentary for the poem. The genre flourished in Arabic until the late-nineteenth century.” van Gelder (2009). Generally, a *badī’iyya* was composed as an ‘imitation’ of al-Busīrī’s (d. 694-6/1294-7) *Burda*, thus using thus the same metre, i.e. *basīt*, and the same rhyme, i.e. *-mī*. See also Bauer (2006a) and van Gelder (2007). Pinckney Stetkevych (2010, 219-227) posits that *badī’iyya* has as its peculiarity the attribution of the role of *mamdūḥ* to the prophet and is therefore is configured as a real “contractual obligation” between poet and prophet as if the praised

and friend al-Ru'aynī I-Ġarnāṭī (d. 779/1377),³⁹ who wrote a commentary on this called *Ṭirāz al-ḥulla wa-šifā' al-ḡulla*. In doing so, I hope to contribute with an initial investigation of a work that has not yet received due attention from scholars. Furthermore, it represents a literary genre which sees its birth in this period and will develop later, becoming an archetype for wider works, such as the encyclopaedic work *Ḥizānat al-adab* by Ibn Ḥiġġa I-Ḥamawī (d. 837/1434),⁴⁰ which has as its starting-point the commentary on his own *Badī'iyya* composed to compete against those of Ṣafī I-Dīn al-Ḥillī (d. 749/1348)⁴¹ and 'Izz al-Dīn al-Mawṣilī (d. 789/1387).⁴²

person were the local lord from whom the poet asks for protection. In this case, obviously, the plea to the prophet aims at his intercession on the day of judgment: not a pecuniary benefit, but a spiritual one. On the other hand, *badī'iyya* also fulfils a more practical purpose. According to Pinckney Stetkevych, being a poem in praise of the prophet, it carries and conveys strong emotions and passions and, through the mnemonic form of poetry, facilitates the memorisation of concepts and definitions of the *'ilm al-badī'*.

³⁹ The full name of Ibn Ġābir was Abū 'Abd Allāh Šams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. 'Alī b. Ġābir al-Andalusī I-Hawwārī I-Marī and he spent his life closely connected to his dear friend and colleague al-Ru'aynī, whose name was Abū Ġa'far Šihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Yūsuf b. Mālik b. Ismā'īl b. Aḥmad al-Ru'aynī I-Ġarnāṭī I-Uryūlī I-Ilbīrī. They lived their lives extremely connected to each other and were known as the blind (Ibn Ġābir) and the seeing (al-Ru'aynī). Originally from Muslim Spain, their dates of birth are unknown, but both had the same education, attending the lessons of al-Qiġāṭī (d. 730/1329). They decided to leave Spain together in the year 738/1337-8 to perform the pilgrimage travelling through Egypt and Syria, where they had the opportunity to meet important scholars such as Abū Ḥayyān al-Ġarnāṭī and al-Šafadī. To the latter, Ibn Ġābir asked an *iġāza* for the *Faḍḍ al-ḥitām* (Bonebakker, 1984, 80 n. 31). Their friendship lasted until Ibn Ġābir married, but the latter nevertheless composed an elegy for the death of al-Ru'aynī. Al-Ru'aynī died in 779/1377, and Ibn Ġābir in 780 / 1378-9. On their lives and al-Ru'aynī's commentary, see Bonebakker (1984, 2012c). On al-Ru'aynī's poetry with specific reference to his descriptive and *tawriya* poems, see Del Moral (1985-1986; 1987). Ibn Ġābir's poems have been edited in (*Dīwān; Šī'r*).

⁴⁰ His full name was Abū Bakr Taqī I-Dīn b. 'Alī b. 'Abd Allāh al-Ḥamawī I-Qādirī I-Ḥanafī I-Azrārī. He was born in Ḥamā in 767/1366 where he also died in 837/1434. Having studied in Damascus, Mosul, and Cairo, he moved to Damascus and was in the city during the siege of Barqūq (d. 801/1399) in 791/1389. He was appointed *munšī* in the *dīwān* after the interest of the sultan al-Mu'ayyad's (d. 824/1421) personal secretary al-Bārīzī (d. 830/1427). His works include the *badī'iyya*, which is an ode in praise to the Prophet composed to rival and overcome the *badī'iyya* of 'Izz al-Dīn al-Mawṣilī and Ṣafī I-Dīn al-Ḥillī, and for which he composed a commentary entitled *Ḥizānat al-adab* also known as *Taqdīm Abī Bakr; Qahwat al-inšā'*, a collection of official and private correspondence; the poetic anthologies *Tamarāt al-awrāq* and *Maġrā l-sawābiq*. See Brockelmann (2012), and Stewart (2009a).

⁴¹ His full name was Ṣafī I-Dīn 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Sarāyā Abū I-Maḥāsin al-Tā'ī I-Sinbisī I-Ḥillī, although he was the best-known poet of the eighth century, the date of his birth and death are unclear. He is said to have been born in al-Ḥilla in the 678/1279 or one year before, and he died in ca. 749/1348. During his life, he received declarations of esteem from other great literati such as al-Šafadī and Ibn Nubāta; he enjoyed a respectful rivalry with the latter. In this context, it is essential to underline how al-Ḥillī is considered the first poet to compose a *badī'iyya* in praise of the prophet, structuring it as a *mu'araḍa* of al-Busīrī's *Burda*, using the same metre and rhyme. His diwan has been preserved and has been reprinted several times, even if a critical edition is still a *desideratum*. For more details, see DeYoung (2011a) and Heinrichs (2012e). For his *badī'iyya*, see in particular Pinckney Stetkevych (2018).

⁴² 'Alī b. al-Ḥusayn b. 'Alī b. Abī Bakr al-Dimašqī I-Ḥanbalī, known as 'Izz al-Dīn al-Mawṣilī, was born in Mosul, from where he travelled first to Aleppo and then to Damascus, where he died in 789/1387. His most important work is the *badī'iyya* in the praise of the prophet. The distinctive trait of his poem is

1.1.2.2.1 al-Ru'aynī's commentary on Ibn Ġābir's *badī'iyya*

Al-Ru'aynī's commentary is more detailed than the other typical *badī'iyya* commentaries, excluding Ibn Ḥiġġa's *Ḥizāna*. This is evident if we compare his work with another very well-known commentary by a coeval author: Ṣafī l-Dīn al-Ḥillī's *Šarḥ al-kāfiya al-badī'iyya*, a commentary on his own *badī'iyya*, which is considered the archetype of the genre.⁴³

As Bonebakker (1984) points out, although al-Ru'aynī states in the introduction (*Tirāz*, 94) that Ibn Ġābir followed the structure of the '*ilm al-badī'* proposed in al-Qazwīnī's (d. 739/1338)⁴⁴ *Talḥiṣ al-miftāḥ*, in reality the order of the figures presents first the figures of expression (*lafziyya*) followed by the figures of meaning (*ma'nawīyya*), as in the work of Badr al-Dīn Ibn Mālik (d. 686/1287)⁴⁵ *al-Miṣbāḥ*. The reason why Ibn Ġābir adopted this arrangement is explained by al-Ru'aynī, who stated that, since the vehicle for the meaning (*ma'nà*) is the expression (*lafz*), it had

that he mentions in each line the name of the figure of speech depicted in the line, by way of *tawriya/tawǧīh*, i.e. playing with the proper meaning and the technical sense. See Bauer (2018).

⁴³ Also known as *al-Natā'iġ al-ilāhiyya fī šarḥ al-kāfiya al-badī'iyya*; see Heinrichs (2012e). For Bonebakker (1984), the question of whether Ibn Ġābir was inspired by al-Ḥillī's *badī'iyya* or the other way around is still open.

⁴⁴ Known as Ḥaṭīb Dimašq, his name was Ġalāl al-Dīn Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Umar al-Qazwīnī; he was most probably born in Mosul in 666/1268. He moved with his brother to Damascus in ca. 689/1290, where he served as *qāḍī* and teacher, until he became chief *qāḍī* of the army of Syria in 724/1324. He was also appointed *ḥaṭīb* and *imām* at the Umayyad Mosque in 706/1307. During those years, he had contacts with intellectuals and literati of the epoch such as Ibn Nubāta l-Miṣrī. Only two of his works have survived: the *Talḥiṣ al-miftāḥ*, which is an abridgement of the third part of al-Sakkākī's *Miftāḥ al-'ulūm*, and *al-Ṭdāḥ fī 'ulūm al-balāġa*, which is an explanation of his previous work, enlarged and richer in *loci*. The importance of these two treaties in the history of Arabic rhetoric is shown by their widespread diffusion they had in every country of the Arab-Islamic world. The systematisation made by al-Qazwīnī of the previous rhetoric material became the canonical formulation of '*ilm al-balāġa* which endures to the present day and is reported in contemporary manuals on rhetoric – e.g. al-Ġārim and Amīn (1999). He died in Damascus on 15 Ġumādā 739/30 November 1338. On al-Qazwīnī and his work, see among others Maṭlūb (1967), Jenssen (1998), Bonebakker (2012).

⁴⁵ Badr al-Milla wa-l-Dīn Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. Ġamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh b. Mālik, was the son of the famous author of the *Alfiyya*, Ibn Mālik (d. 672/1274), who was his first teacher. He lived first in Damascus, then in Ba'labak, and returned finally to Damascus to succeed to his late father at the *madrasa* 'Ādiliyya. He died in Damascus in 686/1287. What is of most interest among his works is the *Kitāb al-miṣbāḥ*, which is a shortened version of the third part of al-Sakkākī's (d. 626/1229) *Miftāḥ al-'ulūm*. Although preceding al-Qazwīnī's abridgement, it was not as successful. Nonetheless, *al-Miṣbāḥ* was disseminated widely and was known by the literati; it was also widely quoted in later sources, such as in Ibn Ḥiġġa (*Kašf*, *Ḥizāna*). Indeed, he was the first to settle the tripartite division of the *balāġa* into three distinct '*ilm*: *al-ma'ānī*, *al-bayān*, and *al-badī'*. For reference, see Maṭlūb (1964, 1967) and Simon (2009).

to be investigated first. While adopting al-Qazwīnī's classification but in the order laid down by Badr al-Dīn Ibn Mālik, al-Ru'aynī (*Ṭirāz*, 91-92) also points out that the division in *lafziyya* and *ma'nawiyya* is not fully satisfactory. Given that some figures only play at the level of expression, and others play at the level of meaning, such as *tawriya*, there are still figures which play at both levels, such as the *muṭābaqa* (antithesis). Nonetheless, al-Ru'aynī does not adopt this tripartite division, but complies with the dual scheme passed down by his predecessors. Being based on the section of *'ilm al-badī'*, several tropes are omitted from both in the *badī'iyya* and the commentary, i.e. those classified within the *'ilm al-bayān: isti'āra* (metaphor), *tašbīh* (simile), and *kināya* (metonymy).

Al-Ru'aynī's system of analysis is very similar to that of al-Ṣafadī in his commentary on the *Lāmiyyat al-'aḡam* entitled *al-Ġayt al-musaḡḡam fī šarḥ lāmiyyat al-'aḡam*.⁴⁶ Taking Ibn Ġābir's *badī'iyya* as a path to follow, al-Ru'aynī starts each chapter with the name, definition, categorisation, and subdivisions of the figure of speech at play in the line or lines that Ibn Ġābir composed on the figure. He adds, then, other *loci* mainly issued from poetry and the Koran, but sometimes also from prose pieces. The distinctive feature of al-Ru'aynī's commentary is that, for each quoted verse of Ibn Ġābir's *badī'iyya*, he proceeds through a five-points analysis. Given the single line, he begins with (1) *al-luḡa*, where he explains the lexical difficulties which the reader encounters, elucidating the keywords to understand the figure of speech at play and possible unusual terms. After that, (2) he clarifies the syntax (*al-i'rāb*) of the line, and then (3) addresses the *istišhād* by carefully explaining what the figure consists of and how it is presented within the line. In this section, al-Ru'aynī usually inserts other examples, be they poetry or prose, in which one can find the use of the same figure and, in the case of particular subdivisions, the use of that specific type or subdivision. He closes (4) the investigation of the verse with any addition (*al-ziyāda*), in which he lists other figures possibly used in the same line, and finally (5) *al-ma'nā*, where he paraphrases the verse elucidating its meaning also in relation to the other verses composing the whole *badī'iyya*.

⁴⁶ Compare Ṣafī I-Dīn al-Ḥillī (*Šarḥ*), al-Ru'aynī (*Ṭirāz*), and al-Ṣafadī (*Ġayt*).
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1.1.2.2.2 The *tawriya* section

Al-Şafadī organised his system into four *aqsām* (types): 1. *Tawriya muğarrada* (bare *tawriya*), 2. *Tawriya muraššaḥa* (prepared *tawriya*), 3. *Tawriya mubayyana* (explained *tawriya*), and 4. *Tawriya muhayya'a* (supported *tawriya*). He then divided these four types into seven subdivisions (*aḍrāb*):

It has been settled by what I have said before that the *tawriya* is divided into four types (*aqsām*), which are subdivided into seven subdivisions (*aḍrāb*). The *muğarrada* has a unique subdivision. The *mubayyana* has two subdivisions: a first in which the *lāzim* (correlative) of the *muwarrà 'an-hu* (hidden meaning) precedes [the *tawriya*-word], and a second in which it follows it. The *muraššaḥa* has two subdivisions: a first in which the *lāzim* of the *muwarrà bi-hi* (hiding meaning) precedes [the *tawriya*-word], and a second in which it follows it. The *muhayya'a* has two subdivisions: a first in which the supporting element (*tahayyu'*) is realised in one part, and a second in which it is realised in both parts. (al-Şafadī, *Faḍḍ*, 83)

On the other hand, al-Ru'aynī borrowed al-Şafadī's scheme and developed it in detail, adding two more subdivisions not mentioned by al-Şafadī: "Know that the poet (i.e. Ibn Ğābir) established that the *tawriya* is of four types (*anwā'*) comprising nine subdivisions (*aqsām*)" (*Ṭirāz*, 450). His analysis goes as follows:

1. *Tawriya muğarrada* (bare *tawriya*) (al-Şafadī, *Faḍḍ*, 76-77), (al-Ru'aynī, *Ṭirāz*, 450): it is a *tawriya* which has no *lāzim* (correlative), nor referring to the *ma'nà qarīb* (near meaning), or to the *ma'nà ba'īd* (distant meaning). On this point, al-Şafadī and al-Ru'aynī do not differ. However, the latter adds that, in order to classify this *tawriya* as *muğarrada*, there can also be two *lawāzim* each referring to one of the two meanings of the *tawriya*-word. If this happens, there is a balance in the utterance for which neither of the two meanings prevails over the other. Therefore, the reader is not led to one of the two possibilities, since he/she is actually led to both, which cancel each other out.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ "Or a correlative is mentioned for each of them (i.e. the *ma'nà qarīb* and the *ma'nà ba'īd*), thus they are equal to each other and neither of them outweighed the other, as if no correlative has been uttered at all. Thus, it is *muğarrada* too" Al-Ru'aynī (*Ṭirāz*, 450).

2. *Tawriya muraššaḥa* (prepared *tawriya*) (al-Şafadī, *Faḍḍ*, 78-80), (al-Ru‘aynī, *Ṭirāz*, 450): it is a *tawriya* which has a *lāzim* referring to the *ma‘nà qarīb*, which can precede or follow the *tawriya*-word. Both authors share this definition, but al-Ru‘aynī also underlines that the name *muraššaḥa* points to the fact that this type of *tawriya* has been ‘prepared’ so to say – namely, it has been reinforced since the near meaning needs to be intensified, for it is considered ‘weak’, and uttering a *lāzim* referring to it gives it strength. Since the near meaning is not the intended meaning of the *tawriya*-word, we can identify in the attitude of inserting a *lāzim* referring to the *qarīb* the will of reinforcing the perception in the reader of the not intended meaning, so that a decoding of the poetic message becomes more difficult and consequently the aesthetic effect is greater.
3. *Tawriya mubayyana* (explained *tawriya*) (al-Şafadī, *Faḍḍ*, 78), (al-Ru‘aynī, *Ṭirāz*, 450-451): it is a *tawriya* which has a *lāzim* referring to the *ma‘nà ba‘īd*, which can precede or follow the *tawriya*-word. Both authors share this definition and al-Ru‘aynī only adds that its name is due to the effect of the *lāzim* referring to the intended meaning, i.e. it makes the *tawriya*-word clear and manifest.
4. *Tawriya muhayya‘a* (supported *tawriya*) (al-Şafadī, *Faḍḍ*, 80-81), (al-Ru‘aynī, *Ṭirāz*, 451): it is a *tawriya* whose *tawriya*-word needs another expression (*lafẓ*) to be an effective *tawriya* and without which the *tawriya*-word would not be a *tawriya* at all. On this point, al-Şafadī and al-Ru‘aynī agree. The particularity of this type of *tawriya* is that the disclosing expression can refer to one of the two meanings of the *tawriya*-word – thus having a *tawriya* supported by another *lafẓ* referring either to the *ma‘nà qarīb* or to the *ma‘nà ba‘īd* – or to both of them, giving rise to a perfect balance.

This is the categorisation that Ibn Ğābir followed in writing his *badī‘iyya*, where he provided for each type and each subdivision of *tawriya* a poetic line as an example, which I will quote (numbers refer to the lines in Ibn Ğābir’s *badī‘iyya*).

مَنْ الْعَزَالَةُ قَدْ رَدَّتْ لِطَاعَتِهِ * لُوْرَامِ أَنْ لَا تَزُوْرَ الْجَدِيَّ لَمْ تَرِيْمِ ١٠١
 دَانِي الْفُطُوْفِ جَمِيْلُ الْعَفُوِّ مُقْتَدِرٌ * مَا ضَاقَ مِنْهُ لِجَانٍ وَاسِعِ الْكَرِيْمِ ١٠٢

- ١٠٣ لا يَرْفَعُ الْعَيْنَ لِلرَّاجِينَ يَمْنَحُهُمْ * بل يَخْفِضُ الرَّأْسَ قَوْلًا هَاكَ فَاخْتَكِمِ
- ١٠٤ يا قاطِعَ البِيدِ يُسْرِيهَا عَلَى قَدَمٍ * شَوْقًا إِلَيْهِ لَقَدْ أَصْبَحَتْ ذَا قَدَمٍ
- ١٠٥ لَقَدْ اِعْتَصَمْتَ بِأَقْوَامٍ جُفُونَهُمْ * لا تَعْرِفُ السِّيفَ خُلُوعًا مِنْ خِضَابِ دَمٍ
- ١٠٦ جَوَازِمُ الصَّبْرِ عَنِ فِعْلِ الْجَوَى مُنِعَتْ * وَرَفَعَهُ حَالٌ إِلَّا حَالُ قُرْبِهِمْ
- ١٠٧ فِي الْقَلْبِ وَالظَّرْفِ مِنْ أَهْلِ الْحِمَى قَمَرٌ * مَنْ يَعْتَصِمُ بِحِمَاهُ الرَّحْبِ يُحْتَرَمُ
- ١٠٨ يَا مُتَهَمِينَ عَسَى أَنْ تُنَجِدُوا رَجُلًا * لَمْ يَسْلُ عَنْكُمْ وَلَمْ يُصْبِحْ بِمَتَّهِمْ
- ١٠٩ أَغَارَ دَهْرٌ رَمَى بِالْبُعْدِ نَارِحَنَا * فَأَنْجِدُوا يَا كِرَامَ الذَّاتِ وَالشِّيمِ⁴⁸

- 101 He is the one whose obedience the *she-gazelle/sun* has been brought back to. If he desired that she does not visit the *kid/the Capricorn*, she would not have departed.
- 102 He is the one approaching the grape bunches, good in forgiveness, the powerful. For his part, the wide magnanimity did not narrow for a *gatherer/criminal*.
- 103 He does not raise the *eye/gold* for those pleading bestowing on them, rather he lowers the head saying: 'Here you are, act freely!'
- 104 O crosser of the deserts, you travel through them on foot yearning for him (i.e. Muḥammad). [By God,] you do have a *foot/predecessor*.
- 105 You sought refuge in people whose *eyelids/scabbards* do not know the sword free from the dye of blood.
- 106 The *apococate governors/breakers* of endurance were prevented from the *verb/action* of the ardent passion, *its nominative/its removing* transmuted [in every condition] except in the condition of their proximity.
- 107 There is a moon in (between) *Antares/the heart* and *Alterf/the eye* of the *ahl al-ḥimà*; whoever seeks refuge in his unconfined protection, he will be held in reverence.
- 108 O people going to Tihāma, perhaps you *go to Nağd/help* a man who did not forget you and has not been suspected [ever].

⁴⁸ The whole *badī'iyya* is published in Ibn Ḡābir (*Dīwān*, 510-519; *Šī'r*, 134-146) and amounts to 177 lines.

109 The time *entered al-Ġawr/plundered* and afflicted who is far away with distance; then *go to Naġd/help*, o people, noble of an innate disposition.

101. In this verse, Ibn Ġābir presents the first subdivision of the *tawriya muġarrada*, namely a verse whose *tawriya* has no *lāzim*. In this line, the wordplay concerns two words which are not new to this kind of wordplay: the words *al-ġazāla* and *al-ġady*. The word *al-ġazāla* refers to the female gazelle and this first reference is considered its *ma'nà qarīb*, while the *ma'nà ba'īd* is the sun. The second *tawriya*-word, in turn, means 'the kid' and it is immediately perceived as *ma'nà qarīb*, but it also denotes 'the sign of Capricorn' (Kunitzsch, 1959, 112-113; 1961, 22),⁴⁹ which is the *ma'nà ba'īd*. This line is considered a *tawriya muġarrada* because a *lāzim* is uttered for none of the *tawriya*-words. In his analysis, al-Ru'aynī objects to this interpretation, arguing that there are actually two *lawāzim* for both words – or, better, each word is a *lāzim* for the other. This could be considered correct if we acknowledge that the immediately perceived meaning of *ġazāla* is connected with the first meaning perceived in *ġady*, thus enclosing the sense of the poetry in the semantic field of animal life. If it were true, this line would have been classified as a *tawriya muraššaḥā* for the presence of two *lawāzim* referring to the *ma'anà qarīb*. However, al-Ru'aynī, like al-Šafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 76) before him, rejects this opinion, stating that the essential condition for being a *lāzim* is that the word actualising it must not be a *muštarak* (homonymous) word.⁵⁰ This is what prevents these two words from being *lāzim* for each other.

It should to be noted that, in choosing these two words for his verse, Ibn Ġābir lacks originality, since the same wordplay is found in the often-quoted two-line poem by al-Qādī 'Iyāḍ (d. 544/1149), which is given as example of the *tawriya muġarrada*:⁵¹

كأن نيسان أهدى من ملبسه * لشهر كانون أنواعا من الحلل

⁴⁹ It also indicates the polar star: "*al-ġudayy*, das Böckchen'. Der Polarsterne, α Ursae Minoris, hieß bei den Arabern seit alters *al-ġdy* [...] was einfach *al-ġady*, der Bock' zu lesen wäre, gleichlautend mit den Namen des Tierkreisbildes 'Steinbock', *al-ġady*." Kunitzsch (1961, 62).

⁵⁰ See also Ibn Hiġġa (*Kašf*, 269; *Hižāna*, 3:535).

⁵¹ Many are the examples of the word *ġazāla* used as a *tawriya*-word, which are impossible to list.

أو الغزالة من طول المَدَى حَرَفَتْ * فما تفرَّق بين الجَدِي والحَمَل⁵²

It is as though Nīsān had given of its own clothes various dresses to the month of
Kānūn

Or as though the sun/she-gazelle had become weak of intellect through old age and
could no longer distinguish between the sign of Capricorn/the kid and the sign of
Aries/the lamb.⁵³

In commenting on this poetry, al-Şafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 76) had already pointed out that the *lāzim* referring to the *tawriya*-word must be an unequivocal (*şarīḥ*) word and not a *muştarak*. He also reported that the word *ġazāla* is not used in the language of the Arabs to denote the female gazelle, for which for the word *zabya* is used, but is (or at least should be) only used to denote the sun. Of course, this statement then casts doubt on the existence of the *tawriya* itself, since the use of *ġazāla*-gazelle is incorrect. Nonetheless, al-Şafadī does not go so far and seems to accept, albeit only implicitly, that this word can be understood as a common use denoting a female gazelle.

Thus, where is the originality in Ibn Ğābir's line in praise of the prophet? Al-Ru'aynī highlights the fact that the *tawriya* is not the only figure at play in this line, the most important being the *iqtibās*, a quotation from the holy book or from the *ḥadīṭ* of the prophet.⁵⁴ In this very case the quotations – or better the references – are two, and both are to the *ḥadīṭ*.

The first *ḥadīṭ* is that commonly known as *ḥadīṭ radd al-şams*. It reports a story related to the prophet and his son-in-law and fourth caliph 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661), I report the version quoted in al-Albānī (1992, no. 971):.

⁵² Ibn Mālik (*Miṣbāḥ*, 260), Ibn Abī l-Işba' (*Tahrir*, 270), Rukn al-Dīn al-Ġurġānī (*Işārāt*, 216), al-Qazwīnī (*Īdāḥ*, 6:40), al-Şafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 76), al-Ru'aynī (*Ṭirāz*, 453), al-Subkī (*'Arūs*, 2:346), al-Taftāzānī (*Muṭawwal*, 652), Ibn Ḥiġġa (*Kaşf*, 269; *Ḥizāna*, 3:535), and al-Suyūṭī (*'Uqūd*, 260).

⁵³ Bonebakker's translation (1966, 11).

⁵⁴ I deal with this figure and its relationship with *tawriya* in the chapters 4 and 5.

“The prophet performed the *zuhr* prayer in al-*Ṣahbā*’, then he sent ‘Alī to attend to a matter. He came back when the prophet had already performed the ‘*aṣr*’ prayer, then the prophet laid down on ‘Alī’s breast and slept. ‘Alī did not move the prophet until the sun set. [When he woke up] the prophet said: ‘O God! If it complies to your will and to the will of your messenger, bring back the sun.’ Asmā’ said: ‘I saw it setting, then I saw it rising after having set.’”

There is no consensus among *ḥadīth* premodern scholars on the status of this tradition. Some consider its transmitters reliable and therefore judge the *ḥadīth ṣaḥīḥ* (sound).⁵⁵ On the other hand, some scholars judge this tradition based on unreliable transmitters, and therefore argue that the entire *ḥadīth* cannot be accepted. Specifically, there are two traditions that refer to the prophet’s prodigy of not only stopping the sun, but of making it retrace its steps. The author who took it upon himself to gather these two positions and to bring together the arguments for and against the validity of this tradition was al-Suyūṭī, who devoted the treatise *Kaṣf al-labs fī ḥadīth radd al-šams* to this issue.⁵⁶ Al-Suyūṭī enumerates 17 different variants of this *ḥadīth*, attentively reporting the *isnād* for each of them and eventually leaning towards a positive judgment on its soundness. If we look at his sources, we note that the arguments that he advances derive mainly from two authors, al-Ṭaḥāwī (d. 321/933)⁵⁷ and the famous Ḥanbalite scholar Ibn al-Ġawzī (d. 597/1200).⁵⁸ The former was among those who argued for the soundness of this *ḥadīth*. In his *Šarḥ muškil al-āṭār* (*Muškil*, no. 1067-1074), he points out that this *ḥadīth* is among the ‘*alāmat al-nubuwwa* (the signs of the prophecy)⁵⁹ and that it can be accepted as

⁵⁵ On the terminology of *ḥadīth* science and its development, see Pavlovitch (2018; 2019).

⁵⁶ An even more accurate treatise is al-Šāliḥī I-Šāmī (*Muzīl*).

⁵⁷ Abū Ġa’far Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Salāma b. ‘Abd al-Mālik al-Azdī al-Ḥaġrī was an Egyptian scholar of *fiqh* and *ḥadīth* criticism who adhered to the Ḥanafite school and applied himself to the diffusion of this *madḥab*. Later *ḥadīth* scholars, such as Ibn al-Ġawzī, strongly criticised his work and competences. He died in 321/933. See Calder (2012).

⁵⁸ He is one of the most important representatives of the Ḥanbalite *madḥab*. His full name was ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. ‘Alī b. Muḥammad Abū I-Faraš b. al-Ġawzī, he was born in Baghdad in 510/1126, where he also died in 597/1200. He was a *faqīh*, *wā’iz*, and *ḥadīth* scholar, one of the most influential personalities of his time, and he became the director of five *madrāsas* in Baghdad and enjoyed the esteem of the caliph and the ruling class. His disgrace is dated to 590/1194, when the vizirate passed into Šī’ite hands. He was arrested and forced into exile until two years before his death. It is important to underline his rigour regarding not only the non-*Sunnī* schools, but also against *Sunnī* scholars guilty, in his opinion, of *bid’a*. See Laoust (2012).

⁵⁹ On this topic, see Schimmel (1981), in particular chapter 3.

trustworthy on the basis that other *aḥādīṭ* provide a ground on which the actions of the prophet and the happenings of the '*radd al-šams*' *ḥadīṭ* are judged as conforming to the prophetic status of Muḥammad. Specifically, there are three main reasons: 1) we find in *aḥādīṭ* that the sun only stopped for Joshua (Yūša' b. Nūn) and for nobody else. Although this is true, al-Ṭaḥāwī specifies that in Joshua's case the sun stopped before setting and did not retrace its steps after setting, so the fact that the sun can stop only for Joshua does not exclude the fact that the sun may retrace its steps after having already set for Muḥammad. 2) There are *aḥādīṭ* that state the importance of not skipping any prayer, so it is possible that the sun moved back to permit 'Alī to perform the *maḡrib* prayer. 3) Although there are *aḥādīṭ* warning those who sleep during the day, and in particular between the two prayers of '*aṣr*' and *maḡrib*, their *asānīd* are *munqāṭi'* (interrupted) and therefore the fact that the prophet fell asleep between the two prayers cannot be regarded as a disgraceful action. The same judgement has been expressed by Ibn Ḥaḡar al-'Asqalānī (*Faṭḥ*, 6:255-256), who, in commenting on (al-Buḡārī, *Ṣaḡīḥ*, no. 3124), states that this is a great miracle performed by the prophet and that Ibn al-Ġawzī was wrong in defining it as *mawḍū'*. On the other hand, Ibn al-Ġawzī was among the scholars who judged it as not complying with the reliability requirements of the chain of transmitters and who expressed his disapproval of those supporting its soundness. Unlike al-Ṭaḥāwī, Ibn al-Ġawzī claimed that the transmitters of this *ḥadīṭ* cannot be considered trustworthy, for they are commonly judged by other *ḥadīṭ* scholars as liars, weak transmitters, or inventors of traditions.

The second *ḥadīṭ* relates the story of the prophet's encounter with a she-gazelle, which asked the prophet to untie her so that she could suckle her babies. I report the version quoted in al-Albānī (1992, no. 6737):

The messenger of God was in the desert. And behold, someone calling him: 'O messenger of God!'. He turned around but could not see anyone, then he turned and saw a tied she-gazelle (*zabya*). She said: 'Approach me, o messenger of God' He approached her and said: 'What do you need?' She replied: 'I have two babies on that mountain, untie me so that I can go and suckle them, then I will be back to you'

the prophet asked: ‘Will you?’ She answered: ‘God will punish me with the punishment of the ‘*aššār*⁶⁰ if I do not do it’. He set her free, so she went, suckled her two babies, and came back. Then the prophet tied her. The Bedouin noticed [what had happened] and asked: ‘What do you need, o messenger of God?’ He replied: ‘Yes, set her free.’ So he set her free and she went out galloping and saying ‘I testify that there is no deity but God and that you are the messenger of God.’

This *ḥadīṭ* is found in al-Ṭabārānī (d. 360/971)⁶¹ (*Mu‘ğam*, 23:331-332). Variants of this *ḥadīṭ* are reported in other sources, such as Abu Nu‘aym al-Iṣfahānī (d. 430/1038)⁶² (*Dalā’il*, no. 274) and by al-Bayhaqī (d. 454-458/1062-1066)⁶³ (*Dalā’il*, 6:34-35), the latter assigning to this *ḥadīṭ* the grade of *ḍa‘īf*.

Beyond judging the reliability of the transmitters and how this tradition is accepted by premodern and contemporary Muslim scholars, how can we describe its use within Ibn Ḡābir’s *badī‘iyya*? In light of what I have described so far, we can see how the use of *tawriya* in Ibn Ḡābir’s line allows the poet to refer to two prophetic *aḥādīṭ* by uttering two equivocal words; that is, to recall a frame of reference in the reader that depicts the prophet in the act of performing miracles or prodigies. Specifically, the first *ḥadīṭ* – commonly known as ‘*radd al-šams*’ – refers to within this verse by the verb *ruddat* and the noun *al-ğazāla*, which replaces the noun *šams* or *šaraq* usually found in *aḥādīṭ* collections. The second *ḥadīṭ* refers to by the words *al-ğazāla*, which replaces *zabya* (she-gazelle) found in the sources; and from the noun *al-ğady*, which is substitute for the noun *ḥiṣf* (baby). Moreover, it also refers to the ‘Capricorn’ and pairs with to the noun *al-ğazāla*, when understood as ‘sun’. If we analyse the structure of the verse, we can see that the first hemistich is a small synopsis of the

⁶⁰ ‘*Aššār* or ‘*āšir* pl. ‘*uššār*: tax collector, broadly someone who takes someone’s else wealth without having the right to do so, i.e. God will punish me with death.

⁶¹ Abū l-Qāsim Sulaymān b. Ayyūb b. Muṭayyir al-Laḥmī died in Iṣfahān in 360/971. He was a *ḥadīṭ* scholar especially known for three *ḥadīṭ* collections. He was the teacher of Abū Nu‘aym al-Iṣfahānī. See Fierro (2012).

⁶² Abū Nu‘aym Aḥmad b. ‘Abd Allāh b. Aḥmad b. Iṣḥāq b. Mūsā b. Mihrān al-Šāfi‘ī-Iṣfahānī died in 430/1038. He was a *ḥadīṭ* scholar especially known for his works on mysticism. See Chabbi (2011).

⁶³ Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Bayhaqī was born in Ḥusrawğird in 384/994, and is said to have died in Nīšāpūr in 458/1066 or in Bayhaq in 454/1062. He was a *ḥadīṭ* scholar and adhered to the Šāfi‘ite school; he was also recognised by Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) as the most important *ḥadīṭ* scholar of his law school. See Dickson (2011).

ḥādīt relating how the sun was made to retrace its steps by the will of God and his prophet, allowing ‘Alī to perform the ‘*asr* prayer. On the other hand, if we observe the second hemistich, we notice that it is the synopsis of the second *ḥādīt*, a reference depending on uttering the word *ǧazāla* in the first hemistich. We therefore have an intertwinement of narrative worlds – that is, access through the poetic verse to a wider range of data on the prophetic nature of Muḥammad and the prodigies that he performed. The choice and mention of these two *aḥādīt* have a clear logic. First, they are *aḥādīt* that, although not part of the prophet’s established tradition since they are not mentioned in the six canonical collections, are nonetheless part of the traditions which demonstrate his prophetic nature. Specifically, the poet’s purpose lies in praising the person of the prophet described as the person who has power over creation: with the will of God, the prophet was able not only to stop the sun, as happened for Joshua, but even to make it rise in the sky after it had already set. At the same time, Muḥammad can speak to animals and is described in the second *ḥādīt* as a righteous person who gives freedom to a gazelle after she has kept her word and returned to captivity. In this story, we can certainly see a reference to Solomon (Sulaymān b. Dāwūd), who, in addition to his wisdom, was also known for his gift of talking to animals. In this way, the prophet Muḥammad stands above creation and other prophets, being the last one, the seal. And this is the meaning that Ibn Ǧābir wants to convey with this line, and he does so by utilising the evocative power of two *tawriya*-words. It should be highlighted that this is an appropriate example both of how the meaning of the *tawriya*-words exist and interact to convey the intended meaning, and above all of how the two meanings do not exclude each other, since a perfect double reading of the line is possible.

102. In this verse, the poet presents a *tawriya muǧarrada* of the second type, i.e. a *tawriya*-line in which two *lawāzim* are uttered, one for the *ma‘nà qarīb* and the other for the *ma‘anà ba‘īd*.⁶⁴ The *tawriya*-word is the noun *ǧānī*, the *nomen agentis* of the verb *ǧanà*, which has as its first signification ‘to gather, to pluck’, e.g. *ǧanà l-ṭamara* (he gathered the fruits), but which can also be used with the preposition ‘*alà*,

⁶⁴ Ibn Ḥiǧǧa (*Kašf*, 277; *Ḥizāna*, 3:545) agrees on calling this the second type of *tawriya muǧarrada*.

meaning ‘he committed a crime (*ǧināya*)’. This last use is the meaning intended by the poet. It is to this meaning that the *lāzim* ‘*ǧamīl al-‘afw*’ (good in forgiveness) refers, while the *ma‘nà qarīb* has the phrase ‘*dānī l-quṭūf*’ (approaching the grape bunches) as *lāzim*. The encounter between these two opposing *lawāzim* makes the *tawriya muǧarrada*. Unlike the previous line, the two meanings in this case, although being plausible, are not at the same level, for the interpretation which pictures Muḥammad as a magnanimous person prevails over the other, and the sense that the author wants to convey is precisely that.

This type of *tawriya* is also listed by al-Suyūṭī (*‘Uqūd*, 261), who proposes to call it *tawriya muqtarana* (combined *tawriya*).

103. Having presented the two subdivisions of *tawriya muǧarrada*, Ibn Ǧābir then moves to the second type: *tawriya muraššaḥa*, and in this line he presents its first subdivision, i.e. when the *lāzim* comes after the *tawriya*-word. Once again, Ibn Ǧābir chooses an unoriginal *tawriya*-word, one often present in *tawriya* poetry and deeply discussed by lexicographers, poets, and literati in general: the word ‘*ayn*’. Among its many meanings, the two which are at play in this line are ‘gold’ and ‘eye’, the former being the intended meaning (*ba‘īd*), and the latter, the non-intended (*qarīb*). The *lāzim* referring to the *qarīb* meaning ‘eye’ is the noun ‘head’ (*al-ra’s*).

104. The second subdivision of the *tawriya muraššaḥa*, where the *lāzim* precedes the *tawriya*-word, is presented in verse 104. The *tawriya*-word is the phrase *dā qadam* at the end of the last hemistich. Its *qarīb* meaning is ‘foot’, which the *lāzim yusrī-hā* ‘to travel by night’ refers to, since it is an action to be accomplished on foot, as al-Ru‘aynī points out. The *ma‘nà ba‘īd*, on the other hand, is *sābiq* ‘predecessor, antecedent’, as we will see.⁶⁵ The meaning that the poet wants to convey in this line is that God bestows his grace on the sincere believer who, like Muḥammad, faces the hardships of life with his heart turned to God and animated by true and deep faith.

⁶⁵ Cf. Ibn Ḥazm’s analysis of the attributes of God in section 3.3.1.
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105. With this verse, we shift to the third type of *tawriya*, the *mubayyana*, which has a *lāzim* referring to the *ma'nà ba'īd*. Here, the *lāzim al-sayf* 'sword' follows the *tawriya*-word *ǧufūn* 'eyelids', which is the *ma'nà qarīb*, and 'scabbards', the intended meaning. The latter is easily understandable, since the addressee takes refuge in people who are accustomed to war, ready to maintain their positions, to the point that their swords are sheathed only when they are sprinkled with the blood of their enemies.

106. The second subdivision of *tawriya mubayyana* is presented in line 106, in which the *lāzim ṣabr* 'endurance' precedes the two *tawriya*-words *fi'l* 'verb' and 'action', and *raf'* 'nominative' and 'elevation'. The two meanings belonging to the technical terms used in syntax (*naḥw*) are not the intended meanings, the *qarīb*, while the *ba'īd* meanings are those derived from the primary meanings of the verbs: in the first case, an action producing an effect; in the second, the removal of something. However, this verse shows greater complexity since, in addition to the two *tawriya*-words just listed, there is another *tawriya*-word at the beginning of the first hemistich: *ǧawāzim*. It has, as *qarīb* meaning, the technical term used in *naḥw*, i.e. 'apocopate governors'; and, as *ba'īd* meaning, 'breakers'. This *tawriya*-word is, in turn, connected to the *lāzim* of the *ma'nà ba'īd ṣabr*, which follows the *tawriya*-word, therefore making it an example of *tawriya mubayyana* of the previous subdivision. The meaning of the whole line is a hymn to love: the power of passion has affected the reason, and nothing can endure in the hearts of lovers since its vestiges have been cancelled. Nothing can cure the sign left by passion except the closeness of the two lovers, ready to spend their nights and their days together. It should be noted that al-Ru'aynī does not consider the word *ḥāl* a *tawriya*-word, too, the most likely reason being that he considers it as an example of *ǧinās tām*, i.e. two words that have the same phonetic form, but that pertain to two different parts of speech: *ḥāl*-verb 'transmute' and *ḥāl*-noun 'condition'. Another clarification on this line concerns the *tawriya*-words which belong to a specific language of the sciences of grammar and syntax. At this stage of the formulation of *tawriya*, the use of these words was fully considered as an example of *tawriya*. It was only later, and only after the formulation given by Ṣafī I-Dīn al-Ḥillī, that the use of technical terms and their double reading was considered

a type of *tawġih*, specifically *tawġih*₂: “The *tawġih* is when the speaker aims, in some words of an utterance or in the whole utterance itself, at harmonious nouns [meant] in their technical use, such as proper names, scientific principles, etc. willing to match the second meaning of the expression, without being a real *ištirāk* unlike *tawriya*.” (al-Ḥillī, *Šarḥ*, 122). In al-Ru‘aynī’s commentary on Ibn Ġābir’s *badī‘iyya*, the section devoted to *tawġih* still reports the formulation of *tawġih*₁, i.e. “That the utterance bears a twofold meaning: first a praise, and second a dispraise” (al-Ru‘aynī, *Ṭirāz*, 607).⁶⁶

107. With this verse, the poet introduces the last type of *tawriya*, the *tawriya muhayya’a*, with its three subdivisions. In this line, the *tawriya*-words are two: *al-qalb*, or *qalb al-‘aqrab*, is the name of the star α Scorpionis or Antares, the red luminous star in the constellation of Scorpius and it is the eighteenth lunar station (Kunitzsch 1959, 169; 1961, 91); and *al-ṭarf* is the ninth lunar station and corresponds to the λ Leonis or Alterf, i.e. the eye of the lion. Sometimes this name is also used for β Cancri (Kunitzsch 1959, 139-140; 1961, 114). To these astronomical meanings, we can also add the more common meanings denoting ‘heart’ and ‘eye’. While reading this line, the reader does not perceive immediately the astronomical senses and limits himself/herself to understanding the line as a reference to two parts of the human body. Al-Ru‘aynī points out that what distinguishes this *tawriya* is the fact that it is not perceived as such unless another word or phrase opens to the reader the twofold nature of the word. In this case, the *muštarak* words are ‘supported’ by the word *qamar* ‘moon’ which follows them and widens the semantic field of reference, allowing the reader to identify in the two previous words a clear reference to the astronomical terms used to indicate two bright stars and two lunar stations through which the moon completes its journey through the sky. Therefore, without the

⁶⁶ *Taġih*₁ is also known as *ibhām*, for example in Ibn Abī l-Iṣba‘ (*Tahrīr*, 596-598; *Badī‘*, 306-313), Ibn Ḥiġġa (*Hiżāna*, 2:110-124). The use of the term *tawġih* as a synonym for *tawriya* is contested by al-Ṣafadī, who clearly specifies the differences between these two figures and argues against using it to define *tawriya*, see al-Ṣafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 69-74), and Bonebakker (1966, 20-22). The essential difference lies in the fact that *tawġih*₁ and *ibhām* are figures which provide the whole utterance – and not the single word – with two opposite meanings, neither of which is preferred over the other, while *tawriya* has an intended meaning (*al-ma’nà l-murād*, *al-ma’nà l-ba’id*) which is concealed by the near meaning (*al-ma’nà l-qarīb*). Cf. also Bauer (2016, 33-34).

mention of *qamar*, the *tawriya* would not have existed at all. One must say that the introduction of the word *qamar* makes a difference in the perception of the *qarīb* vs *ba'īd* issue. Indeed, when the reader first reads this line, it seems obvious to assign the common meanings 'heart' and 'eye' to the *tawriya*-words, being them *qarīb* meanings. But, once the word *qamar* has been uttered, the reader will understand as *qarīb* meaning the astronomical one, since it is deeply related to the movement of the moon. It is precisely on this shift that the aesthetic effectiveness of *tawriya* lies: the astronomical reading becomes the *qarīb* meaning and conceals the *ba'īd* – namely, the first meaning understood by the reader, the former *qarīb*.

108. The second subdivision of *tawriya muhayya'a* is represented by the *tawriya*-word *tunġidū*, which is preceded by the noun *muthimīna* (lit. 'those entering Tihāma; those going to Tihāma, i.e. Mecca) without which the *tawriya* would have not been a *tawriya*. The process is comparable to the one that I discussed in the preceding line. Without *muthimīna*, the reader would have assigned to *tunġidū* only one meaning (namely, to help), while with the presence at the beginning of the text of a noun disclosing another possible meaning causes the reader to assign immediately the suggested meaning to the verb. Thus, the *qarīb* meaning becomes 'to enter the Naġd, to go to Naġd', while 'to help', not suggested by the preceding *muthimīna*, becomes the *ba'īd* meaning, the intended one.

109. Ibn Ġābir's section on *tawriya* ends with line 109, in which the poet describes the very last subdivision of *tawriya muhayya'a* – namely, a *tawriya* constituted by two interdependent *tawriya*-words: two expressions that give each other the status of *tawriya*, and without which neither *tawriya*-word would have existed at all. In this line, these two expressions are the verbs *aġāra* and *anġidū*, which both depend on each other, since the *ba'īd* meanings 'to make a foray' and 'help' are concealed by the *qarīb* meanings 'to enter al-Ġawr, to go to al-Ġawr' and 'to enter the Naġd' as in the previous line. These *qarīb* meanings would not have been understood as concealing meanings if one of the two had not been there. This late subdivision of

tawriya recalls another figure, which is a kind of predecessor to *tawriya*: the *muğālaṭa ma'nawiyya*, which I will return to later.⁶⁷

1.1.2.2.3 al-Ru'aynī's addition on *tawriya*

While commenting on Ibn Ġābir's *badī'iyya*, al-Ru'aynī added to his friend's verses other *loci* describing each *tawriya* subdivision, most of them taken from examples already cited by other authors and commonly associated with *tawriya* in various literary works. He closes this examination of the examples with a *qaṣīda* containing in each verse one or more names of *sūras* used as *tawriya*, for a total of 55 lines (*Ṭirāz*, 475-480). But what is of interest are the four *tanbīhāt* that he adds at the end of the chapter, where he clarifies some issues, the most important being the relationship between *tawriya* and *luġz* (riddle), which was not contemplated in al-Şafadī's analysis.

1. Not every homonymous word is a *tawriya*, for some words which can be used as homonyms are not in common circulation among people to express one of the meanings intended by the author. This is the case, for example, of variants (*luġāt*), which are known and used in a closed community of speakers but are not commonly diffused and recognised. Al-Şafadī adds that toponyms known by a small community are not to be considered homonyms as well. Both authors stress the importance of the mutual understanding of a word as a homonym to make it a good attempt at *tawriya*. I will devote the next section to the definition of homonymy (*iştirāk*) in al-Şafadī's thought; although not the first to associate *tawriya* with *iştirāk*,⁶⁸ he was the first to provide a theoretical basis for their mutual relationship. This remark will also be reported by Ibn Hiġġa l-Ĥamawī in (*Kaşf*, 276; *Ĥizāna*, 3:545).

2. *Tawriya muġarrada* is more common than *tawriya muhayya'a*, for the former does not need any other word or phrase to be actualised in a text, while the latter needs

⁶⁷ See chapter 2.

⁶⁸ See chapter 2.

another text segment which opens the twofold reading of the *tawriya*-word. This second remark is connected to the third clarification.

3. Difference between a *lāzim* and a *lafz yuhayyi'u*. As I have already stated, the presence of a *lāzim* referring to the *tawriya*-word in a given text is not a necessary, for *tawriya* is actualised even without it. On the other hand, when one of the two meanings of a word needs another text segment to be actualised – a ‘supporting expression’ – is a case of *tawriya muhayya'a*, thus this element (*lafz yuhayyi'u*) is necessary.

4. *Tawriya vs luġz*. The use of *tawriya* aiming at an ambiguity of the whole text, and therefore a differentiation between levels of understanding, is well suitable to the formulation of riddles and word plays. In this regard, al-Ru'aynī says:

Know that the intended meaning of the expression (*lafz*) of the *tawriya* is indicated through the expression, be it *ḥaqīqa* or *maġāz*. While the expression of a riddle (*luġz*) does not indicate its intended meaning nor in a *ḥaqīqa*, or *maġāz* way and it is not among the meanings (*'awāriḍ*, lit. happenings) of that expression. It is a concept understood through derivation (*ḥads*)⁶⁹ and guessing (*taḥmīn*), this is why the intellects differ about its solution, depending on their sharpness and their devotion to it. There are those who are fast in its understanding and those who are slow. How many people are the intellectually sharper but the slower in its solution because they are not used to it and how many people are the contrary thereof! (*Ṭirāz*, 481-482)

This is the difference reported by al-Ru'aynī between *luġz*⁷⁰ and *tawriya*, a difference that has been already underlined and explained by previous authors, such as Ḍiyā' al-

⁶⁹ Lit. ‘conjecturing’. In (*Lisān*, s.v.), the *maṣdar ḥads* is glossed *al-tawahhum fī ma'ānī l-kalām wa-l-umūr* (make an opinion on the meanings of the speech and the concepts). The idea at the basis of *ḥads* is that one tries to understand something starting from a set of information and trying to make an image of a state of affairs, thus conjecturing about something. Cf. (*OED*, s.v. conjecture). In this case, the translation ‘derivation’ is more appropriate because it matches the idea that one can reach a certain solution through the information given in the riddle and underlines the rational effort to be applied to reach its solution. Terms like deduction, induction, and inference are too much bound to the technical terminology of formal logic to be used in this context. In the case of riddles, there is no logical inference *stricto sensu*, i.e. the inference of a true proposition starting from true premises or premises whose truth is assumed.

⁷⁰ Riddles, quizzes, enigmas, and charades are wordplays that have their roots in the pre-Islamic era, but which only saw their true flowering and diffusion in the Ayyubid and Mamluk ages, up to the Ottoman age. This literary genre saw an interesting development in literature, and there are many collections and anthologies of riddles and puzzles, often accompanied by the solutions. I cannot go

Dīn Ibn al-Aṭīr (d. 637/1239) and al-'Alawī l-Yamānī (d. 745/1344 or 749/1348).⁷¹ Among the examples that al-Ru'aynī gives for the *luġz*, there is the two-line riddle epigram which has as its solution the molar tooth (*dīrs*).⁷² But what I will present here is at the same time a riddle and a wordplay, a funny word play, one must say (*Ṭirāz*, 483):

وَلِي خَالَةٌ وَأَنَا خَالُهَا * وَلِي عَمَّةٌ وَأَنَا عَمُّهَا
فَأَمَّا الَّتِي أَنَا عَمُّ لَهَا * فَإِنَّ أَبِي أُمُّهُ أُمُّهَا
أَبُوهَا أَخِي وَأَخُوهَا أَبِي * وَلِي خَالَةٌ هَكَذَا حُكْمُهَا

I have a maternal aunt and I am her maternal uncle; I have a paternal aunt and I am her paternal uncle.

About whom I am her paternal uncle, the mother of my father is her mother.



His father is my brother and her brother is my father; I have a maternal aunt and that is what she thinks.

These three verses embed two different situations with different characters at play. The explanation of this riddle given by al-Ru'aynī is difficult to understand without drawing a sketch of it:

into detail, but refer to the basic bibliography in Bencheneb (2012) and Bosworth (2012). For a careful analysis, I refer to Papoutsakis (2019), who offers an interesting study regarding al-Ḥaḏīrī's (d. 568/1172) *Kitāb al-i'ġāz fī l-aḥāġī wa-l-alġāz*, the first treatise-cum-anthology of riddles. She provides the first account of this unpublished work, with particular reference to the structure of the work and the types of riddles collected within it, to the sources used by the author and the poets he cited. On the development of the genre in the Ottoman era, I refer to Papoutsakis (forthcoming), where she particularly addresses a type of riddle, the *mu'ammā*, which witnessed a particular diffusion in that era.

⁷¹ I will deal with the works of these two scholars in chapter 2.

⁷² See chapter 2.1.2.



The sketch makes the whole familiar intertwinement results clearer. The difficulty of this riddle lies in the fact that the solution is not conveyed by the words and phrases composing the riddle. As al-Ru'aynī pointed out, the meaning of the riddle, its solution, is not given through a semantic discovery of its constituents, but through the use of the faculties of the intellect. The reader should be able to understand, and above all to imagine or deduce, the relationships linking the subject of the narrative

to the other characters by hypothesising other actors who are not mentioned in the text.

The fact that the resolution of a riddle is based on the intellectual skills of the reader does not mean that it cannot be formulated through the use of figures of speech, and especially of *tawriya*, which, as we have seen, is well suited to creating a semantic ambiguity at the level of the text. The following verses are an example of using *tawriya* as an enunciative tool for a *luġz* (*Tirāz*, 484):

وذي سُحوبٍ رَاكِعٍ سَاجِدٌ * مُجْتَهِدٌ فِي خِدْمَةِ الْبَارِي
يُلَازِمُ الْخَمْسَ لِمِيقَاتِهَا * وَدَمْعُهُ مِنْ طَرْفِهِ جَارِي

An emaciated one, bending, prostrating, and struggling to do the service of the
Creator/reed carver,

It keeps to the five *prayers/fingers* at their appointed time, while its blood is flowing
from the *eye/nib*.

This is an interesting two-line epigram showing how *tawriya* used in a riddle helps the reader to understand the solution to it. Who or what is the subject of the enigma? To reach an answer, the reader should start with the hints found in the *tawriya*-words. Here, there are three. First, the word *al-bārī* (i.e. *bārī*) is commonly understood as an epithet of God, one of his names, meaning ‘the creator’. This is its first meaning, the one that immediately understood by the reader. This *qarīb* meaning is connected with the beginning of the first verse, where the co-text clearly suggests a religious practice, that of prayer, through the words *rāki*’ and *sāġid*, both suggesting an agent performing two movements of the canonical prayer. This is all the more plausible if we look at the first hemistich of the second verse, where a second *tawriya*-word, *al-ḥams*, clearly denotes the five daily canonical prayers, i.e. its *qarīb* meaning. The very last hemistich is in turn connected with the first verse, where the subject of the riddle is depicted as emaciated, altered (*wa-dī šuḥūb*) and struggling to perform a task into which the subject puts great effort (*muġtahid*). This depicts the cause of the events narrated in the very last hemistich, where we read

about a subject whose blood is flowing from the eye, *qarīb* meaning of the third *tawriya*-word *ṭarf*. So far, everything suggests that the riddle has a human subject who is completely devoted to the service of God and who abides by this service despite the pain and struggle that he feels. Or at least this is what is suggested to us if we interpret the *tawriya* words according to their *qarīb* meanings. However, if we consider the *tawriya*-words in their *baʿīd* meanings, we discover that the subject could be quite different. The word *bārī*, if understood as *nomen agentis* of the root *b r w*, denotes the creator of a reed pen, someone who fashions or carves it. This *maʿnā baʿīd* seems to be completely at odds with the co-text found in the first line, and is therefore not grasped immediately by the reader. For this reason, the other two *tawriyas* intervene – which, as we have seen, agree with the *qarīb* meaning of the first and with the co-text. This adds two other reading keys that direct the reader towards the solution. Specifically, *ḥams* refers, in addition to the prayers, to the five fingers which grasp the hypothetical dip pen shaped by the *bārī*, a dip pen equipped with a *ṭarf* (tip, nib), from which the ink flows like blood, the blood of an individual exhausted from the continuous service imposed on him by the writer.

This demonstrates how the interaction between *tawriya* and reader can lead to the solution of the riddle. As in the previous example, the solution is not given at the semantic level. Nonetheless, the semantic level provides the means by which the message intended by the text can be inferred, and *tawriya* is, at least in this last example, an essential vehicle for the solution.

It is with this digression on riddles that al-Ruʿaynī closes the section on *tawriya* in his commentary.

Returning to al-Ṣafadī and his *Faḍḍ al-ḥitām*, the first *muqaddima* ends with a subchapter on *istiḥdām* and a *tatimma* on the use of *taḍmīn* (quotation) as a *tawriya*, i.e. changing the meaning of one or more words through *tawriya* in order to change the meaning of the primary text segment inserted in the second text. As I have already stated in the introduction, I will not consider *istiḥdām* in my work, and I will deepen the relationship between *tawriya* and *taḍmīn* in chapter 5, to which I postpone the discussion on al-Ṣafadī's pages.

1.1.3 The second *muqaddima*

The second *muqaddima* consists of four parts: the first three sections are devoted to *ištirāk*, while the fourth part is devoted to three infelicitous cases of *tawriya*. The second *muqaddima* ends with a *tatimma* about the most common mistakes when trying to use *ištirāk*.

1.1.3.1 *Ištirāk*: a foundation of *tawriya*

One of the theoretical foundations on which *tawriya* is based is *ištirāk*. Al-Şafadī pays much attention to this linguistic aspect by devoting the entire second part of his treatise to the question of homonymy. In the first part he discusses the advantages of using homonymous words, while in the second part, he focuses on the linguistic-theoretical foundations of *ištirāk*.

As pointed out by Bonebakker (1966, 87-89), al-Şafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 96-101) associates two main advantages with *ištirāk*; or, better, he sees the use of a *muštarak* word as a way to express two different enunciative situations. The first case is what can be called ‘meaning condensation’ (*iḥtişār al-kaṭīr fī l-qalīl*) – namely, the will of the speaker to condense his utterance by using a word which shares more than a meaning, thus sharing in the same signifier several or many signifieds. The example of *ištirāk* always used is the word ‘*ayn*, and al-Şafadī makes no exception, pointing out that it has fifteen different meanings.⁷³ Al-Şafadī does not explain at length why *ištirāk* should be used in this way, only saying that “You designate heterogeneous things in their *ḥaqīqa* with expressions sharing their meanings” (*Faḍḍ*, 96).

The second case is more complex, and al-Şafadī devotes more space to it in his treatise. It is for him the “freedom that the one hiding his matter obtains in concealing his condition being, however, necessarily truth (i.e. saying a truth

⁷³ Al-Şafadī wrote an entire book on this topic, *Şarf al-‘ayn ‘an şarf al-‘ayn fī waşf al-‘ayn*, where he dealt with the word and concept ‘*ayn*’ from many points of view: from its etymology to its nature as a homonym, from its use as a technical term in science to its use in literary contexts. For the meanings of the word ‘*ayn*, see in particular (*Şarf*, 2:85-159). In a whole chapter (*Şarf*, 2:160-175), al-Şafadī devoted much space to the description of the homonymy phenomenon, providing the same explanation that he gives in (*Faḍḍ*, 96), but more accurately and supported by more examples. See also Talib (2019).

statement). So, the antagonist is satisfied with which suits what he sought [to know], ‘For in equivocal speech there is the freedom of lying’⁷⁴. In other words, the use of a *tawriya* allows the speaker to hide in his utterance a second utterance corresponding to his real communicative intentions in order to conceal it from the reader, or to allow only the sharp reader to perceive it or those who share with the speaker the same set of knowledge, the same ‘Encyclopaedia’ (Eco, [1979] 2006). Al-Şafadī provides three main examples of this use, accordingly to the aim of the speaker. The first case corresponds to the need to answer a question sincerely, while at the same time having to hide one’s thoughts. One of the examples cited by the author is an anecdote referring to the prophet, who concealed his identity without lying.⁷⁵ The second case concerns riddles, as we have already seen in the previous section. The third and last case that al-Şafadī cites is the desire to conceal theories, practices, and beliefs so that only the initiates can grasp the true meaning hidden beneath the surface. An example is the line by ‘Afif al-Dīn al-Tilimsānī (d. 690/1291):

عَجِبْتُ لَهَا فِي حُسْنِهَا إِذْ تَفَرَّدَتْ * لِأَيَّةٍ مَعْنَى بَعْدَ ذَلِكَ تَنَنَّتِ⁷⁶

I wondered at her, for she was unique in her beauty in whatever sense after she
bent [her body]/was double.

Al-Şafadī points out that the aim of the poet was to conceal in a love poem his views on *al-wahda*, i.e. unity, and he is probably referring here to *wahdat al-wuġūd*: “The oneness of being or the unity of existence” (Chittick, 2012). I have some difficulties to understand this line, but two interpretations are possible: 1. The verb *tafarrada* refers to the unity of God, i.e. his unique way to exist, and 2. The union between the two lovers stands for the union between the *şufī* and God, two beings becoming one.

As for the theoretical part, al-Şafadī devotes much more space to the principles upon which *istīrāk* is based and delineates its theoretical structure. He opens by giving the

⁷⁴ Bonebakker’s translation (1966, 87) of *li-anna fī l-ma‘ārīd mandūḥa ‘an al-kaḍb*. There are many reports about this tradition, see for reference al-Buḥārī (*Adab*, no. 885), al-Ṭahāwī (*Muškil*, 7:369-370), al-Ṭabārānī (*Mu‘ġam*, 18:106-107).

⁷⁵ I will analyse this anecdote in the next chapter, see section 2.1.1.

⁷⁶ ‘Afif al-Dīn al-Tilimsānī (*Dīwān*, 1:133 with variant: بعد ذلك تننت < بعدها قد تننت), al-Şafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 101).

definition of *ištirāk*: “Know that the *ištirāk* consists in an expression coined (*lafza mawḍū‘a*) for two – or more – proper meanings (*ḥaqīqatayn*) as a first coinage (*waḍ‘*),⁷⁷ whence they are both like that.” (*Faḍḍ*, 101; *Ṣarf*, 2:160). Al-Ṣafadī intends to point out with this statement that the real *ištirāk* occurs in a word which shares at least two meanings which are proper meanings and not derived through a figurative process (*mağāz*). This is the first remark that the author specifies, saying that the expression is a first coinage (*bi-l-waḍ‘ al-awwal*), i.e. to coin an expression for a given meaning, so the meaning becomes the proper meaning of this expression. Once again, the example is the word ‘*ayn*, whose phonetic expression encloses more than a meaning, such as ‘eye’, ‘gold’, etc. The expression ‘*ayn* has been assigned to all of these meanings separately and thus the expression happened to refer to more than an object, becoming a *muštarak*. On the other hand, al-Ṣafadī does not consider real *ištirāk* a word which denotes a proper meaning (*ḥaqīqa*) and another figurative sense (*mağāz*). For instance, the case of the word *ṣalāt*, whose proper meaning is ‘prayer’, but connotes also the set of movement performed during it and through a figurative process it became its figurative sense. The figurative derivation is not a case of first coinage, for it consists in an assignment of a new meaning to an already existing word.⁷⁸ He also underlines that a condition for *ištirāk* is the absolute identity of the expressions conveying different meanings in their letters and patterns (*fī l-ḥurūf wa-l-ṣiyag*); its opposite is called by al-Ṣafadī a *mutawāṭi‘* expression, namely a set of words different in components and patterns but sharing the same meaning, thus the case of synonymy, commonly called *tarāduf*.⁷⁹ The example given by the author is the object ‘sword’, which can be called *sayf*, *murhaf*, and *ṣārim*.

⁷⁷ I adopt the translation ‘coinage’ for *waḍ‘* following Sheyhatovitch (2018; 2020). Weiss (1987) is the author of a seminal work on ‘*ilm al-waḍ‘*, which he translates as ‘philosophy of language’, in which he underlines that it is a late science in comparison with other ‘linguistic sciences’ such as ‘*ilm al-ṣarf* (morphology), ‘*ilm al-naḥw* (syntax), and ‘*ilm al-luḡa* (lexicography). In translating *waḍ‘*, Weiss chooses ‘positing’ and for its agent – *wāḍi‘* – ‘Positor’. On the theoretical basis of this science, see Weiss (1987; 2012).

⁷⁸ Cf. Sheyhatovitch (2018, 78-81; 2020, 68-70) outlining the concept of first and second coinage in al-Fārābī (d. 339/950).

⁷⁹ The concept of synonymy is commonly called *tarāduf*. Premodern Arab authors are divided in the approach towards this phenomenon. Some are in favour of synonymy, while others deny it in principle by arguing, for example, that the synonymous terms are nothing but qualities which designate an object and not the object itself, e.g. *sayf* and *ṣārim*, where the latter is only a quality – the being sharp – of the sword. On this topic, see Bettini (1983; 2011b).

Having defined the concept of homonymy, al-Şafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 103, *Şarf*, 2:161-164) reports the conflicting opinions of the scholars regarding this phenomenon. To those who deny the *iştirāk* and claiming that, if several meanings could be contained in a single expression, then mutual understanding would be impossible,⁸⁰ al-Şafadī replies that what is fundamental for mutual understanding is the context of enunciation and the co-text (*qarā'in min al-ḥāl wa-l-maqāl*) within which the homonym is uttered. It is clear that for al-Şafadī the existence of *iştirāk* is obviously essentially for two reasons: 1. The expressions are in finite number since they are composed of a finite number of letters, while the expressible concepts are potentially infinite, making the *iştirāk* essential and necessary, and 2. The same predicate can be used for more than a single thing, even if the actualisation of such a predicate differs in relation to the entity to which it refers. Al-Şafadī uses the example of the predicate 'existence' (*wuġūd*), which applies to both God and creature, but in a different manner, so that to predicate the existence of God and of the creature does not imply predicating the same quiddity and essence in both subjects. Therefore, one cannot say that the word *wuġūd* refers to a unique concept, a unique *ma'nà*; rather, it is a *muştarak*.⁸¹ Having said that, we can infer that for al-Şafadī a homonymous expression – a *muştarak* – is due to at least two different acts of coinage (*waḍ'*), for the coiner (*wāḍi'*) settled a word for each meaning he wanted to express and these words happened to have the same phonetic expression.

Although homonymy is usually actualised in words pertaining to the same lexical category, and al-Şafadī specifies that it generally occurs between nouns, he also highlights that *iştirāk* can also be actualised in a word whose morphological form can be interpreted as two different parts of speech. For instance, the case of words expressing a meaning as nouns and another meaning as verbs or particles. The words *asīru* and *lālā* (*lā'lā'*) are a representative case. The first expression can be read as a

⁸⁰ E.g. the view of Ibn Durustuwayhi (d. 346/957), see Bettini (2011a).

⁸¹ "The word 'existence' (*al-wuġūd*) is predicated for the existence of the necessary one (i.e. God) and the existence of the possible (*wuġūd al-wāġib wa-wuġūd al-mumkin*) by way of their essential reality (*ḥaqīqa*). The existence of whatever is the quiddity (*māhiyya*) itself, as it was established in theology. [...] The essential reality of the necessary differs from the essential reality of the possible, then to predicate the 'existence' about both of them is by way of *iştirāk*" (al-Şafadī, *Faḍḍ*, 103; *Şarf*, 2:163-164). On *ḥaqīqa* and *māhiyya*, see Gardet (2012).

noun meaning ‘prisoner’, or as a *muḍāri*‘ verb meaning ‘I travel’; the second can be read as a particle (an adverb in this case) repeated twice ‘no, no’, or as a noun ‘joy’.⁸² In general, al-Ṣafadī seems to give much importance to the concept of *ištirāk*, but it should be emphasised that for the author the true *ištirāk* is only in one word whose two different meanings are both considered proper meanings and not derived through figurative processes such as metaphor (*isti‘āra*) or metonymy (*kināya*). However, his opinion is not shared by other writers, such as al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505)⁸³ (*Muzhir*, 1:374-375), also quoted in Bettini (2011a), who underlines how only some of the numerous meanings of ‘*ayn* are actually to be considered as proper meanings. He says: “What ‘*ayn* refers to is divided into two parts: the first of them traces back to the seeing eye, while the second does not. The first is divided into two parts: the first by way of etymology (*ištiqāq*) and the second by way of figurative process (*tašbīh*)”.⁸⁴ This is true if we consider some of the meanings of the word ‘*ayn*; for example, this word is used to express the spy (*ǧāsūs*) for, as al-Suyūṭī explains, it is a meaning derived from the action of the eye, i.e. seeing. Therefore, the spy is someone who sees and reveals unknown facts.⁸⁵

⁸² See the two epigrams translated by Bonebakker (1966, 91), which play with these two words taken from al-Ṣafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 105).

⁸³ Abū l-Faḍl ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Abī Bakr b. Muḥammad Ḡalāl al-Dīn al-Ḥuḍayrī “famous Egyptian scholar, at present recognised as the most prolific author in the whole of Islamic literature” (Geoffroy, 2012). He was born in 849/1445 in Cairo, where he also died in his house on Rawḍa island in 911/1505. Before he was 18, he held the position of his father as a Ṣāfi‘ite law teacher in the Ṣayḥū mosque, distinguishing himself by competence and rigour. His works and his fame soon reached the limits of the Arab-Islamic world, which resulted in a large number of admirers who looked at his works with esteem, but which also earned him a good number of detractors, first of all al-Saḥāwī (d. 902/1497), who stigmatised the claims of al-Suyūṭī regarding the exercise of *iǧtihād*. Al-Suyūṭī was an intellectual who approached every field of science, from religious sciences to erotica, making his mission to preserve and spread the Arab-Islamic knowledge of the previous centuries. On his life, see Sartain (1975), Spevack (2009), and Geoffroy (2012). The most recent publication on al-Suyūṭī is the volume edited by Ghersetti (2016); on his legal thought, see Hernandez (2017); and also Lagarde’s (2018) two-volume translation of the *Itqān fī ‘ulūm al-Qur‘ān*.

⁸⁴ In this case, *tašbīh* does not refer only to the simile, but embraces the whole spectrum of figurative language, such as *isti‘āra* (metaphor), *kināya* (metonymy), etc.

⁸⁵ An interesting analysis of the phenomena of homonymy and polysemy was given by a contemporary scholar who devoted much effort to the study of Arabic lexicology and lexicography. Ben Mrad (2011) highlights that the term *muštarak* is often used in pre-modern sources to designate both phenomena, a designation that we have seen does not apply to al-Ṣafadī, for *ištirāk* is only applied to a word sharing two or more proper meanings and not a proper and a derivate sense. In order to distinguish between homonymy and polysemy, Ben Mrad (2011, 331-332) resorts to Milner’s *Introduction à une science du langage*, Paris: Seuil, 1989, and borrows three categories: 1. *L’appartenance catégorielle* (= C), 2. *La forme phonologique* (= P), and 3. *La signification lexicale* (= S). To these categories, Ben Mrad adds 4. *La forme morphologique* (= M), which represents the pattern upon which an Arabic word is built, its *ṣīga* pl. *ṣiyaḡ*, and 5. *L’origine étymologique* (= E). These are properties of the words whose lack or

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1.1.3.2 Infelicitous *tawriya*

Having approached the *ištirāk* phenomenon from a theoretical point of view, al-Şafadī turns his attention to the misuse of homonymy in a poetic context. We can define this second part of the second *muqaddima* as a counterpart to *tawriya* theory. Or, rather, as a series of clarifications on the use or abuse of (pseudo)homonymous words. As pointed out by Bonebakker (1966, 91-92), al-Şafadī demonstrates a solid knowledge of the Arabic lexicon above all in this section and in the others that follow. There are three categories to which these incorrect uses of *tawriya* can be assigned: 1. When an error occurs in homonymy (*fī-mā ḥaṣala min al-wahm fī l-ištirāk*), 2. The imperfect *tawriya* (*al-tawriya l-nāqiṣa*), and 3. The far-fetched *tawriya* (*al-tawriya al-ba'īda*).

1.1.3.2.1 Erroneous homonymy

Al-Şafadī discusses in the section on erroneous homonymy (*Faḍḍ*, 105-115) many examples of the use of a word thought to be a homonym, but which does not denote the meanings that the poet wanted to convey. This can happen for several reasons. For instance, there is the need for the poet to respect the constraints of Arabic poetry, in particular the rhyme. This is the case in a two-line poem by Abū l-Ḥusayn

presence distinguish them. Applied to words, he notes the difference between them by (-) when there is no difference, thus a resemblance, and (+) when the words differ. For instance, the author proposes the examples of the words *nāmūs* (law) and *nāmūs* (mosquito) which he analyses as follow [- P, - M] [+ C, + S, + E], i.e. they are phonologically and morphologically similar, but their categories, meanings, and etymology differ. Another example he gives are the words *ḥurṣ* (palm) and *ḥurṣ* (earring): [- P, - M, - C] [+ S, + E], i.e. they differ only in meaning and etymology. Therefore, these two cases are homonyms. On the other hand, when he turns his attention to the word *‘ayn*, he affirms that all its meanings are connected to the first signification, thus having a common etymology [- E], i.e. ‘eye’. A case of polysemy. From his analysis, he deduces that a general rule for polysemy runs as follow: [- P, - M, - C, - E], [+ S]. On the other hand, there are three possibilities for homonymy. Two of them are those already described, while the last is depicted by the properties [- P, - M, - E], [+ C, + S], for example the word *‘adl*, which is used as noun and adjective [+ C] and thus assuming two different meanings [+ S]. It should be noted that for Ben Mrad, the difference of category, i.e. their being two different parts of speech, is a sufficient criterion to categorise them as homonymy and not as polysemy.

al-Ġazzār (d. 679/1281), where the word *quriḍa* has as its first meaning ‘it has been cut’, but is intended by the author as *quriḍa*, i.e. ‘it has been tanned’.⁸⁶

وقائلٍ قال ما أعددت من أُهْبٍ * لذا الشتاءِ وذا البردِ الذي عرضا
فقلتُ دعني فقد أعددتُ لي بَدَنًا * مُشَلِّحًا وشقًا في القلبِ قد قُرِضا

To whom said, ‘You have not prepared the equipment for this winter and this cold
which came.’

I replied: ‘Leave me! I did prepare for me a coat of wool and misfortune, which has
been already cut in my heart.’

Or, for instance, two epigrams where the word *šifā* (*šifā*) denoting the primary meaning ‘cure’ is intended by the poet as *išfā*, i.e. the awl of a shoemaker (Bonebakker, 1966, 92). Another kind of ‘false’ *ištirāk* is represented by the association of a plural form with two singular forms having two different meanings. Or the use of a word with a given pattern to represent another word which differs from the first by a single vowel. Such is the case with the word *riqqa*, *nomen verbi* of *raqqa*, which means among other things ‘pity, mercy’. It is intended by the poet Sayf al-Dīn al-Mušidd (d. 656/1258) as *raqqa*, i.e. a piece of land near a river which is flooded and is therefore very fertile, referring in this epigram to the saliva of the beloved that heals the distress of the lover:

وشادنٍ أوردني هَجْرُهُ * لهيبِ حرِّ الشوقِ والفرقة
أصبحتُ حَرَّانَ إلى ريقِهِ * فليت لي من قلبه رِقَّةٌ⁸⁷

⁸⁶ The difference between the letter *ḍ* and *ḏ* has always been a topic of discussion among Arab scholars. The two letters often overlap, and this ambiguity can be seen in many words, which Arab scholars have always tried to rectify by compiling lists of words where the speaker can confuse these segments. All the sources I could check report the difference between *qaraḍa* and *qaraḏa*. See, for instance, Ġamāl al-Dīn b. Mālik (*Urġūza*, v. 94-95). For another *tawriya* epigram where the difference lies in *s* and *ṣ*, see Gibert (1962, 556).

⁸⁷ Al-Mušidd (*Dīwān*, 114, with variant: هجره < حبه, 120, with variant: مشيت < أصبحت), al-Šafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 108).

O young gazelle, the separation from him brought me the burning flame of desire
and separation.

I became thirsty for his saliva; would I have mercy from his heart.

Another instance of false *ištirāk* is the use of combined words. For instance, *al-šāmāt*, which is the plural of *šāma* 'mole', but which could be understood as *al-šāh māt* (namely, the final move in the game of chess). In this regard, al-Šafadī clearly states that the elision of the *h* – due to the *naḥt* process by which two independent words blend to form a unique word (Ali, 2006, 451-455) – in *al-šāh* invalidates any ambition to present a good *tawriya*.

Al-Šafadī collects many other examples in this part of his treatise, which occupies a comparatively large amount of space. In most cases, the *loci* refer to situations in which the poet creates a *tawriya*, a homonymy where in reality one does not exist. As in the examples that we have seen, most of these are changes of vowel, attributions of the same plural form to different singular words, combinations of words in order to create an assonance inducing the reader to think that there is a *tawriya* where in fact there is not one, etc. Finally, al-Šafadī says at the end of this section that a given word, despite being a perfect homonymous word, cannot be considered a *tawriya* if one of the two meanings is closely related to the toponymy of an area not universally recognised and known, an area that only a few readers have knowledge of in their Encyclopaedias. For, the purpose of *tawriya* is for the public to recognise and decode it.

1.1.3.2.2 *al-Tawriya l-nāqiša*

Having described infelicitous *ištirāk*, al-Šafadī opens the section about the imperfect *tawriya* (*al-tawriya l-nāqiša*) (*Faḍḍ*, 115-119). Bonebakker (1966, 92-93) has already presented the essential points of this section, in which al-Šafadī lists some examples of *tawriya nāqiša* which, unlike the previous category, is based on a real *ištirāk*. This is indeed the essential characteristic for which the two categories described so far stand out. If in the previous a real *ištirāk* was not there, in *tawriya nāqiša* the *ištirāk* is actualised in a word which could then result in a double reading of the text where

it is uttered. If, however, the *ištirāk* is realised, what prevents the double reading of the homonymous word is, in most cases, the different attribution of grammatical case. This means that one of the two meanings of the homonymous word, although plausible within the semantic frame of the text, cannot be considered as a part of it because it is expressed by a word whose case cannot refer to one of the two meanings. This is the case in the example cited by Bonebakker (1966, 92), in which the word *āba*, although denoting a verb, i.e. ‘to return’, and a noun, i.e. ‘August’, can only be interpreted as a verb, since the attribution of the accusative case to the name would result in a syntactically flawed phrase, a sentence *ġayr mufīda*. A very similar example is found in the verses of al-As‘ad Ibn Mammātī (d. 606/1209):

قد نَفَّتَ السِّحْرُ السَّحْرَ * وَأَشْبَهَ الزُّهُرُ الزُّهُرُ
وَبَلَّ كَافُورُ النَّدَى * ثِيَابَ أَوْرَاقِ الشَّجَرِ
وَالْعَنْدَلِيبُ إِذْ رَأَى * مُحَرَّمَ الرُّوضِ صَفَرُ

The enchantment blew the false dawn and the blossom resembled the three nights
at the beginning of the month.

The moisture of the camphor moistened the garments of the leaves of trees.

And the nightingale whistles, when it sees the prohibited gardens.

According to al-Šafadī’s, the author uses in this epigram an imperfect *tawriya* based on the words *muḥarram* and *šafar*. The *qarīb* meaning of the former is the past participle ‘forbidden’ in the position of a direct object of the verb *ra’ā* ‘to see’, an action attributed to the nightingale. As for the latter, its *qarīb* meaning is the verb *šafara*, i.e. ‘to whistle, to chirp’, also attributed to the nightingale. On the other hand, the poet seeks as intended meaning the two months of *muḥarram* and *šafar*; however, if interpreted according to these meanings, the utterance is not complete, and the sentence is *ġayr mufīda*. This is due to the fact that, if we interpret *šafar* as a noun and not as a verb, it would be the second direct object of the verb *ra’ā*, which would make the sentence require completion, i.e. the protasis introduced by *id* would

lack the apodosis represented by the verb *şafara*. Therefore, *tawriya* is *nāqışa* – namely, one of its two senses leads to a syntactically incorrect sentence.

Other examples have been quoted by Bonebakker (1966, 93). One is the citation of a book by abbreviating its title, where the abbreviation is not commonly applied to this title. Al-Şafadī considers this to be an imperfect *tawriya* – i.e. the book *Tashīl al-fawā'id wa-takmīl al-maqāşid* by Ğamāl al-Dīn b. Mālik, usually abbreviated as *al-Tashīl* and not as *al-Fawā'id*, for one should not refer to the *muḍāf ilay-hi* without mentioning the *muḍāf* (al-Şafadī, *Faḍḍ*, 118-119).⁸⁸ Another example he quotes is about the juxtaposition of two concepts that logically contradict each other, *al-ğam' wa-l-ḥuluww*, which, if meant to be the union of togetherness and aloneness, are mutually contradictory as if we pretend to find the property of being at the same time divisible and indivisible in a number.

The last example is somewhat strange, since it should be assigned to the previous section on the false *iştirāk* rather than to that of *tawriya nāqışa*. It is a two-line poem by Ğamāl al-Dīn Ibn Maṭrūḥ (d. 649/1251) that plays on the word *suwayd*:

وظبي قد رأيناه بُبُصرى * يَصِيدُ الأسدَ صَيْدًا أَي صَيْدِ
فقلتُ الأصلُ قال من السويدا * فقلتُ لصاحبي هذا سُوَيْدِي

Such a *he-gazelle/beautiful boy*, we saw him in Buşrà hunting *lions/men*, whatever prey he was.

I asked: 'Where are you from?' He answered: 'From al-Suwaydā.' I said to my companion: 'This is my little lord.'

⁸⁸ The three-line poem by Sa'd al-Dīn Muḥammad b. 'Arabī (d. 656/1258-1259) runs as follow:

إِنَّ الإمامَ جمالَ الدينَ فَضَّلَهُ * إلهه ولنشر العلم أهله
أملى كتاباً له باسم الفوائد لم * يزل مفيداً لذي لب تأمله
فكل مسألة في النحو يجمعها * إِنَّ الفوائد جمع لا نظير له

God made the Imām Ğamāl al-Dīn excel and made him worthy of the spread of the knowledge. He dictated a book called *al-Fawā'id*, which never ceased to be useful to those with an investigating intellect.

He collected (*yağma'u*) every subject of grammar; indeed *the benefits (fawā'id) is a plural (ğam')/al-Fawā'id is a collection (ğam')* which has no equal!

Contrary to what al-Şafadī states, al-Suyūṭī (*Buğya*, 1:132-133) points out that Ğamāl al-Dīn b. Mālik was the author of a book called *al-Fawā'id*, of which the *Tashīl al-Fawā'id* was an abridgment. Thus, the *tawriya* in this verse is correct.

As I have just pointed out, this looks like an example pertaining to the category of false *ištirāk* rather than to that of *tawriya nāqīša*. This is because al-Şafadī judges negatively the use of *suwaydī* as a relative adjective. The only possible meaning for the morphological form *suwaydī* is that of the diminutive ‘my little lord’; it is incorrect to associate with this form the meaning of the relative adjective ‘from al-Suwaydā’ – indicating the origin of the young man – because the correct forms are only *suwaydāwī* and *suwaydāī*.

It is clear that it is necessary for al-Şafadī that a *tawriya* supports both readings suggested by the homonymy. Therefore, if it does not support one of the two senses of the homonymous word at the syntactic or logical level, then the *tawriya* is incomplete, imperfect. This does not mean, however, that this *tawriya* does not exist, and here lies the difference between an incorrect *tawriya* and a false *ištirāk*. For al-Şafadī, a false *ištirāk* does not give rise to a *tawriya*, while a *tawriya nāqīša*, albeit imperfect, is still a *tawriya*, given that the homonym is understandable by the reader, but cannot be judged as a successful example of *tawriya*.

1.1.3.2.3. al-Tawriya l-baīda

Al-Şafadī devotes the penultimate section of this second *muqaddima* to what he calls *tawriya baīda* (far-fetched *tawriya*), i.e. the third and last type of the three possible unhappy attempts to formulate a *tawriya*. It must be admitted that this section is characterised by a certain level of difficulty and sometimes the few examples that al-Şafadī provides are not easy to grasp. Let us start first with the definition in (*Faḍḍ*, 120), also in Bonebakker (1966, 93-94): “The *tawriya* is *baīda* because of the use of a concept connected (*muta‘allaq*) with the *muwarrà bi-hi* or of a correlative (*lāzim*), instead of the *muwarrà bi-hi* itself. Or putting a concept connected (*muta‘allaq*) with the *muwarrà ‘an-hu* or a correlative (*lāzim*) in its stead”. Al-Şafadī does not provide many examples of this kind of *tawriya*, which seems to be based, above all, on the association of ideas that a certain segment of text should suggest to the reader a second segment which can then be read as a *tawriya*. I will try to make this

explanation clearer through some examples. The first that the author quotes is an epigram by al-Šabb al-Zarīf (d. 688/1289):

وَشَادِنٍ يَسْلُبُ الْعُقُولَ وَلَا * يُمَهِّلُهَا فِي الْهَوَىٰ فَيُهْمِلُهَا
تَغْزُلُ الْحَاظِلَةَ فَكَمْ فَتَكَّتْ * فِي قَلْبِ مَنْ رَاقَهُ تَأْمُلُهَا
جَدِيدَةُ السِّخْرِ لَمْ تَزَلْ أَبَدًا * حَدِيثُهَا فِي الْهَوَىٰ وَمَغْزَلُهَا⁸⁹

Such a he-gazelle, he steals the mind and does not allow the passion to last, rather he abandons it.

His looks are *spinning/flirting*, how often did they bring death in the heart of the person who loves to contemplate them?

Always new enchantment, their speech and their *spindle/flirting* never end in the passion.

In this epigram, the last word should be vowelless *miğzal* - or *muğzal*, cf. (*Lisān*, s.v.) – that is, a *nomen instrumenti* that means ‘spindle’. Al-Šafadī points out that in this case it is not possible for the word to be vowelless *mağzal*, i.e. a *nomen verbi* meaning ‘love talk, flirting’, because, at least as far as I have understood, he does not foresee this form of *mašdar*, despite it being reported in the dictionaries and used in poetry (*Lisān*, s.v.). It is clear, therefore, that within this text the first meaning is not applicable. How, then, can the presence of this expression be justified? Al-Šafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 120) explains that the word *ğazal*, *nomen verbi* of *ğazila*, denotes the love talking, the conversation between the lovers, the flirtation; and the noun *ğazl* is the *nomen verbi* of *ğazala*, i.e. ‘to spin, e.g. cotton’. The poetic use introduced and legitimised the use of the word *ğazl* instead of the word *ğazal* to mean ‘flirtation, love talking’. In the case in question, in the second verse the verb *tağz_lu* could be the *muḍāriʿ* tense of both verbs depending on the vowel attributed to the second radical letter. Since the looks are the subject of the verb, the only possible image is that of the looks engaged in a love conversation; therefore, the poet intends the

⁸⁹ Al-Šafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 120, with variant: *يُمَهِّلُهَا فِي الْهَوَىٰ فَيُهْمِلُهَا*), al-Šabb al-Zarīf (*Dīwān*, 217).

meaning *ġazila-yaġzalu-ġazal*. Looks which speak of love, but which have a deadly effect on those who contemplate them. By virtue of the use of the *maṣḍar ġazl* to mean *ġazal*, al-Ṣafadī attributes to the poet the use of the word *miġzal* to actually mean the *maṣḍar ġazal*, as if it were an association of ideas for which the *qarīb* meaning of *miġzal*, i.e. ‘spindle’, suggests the *maṣḍar ġazal* ‘love talking’, by virtue of the fact that it can be replaced by *ġazl* ‘the spinning’. According to this analysis, it is possible to say that a concept connected to the *muwarrà ‘an-hu* is replacing the *muwarrà ‘an-hu* itself.

A second example of *tawriya ba‘īda* has been already analysed by Bonebakker (1966, 94). It is a two-line epigram by Ibn Lu‘lu‘ al-Dāhabī (d. 680/1281):

أَدِرْ كُؤُوسَ الرَّاحِ فِي رَوْضَةٍ * قَدْ نَمَقَتْ أِبْرَادَهَا السُّحُبُ
الطَيْرُ فِيهَا شَيْقُ مُغْرَمٍ * وَجَدَوْلُ الْمَاءِ بِهَا صَبٌّ⁹⁰

Make the cups of wine go around in a garden, the garments of which have been
skilfully woven by the [rain]clouds.

And in which the birds are longing and amorous, and the brook of water is love-
lorn.⁹¹

These two lines are easier to understand than the previous. Bonebakker (1966, 94) paraphrases al-Ṣafadī’s words stating that the word *sabb* has as *qarīb* meaning ‘lovelorn’ and as *ba‘īd* meaning ‘rushing down’. However, al-Ṣafadī affirms that only the augmented form *taṣabbub* actually bears this *ba‘īd* meaning, and *ṣabb* is used when refers to the rain as in (Q 80:25): “We pour out water in abundance”⁹² (*an-nā ṣababnā l-mā‘a ṣabban*). The use that he attributes to the poet is justified by the fact that the brook (*ġadwal*) is a correlative (*lāzim*) of the rain – in this case, it is better to speak of a consequence, i.e. the rain is the cause of the brook. But it results in a far-fetched *tawriya*.

⁹⁰ Al-Ṣafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 121), Ḥamd (2012, 222).

⁹¹ Bonebakker’s translation (1966, 94).

⁹² All the Koranic translations are taken from Droge (2013).

A third two-line epigram by al-Šabb al-Zarīf is quoted as a third case of *tawriya ba'ida*. It is based on an antithesis which fails due to the difficult syntax of the line in which the poet has turned the linear order upside down (Bonebakker, 1966, 95).

The very last example to be found in this section is attributed to the pen of al-Mušidd:

كَاتِبُ ذَاكَ الْخَدِّ قَدْ * قَوْمُهُ إِذْ مَشَقَّهُ
نَسَخُ مَجَازِ خَصْرِهِ * سُرَّتُهُ الْمُحَقَّقَهُ⁹³

The copyist of this mark did it accurately when he wrote it elegantly (or: copied it).

A copy, the way/figurative sense of his waist is its centre-piece/navel well
executed/real.

These two verses focus on the use of technical terminology for the art of writing. According to al-Šafadī, the poet's aim is to create an antithesis between *mağāz* and *muḥaqqāqa*. The former has two meanings: the first is 'way, path', while the second is the most familiar to us of 'figurative sense'. The second word is also understood as *tawriya* bearing two meanings, the first is connected with the activity of copying and is defined by Gacek (2001, 34-35): "1. Ancient book hand used by the scribes [...] 2. Family of scripts characterized by a clear execution of letters. 3. The principal rectilinear script (used mostly for the copying of the Qur'ān) characterized by tapered descenders". The second meaning should be the word *ḥaqqīqa* 'proper meaning'. Al-Šafadī's judgement is clearly negative towards this composition since the use of the pattern *mufa'ala* instead of *fa'ila* is not recorded for the meaning 'proper meaning', and it therefore cannot be accepted.

This section ends with al-Šafadī's words warning against defining these infelicitous examples as *tawriya*, and he claims that the terms *ihām al-tawriya* and *ṭayf al-tawriya* (illusory *tawriya*) are more appropriate.

⁹³ Al-Šafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 122), al-Mušidd (*Dīwān*, 117). In the edition of the *Dīwān* available to me, these verses are not an independent epigram, but only the last verse is a part of a longer *qaṣīda* of 23 lines.

1.1.3.3 Common mistakes in the use of *ištirāk*

After describing these three cases of the infelicitous use of a homonymous word to create a *tawriya*, al-Şafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 123-130) closes the second *muqaddima* with a *tatimma*, in which the person who wants to compose *tawriyas* is warned against some common mistakes in the use of *ištirāk*. Bonebakker (1966, 95-96) has already summarised the essential points of this section, and I will complete Bonebakker's analysis by indicating the points to which al-Şafadī directs our attention. Al-Şafadī underlines the importance of not underestimating two essential aspects in the search for the homonym: namely, the *mādda* (radical) and the *şīga* (pattern) of each single expression from which a *tawriya* is to be obtained. The author presents six cases.

1. The first case is represented by nouns with the same *mādda* but different *şīga*, such as طلا, which can be understood as *ṭalan* 'new-born, kid', *ṭilan* (as well as *ṭilā*) 'grape juice reduced of two thirds by cooking', or *ṭulan* (pl. of *ṭulya*) 'sides of the neck'. In this case, it is clear that al-Şafadī's purpose is to underline how being a homograph is not a sufficient condition for judging an expression to be a homonym, since homophony is also necessary.

2. The second case is found in verbs which have the same *mādda* but a different *şīga* when in their *māḍī* form, leading to a diversity of meaning and preventing the use of one of the two forms for both meanings. The example cited by al-Şafadī is the verb *qarra*, which, if vowelled with 'i' in the second radical letter, means 'to be cooled', e.g. *qarirtu bi-hi 'ayn* (thereby I became cool-eyed.); and, if vowelled 'a', means 'to settle', e.g. *qarartu fī l-makān* (I settled in the place).

3. The third case refers to those verbs that have a unique *şīga* when in *māḍī* tense, but differ when in *muḍāri'*, therefore also differing in meaning. For example, the verb *ḥalla*, which, if conjugated *yaḥullu*, means among other things 'to descend in a place', and, if conjugated *yaḥillu*, means 'to be allowed'.

5. In this case, the verbs present a single *şīga* when in *māḍī* tense, but two different *mādda* when in *muḍāri'*, as in the case of *ḥāra yaḥāru* 'to be confounded', but *yaḥūru* 'to return'.

6. The last point that al-Şafadī counts depicts the verbs that agree when in *māḍī* tense, but differ when in *muḍāri'*, e.g. *sarà* and *sarā* – which al-Şafadī judges agreeing

each other – conjugated respectively *yasrī* ‘to travel by night’ and *yasrū* ‘to have good virtues’.

A closing remark ends the second *muqaddima*, in which al-Şafadī states that the aesthetic effect engendered by figures of speech in general, and by *tawriya* in particular, is much stronger when the figure is uttered in the word containing the rhyme.

1.2 Conclusions

What I have presented in this chapter is what we can define as the canonical formulation of *tawriya*, i.e. the description and categorisation which will remain almost unchanged in the writings of al-Şafadī’s successors.

He was not the first to introduce a classification for *tawriya*. For example, Badr al-Dīn Ibn Mālik (*Miṣbāḥ*, 260-262) introduced a quadripartite classification: *muğarrada*, *muraşşaha bi-mā qabla-hā*, *muraşşaha bi-mā ba’dā-hā*, and *muraşşaha bi-lafẓayn kull min-humā yuraşşihu şāḥiba-hu*. The last is what al-Şafadī and al-Ru’aynī will categorise as *tawriya muhayya’a*. This first attempt to classify the types of *tawriya* will not be adopted by Ibn Mālik’s successors. The reason for that is because his system is not suitable for the description of the different types of *lawāzim* with respect to the meanings (*qarīb* and *ba’īd*) to which they refer. Not even al-Qazwīnī (*Talḥīṣ*, 97; *Īdāḥ*, 6:38-40) applies his quadripartite division and only adopts the definitions of *muğarrada* and *muraşşaha*.

Among al-Şafadī’s successors who criticised his work, we find Ibn Ḥiğğa I-Ḥamawī, who felt compelled to compose his own treatise in which he criticised his predecessor especially for having devoted parts of his treatise to discussions of little value, e.g. *taḍmīn*, and for having devoted too much space to *iştirāk* without having discussed it together with *ğinās*. He also criticised al-Şafadī for having collected in the last part of the *Faḍḍ* some epigrams of his without spending a single word on their classification. However, if we look at the two works of Ibn Ḥiğğa (*Kaşf*; *Ḥizāna*), we note that the theoretical part is entirely based on that proposed by al-Şafadī and does not differ from it. The merit of Ibn Ḥiğğa’s works is that they collect a huge number

of *loci* (more than a thousand in *Kašf* alone, and almost double that in *Ḥizāna*) that he uses to introduce us to the best poetic compositions containing this figure of speech. His selection is an invaluable source and tool that provides us with a picture of the poetic aesthetics of the epoch. It must be said that, despite criticising his predecessor for not having assigned each *tawriya*-epigram to its subdivision, Ibn Ḥiğġa commits the same sin by giving us a rich encyclopaedia of unanalysed lines.

Some clarification to Ṣafadian theory was provided by al-Ṣafadī's contemporary al-Ru'aynī, who did not subvert the theory, but added some details that later scholars, like Ibn Ḥiğġa and al-Suyūṭī, would the accept. Al-Ru'aynī must also be recognised for having drawn from the previous tradition some clarification about the use of this figure in the art of riddles by integrating it within the theory of *tawriya*. This choice could indicate al-Ru'aynī's knowledge of previous authors such as Ḍiyā' al-Dīn Ibn al-Aṭīr, who integrated a section on the difference between *tawriya* and riddles in the chapter of the *Maṭal al-sā'ir* devoted to the *muġālaṭa ma'nawiyya* (semantic misleading). Furthermore, the example of *tawriya muhayya'a* expressed in verse 109 by Ibn Ğābir seems closely connected to the *muġālaṭa*, which presents a structure based on the mutual relationship of two homonymous words (this I will discuss in the next chapter). That said, it can be assumed that both Ibn Ğābir and his commentator al-Ru'aynī based their works on different sources and not only on the works of Badr al-Dīn Ibn Mālik, al-Qazwīnī, and al-Ṣafadī. This statement seems to be correct if one analyses the chapter on *tawriya*. However, it would be appropriate to verify this hypothesis by studying those other sections of this commentary that have not yet received adequate attention.

Another foundation of al-Ṣafadī's treatise is the description of the *ištirāk*. In Ṣafadian thought, one can speak of *ištirāk* only if two words are homographic and homophonic, and if they have been coined independently for two different concepts. He therefore does not include the words that, despite being homographic and homophonic, have two meanings, one of which is derived from the other through a figurative process. This distinction is essential for al-Ṣafadī, but it will not be taken up by later authors who will not grant the same interest to *ištirāk*. However, it should be stressed that, although al-Ṣafadī considers *ištirāk* to be the foundation of *tawriya*, in his work he provides examples of *tawriya* which are not strictly homonymous. This

clarification is valid above all if we consider the Koranic verses quoted in the treatise, verses containing *tawriya*-words whose meanings are not always proper meanings, but often figurative derivations from a primary sense.

If considered as a whole, this treatise, which, as hypothesised by Bonebakker (1966, 98), was perhaps never finished, has in itself all the essential characteristics of an *adab* work typical of his time. Not unique in its kind, it is deeply pervaded by the spirit of the epoch. It is a treatise-cum-anthology aspiring to exhaustiveness from all points of view and comparable with Talib's (2019) analysis. This is evident when considering the parts comprising the treatise. Al-Şafadī starts with an introduction describing the topic of his treatise, he then moves to the first part where he starts with a philological section and afterwards deals with the definition and classification of *tawriya*. The second part opens with *iştirāk* and ends with some examples of the infelicitous use of *iştirāk* and *tawriya*. The seal of the work is a selection of epigrams in his own hand.

2. The *muġālaṭa ma'nawīyya*: a forgotten attempt at *tawriya*

During the first phases of the theorisation of *tawriya* – i.e. from approximately the time of its first formulation as *ihām* by Rašīd al-Dīn al-Waṭwāt (d. 578/1182-1183)¹ in his *Ḥadā'iq al-siḥr* and as *tawriya* by Usāma b. Munqid (d. 584/1188)² in his *al-Badī' fī naqd al-šī'r*, until its final quadripartite canonical formulation in al-Şafadī's (d. 764/1363) *Faḍḍ al-ḥitām* and in the work of his successors – different authors discussed *tawriya* in relation to other figures of speech. In doing so, some authors did not use the term *tawriya*, but other terms instead. An example of this is found in authors who used the term *muġālaṭa ma'nawīyya* (semantic misleading), which sees among its advocates three important authors such as ʔiyā' al-Dīn Ibn al-Aṭīr (d. 637/1239)³ in his *al-Maṭal al-sā'ir*, Abū 'Abd Allāh Ğamāl al-Dīn Ibn al-Naqīb (d. 698/1298) in his *Muqaddimat tafsīr Ibn al-Naqīb*,⁴ and Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza al-'Alawī l-Yamanī (d. 745/1344 or 749/1348)⁵ in his *al-Ṭirāz al-mutaḍammin*. Al-Şafadī (*Faḍḍ*,

¹ Rašīd al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. 'Abd Ğalīl al-'Umarī, better known as Rašīd al-Dīn al-Waṭwāt, died in 578/1182-1183 at the age of 97. He was chief secretary and renowned for his writing skills in both Arabic and Persian. Of particular importance in his work are the collections of bilingual letters, his *dīwān* with more than 8500 verses, and his book on figures of speech, *Ḥadā'iq al-siḥr fī daqā'iq al-šī'r*, where he was the first to name the figure *tawriya*. See de Blois (2012).

² Usāma b. Muršid b. 'Alī was born in Şayzar in 488/1095 and died on 23 Ramaḍān 584/16 November 1188. He was above all a warrior and a politician, but his literary merits are certainly not inferior to his military ones. A source about his life is the *Kitāb al-i'tibār*, a book of memories containing interesting information on the life of the epoch and on the 'cohabitation' with the crusaders, wherefrom its pages in which he describes their customs. Often involved in power games and accused of having participated in some attacks against political authorities, he was forced to leave Syria and take refuge in Egypt, from where he was then forced to flee once again to take refuge in Damascus. He ended his life in the service of Şalāḥ al-Dīn (d. 589/1193), although he spent the last few years of his life away from the political scene. In addition to his autobiography, his works include his *dīwān* and *al-Badī' fī naqd al-šī'r*, a treaty about figures of speech which is my source for *tawriya*. See Humphreys (2012), and DeYoung (2011c).

³ ʔiyā' al-Dīn Abū l-Faṭḥ Naşr Allāh was born on 20 Şa'bān 558/24 July 1163 and died on 29 Rabī' al-ṭānī 637/28 November 1239. He was very active in politics and was the *wazīr* of Şalāḥ al-Dīn's son in Damascus. He ended his life as *kātib al-inşā'* in Mosul and died while travelling to Baghdad during an embassy journey. He wrote several works mostly devoted to prose, poetry and literary criticism. See Rosenthal (2012).

⁴ His work *Muqaddima fī tafsīr Ibn al-Naqīb* was edited and printed in Cairo in 1909 under the title *Kitāb al-fawā'id* and attributed to Ibn Qayyim al-Ğawziyya (d. 751/1350). See Sa'īd 'Alī (1991).

⁵ Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza b. 'Alī b. Ibrāhīm al-Ḥusaynī l-'Alawī l-Ṭalībī was born in Şan'ā' in 669/1270 and died in 745/1344 or 749/1348. As a Zaydite *imām*, he exercised his authority over part of Yemen until his

75) is aware of ʿIyāʿ al-Dīn Ibn al-Aṭīr’s use of this definition, and limits himself to saying that “it is a close definition”. Unlike his response to other definitions of *tawriya*, he does not add any further comment. Al-Ṣafadī does not completely reject ʿIyāʿ al-Dīn Ibn al-Aṭīr’s definition, but somehow relegates it to a subordinate place. Is there anything more to discover about the relationship between *muḡālaṭa maʿnawiyya* and *tawriya*?

In this chapter, I will present the views of these three authors and demonstrate that in their work the *muḡālaṭa maʿnawiyya* shares the same theoretical background of *tawriya*, and that it is often possible to analyse the *loci probantes* given by the authors using the same approach and terminology of *tawriya*.

2.1 The *muḡālaṭa maʿnawiyya* in Ibn al-Aṭīr’s view

Bonebakker (1966) quotes Ibn al-Aṭīr among the predecessors of al-Ṣafadī, underlining that he uses the term *tawriya* in a wider sense and not as a specific technical term to designate a particular figure of speech. This is shown at the very beginning of Ibn al-Aṭīr’s chapter on *muḡālaṭa maʿnawiyya*:

This type (i.e. the *muḡālaṭa maʿnawiyya*) is among the most pleasant [figures] that are used in the speech and its expressions, for there is a *tawriya*. It consists in mentioning a meaning (*maʿnā*) which has a similar or an opposite [meaning] in something else. The opposite is better and finer. The first – the one which happens to have a similar meaning – takes place in the homonym expressions (*fī l-alfāz al-muṣṭaraka*). (Ibn al-Aṭīr, *Maṭal*, 3:76)

In commenting on this definition, Bonebakker points out that this “can hardly be called a definition” (1966, 46-47 n. 5). Even though this statement is true, Ibn al-Aṭīr’s treaty by Ibn al-Aṭīr is still very useful for the *loci* that he presents from both poetry

death. His works are mostly theological and legal, but he also composed a commentary on al-Zamaḡṣarī’s (d. 538/1144) *Mufaṣṣal*, and the *Ṭirāz al-mutaḍammīn*, whose sources are Ibn al-Aṭīr and most likely Badr al-Dīn Ibn Malik (d. 686/1287). See van Gelder (2012c) and Bonebakker (2012b).

and prose; starting from these *loci*, we can draw a parallel with *tawriya*.⁶ First, let us consider his definition. Within the definition, the word *tawriya* is not used to designate a singular and specific figure of speech. Instead, it represents a wider category, which we can call ‘ambiguity’ or ‘obscurity’,⁷ meaning the whole result of a semantic play based on the concealment of a second sense or an articulated concept. The figure that Ibn al-Aṭīr describes is called *muḡālaṭa ma’nawīyya*.⁸ It consists of a word or phrase that bears a twofold meaning, or a meaning which can be interpreted in more than one way. The *muḡālaṭa* can be either *miṭlī* or *naqīdī*, depending on the nature of the two conveyed meanings in question. The *miṭlī* type is based on homonymy.

2.1.1 The *muḡālaṭa ma’nawīyya miṭliyya*

To exemplify the *muḡālaṭa ma’nawīyya miṭliyya*, Ibn al-Aṭīr quotes three lines by al-Mutanabbī (d. 354/955):

يَشْلُهُمْ بِكُلِّ أَقْبَبٍ نَهْدٍ * لِفَارِسِهِ عَلَى الْخَيْلِ الْخِيَارُ
وَكُلَّ أَصَمٍّ يَعْسِلُ جَانِبَاهُ * عَلَى الْكَعْبَيْنِ مِنْهُ دَمٌ مُمَارُ
يُغَادِرُ كُلَّ مَلْتَفَةٍ إِلَيْهِ * وَلَبَّئْهُ لَتَعْلَبِهِ وَجَارُ⁹

He drives them away with every lean and strong mount, and its horseman has the choice upon all the others about how to proceed.

And every solid spear, its sides quiver and on the joints thereof blood is poured.

He leaves behind everyone who turns towards him making his breast a den/spear wound for his fox/spear-head.

⁶ For example, al-Zarkašī (d. 794/1392) (*Burhān*, 3:445) cites *muḡālaṭa* among the synonyms of *tawriya*, together with *ihām*, *taḥyīl*, and *tawḡīh*.

⁷ Similar, but not entirely superimposable to the *obscuritas* in the Greek-Latin rhetorical tradition. Cf. Lausberg ([1963] 1984, §§ 132-133).

⁸ Bonebakker translates it as “suggesting erroneous interpretations” (1966, 46).

⁹ Al-Mutanabbī (*Dīwān*, 400), Ibn Ğinnī (*Faṣr*, 3:67-70), Ibn al-Aṭīr (*Maṭal*, 3:76), al-‘Alawī l-Yamanī (*Ṭirāz*, 3:36-7), al-Yāziġī (*‘Arf*, 2:226-27), Bonebakker (1966, 47 only the last verse).

The ambiguity results from the union of the two words *ṭa'lab* and *wiġār*, which can be interpreted according to their two different meanings. In the case of the word *ṭa'lab*, 'fox' and 'spear-head' are the two possible readings. In turn, the word *wiġār* has as its first meaning 'den', e.g. a hole made by an animal in the subsoil. Ibn al-Aṭīr underlines that the union of the two meanings of *ṭa'lab* makes it possible for a transfer of meaning for the word *wiġār* that is appropriate to the second meaning of the word *ṭa'lab*. That is to say, the hole caused by the spear-head is a metaphorical 'den' for the weapon.

The peculiarity of the last line is that the wordplay entails two words which are connected by a transfer of sense: "*naqal al-ma'nà min miṭli-hi ilà miṭli-hi*" (*Maṭal*, 3:76). In other words, the meaning *ṭa'lab*₁ 'fox' corresponds to the meaning *wiġār*₁ 'den', while the meaning *ṭa'lab*₂ 'spear-head' corresponds to the meaning *wiġār*₂ 'spear wound'. In this way, a parallelism is created through which the figure of speech achieves its goal, resulting in a good balance and making the reader connect these two words through a figurative process. Curiously, though, this line is not quoted by any other scholar either as an example of *tawriya*, or as an example of any other figure of speech. In my opinion, these three lines from a 66-line *qaṣīda* versifying Sayf al-Dawla's (d. 356/967) report of his attack on rebellious tribes can be considered a correct example of *tawriya*. If we look at the words used, we can affirm that this is what the critics following Ibn al-Aṭīr define as a *tawriya muhayya'a*, for the preceding co-text supports the meaning 'spear-head' for *ṭa'lab* with the presence of *lawāzim* (correlatives) such as *aṣamm* and *damm mumār*, which can only refer to the this meaning. The use of the word *wiġār* opens the possibility of interpreting *ṭa'lab* as 'fox', and it is only through the utterance of this word that actualises this meaning. Besides these three lines, which have not received such wide attention in later authors, Ibn al-Aṭīr quotes a second example: two lines by al-Mutanabbī (d. 354/955), which will also be quoted by al-Safadī, Ibn Ḥiġġa l-Ḥamawī (d. 837/1434), and Ibn Ma'ṣūm (d. 1120/1708)¹⁰ as an early attempt at *tawriya*. This attempt was successful, it was but not at the same level of their contemporaries.

¹⁰ His full name was 'Alī Ḥān Ṣadr al-Dīn Ibn al-Amīr Niẓām al-Dīn Aḥmad; he was born in Medina in 1052/1642 and died in Shiraz in 1120/1708. He wrote poems and literary anthologies. His most important work is a *badī'iyya* consisting of 147 lines, where he enumerates the figures of speech and,

بِرَعْمِ شَبِيبٍ فَارَقَ السَّيْفُ كَفَّهُ * وَكَانَا عَلَى الْعِلَاتِ يَصْطَحِبَانِ
كَأَنَّ رِقَابَ النَّاسِ قَالَتْ لِسَيْفِهِ * رَفِيقَكَ قَيْسِي وَأَنْتَ يَمَانِي¹¹

In spite of Šabīb, the sword abandoned his hand, although they have been companions under all circumstances.

As if the necks of people said to his sword: ‘Your companion is a Qays while you are Yemenite/a good-forge sword.

These two lines are taken from a 27-lines *qaṣīda* dedicated to Šabīb b. Ğarīr al-‘Uqaylī, who was killed in Damascus in 348/959 during the battle against Kāfūr al-Iḥšīdī (d. 357/968). Ibn al-Aṭīr maintains that this *muġālaṭa* “is like the first, but more subtle and obscure” (*Maṭal*, 3:77). This is due to the fact that the equivocal word *yamānī* needs to be interpreted in light of the co-text. The intended meaning is the one related to the battlefield, i.e. ‘a good-forge sword’ suggested in the co-text by the word *sayf* in the first line and the phrase *riqāba l-nās* in the second, both *lawāzīm* of the *ma‘nā ba‘īd*. On the other hand, the adjective ‘Yemenite’ – even though it does not need any particular explanation or hint to be understood as related to the provenance of a person – needs to be linked with the word Qays, which introduces a new context: tribal rivalry. The rivalry is supposed to be between the tribes Qays and Kalb, the latter having Yemenite origins.¹² Therefore, the meaning depicted in the second line leads us to identify the protagonist of the poem in opposition to his faithful companion, the sword. This opposition is due to the death of the protagonist, which leads the sword to forsake the hand that wielded it. This is as though the two actors – the protagonist and his sword – were members of two rival tribes. Without the word Qays, with *is* paired with *yamānī*, the sense of strong rivalry would not have been expressed. Thus, we can understand Qays as a *lāzīm* of the *ma‘nā qarīb*. It is not

like al-Mawṣilī (d. 789/1387), names them; he also provided a commentary of it called *Anwār al-rabī‘ fī anwā‘ al-badī‘*, which he completed in 1093/1682. See Lowry (2009; 2017).

¹¹ Al-Mutanabbī (*Dīwān*, 475), Ibn Ğinnī (*Faṣr*, 4:718), Ibn al-Aṭīr (*Maṭal*, 3:76-7), al-Šafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 42, 90; *Ġayt*, 2:27 with variant رَفِيقَكَ < عدوك), Ibn Ḥiġġa (*Ḥizāna*, 2:79, 3:187; *Kašf*, 52), Ibn Ma‘šūm (*Anwār*, 2:50), al-Yāziġī (*‘Arf*, 2:348-49), Bonebakker (1966, 70).

¹² Cf. Watt (2012c); Fück and Dixon (2012).

easy at this point, to classify this type of *muġālaṭa-tawriya*, since both meanings seem to have *lawāzim* referring to them.¹³ None of the other authors gave any explanation on its classification. Al-Ṣafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 42), for example, does not even explain the wordplay and limits himself to referring to al-Mutanabbī's commentators, while in (*Ġayt*, 2:27) he provides only a short gloss of *yamānī*. Ibn Ḥiġġa l-Ḥamawī (d. 837/1434) explains the twofold meaning of these lines in both (*Kašf*, 52) and in the *tawriya* chapter of (*Ḥizāna*, 3:187). He also arranges (*Ḥizāna*, 2:79) al-Mutanabbī's lines in the *ṭibāq* (antithesis) chapter, presenting them as a good example of interaction between *tawriya* and *ṭibāq*: "Among those who clothed the *muṭābaqa* with the silk dress of *tawriya*, there is Abū l-Ṭayyib al-Mutanabbī when he said [...] by my life, Abū l-Ṭayyib elevated the value of the *muṭābaqa* and effaced its meanness by his proximity with this figure of speech, which became of great value among the literati." In this case, the *ṭibāq* is not a mere opposition of two contraries, but a complex figure whose value lies in the opposition of the nature of the two actors in the narrative: on one side, the protagonist who, once killed, leaves the sword, his most trusted companion; on the other, the sword, which is also deprived of its companion. The antithesis is not only in the association of the two tribes, Qays and Kalb. It develops between the word *rafiq* 'companion' and the fact that, being separated, they are compared through a metaphorical process to the distance and rivalry which have always distinguished the Qays and Kalb tribes. These two lines, then, are from the point of view of the rhetorical devices that they use more complex than they seem. They are the union of at least three figures of speech which participate equally in the success of the final pathos – that is to say, a tragic vision of the death of the hero.

A classification of this lines as a mere example of *muġālaṭa* – or *tawriya* – is to some extent unhelpful. The *tawriya* makes possible an interpretation of the text through a metaphorical understanding of the companionship between the hero and his sword as if they were two enemies instead. This engenders an opposition of senses resulting in a *ṭibāq*.¹⁴

¹³ It could be classified as a second type of *tawriya muġarrada*, with *lawāzim* referring to both meanings. But, as we will see, these lines are more complex.

¹⁴ The same explanation is found in Ibn al-Ma'sūm (*Anwār*, 2:50).

Another interesting example of *muġālaṭa* that is quoted by Ibn al-Aṭīr is a four-line epigram. None of the later critics quoted it among the *tawriya loci probantes*. However, I consider it a relevant example to demonstrate that *muġālaṭa* is comparable to *tawriya*.

وَمَنْ مُبْلِغٌ عَنِّي الْوَجِيهَ رِسَالَةً * وَإِنْ كَانَ لَا تُجْدِي لَدَيْهِ الرِّسَالَةُ
تَمَذَّهَبْتَ لِلنُّعْمَانِ بَعْدَ ابْنِ حَنْبَلٍ * وَفَارَقْتَهُ إِذْ أَعْوَزْتَنكَ الْمَاكِلُ
وَمَا اخْتَرْتَ رَأْيِي الشَّافِعِي تَدِينًا * وَلَكِنَّمَا تَهْوَى الَّذِي مِنْهُ حَاصِلُ
وَعَمَّا قَلِيلٍ أَنْتَ لَا شَكَّ صَائِرٌ * إِلَى مَالِكٍ فَافْظَنُ لِمَا أَنَا قَائِلٌ¹⁵

Who is going to deliver to al-Waġīh a letter from me, even if the letters are useless
for him?

You chose to follow the school of Nu‘mān after having been Ḥanbalite, but you
abandoned it when the provisions became scarce to you.

You did not choose the Šāfi‘ite rite piously, but you only like the profit you earn
from it.

There is no doubt that very soon you are going to approach *Mālik b. Anas*/the
guardian Mālik, so be aware of what I am saying.

This satirical epigram is quoted in several sources and it is attributed to al-Tikrītī (d. 599/1202),¹⁶ who reprimands al-Waġīh Ibn al-Dahhān (d. 612/1215) for his behaviour.¹⁷ The story behind this satirical epigram describes the tendency of Ibn al-

¹⁵ Ibn al-Aṭīr (*Maṭal*, 3:77-8), Ibn Ḥallikān (*Wafayāt*, 4:153 with variants رأى < وذلك لما؛ رأى < وفارقته إذ < وذلك لما؛ رأى < دين؛ الذي منه < الذي هو؛ فافطن < فاسمع), Ibn al-Dubayṭī (*Dayl*, 1:210, 5:34), al-‘Alawī l-Yamanī (*Tirāz*, 3:37 with variants فافطن < فاسمع), al-Šafadī (*Nakt*, 234 with variant الذي منه < الذي هو؛ فافطن < فاسمع), *Wāfi*, 2:82-83, 25:49).

¹⁶ Al-Mu‘ayyad Abū l-Barakāt Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Sa‘īd b. Abī l-Farġ al-Tikrītī. Ibn Ḥallikān (*Wafayāt*, 4: 153), Ibn al-Dubayṭī (*Dayl*, 1:209-210), al-Šafadī (*Nakt*, 234; *Wāfi*, 2:82-83), Bougamra (1983, 246-247). He was a pupil of Ibn al-Dahhān.

¹⁷ Abū Bakr al-Mubārak b. Abī Ṭālib al-Mubārak b. Abī l-Azhar Sa‘īd al-Waġīh Ibn Dahhān al-Naḥwī l-Ḍarīr al-Wāsiṭī. Born in 532-534/1137-39 and died on the 26th of Ša‘bān 612/20th of December 1215. Ibn Ḥallikān (*Wafayāt*, 4: 152-53), Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī (*Iršād*, 6:231-238), Ibn al-Dubayṭī (*Dayl*, 5:33-34), al-Šafadī (*Nakt*, 233-34; *Wāfi*, 25:47-49), al-Ziriklī (*A‘lām*, 6:152 s.v. al-Mubārak b. al-Mubārak), Talas (1939, 72-73), Bougamra (1983, 191-201). According to Bougamra (1983, 191), Ibn al-Dahhān “est probablement le dernier des grands grammairiens qui ont enseigné à la Niẓāmiyya”. He also points out that there is no mention in the sources of why he converted to the ḥanafite rite, and that the sources do not confirm Talas’ claim that Ibn al-Dahhān abandoned the ḥanbalite rite in order to Luca Rizzo

Dahhān to change *madhab* depending on his convenience. As reported by his biographers, he was at first a Ḥanbalite, and then embraced the Ḥanafite *madhab* for no specific reason. But this was not the end of his chameleon behaviour. When he was appointed as a teacher of grammar at the *madrassa* Niẓāmiyya, he faced the problem of not being Šāfi‘ite, given that the school’s *waqf* foresees the assignment of chairs only to people belonging to this rite (Talas 1939, 34-35; Bougamra 1983, 69-75). To remedy the problem, he embraced the Šāfi‘ite rite.¹⁸

The polemical content of al-Tikrītī’s satire is expressed through the *tawriya*-word ‘Mālik’, which plays on two proper names. As suggested by the co-text, the *ma‘nā qarīb* is the name of Mālik b. Anas (d. 179/796), eponym of the Mālikite *madhab*. The *ma‘nā ba‘īd* is *Mālik ḥāzin al-nār* (Mālik the guardian of hell) (al-Maḥallī and al-Suyūṭī, *Tafsīr*, 495), as described in (Q 43:74-78): “Surely the evildoers will remain in the punishment of Gehenna. * It will not subside for them, and there they will be in despair. * We did not do them evil, but they themselves were the evildoers. * They will call out, ‘Master [i.e. Mālik]! Let your Lord finish us off!’ He will say, ‘Surely you will remain. * Certainly we brought you the truth, but most of you were averse to the truth.’” (*Inna l-muḡrimīna fī ‘aḏābi ḡahannama * lā yufattaru ‘anhum wa-hum fī-hi mublisūna * wa-mā ḡalamnā-hum wa-lākinna kānū hum al-ḡālimīna * wa-nādaw yā māliku li-yaqḏi ‘alay-nā rabbu-ka qāla inna-kum mākiṭūna * la-qad ḡi‘nā-kum bi-l-ḡaqqi wa-lākinna akṭara-kum li-l-ḡaqqi kāriḡūna*). The estrangement consists in the opposition described by the poet in which al-Waḡīḡ Ibn al-Dahhān, as quick as he is in changing rite, is depicted as ready to embrace the last rite that he has not yet embraced, or – and this is the intended meaning – to step in front of the keeper of

become the preceptor of the caliph’s sons. Nonetheless, he was the preceptor of the son of ‘Aḏud al-Dīn Abū l-Faraḡ Ibn Ra‘īs al-Ru‘asā’ and used to live in his house. See Talas (1939, 72-73) and Bougamra (1983, 191-194). Most probably, he was appointed at the Niẓāmiyya after 590/1194, when he embraced the Šāfi‘ite rite. Bougamra (1983, 197) comments: “Les hésitations intellectuelles d’Ibn al-Dahhān nous autorisent, quant à nous, à faire deux constatations toutes simples. La première concerne le souci légitime de cet homme invalide [he was blind] de s’assurer, en toute circonstance, des conditions matérielles confortables et la deuxième le peu d’intérêt qu’il accordait aux divisions doctrinales entre les différentes écoles de la *sunna*”.

¹⁸ It has to be noted that the Šāfi‘ite clause was not as strict as depicted. Several teachers appointed at the Niẓāmiyya, as well as lecturers, were not Šāfi‘ite. For example, Abū Maṣṣūr al-Ġawālīqī (d. 539/1144) was Ḥanbalite. Bougamra (1983, 74-75) maintains that the Šāfi‘ite clause was most probably applied to the teachers of legal sciences, but it was flexible in case of teachers of *naḡw* and *luḡa*.

hell and probably to spend his afterlife burning into the fire as a punishment for his hypocrisy. The co-text provides hints and correlatives referring to the near meaning: Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), eponym of the Ḥanbalite school; al-Nu'mān (d. 150/767), i.e. Abū Ḥanīfa al-Nu'mān b. Ṭābit, eponym of the Ḥanafite school; and al-Šāfi'ī (d. 204/820), eponym of the Šāfi'ite school. No correlative refers to the distant meaning. This is why these four lines are a good example of *tawriya muraššaḥa* (prepared *tawriya*).

Ibn al-Aṭīr continues providing other poetic examples, before turning his attention to the analysis of the *muġālaṭa* in prose texts. He provides a total of eight extracts taken from his own prose. I will quote the three that I consider helpful in a comparative analysis with the canonical formulation of *tawriya*.

The first example that he gives is the double entendre attributed to the prophet:

It is reported in the information mentioned about the expedition of Badr that the Prophet was journeying with his companions directed to Badr, when an Arab man met them and asked: 'From which people are you?' The Prophet replied: 'From *mā*'. The man started thinking and saying: 'From *mā*' from *mā*', trying to understand which clan of the Arabs was called *mā*'. The aim of the Prophet was to hide his matter. He continued, then, on his way.¹⁹ (Ibn al-Aṭīr, *Maṭal*, 3:79)

This is a frequently quoted anecdote to show how the prophet could hide his identity without lying. Ibn al-Aṭīr affirms that the *muġālaṭa* in this text is represented by the word *mā*', which has two meanings: 'water' and the name of a tribe.²⁰ The wordplay relies on the fact that the prophet could conceal his identity while avoiding lying. His reply '*mā*' allowed him to make the person that he was addressing think that *mā*' was the name of a tribe, while the prophet himself meant that they had been created from water. This *muġālaṭa miṭliyya* is completely comparable to the figures described in the poetry excerpts mentioned above.

¹⁹ Also quoted in al-'Alawī l-Yamanī (*Ṭirāz*, 3:39), al-Šafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 97), al-Ru'aynī (*Ṭirāz*, 453), Ibn Hiḡġa (*Kašf*, 52; *Ḥizāna*, 3:187, 3:534).

²⁰ See Kaḥḥāla (*Qabā'il*, 3:1023).

The following is another interesting prose extract in which the *muğālaṭa* plays on historical figures and is strictly combined with the text of revelation:

I knew my reed pen being used to adorn itself with the nouns of eloquence, and its motifs were emerging from its darkness, since my hand, with regard to it, became *ḥammālat al-ḥaṭab/the carrier of the firewood*, while my mind became *Abū Ğahl/ignorant* after having been *Abū Lahab/brilliant*.²¹ (Ibn al-Aṭīr, *Maṭal*, 3:80)

The author judges this excerpt as a good example of *muğālaṭa*, saying that it is a *tawriya laṭīfa*. The wordplay involves the words *ḥammālat al-ḥaṭab*, Abū Ğahl, and Abū Lahab. Abū Lahab is the name of the famous ‘Abd al-‘Uzza Abū ‘Utba, half-brother of the prophet’s father and leader of the clan Hāšim of the Qurayš,²² nicknamed Abū Lahab for his handsomeness. Despite initially protecting Muḥammad, he withdrew his protection after Abū Ğahl and ‘Uqba b. Abī Mu‘ayṭ had accused Muḥammad of evil speech against the ancestors. He died after the battle of Badr in 2/624. He is mentioned together with his wife in the Koran in *sūrat al-masad* (Q 111:1-5): “The hands of Abū Lahab have perished, and he has perished. * His wealth and what he has earned were of no use to him. * He will burn in flaming Fire, * and his wife will be the carrier of the firewood, * with a rope of fibre around her neck” (*Tabbat yadā abī lahabin wa-tabba * mā aġnà ‘an-hu mālu-hu wa-mā kasaba * sa-yaṣlā nāran dāta lahabin * wa-mra’atu-hu ḥammālata l-ḥaṭabi * fī ġīdi-hā ḥablun min masadin*).²³ The use of Koranic verses or, as in this case, a clear and understandable reference to them, is a figure of speech called *iqtibās*, which means “taking a live

²¹ *Wa-‘ahdī bi-qalamī wa-huwa yataḥallà min al-bayān bi-amsā’i-hi wa-tabruzu anwār al-ma‘ānī min zalmā’i-hi wa-qad aṣbaḥat yadī min-hu wa-hiya ḥammālat al-ḥaṭab wa-aṣbaḥa ḥāṭirī abā ġahl ba‘da an kāna abā lahāb.*

²² See Kaḥḥāla (*Qabā’il*, 3:1207).

²³ The religious significance, in this case, is not to the direct service of the development of the *muğālaṭa*; it is, nonetheless, recognised by the reader and remains in the background. Nevertheless, the theological disquisitions presented by the various Koran commentators are not of particular interest in the analysis of this text. Therefore, I will limit myself to mentioning the references to two commentaries of which that I will make wide use of in the next chapter: al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Kaššāf*, 6:455-459), and al-Rāzī (*Tafsīr*, 32:165-173).

coal or a firebrand (*qabas*) from a fire' [and] denotes a quotation or borrowing from the Qur'ān or *ḥadīth* with or without explicit acknowledgement" (Orfali, 2018).²⁴ Abū Ğahl, however, is the nickname given by Muḥammad to 'Amr b. Hišām b. al-Muġīra Abū Ḥakam, chief of the Maḥzūm clan of the Qurayš,²⁵ a strong opponent of the prophet and a supporters of the battle of Badr against the Muslims. He perished during the battle.²⁶ Ḍiyā' al-Dīn Ibn al-Aṭīr explains that the object of this figure is the *ḥāṭir* 'mind', which is associated with the good qualities of Abū Lahab expressed by his *kunya* in its literal meaning, i.e. burning, glazing. On the other hand, the mind is also described as ignorant and stupid after the association with Abū Ğahl and his *kunya*. The author goes to point out that another double entendre association is between the *qalam* 'reed pen' and *ḥammālat al-ḥaṭab*. When someone wants to blame the pen, in the sense of blaming the art of writing, calls it *ḥaṭab* 'firewood'. Here, the hand of the writer is holding the pen/firewood, exactly as Abū Lahab's wife is carrying the firewood in hell.

This text extract represents the use of proper names as *muġālaṭa* denoting a second meaning. This motif will not remain confined to this piece. By way of example, I quote an epigram by al-Šābb al-Ẓarīf (d. 688/1289) in which the figure of speech is expressed by the same words:

لو لم تَكُنْ ابْنَةُ العُنُقُودِ فِي فَمِيهِ * مَا كَانَ فِي خَدِّهِ القَانِي أَبُو لَهَبِ
تَبَّتْ يَدَا عاذلي فِيهِ وَوَجَّتُهُ * حَمَالَةُ الوَرْدِ لَا حَمَالَةَ الحَطَبِ²⁷

If only the daughter of the bunch of grapes had not been in his mouth, there would not have been *Abū Lahab/the flame* in his blood-red cheek.

May *the hands* of the person who blames me about him *perish!* And may his cheek be the bearer of roses rather than of firewood/ḥammālatu l-ḥaṭabi.

²⁴ See also Van Gelder (2002-2003). This text is an appropriate example of how *muġālaṭa ma'nawiyya* – and *tawriya* in general – can be combined with *iqtibās* and work together within a text. I will devote a whole chapter to this topic, and limit myself here to mentioning only the information needed to appreciate Ibn al-Aṭīr's text. See chapter 5.

²⁵ See Kaḥḥāla (*Qabā'il*, 3:1058).

²⁶ On these two protagonists in Islamic history, see Rubin (2007) and Watt (2012 a, b).

²⁷ al-Šābb al-Ẓarīf (*Dīwān*, 70), Ibn Ḥiġġa (*Kašf*, 116-17; *Ḥizāna*, 3:285), al-'Abdarī l-Šaybī (*Timṭāl*, 1:153).
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This epigram is quoted by Ibn Ḥiǧǧa (*Kašf*, 77; *Ḥizāna*, 3:224) as an example of *tawriya* expressed by the Koranic quotation embedded in the text. The two Koranic verses are (Q 111:1, 4) and are marked in italics in my translation. The Koranic meaning which recalls the story of Abū Lahab and his wife is the *ma'nà qarīb* conveyed by the poet, but not intended by him. Here, the Koranic text is used in a *ǧazal* text and helps to express the intensive and burning flame that the beloved has in his cheeks by a comparison suggested by the destiny of Abū Lahab and his wife to end their days burnt in the eternal fire of hell. The cheeks are therefore the carriers of the fire, altered by inebriation, whilst the poet lashes out against those who reproach him for loving that young man, imagining and hoping that his red cheeks inebriated by wine could be rosy, fresh and tender as rose petals.

In both these examples, Ibn al-Aṭīr's extract and al-Šābb al-Zarīf's epigram, the *ma'nà qarīb* is related to the historical figures, while the *ma'nà ba'īd* is expressed by the literal meanings of these phrases. In the first text, *ḥammālat al-ḥatab* means 'carrier of firewood', i.e. the hand is carrying the firewood, which denotes the reed pen in a pejorative sense, extending the blame from a single reed pen which becomes the symbol of the art of writing. The intended meanings in the names Abū Ġahl and Abū Lahab are to be understood as compound expressions of the type 'abū plus noun' corresponding to 'have a quality', 'be such and such'. In this case, the mind is 'ignorant' in its literal sense, and 'flaming' in the figurative sense of 'brilliant'.

In the epigram, the first expression *ḥammālat al-ḥatab* shares the same meaning with the preceding text, i.e. 'bearer of the firewood', which denotes the inebriated cheek of the beloved. Abū Lahab, however, denotes a 'vivid flame' i.e. the manifest sign of inebriation.

The last extract is a *muǧālaṭa* based on two words with a technical meaning:

I have learned that that pleasure [I felt] near him has as a consequence the loneliness and that the first gulp from his encounter makes the bowels thirsty. Indeed, the nature of the time is to replace the clearness with turbidity, to prolong the days of its/his disobedience, and to shorten the days of its/his obedience. What I only say is that it perceived that stolen happiness and it imposed upon it the punishment of

severing. It saw the life being pleasant/hafḍ thus it put an end to it by an opposite case/rafʿ.²⁸ (Ibn al-Aṭīr, *Maṭal*, 3:81)

The figure in this extract relies on two words: *ḥafḍ* and *rafʿ*, which are also an example of *ṭibāq*. From a semantic point of view, they are two antithetical terms, since *ḥafḍ* – *maṣḍar* of *ḥafaḍa* – means literally ‘to lower’, while *rafʿ* – *maṣḍar* of *rafaʿa* – means ‘to raise’. They are therefore an appropriate example of *ṭibāq*. On the other hand, the term *ḥafḍ* applied to the noun *al-ʿayš* ‘life’ conveys the sense of ‘an easy life’, ‘a pleasant life’. The joy of life, experienced through the closeness of the beloved and being able to ‘drink’ from him, comes at the end by the adverse fate, the tyrant time. The end of this experience of joy is described through the action of an opposite event: namely, the word *rafʿ*, which in this case assumes the meaning of ‘to put an end’. The power of this antithesis is enhanced by the use of two words with a twofold meaning. The first meanings that we have just described see in parallel two other meanings that are, however, related to the technical use of the terms in question. In fact, if we turn our attention to grammar, we note that *ḥafḍ* and *rafʿ* are the terms that designate the genitive case and the nominative case respectively, while the term *ʿāmil* indicates the regency operator who assigns a specific case to a word. In applying to this *muḡālaṭa* the theoretical ground of *tawriya* it results that the *maʿnā qarīb* of the two antithetical words is their technical meaning, while the two *maʿnā baʿīd* are those which express the pleasure of life and its coming to an end. Although the presence of two antithetical terms could suggest classifying this example as a *muḡālaṭa naqīdiyya*, the *naql al-maʿnā* that we have seen above is preponderant in the construction of the figure. The *naql* is based on the parallelism *ḥafḍ : rafʿ* = pleasant life : end of it. The phrase which triggers the *muḡālaṭa* is *ʿāmil al-rafʿ*, making possible a reading of *ḥafḍ* as a technical term, for if *ʿāmil al-rafʿ* were substituted with another phrase bearing the *baʿīd* meaning, the whole *muḡālaṭa* would not have been actualised, since *ḥafḍ* acquires its technical meanings once paired with *rafʿ*. The co-

²⁸ *Wa-qaḍ ʿalimtu anna ḡālika l-uns bi-qurbi-hi yuʿqibu ṭḥāš wa-anna tilka l-nahla min liqāʾi-hi taḡʿalu l-akbād ʾiṭāš fa-inna šimat al-dahr an yubaddila l-ṣafw kadr wa-yuwassiʿa ayyām ʾaqūqi-hi ṭūl wa-ayyām birri-hi qiṣar wa-mā aqūlu illā anna-hu šaʿara bi-tilka l-masarra l-masrūqa fa-aqāma ʾalay-hā ḥadd al-qaṭʾ wa-raʾà l-ʿayš fī-hā ḥafḍ fa-azāla-hu bi-ʿāmil al-rafʿ.*

text strongly suggests the *ma'nà ba'īd* and gives no room for a possible double reading of the extract based on the *ma'nà qarīb*. In this case, too, the *muḡālaṭa-tawriya* could be compared to a *tawriya muhayya'a*.

What is more interesting, however, is that in this short text the *muḡālaṭa* shares with the *tawriya* the relation to another figure of speech called *tawḡīh*, or better, the second formulation thereof: *tawḡīh₂* namely, the use of technical terms from the arts and sciences in a text in which only the non-technical meanings provide a sound reading.²⁹ *Tawḡīh₂* and *tawriya* are often in fact overlap, and *tawḡīh₂* can be considered a *tawriya*, given that it is based on the same theoretical ground (a word with two meanings), with the only difference being that one of them is a technical term from the arts and sciences or a proper name.

2.1.2 The *muḡālaṭa ma'nawīyya naqīdiyya*

The second type of *muḡālaṭa* described by Ibn al-Aṭīr is a figure based on a semantic opposition. He quotes only one poetic line by an unnamed poet:

وما أشياء تُشْرِيهَا بِمَالٍ * فَإِنْ نَفَقَتْ فَأَكْسَدُ مَا تَكُونُ³⁰

What are goods you buy for money, since if they *are much in demand/perish* they are worthless in the market?

Ibn al-Aṭīr underlines that the *muḡālaṭa naqīdiyya* is less frequently used than the *muḡālaṭa miṭliyya*. This is due to the fact that this figure is based on a word which has one of its two meanings in antithetical opposition with another word in the text. This is the case in the line quoted above, where the verb *nafaqa* has two opposite meanings. When referring to merchandise, it means 'to be much in demand, to sell well', but, when referring to animals, it means 'to perish, to be exhausted'. The opposition is between the first sense of the verb *nafaqa* and the following word

²⁹ See section 1.1.2.2.2

³⁰ al-Ḥātimī (*Ḥilyat*, 2:191), Ibn al-Aṭīr (*Maṭal*, 3:82), Ibn al-Naqīb (*Muqaddima*, 253), Bonebakker (1966, 48).

aksad, derived from the verb *kasada*, which means ‘to find no market, to sell badly’. The opposition therefore appears to be a contradiction: a highly sought-after good should sell well and not the other way around. The aesthetic value of this figure lies precisely in the role of the reader, who must set aside the first meaning of *nafaqa* and reduce it to the role of *maʿnā qarīb*, while highlighting the sense of ‘to perish’ commonly applied to animals, which then becomes the intended meaning. In doing so, the line emerges from the contradiction and acquires coherence.³¹

The second example that Ibn al-Aṭīr gives is an extract from his own prose:

The attendant sought someone who would report from him the explanations of these events which he summarised and would present their images to whom was absent like they presented themselves to whom was present. And whose status in regard of intelligence is outstanding like the status [of these events] is. They are the brides of the acts. So only the most eloquent of the people is eligible to achieve their beauties. Who brings them is that man, who is the relator of the news about their victory whose veracity lies in the numerous wounds of the men. And the higher authorities of its transmission have been taken from the extremities of the spearshafts. The nights and days have their transmitters. What about if the days and nights transmit themselves?³² (Ibn al-Aṭīr, *Maṭal*, 3:83)

Ibn al-Aṭīr comments on this extract, saying that both the *muḡālaṭa naqāḍiyya* and *miṭliyya* are at play within it.

The phrase expressing the *naqāḍiyya* is “*wa-huwa rāwī aḥbār naṣri-hā allātī ṣiḥḥatu-hā fī taḡrīḥ al-riḡāl*”, which must be read in the light of the technical terminology of the science of the *ḥadīṭ*, where it is essential to establish the reliability of the transmitters. *Ḥarḥ* is a technical term that indicates the weakness and unreliability of

³¹ It should be noted that the verb *šara* is a Janus word, its meaning being both ‘to sell’ and ‘to buy’. This is called *ḍidd* (enantiosem). However, in this line it seems that it does not play any part in the understanding of the figure, since none of the critics spend a single word on it.

³² *Wa-qad irtāda l-ḥādīm man yuballīgu ‘an-hu mašārīḥ ḥādā l-waqā’i’ allātī ḥtašara-hā wa-yumaṭṭilu šuwara-hā li-man ḡāba ‘an-hā ka-mā tamaṭṭalat li-man ḥaḍara-hā wa-yakūnu makānu-hu min al-nabāha karīm ka-makāni-hā wa-hiya ‘arā’is al-masā’i’ fa-aḥsan al-nās bayān mu’ahhal li-ibdā’ ḥisāni-hā wa-l-sā’ir bi-hā fulān wa-huwa rāwī aḥbār naṣri-hā allātī ṣiḥḥatu-ha fī taḡrīḥ al-riḡāl wa-‘awālī isnādi-hā ma’ḥūḍa min ṭaraf al-‘awālī wa-l-layālī wa-l-ayyām la-hā ruwā fa-mā l-ḡann bi-riwāyat al-ayyām wa-l-layālī.*

a transmitter, which can lead to the invalidation of the chain of transmission itself.³³ The adjective *mağrūh* is therefore applied to the man who is not reliable in his transmission, for example because he is known to be a liar or to be of unsound intelligence. Within the text under analysis, the truthfulness of the battle events narrated is based on the *tağrīh* of the men who participated in it. In this case, the word *tağrīh* does not take on its technical meaning of ‘make someone *ğarh*’, but rather its etymological meaning, namely ‘to have suffered many wounds’ by the men who participated in the battle. Precisely these numerous wounds are the undeniable eyewitnesses of struggle and victory. The opposition is therefore represented by the shift from a negative meaning – weak, unsound – to a positive one – incontrovertible witness.

The second figure is the *muğālaṭa miṭliyya* contained in the phrase “*wa-‘awālī asnādi-hā ma’ḥūḍa min ṭaraf al-‘awālī*”. The word on which the figure hinges is ‘*awālī*. As the plural of ‘*ālin*, I have translated it with ‘higher authorities’ in the sense of the closest authorities to the prophet, those that can never be reproached with *ğarh*. The second occurrence of the word, however, no longer refers to the transmitting ‘authorities’ of the facts, but to the means by which they were taken: the ‘spear-shafts’. In the text, the trustworthy authorities are those who transmit the events of the battle, as if they were *ḥadīth* transmitters. But what is the seal of their credibility? The answer lies in the way that they were ‘selected’: through the extremities of the spears. Witnesses and transmitters, every wound is a sign of the truth.

No other examples are given for the *muğālaṭa naqīḍiyya*, and Ibn al-Aṭīr limits himself to ending the chapter by underlining the difference between the *muğālaṭa ma’nawīyya* and the *tağnīs*:

If it were said: ‘The first type (i.e. *muğālaṭa miṭliyya*) of this category is the *tağnīs* (paronomasia),³⁴ which has a single expression and a different meaning, like the example you gave, i.e. the words *ṭa’lab* and *wiğār* in the verses by Abū l-Ṭayyib, for

³³ See Robson (2012).

³⁴ Paronomasia covers only some aspects of the *tağnīs*; in this case, for example, a better translation would be antanaclasis – even if it covers several phenomena, cf. Lausberg ([1963] 1984, §§286-292) – or simply repetition of two homonyms. Cf. Cachia (1998, 19-31), and Heinrichs (2012).

ṭa'lab is both the animal and the very point of the spearhead. Akin are the other examples'. The answer would be: the difference between these two categories is evident and it is that in the *tağnīs* the single expression is mentioned twice, and it is equivalent in the form but is different in the meaning. (Ibn al-Aṭīr, *Maṭal*, 3:83)

The difference between these two figures can therefore be summarised thus. On the one hand, *tağnīs* is a figure based on the repetition of the same word, each time expressing one of the two meanings of the word; it is, so to say, a figure *in praesentia*, since the word must be uttered as many times as there are meanings to be conveyed. On the other, the *muğālaṭa*-word is a figure uttered only once and includes in itself both senses; it is a figure *in absentia*, because two meanings are contained in a single uttered word. This type of *tağnīs* is called *tağnīs* – or *ğinās* – *tāmm* (perfect *tağnīs* or antanaclasis) (Cachia 1998, 21). It is still open as to whether the last prose extract quoted by Ibn al-Aṭīr, which contains the repetition of the word 'awālī, should be taken as an example not of *tağnīs*, but of *muğālaṭa miṭliyya* instead.

2.1.3 al-Alğāz wa-l-ahāğī

After his chapter on *muğālaṭa*, Ibn al-Aṭīr turns his attention to a figure that is often confused with *muğālaṭa*, but which, while presenting similarities at the level of semantic ambiguity, is completely detached from it. These are *alğāz* (riddles) and *ahāğī* (quizzes). Some later authors, as we have seen, will also clarify the difference between these figures. Ibn al-Aṭīr distinguishes them according to solid theoretical definitions. On *alğāz*, he says:

This type of figure is also called *mu'ammā* (puzzle). It is, sometimes, similar to the *kināya* (metonymy), and sometimes to the *ta'rīd* (euphemism). It is also similar to the *muğālaṭa* and almost all the masters of this art dealt with it. (Ibn al-Aṭīr, *Maṭal*, 3:84)

He therefore sees a similarity between *kināya*, *ta'riḍ*, and *muḡālaṭa*.³⁵ But where does the difference lie? Ibn al-Aṭīr continues his chapter by underlining some fundamental differences between these figures and describing the prerequisites on which they are based:

When it is about homonyms, it goes under the *muḡālaṭa* chapter and not under the *aḥāḡī* chapter. *Alḡāz* are a separate matter from all of this, for if ever they would have been [the same matter] altogether, it would have been said *luḡz* and *uḥḡiyya*, while it has been said *kināya* and *ta'riḍ* instead. Moreover, a part thereof is what is called *muḡālaṭā* and another which does not belong to it, so they are called *luḡz* and *uḥḡiyya*. I have already said that the *kināya* is an expression denoting from one side the proper meaning (*ḥaqīqa*); from the other side the figurative meaning (*maḡāz*), and the expression conveys both of them together. About the *ta'riḍ*, it is what is understood from the side of the expression and neither from its proper nor figurative denotation. The *muḡālaṭa* is what is uttered and what is conceived as two things, the first of which is the denotation by the expression of two meanings through conventional homonymy; the other is the denotation by the expression of a meaning and its contrary. Concerning the *luḡz* and *uḥḡiyya*, they are a unique thing, i.e. every meaning which is extracted through derivation (*ḥads*) and guessing (*ḥazr*) and not through either the proper or the figurative denotation of the expression, nor it is understood from its side. (Ibn al-Aṭīr, *Maṭal*, 3:85)

These definitions are very clear and accurately represent the difference between the various figures of speech described. As for the *kināya*, I cite just one example to frame what Ibn al-Aṭīr says about the two sides of the meaning: *ḥaqīqa* and *maḡāz*. In the chapter devoted to *kināya*, he cites as an example the Koranic phrase contained in (Q 4:43) and (Q 5:6), “Or if you have touched women” (*aw lāmastumu l-nisā'*) (*Maṭal*, 3:51), affirming that both meanings conveyed by the expression are to be considered correct. The first refers to its *ḥaqīqa* sense, skin contact; the second, to its *maḡāz* sense, sexual intercourse.

³⁵ The concepts metonymy and euphemism do not pretend to be perfectly superimposable onto the translated words *kināya* and *ta'riḍ*, but I propose them as working translations. For example, Cachia (1998, 64, 66-67) prefers to translate *kināya* as ‘concomitance’ and *ta'riḍ* as ‘obliqueness’. Cf. also Pellat (2012).

On the other hand, the *ta'riḍ* is based on the understanding of a meaning which is neither the proper nor the figurative meaning; instead, it is the result of both conveying another meaning without it ever being affirmed. An example is when a request is not formulated, but is understood in an utterance such as “*wa-laysa fī yadayya šay*” (*Maṭal*, 3:56) (there is nothing in my hands), meaning that I need help and I am asking for it without uttering the question.

Riddles are therefore different to the other three figures mentioned because they entail the use of the reasoning in order to understand and guess the desired meaning, since it is not understandable by referring either to a conventional or to a figurative meaning. I give only one example of a riddle, which Ibn al-Aṭīr cites without attribution:

وصاحبٍ لا أَمَلُ الدَّهْرَ صُحْبَتَهُ * يَشْقَى لِنَفْعِي وَيَسْعَى سَعْيِي مَجْتَهِدِ
ما إن رأيتُ له شَخْصاً فَمُدُّ وَقَعْتُ * عَيْنِي عَلَيْهِ افْتَرَقْنَا فُرْقَةً الأَبَدِ³⁶

Such a companion! I am not tired of the time of his companionship. He grows for my advantage and he strives himself to the utmost effort.

I never saw him in person but since my eye settled on him, we became separated forever.

Who is the companion of whom the poet has lost? Who is the companion whom the poet never saw until the day he departed forever? Well, it is the molar tooth, or the wisdom tooth (*al-ḍirs*).

The solution to this riddle cannot be found by looking at the meaning of the single words, since they do not convey the solution through their semantic connections at the level of proper and figurative meanings, and nor through the implied meaning of the whole sentence, since the *luḡz*

³⁶ The author is Usāma b. Munqib: (*Dīwān*, 203 with variant *وصاحبٍ لا تَمَلُ الدَّهْرَ صُحْبَتَهُ*؛ وصاحب... صحبته < وصاحب لا تَمَلُ الدَّهْرَ صُحْبَتَهُ؛ ما إن... عليه < لم أَلْقَهُ مَدَّ تَصَاحِبِنَا فَحِينَ بَدَأَ لَنَاظِرِي (*Maṭal*, 3:85), al-Ruʿaynī (*Ṭirāz*, 482), Ibn Ḥiḡḡa (*Ḥizāna*, 4:196).

It is not indicated that it is the molar tooth by way of the proper meaning, nor the figurative sense, nor the implied meaning (*mafḥūm*), for it is something which is derived and guessed, and the minds differ in being fast or slow while solving it. If it were said: ‘The riddle is understood by way of the implied meaning and these two lines are understood through the implied meaning.’ The answer would be: what is understood through the implied meaning is the *ta’rīd*, as in his words ‘I am poor, I am needy’. This utterance does not connote the request nor the demand by the proper meaning nor the figurative sense: it is only understood that the person who uttered it is using a euphemism for his demand. These two lines are not like that because they comprehend nothing but what is understood through derivation and guessing and nothing else. This applies to every *luġz*. (Ibn al-Aṭīr, *Maṭal*, 3:85-86)

That there is a certain similarity between the *muġālaṭa* and the *aḥāġī* is undeniable, especially if we consider the upper level within which these two figures are inserted – namely, that of ambiguity. The common point of these figures is precisely the ambiguity, which Ibn al-Aṭīr defines as *tawriya*. As he explains, the resolution of these figures by the reader occurs in different ways. As far as *muġālaṭa* (but also in other figures) is concerned, the resolution occurs at the lexical level based on the proper meanings or figurative senses of the equivocal words or phrases. The *luġz*, on the other hand, presents a wordplay that cannot be solved at the lexical level, but requires the reader to be wise and witty to be able to derive the intended meaning from the initial utterance, without it being explicitly stated.³⁷

2.2 The *muġālaṭa ma’nawiyya* in Ibn al-Naqīb’s view

The second author who discusses *muġālaṭa ma’nawiyya* is Ibn al-Naqīb (*Muqaddima*, 252-257). From a theoretical point of view, he does not offer many more details about this figure than his predecessor Ibn al-Aṭīr. Nonetheless, in contrast to Ibn al-Aṭīr, who classified the *muġālaṭa* phenomenon into two types, he maintains that the *muġālaṭa* is, in fact, branched into three types.

The first is the *muġālaṭa naqīdiyya*, an example of which is the above-mentioned line that plays on the verb *nafaqa*. The second is the *muġālaṭa miṭliyya*, of which he

³⁷ Cf. also al-Ru’aynī (*Tirāz*, 481-482) and section 1.1.2.2.3.

quotes the same *loci* quoted by Ibn al-Aṭīr, such as al-Mutanabbī's verses. The third contains the riddles: *alġāz and aḥāġī*. This is the only difference between Ibn al-Naqīb and Ibn al-Aṭīr, the latter, as we have seen, clearly distinguishing between *muġālaṭa* and *alġāz*. Not much else can be added on what Ibn al-Naqīb presents in his *Muqaddima*, and nor can his contribution broaden reflections already presented by his predecessor.

2.3 The *tawriya* in al-'Alawī l-Yamanī's view

Al-'Alawī l-Yamanī is the last author that I consider in this chapter. His point of view is comparable to that of Ibn al-Aṭīr, given that he arranges *muġālaṭa ma'nawiyya* and *alġāz* separately. However, he considers both the *muġālaṭa* and *alġāz* as two subdivisions of a wider category, which he calls *tawriya*. As underlined by Bonebakker (1966, 46-47 n. 5), the definition given by Ibn al-Aṭīr lacks details and is somewhat obscure. In contrast, al-'Alawī l-Yamanī provides a more detailed definition of the phenomena under analysis. However, he does not provide different *loci*, limiting himself to repeating some of those already quoted by his predecessors. He starts the chapter with the following definition of *tawriya*:

Know that this noun [i.e. *tawriya*] is denoting everything from which a meaning is understood, whose manifest meaning of the expression does not denote it, but it becomes understood through its utterance. Its etymology derives from the speech 'You concealed this' in the sense of 'You hid it'. It is found in the *ḥadīṭ* "When he desired to travel, he concealed with something else" (*kāna idā arāda safar warrà bi-ġayri-hi*),³⁸ i.e. he hid it, alluded to it, and made to think that he wanted something else. This is like the *kināya*, the *ta'rīd*, the *muġālaṭa ma'nawiyya*, the *aḥāġī*, and the *alġāz*. These concepts are all sharing their being denoting given concepts on the plan of their manifest meanings. However, when uttered other concepts are understood, which are not given on the plan of their manifest meanings. We have already spoken about the *kināya* and the *ta'rīd*, we gave examples, we showed the

³⁸ Most probably *kāna idā arāda ġazwatan warrà bi-ġayri-hā*. See Ibn Ḥaġar al-'Asqalānī (*Bulūġ*, no. 1270), Abū Dāwud al-Siġistānī (*Sunan*, no. 2637). Cf. with variants al-Buḥārī (*Ṣaḥīḥ*, no. 2947, 2948) and al-Nasā'ī (*al-Kubrā*, no. 8727, 8728). Cf. Bravmann (1971), who does not quote the *ḥadīṭ*, but only the *Sīrat Rasūl Allāh* by Ibn Hišām (d. ca. 213-218/828-833).

distinction between them, and there is no need to repeat it. Now, we are only talking about the *muğālaṭa*, the *ilgāz* (speaking through riddles), and the *uḥḡiyya*, which is included in the *ilgāz* without distinction. We are going to mention what is related to any one of these two categories. All these concepts, if they are easy to approach, then they are easy to perceive. Great eloquence and magnificent purity of language do not concern them, but they are not devoid of multifariousness of speech and vagueness. They indicate the turning [of the speech] into an eloquent usage, the ability to manipulate the expressions, and the capacity [to express] the motifs. They are not excluded from one of the arts of eloquence: the figures of speech. Many a scholar of rhetoric mentioned and discussed them; thus, we have certainly presented them and did not deprive this book of them. (al-'Alawī l-Yamanī, *Ṭirāz*, 3:36)

Tawriya is, thus, more than a single figure of speech: it is an overarching category which contains in itself various nuances of ambiguity. As we have seen in Ibn al-Aṭīr, several figures share similarities. The core of *tawriya* is for al-'Alawī l-Yamanī the fact that it has the power to convey a meaning which crosses the border of the conventional and manifest meaning, and forces the reader to make an effort to understand the second meaning beyond the superficial level. This second meaning has to be understood in view of the whole utterance and not of the single word exclusively. This is all the more true if we consider a figure such as the *luḡz*, in which no lexical hint is given to the reader to figure out the word or phrase object of the wordplay. On the other hand, *muğālaṭa* presents in a single expression both meanings which must be recognised by the reader on the basis of the co-text, the context of enunciation, and the reader's ability to discern which of the two is the one desired by the author.

2.3.1 The *muğālaṭa ma'nawīyya*.

While showing less interest than Ibn al-Aṭīr in providing *loci* with which to support his theoretical claims, al-'Alawī l-Yamanī focuses on explaining in more detail the epistemological foundations of this figure of speech. His definition of *muğālaṭa* presents some interesting points, especially with regard to the concept of intention:

Know that the *muġālaṭa* consists in a single expression denoting two meanings by means of homonymy. They are meant by the intention and not by the expression itself. This is due to the fact that the convention of the homonym expression is to denote two meanings and more by means of substitution. This is the foundation of the convention of the homonym expression. In contrast, when the two meanings are meant through their utterance, [they are only meant] by aim and not by the expression itself. The difference between the *muġālaṭa* and the *ilġāz* consists in the fact that the *muġālaṭa*, as we have said, happens only with homonym expressions which denote one of their two [meanings] by means of substitution in a given convention. They are all meant by aim and intention. On the other hand, the *ilġāz* does not denote two meanings by means of homonymy. Instead, it denotes a meaning by means of its expression and the other meaning by means of derivation, not through the expression. (al-'Alawī I-Yamanī, *Ṭirāz*, 3:36)

The ground of this figure of speech is constituted by a homonym which presents at least two different meanings. The subsequent clarification that the author provides is fundamental to understanding the reader's action in the success of the figure. In this regard, al-'Alawī I-Yamanī emphasises that the two meanings of the word are not understood through the expression itself, but through the intention (*niyya*)³⁹ which resides, as the author points out, outside the acoustic and/or graphic actualisation of a given word or phrase. In other words, that two distinct meanings can correspond to two identical words on an acoustic and graphic level – two homonyms therefore – is a fact that is found on the level of conventional semantics. This means that these meanings are combined with such words and expressions and are thus interchangeable when outside a given co-text and co-occurrence, and context of enunciation. Without these circumstantial determinants, they are perfectly equivalent to each other. Once the homonym has been uttered, its meanings are bound in a given context of enunciation, and their occurrence inserted in a specific co-text, which forbids their complete interchangeability. This is, in my opinion, what al-'Alawī I-Yamanī means by *niyya* and *qaṣd*; that is to say, the intention of the speaker to use a homonym and suggest one or two of its possible conventional

³⁹ Not to be confused with religious *niyya*: “The acts prescribed by the Islamic *sharī'a*, obligatory or not, require to be preceded by a declaration by the performer, that he intends to perform such an act” Wensinck (2012).

meanings. In those given conditions, the meanings have to be recognised by the reader, who is responsible for reconstructing the entire message. The basis on which this work of recognising and reconstructing relies is convention, i.e. the meanings conventionally attributed to a given word and recognised by a community of speakers. The difference between *muġālaṭa* and *alġāz* hinges on this. The riddle is by its own nature an enigma; and, in expressing a riddle, the teller must not convey the solution by a word whose conventional meaning is its solution.

I have not mentioned the *loci* that he presents for both *muġālaṭā* and *ilġāz*, since they are the same as those already discussed in the section on Ibn al-Aṭīr.

2.4 Conclusions

Some general conclusions can be drawn from what we have seen in the works of these authors.

First, the use of the word *tawriya*. Although Usāma b. Munqid (Badī', 60-61) had already established it as a specific figure of speech, it acquires a wider sense in the works of these three authors. I have translated *tawriya* as 'ambiguity' or 'obscurity' to give it a broader sense which can be applied to several figures – such as *muġālaṭa*, *alġāz*, *aḥāġī*, and in a sense also *kināya* and *ta'rīd* – and in general to a text in which these figures act. These three authors also seem not to take into account the figure *ihām* – synonym of *tawriya* – already described by al-Waṭwāt (Hadā'iq, 135-138), and nor does the work of Ibn al-Aṭīr's contemporary al-Sakkākī (d. 626/1229),⁴⁰ who continued using the word *ihām* in his (*Miftāh*, 537). If we compare the definitions of *tawriya*, *ihām*, and *muġālaṭa*, we can see a fundamental similarity: all of these figures are based on homonymy/polysemy (*ištirāk*) and play on a word or phrase conveying

⁴⁰ Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf b. Abī Bakr b. Muḥammad al-Ḥwārazmī Sirāġ al-Dīn al-Sakkākī was born in Ḥwārazm on 3 Ġumādā 555 or 554/11 May 1160 or 1159. He was a supporter of the Mu'tazilite school. His importance in the landscape of Arabic studies is due to his unique book *Miftāh al-'ulūm*, an all-encompassing work on linguistic sciences, which covers all the fields from morphology to lexicography, from syntax to rhetoric and stylistics, from phonetics to etymology. The third part of his book about *'ilm al-ma'ānī wa-'ilm al-bayān* is the basis upon which Badr al-Dīn Ibn Mālik (d. 686/1287) and al-Qazwīnī will build their rhetorical systems destined to be the canonical formulation of *'ilm al-balāġa*. He died in Raġab 626/June 1229. The most complete information on al-Sakkākī is Maṭlūb (1964). See also Smyth (1992a; 1992b; 1995) and Heinrichs (2012a). For a study of the section on *'ilm al-ma'ānī*, see Simon (1993).

two meanings. The question that arises is why these three authors feel the need to use the term *muğālaṭa* instead of conforming to the terminology already used, namely *tawriya* and *ihām*. Do *muğālaṭa* and *tawriya* therefore completely overlapping? This question takes us to the second remark.

Analysing the texts presented by these authors, and in particular by Ibn al-Aṭīr, we can see that the homonymy is the key factor for *muğālaṭa*. Nonetheless, although homonymy is necessary, it is not a sufficient condition. Regarding the *muğālaṭa miṭliyya*, the necessary condition is an element which triggers the second meaning of the homonym word, for example the words *wiğār* and Qays in the lines of al-Mutanabbī mentioned above. The combination of homonym and trigger word constitutes the parallelism which is the structure of this figure.⁴¹ I admit here a certain difficulty in understanding the parallelism in al-Tikritī's lines. It could be explained by the presence of the trigger words referring to the other eponyms of the law schools, but the intended meaning 'guardian of hell' conveyed by the satirical poem only makes sense if we consider the whole text, which is strongly critical of hypocritical behaviour. On the other hand, al-Tikritī's lines are an appropriate example of a possible double reading, since both readings – namely, Mālik b. Anas and Mālik the guardian of hell – express the satirical content of the epigram, albeit in a lighter way in the case of Mālik b. Anas. The same analysis applies to the *muğālaṭa naqāḍiyya*, in which the trigger word must create an opposition, an antithesis, not dissimilar to *ṭibāq*. That said, in the majority of cases a similarity between *muğālaṭa ma'nawīyya* and the *tawriya muhayya'a* that I have described in the previous chapter is evident.

The role of the trigger word – or, if we want to use *tawriya* terminology, *al-lafẓ yuhayyi'u* – opens up a third remark. Is it possible to apply *tawriya* analysis to *muğālaṭa*? In the previous pages, I have used *tawriya* vocabulary to describe *muğālaṭa loci*, trying to establish a parallel. Both figures present two meanings. Sometimes only one of them is intended by the author, and sometimes a double reading is possible even if one of them is still preferred. Moreover, we could consider

⁴¹ A parallelism similar to, but not superimposable on, another figure of speech called *murā'āt al-naẓīr* and translated by Cachia (1998, 73) as 'association'.

the trigger word as a kind of *lāzim* or *lafẓ yuhayyi'u* referring to one of the two meanings of the *tawriya*-word. The difference between *tawriya* and *muġālaṭa* seems to lie in the fact that *muġālaṭa* needs this trigger element, while *tawriya* only needs it in the case of a *tawriya muhayya'a*. But, as we have seen in the previous chapter, this is a less common case of *tawriya*. Due to their substantial similarity, however, the theoretical tools created for the *tawriya* are helpful in explaining how *muġālaṭa* functions.

This is perhaps why (and this is my fourth and final remark) there is no room in later theoretical works on *balāġa* and *badī'* for *muġālaṭa ma'nawiyya*. The *tawriya* theory was better able to account for certain phenomena of homonymy/polysemy in poetic and prose texts, forcing the theory of *muġālaṭa* into oblivion. Unable to adapt to subsequent developments in poetic theory, the latter was thus absorbed into the wider category of *tawriya*.

3. *Tawriya* and the Koran

My goal in this chapter is to investigate how and when *tawriya* and its synonym *ihām* became a reading key for the *mutašābihāt*. To do so, an approach which only takes into account literary and rhetorical criticism is not enough. Many – if not all – treatises on rhetoric and stylistics have been written by scholars of religious studies, in particular Koranic exegesis and legal hermeneutics. For this reason, works of a rhetorical and stylistic character together with Koranic and *ḥadīṭ* commentaries cannot be considered as non-matching pieces. Often, the use of religious works is necessary to understand subtleties of thought which are not clearly expressed in other works.

As underlined by Heinrichs (1968-1969; 2008), the theory of *tawriya* presented by Bonebakker (1966), who mentions Koranic passages in which a homonymic/polysemic word (*muštarak*) could lead to the understanding of a verse as an example of *tawriya*, lacks some details. Investigating these verses will provide us with a better understanding of when and why *tawriya* was used as a reading key in some Koranic verses, and above all in those verses which suggest an anthropomorphic interpretation. This is the case with the frequently quoted examples of Koranic *tawriya*: (Q 20:5)¹ “*al-Raḥmānu ‘alā l-‘arši stawā*” (The Merciful is mounted upon the throne), (Q 39:67)² “*Wa-mā qadarū llāha ḥaqqā qadri-hi wa-l-arḍu ḡamī’an qabḍatu-hu yawma l-qiyāmati wa-l-samawātu maṭwiyyātun bi-yamīni-hi subḥāna-hu wa-ta’alā ‘ammā yušrikūna*” (They have not measured God [with] due measure, when the entire earth will be His handful on the Day of Resurrection, and

¹ ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī (*Asrār*, 391), al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Kaššāf*, 4:67), al-Rāzī (*Tafsīr*, 22:2), al-Sakkākī (*Miftāḥ*, 537, 714), Rukn al-Dīn al-Ġurġānī (*Išārāt*, 216), al-Qazwīnī (*Talḥīṣ*, 97; *Īdāḥ*, 6:38-39), al-Šafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 75), al-Subkī (*‘Arūs*, 2:345), al-Ru‘aynī (*Ṭirāz*, 452), al-Taftāzānī (*Muṭawwal*, 652), Ibn Ḥiġġa (*Kašf*, 51, 268; *Ḥizāna*, 3:186, 534), al-Maqrīzī (*Mawā‘iz*, 4:448), al-Suyūṭī (*‘Uqūd*, 237, 259), Ibn Ḥazm (*Fīṣal*, 2:123), Abū Ḥayyān (*Tafsīr*, 6:214).

² ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī (*Asrār*, 358), al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Kaššāf*, 5:320-323), Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (*Nihāya*, 175; *Tafsīr*, 27:15-19), al-Sakkākī (*Miftāḥ*, 537), al-Zaġānī (*Mi‘yār*, 2:127), Ibn al-Zamlakānī (*Tibyān*, 178), al-Ḥalabī (*Husn*, 65), al-Nuwayrī (*Nihāya*, 7:132), al-Qazwīnī (*Īdāḥ*, 5:110), al-Šafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 75), al-Subkī (*‘Arūs*, 2:292), al-Suyūṭī (*‘Uqūd*, 237), Abū Ḥayyān (*Tafsīr*, 7:421).

the heavens will be rolled up in His right [hand]. Glory to Him! He is exalted above what they associate), and (Q 51:47)³ “*Wa-l-samā’a banaynā-hā bi-aydin wa-innā la-mūsi’ūna*” (The sky – We built it with [Our own] hands, and surely We were [its] extenders indeed).⁴

³ al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Kaššāf*, 5:618-619), Rukn al-Dīn al-Ġurġānī (*Išārāt*, 216), al-Qazwīnī (*Talḥīs*, 97; *Īdāh*, 6:38-39), al-Subkī (*‘Arūs*, 1:115; 2:345), al-Ru’aynī (*Ṭirāz*, 460), al-Taftāzānī (*Muṭawwal*, 98, 652-653), al-Zarkašī (*Burhān*, 3:445), Ibn Ḥiġġa (*Kašf*, 51, 270; *Ḥizāna*, 3:536), al-Suyūṭī (*‘Uqūd*, 261), Abū Ḥayyān (*Tafsīr*, 8:140).

⁴ It is worth underlining that these three verses are not the only examples of Koranic *tawriya*. For example, Ibn Abī l-Iṣbā’ (d. 654/1256) (*Taḥrīr*, 270) quotes (Q 12:95) *qālū ta-llāhi inna-ka la-fi ḍalāli-ka l-qadīmi* (They said, ‘By God! Surely you are indeed in your [same] old error’) as a good example of *tawriya* in the sacred book. The wordplay revolves around the *tawriya*-word *ḍalāl*, which has two meanings, says Ibn Abī l-Iṣbā’. The first is *ḥubb* (love) while the second is *ḍidd al-hudā* (the opposite of going in the right way). The explanation he provides is that the meaning *ḥubb* has been neglected in favour of the use of the meaning *ḍidd al-hudā*, but the intended meaning (*al-murād*) is the one neglected and not that apparently meant. This verse must be understood within the framework of the story of Joseph; in particular, this scene depicts the blind Jacob waiting for his sons’ caravan and feeling the presence of Joseph even though he did not know that he was still alive. So, a paraphrase of the verse reads as follows: ‘They said, ‘By God your capacity of judgement still be under the influence of your ancient attachment towards Joseph.’ Cf. al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Kaššāf*, 3:324) and Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (*Tafsīr*, 18:212). Ibn Abī l-Iṣbā’ in a later work entitled *Badī’ al-Qur’ān* (*Badī’*, 102-103) lists in the *tawriya* chapter, in addition to (Q 12:65), two more examples. The first is (Q 10:92) *fa-l-yawma nubaḡġi-ka bi-badani-ka li-takūna li-man ḥalfa-ka āyata* (Today We rescue you with your body, so that you may be a sign for those who succeed you). In this verse, the author points out that the word *badan* is commonly used to denote the body (*ġasad*), but the concealed and intended meaning is in this case ‘coat of mail’ (*dir*). This meaning is glossed by the author affirming that the rescue of Pharaoh is a sign of posterity precisely because Pharaoh managed to save himself from the Red Sea wearing his coat of mail. Cf. al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Kaššāf*, 3:172) and Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (*Tafsīr*, 17:164). The second verse is (Q 2:145) *Wa-la-in atayta llaḡīna utū l-kitāba bi-kullī āyatin mā tabi’ū qiblata-ka wa-mā anta bi-tābī’in qiblata-hum wa-mā ba’du-hum bi-tābī’in qiblata ba’ḍin* (Yet even if you bring every sign to those who have been given the Book, they will not follow your direction. You are not a follower of their direction, nor are they followers of each other’s direction), where the equivocal word is *qibla*. Ibn Abī l-Iṣbā’ explains the reference to the *qibla* as the direction of prayer which has been given to the Muslims, which is in a middle way (*waṣṭ*) between the direction observed by the Jews and that observed by the Christians. This middle position, or *medietas*, is also the best way to behave, since it is a balance of two extreme positions. It is glossed by Ibn Abī l-Iṣbā’ and by other exegetes with the word *ḥiyār* (choice, the best). As Griffel (2003) points out, this gloss is commonly explained by the word *‘adl* (justice), meaning that the Muslims are the people of the middle position, i.e. justice and good behaviour. This is what is meant by Ibn Abī l-Iṣbā’ when he says that the word *qibla* could mean in this context choice, i.e. the justice and the *medietas* of the good Muslims. Cf. al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Kaššāf*, 1:337-345), Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (*Tafsīr*, 4:107 and following). It is worth underlining that Ibn Abī l-Iṣbā’ does not mention any of the verses that I analyse in this chapter, and nor in the *tawriya* chapter or under any other figure of speech. Another author who undertook the challenge of listing the figures of speech in the holy book is al-Zarkašī (d. 794/1392) in *al-Burhān fī ‘ulūm al-Qur’ān*. Curiously, in the *tawriya* chapter (*Burhān*, 3:445-446), in addition to (Q 51:47), he does not list any of the verses given by his predecessor Ibn Abī l-Iṣbā’. The first verse he quotes is (Q 55:6) *wa-l-naġmu wa-l-šaḡaru yasġudāni* (And the star and the tree prostrate themselves), saying that the word *naġm* means ‘stars’ and ‘herbage’. The hearer thinks that the intended meaning is ‘stars’, since the preceding verse contains the words sun and moon; however, the intended meaning is herbage. Cf. al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Kaššāf*, 6:6), Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (*Tafsīr*, 29:90). The second is (Q 3:39) *wa-huwa qā’imun yuṣallī fī l-miḥrābi* (While he was standing, praying in the place of prayer), glossed with *wa-l-murād al-mā’rifa* (?) (the intended meaning is knowledge (?)), but I could not find any explanation for this meaning, either

I will thus base my investigation on a broader typology of sources, and reconstruct the history of inclusion and interpretation of these anthropomorphic verses in the discussion on *tawriya*. Of the three verses mentioned, I will analyse only (Q 39:67) and (Q 20:5), since the explanation of (Q 51:47) is comparable to that of (Q 39:67) in both rhetorical and theological works.⁵

in al-Zamaḥṣarī's *Kaššāf* or in Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's *Tafsīr*. The third verse that he cites is (Q 88:8) *wuḡūh yawma'īdin nā'imatun* ([Other] faces that Day will be blessed), where *nā'ima* is understood by the reader as connected to *nu'ūma* (delicacy), while the intended meaning is connected to *nī'ma* (grace) and *karāma* (magnanimity). Cf. al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Kaššāf*, 6:364), Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (*Tafsīr*, 31:154). The third is (Q 76:19) *wa-yaṭūfu 'alay-him wildānun muḥalladūna* (And boys of eternal youth circulate among them), where *muḥalladūna* means 'having earrings' (*muqarriṭūna*) and is not derived from *ḥulūd* (eternity). Cf. al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Kaššāf*, 6:25 on Q 56:17), Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (*Tafsīr*, 29:150-151). The fourth is (Q 47:6) *wa-yudḥilu-humu l-ḡannata 'arrafa-hā la-hum* (And He will cause them to enter the Garden – He has made it known to them), where *'arrafa-hā* means *'allama-hum manāzili-him fī-hā* (he made them know their place in it), but it is concealed with the perceived meaning derived from *'arf*, which means *ṭīb*, i.e. an odour, a scent particularly associated with paradise. Cf. al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Kaššāf*, 5:518), Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (*Tafsīr*, 28:48). The fifth is (Q 5:4) *wa-mā 'ullimtum min al-ḡawāriḥi mukallibīna* (And what you have taught some of [your] hunting animals [to catch], training [them]), for which al-Zarkašī does not provide any explanation. Comparing al-Zamaḥṣarī's (*Kaššāf*, 2:197) and Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's (*Tafsīr*, 11:146), I could hypothesise that the ambiguity is in the word *mukallibīna*, which has four possible interpretations based on etymology and use: a) It means the domesticator and is derived from *kalb* (dog) because domestication (*ta'dīb*) is usually applied to dogs; b) Every predatory animal (*sab'*) can be called *kalb*, e.g. the lion (*asad*); c) *kalb* can be derived from *ḍarāwa* (being accustomed [to the chase], greed); and d) the meaning of the verse is nothing more than permission to hunt with dogs. The sixth verse that al-Zarkašī quotes is (Q 9:21) *yubašširu-hum rabbu-hum bi-rahmatin min-hu wa-riḍwānin wa-ḡannātin* (Their Lord gives them good news of mercy from Himself, and approval, and [there are] Gardens), where *riḍwān* is understood as 'approval' but refers to *Riḍwān*, the guardian of paradise. The seventh is the word *rā'inā* in (Q 2:104) *lā taqūlū rā'inā wa-qūlū nẓurnā* (Do not say, 'Observe us', but say, 'Regard us'); al-Zarkašī reports that this word means *ar'i-nā sam'a-nā*, i.e. listen to us, and it is not the *nomen agentis* of the noun *ru'ūna*, i.e. foolishness. Cf. al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Kaššāf*, 1:307), Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (*Tafsīr*, 3:242). The penultimate example that al-Zarkašī gives is (Q 42:28) *wa-huwa llaḡī yunazzilu l-ḡayṭa min ba'di mā qanaṭu wa-yanšuru raḥmata-hu wa-huwa l-walī l-ḥamīd* (He [it is] who sends down the rain after they have despaired, and displays His mercy. He is the Ally, the Praiseworthy), in which *walī* and *ḥamīd* could refer to God, i.e. the believers' friend and praiseworthy/praised, or *walī* can be understood as 'rain of the spring' connected to *ḡayṭ* and thus *ḥamīd* meaning *maḥmūd* refers to the rain. The last verse quoted is (Q 12:42) *uḍkur-nī 'inda rabbi-ka fa-ansā-hu l-šayṭānu ḡikra rabbi-hi* ('Mention me in the presence of your Lord'. But Satan made him forget to mention [him] to his Lord). In this verse, *rabbi-hi* could refer to God if the subject of the verb is Joseph, while it can refer to the king, i.e. the ruler of Egypt, if the subject of the verb is the person of whom Joseph interpreted the dream. Cf. Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (*Tafsīr*, 18:147-148). It should be noted that the inclusion of these verses in the *tawriya* chapter is found only in a few works, which are not mainly focused on rhetoric and stylistics. When mentioning a Koranic verse as an example of *tawriya*, scholars, literati, and theorists of rhetoric limit themselves to the *mutašābihāt* verses which I will approach in this chapter. To extend the analysis to all the verses mentioned by each scholar of religion and rhetoric, both ancient and modern, would not be fruitful, and nor would it help us reconstruct the history of Koranic *tawriya*.

⁵ Cf., for example, al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Kaššāf*, 5:618), al-Rāzī (*Tafsīr*, 29:226), and Abū Ḥayyān (*Tafsīr*, 8:140).
Luca Rizzo

3.1 (Q 39:67)

The first to quote the Koranic verse (Q 39:67) as an example of *ihām* was Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209)⁶ in (*Nihāya*, 175). However, he did not provide any explanation for his choice, and nor did he point to the possible double reading of the verse in the light of the homonymy/polysemy (*ištirāk*) of its words. This verse belongs to the category which van Ess (2012) defines as “anthropomorphism proper” – namely, the anthropomorphism expressed in verses which attribute human limbs to God.⁷ The reason why Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī categorised this verse as an example of *ihām* is because the words *qabḍa* and *yamīn* (which, according to their proper meanings, mean ‘grip’ and ‘right hand’) are open to a double reading. It is therefore important to verify, whether explaining the quoted verse, he mentions this figure in his *tafsīr*. However, before analysing Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s work, I will consider the opinion of ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī (d. 471/1078),⁸ who was a predecessor of al-Rāzī and who

⁶ Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. ‘Umar b. al-Ḥusayn born ca. 534-544/1149-50 in Rayy, where he acquired his instruction. He then moved to Ḥwārizm and to Transoxiana, where he was involved in bitter diatribes with Mu‘tazilite exponents. After various moves, he settled in Herat, having already acquired a reputation as a scholar in religious sciences. There he spent the majority of his life and his reputation was so high that it is said that he had more than 300 pupils. He was versed in philosophy and *kalām*, and staunchly defended Sunnism against *Mu‘tazila* and the anthropomorphism of *Karrāmiyya*. He adhered to Aš‘arism, although he also criticised atomism. He died in 21 Muḥarram 606/26 July 1209. For a list of his works and more bibliographical references, see Anawati (2012). His Koranic commentary, *Mafātīḥ al-ġayb*, is a late work. As underlined by Jomier (1977), the oldest credible date of achievement of *sūrat al-‘imrān* commentary is 595/1199; even though a prior date is mentioned, this seems unlikely. Despite the mention of the date of achievement at the end of some *sūras*, it is not possible to establish without any doubt whether the whole commentary was completed by Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, or whether only the commentary on some *sūras* can be ascribed to his pen, as suggested by Ibn Ḥallikān (d. 681/1282). After comparing the manuscripts available in the Turkish libraries, Jomier (1977) points out that the question remains open. The most recent work on Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī is Arnaldez (2002), who first contextualises the figure of al-Rāzī in the philosophical and intellectual milieu of his epoch, describing the legacy that this intellectual left in the field of religious and philosophical studies, before addressing the work of al-Rāzī as a Koranic commentator on the one hand, and as a philosopher on the other.

⁷ Van Ess (2012) proposes a fourfold classification of anthropomorphism: “(a) anthropomorphism proper, concerning God’s outward appearance, His shape; (b) God’s actions like speaking, sitting, etc.; (c) His feelings like wrath, satisfaction, etc., so-called anthropopathisms; and (d) ‘passive’ anthropomorphisms inasmuch as God may be the object of human perception: when He is seen, heard, etc.” On anthropomorphism, see also Baljon (1988), Abrahamov (1996), Martin (2001), Williams (2009), Holtzman (2011), and Chaumont (2013).

⁸ Abū Bakr ‘Abd al-Qāhir b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ġurġānī was born and spent his entire life in Ġurġān, where he died in 471/1078. He is especially known for his two works on rhetoric and stylistics, *Dalā‘il al-i‘ġāz* and *Asrār al-balāġa*, which can be considered the two pillars on which the later rhetorical tradition will be founded. He was also well versed in grammar, prosody and poetry. For a list of his

wrote two works which laid the foundations for the development of rhetoric (*ilm al-balāġa*): *Dalā'il al-i'ğāz* and *Asrār al-balāġa*. The reason for doing so is that, in his introduction, Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (*Nihāya*, 24-25) himself recognises 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī as the person who both laid the foundations for the scientific study of the *balāġa*, and indicated its fundamental principles and elucidated its rules. Al-Rāzī refers in particular to the works by al-Ġurġānī mentioned above as being the founding works of this science, and commits himself to taking the best from both of them and rearranging this material in *Nihāya*. This is why it is also important to investigate the reasons for al-Rāzī's decision to place (Q 39:67) in the *ihām* section in the works of those who inspired his own work. This brief detour will therefore provide us with a better understanding of the evolution of the explanations and interpretations of this Koranic verse in a linguistic and rhetorical reading key.

3.1.1 'Abd al-Qāhir al- Ġurġānī

'Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī (*Asrār*, 358-362) underlines the semantic value of the expressions 'right hand' (*yamīn*) and 'hand' (*yad*), recurring in Koranic verses and poetry alike. He states:

About 'the hand' standing for the power (*qudra*) by way of allusion (*talwīḥ*) through the *maṭal* (metaphorical image)⁹ and not through a clear reference. You can even see many of the people asserting 'Indeed it means the power (*qudra*)' and they make the word have two meanings, e.g. in the speech of God (Q 39:67) "The heavens will be rolled up in His right [hand]" (*wa-l-samāwātu maṭwiyyātun bi-yamīni-hi*). You see them saying 'The right hand (*yamīn*) means the power (*qudra*)' and they connect it with al-Šammāḥ's line:

works and the methodological features of his linguistic thinking, see Ritter (1959), who edited and translated the *Asrār*; Gherseti (1998a), who proposes using modern theories of linguistic pragmatics to provide a detailed pragmatic analysis of *Dalā'il*; and Abu Deeb (1979; 2012), who focuses on poetics. See also El Ferrane (1990), Sharlet (2011), and Harb (2015; 2019).

⁹ *Maṭal* is a difficult word to translate. Ritter (1959, 384, 386) proposes for *talwīḥ bi-l-maṭal* "Gleichnis nur angedeutet", and for *maṭal* in particular "bildliche Redeweise". I have translated *maṭal* as 'metaphorical image' to try to match its nature of a picture based on comparison.

إِذَا مَا رَأَيْتُ رُفِعَتْ لِمَجْدٍ * تَلَقَّاهَا عَرَابُهُ بِالْيَمِينِ¹⁰

When a banner is raised for the glory, 'Arāba¹¹ will take it with his right hand.

As Abū l-'Abbās did in *al-Kāmil*:¹² he recited the line and said 'The men of letters said that its meaning is the strength (*quwwa*)' and said almost the same about God's speech (Q 39:67) "And the Heavens will be rolled up in His right [hand]". This is their explanation (*tafsīr*) of the sentence, the aim is to quickly negate the meaning 'limb' (*ǧāriḥa*) fearing for the hearer of ideas befalling the ignorant and those who compare God to the creatures (*ahl al-tašbīh*). However, they do not aim at explaining nor the method or the way through which it happened to be understood as the power (*qudra*) and the strength (*quwwa*). But, when you examine the matter, you will understand that it is understood through the *maṭal*. We know as well from the beginning of the verse – which is His speech (Q 39:67) "The entire earth will be in His handful on the day of resurrection" – that the conveyed meaning is the power (*qudra*), then we do not approve turning the grip (*qabḍa*) into a name denoting the power (*qudra*). Instead, we come to the power through the interpretation (*ta'wīl*) and the *maṭal*. So we say: indeed the meaning is – but God knows better – that the *maṭal* of the earth, in its being acted under the command (*amr*) of God and his power (*qudra*) – and nothing in what there is in him of his authority escapes [its power] – is like the *maṭal* of the thing which is in the grip of a human being who collects it in his hand. [...]

When you are saying 'The whole command pertains to God', you know in this way that there is no authority (*sulṭān*) and no control (*istibdād*) in anybody else. The same applies when you say to the human being 'The command is in your hand' meaning the *maṭal* 'The command is like the thing which is in his hand from which he cannot abstain himself'. What does this hesitation about the right hand being a *maṭal* and not a noun denoting the power like a new variant mean? From where is that imagined (*yataṣawwaru*) since you do not see its use being admissible in the cases when there is no approach based on *maṭal* and *tašbīh* (simile)? It is

¹⁰ al-Šammāḥ (*Dīwān*, 335-336), Ibn Rašīq (*Umda*, 1:111; 2:788), Ibn Manzūr (*Lisān*, s.v. *y m n*). Ibn Rašīq quotes another line before that, which is followed in the *dīwān* by another line prior to the line quoted by 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī:

رَأَيْتُ عَرَابَةَ الْأَوْسِيِّ يَسْمُو * إِلَى الْخَيْرَاتِ مُنْقَطِعِ الْقَرِينِ
أَفَادَ مَحَامِدًا وَأَفَادَ مَجْدًا * فَلَيْسَ كَجَامِدٍ لِحَزِّ ضَنْبِينَ

I saw 'Arāba l-Awsī seeking treasures withdrawn from the companion.

He acquired commendations and glory, but he is not stingy and niggardly like an avaricious man.

¹¹ 'Arāba b. Aws b. Qayzī l-Anṣārī (ca. 60/680). He was a Medinan contemporary of the prophet and an esteemed man in his community. al-Mubarrad (*Kāmil*, 75), Ritter (1959, 386), al-Ziriklī (*A'lām*, s.v. 'Arāba l-Awsī).

¹² i.e. al-Mubarrad (*Kāmil*, 1:75, 396).

not said 'He is mighty in his right hand' (*huwa 'aẓīm al-yamīn*) meaning 'He is mighty in power' (*'aẓīm al-qudra*), as well as 'I saw your right hand on this' (*'araftu yamīna-ka 'alà hādā*) as you say 'I saw your power' (*'araftu qudrata-ka*).¹³ ('Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī, *Asrār*, 331-333)

This extract from the *Asrār al-balāġa* describes an interpretation of the verse (Q 39:67) preceding that of Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. According to 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī, this verse represents an example of *maġāz* and specifically an example of *talwīḥ bi-l-maṭal* (allusion through the metaphorical image), which is opposed to *maṭal ṣarīḥ* (clear metaphorical image).¹⁴ Al-Ġurġānī quotes al-Mubarrad (d. 285/898-9) among the authorities who defend interpreting 'the hand' as 'the strength', citing as an example a line by al-Šammāḥ, in which the word 'hand' could be interpreted as 'strength'. 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī does not completely reject this interpretation, but instead raises some doubts about the motivation which led his predecessors to discard so quickly a possible literal interpretation of (Q 39:67). First, he states that the emphasis on the figurative sense of the verse can be attributed to the desire not to falling into literalism resulting in pure anthropomorphism. Second, he criticises his predecessors for having failed to provide any clear and plausible explanation for their choice, which he said was not entirely justified. He thus provides an explanation of the verse resorting to the *maṭal*. The key assumption is that the single word *qabḍa* is not a perfect synonym of 'power'. This is because he does not consider the word *qabḍa* to be a homonym for these two significations; hence, it is not through the single word that the figurative sense of 'power' or 'strength' is understood.

Instead, we should take the first part of this verse together, since it is in its wholeness that it conveys the figurative sense (*maġāz*), reached by means of the interpretation through a *maṭal*. The *maṭal* is therefore described as a kind of comparison. The sense 'power' is conveyed through a non-uttered comparison, which relates the image of the earth held in the hand of God, like a human being would grasp something and

¹³ Cf. Ritter (1959, 386-388).

¹⁴ An example of *maṭal ṣarīḥ* is the expression '*fulān ṭawīl al-yad*' (literally, 'such a long-handed one'), meaning 'someone who has a great power', 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī (*Asrār*, 330), Ritter (1959, 384-385). The explanation given by al-Ġurġānī is that if ever one wants to substitute the word *yad* with another word with the same meaning of the sense intended, i.e. power, the whole sentence will become nonsense. This is due to the fact that in this sentence the words *ṭawīl* and *yad* are in a relationship of genitive construction, and they thus mean 'great power'.

hold it tight in his or her grip. God has the power to act on the earth like a human being has the power to act on whatever is in his or her hand. For example, an expression like ‘the command is in your hand’ means having control over something or someone as if that something or someone were subjugated. This explains why the verse connotes the power and the control of God over creation. However, if the *maṭal* leads to the figurative sense through the picture that it provides, then we cannot affirm that the process underlying the reception of the *maṭal* in the reader is based on *ištirāk*. ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī refuses to call the word *yamīn* a homonym for two main reasons. First, the figurative sense is conveyed by a whole sentence which provides a picture based on comparison, through which the understanding of the sense ‘God’s power’ occurs. Second, the word *yamīn* cannot convey both meanings of ‘right hand’ and ‘power’ because, if we substitute them on a paradigmatic level, resist being interchanged and thus fail the commutation test.

For al-Ġurġānī, (Q 39:67) is therefore a case of *tamtīl* (analogy).¹⁵ The main difference between *tamtīl*, *isti‘āra*, and *tašbīh* is that *tamtīl* is a figure of speech based on a phrase or sentence, while the other two can be realised in a single word.¹⁶ Abu Deeb (1979, 237-242) emphasises that two types of *tamtīl* exist for al-Ġurġānī, the first of related to metaphor (*isti‘āra*), and the second to simile (*tašbīh*). The case of (Q 39:67) is a *maġāz* and an apt example of *tamtīl* based on *isti‘āra*. This is true if we consider the verse as a whole and not only the two words that apparently have two meanings: *qabḍa* and *yamīn*. In ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī’s view, these two words taken separately cannot convey the figurative sense of the sentence, and “therefore, the expression, as one unit, is a form of *maġāz*. No single word has been used in a non-literal sense; the *maġāz* element is a quality of the expression as a whole and because of this the expression cannot be called *isti‘āra*” (Abu Deeb, 1979, 238). The literalness of the single elements within the verse is a fundamental point to understand the role that al-Ġurġānī attributes to *tamtīl*. In contrast to what al-Ġurġānī attributes to other literati regarding the double meaning of the words *qabḍa* and *yamīn*, (Q 39:67) contains in his opinion the word *qabḍa*, which is not synonymous with *quwwa*, and the word *yamīn*, which is not synonymous with *qudra*. This is proven at the

¹⁵ See Abu Deeb (1979, 155-156, 237-242), El Ferrane (1990, 127-130), van Gelder (2012b).

¹⁶ See ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī (*Asrār*, 84-88, 219-220), Ritter (1959, 259-260).

paradigmatic level since they are not interchangeable. This means that the two words in question must necessarily have their proper meaning (*ḥaqīqa*) within the verse. It is only through their connection and relationship with the context that they are a *maṭal*, giving rise to a figurative sense (*mağāz*), which is not intrinsic to any of the words that form the sentence.

If we have in mind the *tawriya*, we quickly understand that, although he never explicitly spoke about *tawriya*, and nor even mentioned the term, and although he lived about a century before the term was first formulated, ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī considers this figure not to have any kind of application in this verse, since we have seen that the two words that should have two meanings have nothing but their proper meanings for al-Ġurġānī, and he rejects calling them *muštaraka*. Why, then, is (Q 39:67) the first Koranic verse cited in chronological order among the examples of *tawriya*, or rather of *ihām*? To answer this question, I will consider the work of Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who as I have already said, drew on al-Ġurġānī’s work.

3.1.2 al-Zamaḥṣarī vs Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī

As mentioned above, al-Rāzī does not provide an explanation in (*Nihāya*, 175) of why he chose (Q 39:67) as example of *ihām*. If we turn our attention to (*Tafsīr*, 27:15-19), we notice that he does not mention the figure *ihām* when explaining this verse. But he takes care of course to underline the double reading of the two words, and in doing so, often refers to and strongly criticises his predecessor al-Zamaḥṣarī (d. 538/1144)¹⁷ (*Kaššāf*, 5:320-323), citing entire passages which I quote below. The text in curly brackets is not quoted by Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, which is designed to show how the thought of these two scholars differ.

¹⁷ Abū l-Qāsim Maḥmūd b. ‘Umar b. Muḥammad b. ‘Umar Ġār Allāh al-Zamaḥṣarī was born in Zamaḥṣar on 27 Raġab 467/18 March 1075. He approached the study of grammar and theology, becoming a strong partisan of *Mu’tazila*. Despite his Persian origins, he was a supporter of the Arabic cause against the *šū’ūbiyya*. His intellectual interests ranged from grammar to lexicography and paremiology, from literature to religious sciences. He died in Ġurġāniyya on 10 Dū l-Ḥiġġa 538/14 June 1144. For a list of his works and more information on his life, see Lane (2006, 9-47, 267-298), Versteegh (2012), and Madelung (2012).

The aim of this utterance, if you take it in its wholeness and totality, is to depict (*taṣwīr*) his majesty and to put before our eyes the essence of his loftiness, {nothing else,} without understanding 'grip' (*qabḍa*) and 'right hand' (*yamīn*) with reference to the proper meaning (*ḥaqīqa*) neither the figurative sense (*mağāz*). The same judgement as well of what is transmitted: "A Jew came to the messenger of God and said: 'O Abū l-Qāsim, indeed God will grab the heavens in the day of resurrection with a finger, the earths with a finger, the mountains with a finger, the trees with a finger, the moist earth with a finger, and the rest of the creatures with a finger. Then he will shake them saying 'I am the master''. The messenger of God laughed astonishing of what he said. He read, thus, [the following verse] to correct him (Q 6:91; 39:67) "They have not measured God [with] due measure" (*wa-mā qadarū llāh ḥaqqā qadri-hi*)."¹⁸ The most eloquent of the Arabs laughed and astonished because he (i.e. the Jew) did not understand of the verse nothing but what those scholars of eloquence who do not make themselves an image (*taṣawwur*) of the act of grabbing, of the finger, of the act of shaking, and the like, understand. Instead, his (i.e. of the Prophet's) understanding of the whole utterance met the main point and essence which are the demonstration (*dalāla*) of the shining power and the great actions which are easy to Him (i.e. God), but from which the understandings and minds [of the humans] are bewildered, and of which the thoughts do not perceive the essence. {The hearer is not brought to the understanding thereof, except by resorting to the interpretation on the way of an image evocation (*taḥyīl*).} You do not see any category of the *'ilm al-bayān* finer, nor more delicate, or more elegant than this category. {You neither see anything more useful and more helpful to undertake the interpretation (*ta'wīl*) of the ambiguous verses (*muṣṭabihāt*) of the speech of God in the Koran, in the other revealed books, and in the speech of the prophets.}¹⁹ (al-Zamaḥṣarī, *Kaššāf*, 5:320-321), (Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr*, 27:15-16)

We can see at a glance that Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's decision to mention only some of what his predecessor al-Zamaḥṣarī had written about (Q 39:67) is motivated by his desire to adopt some of his ideas and to reject others. The *ḥadīth* quoted assumes in both authors the value of a strong condemnation of the vulgar anthropomorphism committed by the literalists, i.e. by that school of thought which gives an extremely literal reading of this and other verses, thus attributing to God a body of flesh and

¹⁸ Cf. with small variants al-Buḥārī (*Ṣaḥīḥ*, no. 4811, 7412-7415), Muslim (*Ṣaḥīḥ*, no. 2786 a-d. In the edition I use book 54 no. 7046-7049), al-Tirmidī (*Ḥāmi'*, no. 3238).

¹⁹ Cf. Heinrichs (1994, 239).

blood, whence precisely anthropomorphism (*taḡsīm*). This condemnation is all the more stronger in al-Zamaḥṣarī, who, as a good Mu'tazilite,²⁰ strongly rejects giving God any parts of the human body. The same applies to any kind of resemblance between the divinity and the human being.

On the other hand, Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, while condemning *taḡsīm*, has a different approach to the words denoting limbs when attributed to God. He seems to share with al-Zamaḥṣarī the judgment expressed on these passages of the Koran, espousing the idea that they are the best cases of figurative language of eloquence. Nevertheless, the two authors diverge on the nature and type of the tropes which underlie the explanation and interpretation of these verses. For al-Zamaḥṣarī, whoever listens to this verse cannot understand its meaning if he/she stops at the superficial level of the literal plan, but must interpret it through the *taḥyīl*, i.e. through a figurative reading of the verse made possible by an image evocation capable of creating an idea of the intended meaning in the reader.²¹ Al-Zamaḥṣarī continues, then, by explaining the double reading of the words and their intended meaning:

²⁰ Is al-Zamaḥṣarī's *Tafsīr* a real Mu'tazilite commentary? Lane (2006) argues that *Kaṣṣāf* is not so impregnated with Mu'tazilism: "The statistics indicate that al-Zamakhsharī's Mu'tazilism simply did not have any significant influence on him as he composed his commentary. Furthermore, not only is the *Kashshāf*'s Mu'tazilite content minimal, its Mu'tazilite 'method' is non-existent" (Lane, 2006, 147). And then "There is, in fact, so little Mu'tazilism in the *Kashshāf* and so many missed occasions to inject some, that to call it such is a misnomer; nor is there any 'special outlook' or 'distinctive approach' that can be discerned in the *Kashshāf* by which its Mu'tazilite character could be redeemed. [...] One could also speak of 'Mu'tazilite influences' in the *Kashshāf* but that is stretching things, for the necessary Mu'tazilite content is lacking" (Lane, 2006, 229-230). See also Lane (2012). On the other hand, Mourad (2007) stresses a certain inconsistency of the theses expressed by Lane: "The first major problem is that Lane does not demonstrate that he is able to recognize the Mu'tazilite aspect of al-Zamakhsharī's *al-Kashshāf*. [...] First, Lane's study does not show sufficient familiarity with the Mu'tazilite scholarship on the Qur'ān. [...] Second, this book shows insufficient familiarity with what Mu'tazilism is, after all, about. Mu'tazilism is about theology. To establish whether or not *al-Kashshāf* is a Mu'tazilite commentary, one needs only to determine whether, and in what manner, al-Zamakhsharī defends some or all of the five principles of Mu'tazilite theology." (Mourad, 2007, 409-410). From my point of view, while admitting a substantial lack of familiarity in theological questions, I believe that the issue of anthropomorphism is not adequately treated in Lane (2006). Based on the *Kaṣṣāf* extracts quoted so far and on those that I will mention later on in this chapter, I can affirm that al-Zamaḥṣarī strong rejection of anthropomorphist interpretations can be considered as completely in line with the Mu'tazilite precepts. On *Mu'tazila* in general, see Schmidtke (2003), Gimaret (2012).

²¹ Heinrichs (1994, 228) defines *taḥyīl* in the context of al-Zamaḥṣarī's commentary as "reducing some abstract notion such as God's omnipotence to a hypothetically posited corporeal image which is intended to make the abstract notion tangible". See also Heinrichs (2008; 2012b). For a translation of the principal sources on *taḥyīl*, see the first part of the volume edited by Hammond and van Gelder (2008, 15-127), which ends with an exhaustive bibliography. The second part is devoted to critical studies on the *taḥyīl* (131-286).

The grip (*qabḍa*) is the *nomen vicis* issued from ‘the gripping’ (*al-qabḍ*): (Q 20:96) “And I took a handful [of dust] from the footprint of the messenger” (*fa-qabaḍtu qabḍatan min aṭari l-rasūli*), while the handful (*qubḍa*), vowelled with ‘u’, is the measure of what is gripped with the hand. It is also said ‘Give me a handful of so-and-so’ meaning the handful called with the verbal noun, as it is also reported ‘He forbade to catch animals of prey’.²² Both meanings are acceptable. The meaning is ‘The earths altogether will be his handful’ – i.e. all of them in his grip, he grips them in a single grip, namely that the earths altogether with their greatness and extension do not reach but a single one of his grips like if he grips them in a unique-hand grip. [...]

When the meaning ‘handful’ is meant, [the expression] is clear, for the meaning is ‘The earths altogether are the measure which he grips with a single hand’. [...]

It is said that ‘his grip’ (*qabḍatu-hu*) means ‘his dominion’ (*mulku-hu*) without opponent or competitor. About ‘with his right hand’ (*bi-yamīni-hi*), it means ‘with his power’ (*bi-qudrati-hi*); about ‘folded in his right hand’, it means ‘destroyed’ because of his oath for he swore to destroy them. Indeed, this interpretation will be manifest to those who smelt the perfume of our science. (al-Zamaḥṣarī, *Kaššāf*, 5:322-323)

In speaking about *qabḍa* and *yamīn*, al-Zamaḥṣarī explains first their proper meanings that give rise to figurative senses. The interpretation of these two words clearly reveals that al-Zamaḥṣarī’s belonged to the Mu‘tazilite theological school.²³ This is evident from his explanations as to why it is possible to interpret this verse anthropomorphically. In fact, in the passage quoted, al-Zamaḥṣarī rejects the possibility of interpreting the verse literally, explaining that if this were true, i.e. if God possessed a hand, then this hand would be like a unit of measure that could contain all the earths altogether in a handful. It follows that the only possible way to interpret the verse is according to its figurative meaning. However, understanding this figurative sense is something that only people acquainted with the science of eloquence can do. As Heinrichs (1994; 2008; 2012a) argues, *taḥyīl* assumes in al-

²² Cf. Lane (*Lexicon*, s.v. ḥ ṭ f), i.e. *ḥaṭfa* ‘a single act of seizing’.

²³ For another Mu‘tazilite theologian and his interpretation of (Q 39:67), see ‘Abd al-Ġabbār (d. 415/1025) (*Mutašābih*, 2:598), who provides a similar explanation of *qabḍa* and *yamīn* without, however, recurring to *taḥyīl*. Cf. also al-Ṭūsī (d. 459-60/1066-67) (*Tibyān*, 9:45-46), Mu‘tazilite and Šī‘ite scholar, who focuses more on the *i‘rāb* of the sentence and cites the line of al-Šammāḥ to prove the figurative interpretation of *yamīn*. He resorts neither to *taḥyīl* nor to *tamṭīl*.

Zamaḥṣarī's thought a particular signification depicting neither a metaphor nor a simile, since the words 'grip' and 'right hand' cannot be connected by means of metaphor with their figurative sense of 'dominion' and 'power'. For, if that were the case, we should ask ourselves what this metaphor stands for – if, as the Mu'tazilite al-Zamaḥṣarī assumes, no human characteristic can be attributed to God.

It is certain that, while not going deeply into the details of the process by which the *maḡāzī* sense is understood, al-Zamaḥṣarī opens up a figurative interpretation of the verse without, however, mentioning any plausible explanation based on homonymy/polysemy.

In contrast, Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī provides a more detailed explanation of the process by which the reader understands the figurative sense through the proper meaning:

We say: here the words 'grip' and 'right hand' have as proper meaning (*ḥaqīqa*) the specific limb and you cannot turn away from the literal meaning of the speech (*zāhir al-kalām*) unless the *dalāla* (demonstration) shows that the accord of these expressions with their literal meanings is rejected. In this case, their accord with the figurative senses (*maḡāzāt*) is, thus, mandatory. Then, it is made clear through the *dalīl* (evidence) that the turning of the meaning so-and-so from that proper meaning (*ḥaqīqa*) to the figurative sense (*maḡāz*) is correct. Moreover, it is made clear through the *dalīl* that this figurative sense is more appropriate than the other way around. When these premises are realised and their sequence follows this path, this becomes the correct way on which the interpretation (*ta'wīl*) of those who profess the truth (*ahl al-taḥqīq*, i.e. the Aṣ'arites) is based, and you did not reach this field following a new way, nor an obscure speech, yet it is the same thing mentioned by those who profess the truth. (Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr*, 27:16)

In this extract, Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī is clearly rejecting al-Zamaḥṣarī's opinion in regarding the reference of the two words 'grip' and 'right hand' to their proper and non-figurative meanings. If, in fact, al-Zamaḥṣarī excluded the possibility that these words refer to their proper meanings (*ḥaqīqa*), al-Rāzī states that this reference cannot and must not be excluded *a priori*. The difference is fundamental.

For al-Zamaḥṣarī, the denied reference makes it impossible for the given word to have two meanings *per se* in the given context, i.e. even if the words *qabḍa* and *yamīn*

have both a proper meaning and a figurative sense, the fact that they cannot refer to God in their literal meaning means that the first meaning is nothing but the element that enables the reader to create the *taḥyīl* image in order to access the desired meaning. We are therefore in the presence not of two separate meanings, but of two words whose first literal meanings can generate a second, figurative sense.

For al-Rāzī, the basis is the literal meaning, and it is only after certain conditions have been fulfilled that we can derive a figurative sense from it. In other words, the proper meaning of the two words is not bound to its being a mere trigger for a *taḥyīl* process. Instead, these words in this context bear two meanings that are linked by the proper-figurative relationship and are not mutually exclusive. It should be emphasised that the process of reasoning that leads from the literal meaning to the figurative sense is a predetermined: it follows the path from premises to conclusion. Indeed, recourse to *mağāz* occurs only after understanding the *ḥaqīqa* meaning and concluding that it cannot be applied to the given context since there is a *dalīl* pl. *dalā'il*, evidence that clearly and incontrovertibly leads to the rejection of the literal meaning. In Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, the *dalīl* is of primary importance in the hermeneutics of the sacred word. As we will see in particular in the next section on (Q 20:5), *dalīl* – whose primary meaning is ‘sign’ – assumes in Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s work the meaning of rational apodictic proof. In his work called *Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīna wa-l-muta’ahḥirīna*, he first posits the difference between an *amāra*, which is just a hint through which a real and apodictic knowledge of anything cannot be reached – so the *amāra* only engenders the supposition, the conviction of the existence of an abstract or concrete entity to which the hint refers, without providing strong evidence or proof – and a *dalīl*, which is inferential reasoning through which a process of deduction or induction leads to sound knowledge of the abstract or concrete entity to which the *dalīl* refers. The only kind of *dalīl* that Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī judges valid is the *dalīl ‘aqlī* (rational *dalīl*), for it is the only which provides a statement that can be proven to be true through an incontestable method: namely, one can infer the

consequence from the cause and the cause from the consequence, or a condition from a given condition.²⁴

Given this premise, the recourse to the figurative sense, which is achieved through the literal meaning, becomes necessary only when the latter sense can be refuted without any doubt, which is not the case. But how does al-Rāzī mediate between these two possibilities? He explains:

We say: there is no doubt that the words ‘grip’ and ‘right hand’ are known to be these members and limbs unless the *dalā’il al-‘aqliyya* forbid the assignment of these members and limbs to God. Thus, the accord of these members following the way of the figurative sense is mandatory. We say: it is said ‘Such a one is in the grip of such a one’ when he is in his control and his subjection. The Almighty said: (Q 23:6) “Except from their wives or what their right [hands] own” (*illā ‘alā azwāġi-him aw malakat aymānu-hum*), its intended meaning (*murād*) is ‘its being possessed’. It is said ‘This house is in the hand of such a one and such a one is the possessor of the hand’, the intended meaning (*murād*) of all of them is the power (*qudra*). The jurists say in their legal stipulations ‘Such a one took possession (*qabaḍa*) of so-and-so and it became of his property’, meaning nothing but his specific

²⁴ Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī defines the *dalīl* as follow: “The *dalīl* (evidence) is what entails with its knowledge the knowledge of the necessary existence of the *madlūl* (what is proven), while the *amāra* (hint) is what entails with the knowledge thereof the conviction of the existence of the *madlūl*. Each one of them can be exclusively ‘*aqlī* (rational), exclusively *samī* (traditional), or composed (*murakkab*) by both. About the ‘*aqlī*, it must be in such a way that its existence entails the existence of the *madlūl*, so that the consequence (*luzūm*) is actualised (*hāṣil*) and it necessarily follows in this type. If it is not actualised, it is of another type: the *istidlāl* (inference) from given conditions (*ṣurūṭ*) of another condition (*ṣarṭ*) like the *istidlāl* from [the condition of] knowledge (*‘ilm*) to [the condition] of being living (*ḥayāt*). If it is actualised by the other type, it is the inference by the particular cause (*al-istidlāl bi-l-‘illa l-mu‘ayyana*) of the particular ‘caused’ (*al-ma‘lūl al-mu‘ayyan*), and by the particular ‘caused’ of the absolute (*muṭlaqa*) or particular cause. [...] About the exclusively *samī*, it is impossible, because it was predicated something which was not rationally known: its veracity was not inferred. About the *murakkab*, it goes without saying” (Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Muḥaṣṣal*, 50-51). See Anawati and Gardet (1948, 162-163). For an overview of the concepts of logic which played a role in Islamic theology and their development and use in different contexts, see van Ess (1970). For a philosophical interpretation of *dalīl* and derivatives, see Goichon (1938, no. 251-254). As we will see in the third section of this chapter, the notion of *dalīl* changes in the thought of the Zāhirites.

property. When the difficulty of according these expressions to the proper meanings (*ḥaqā'iq*) is proven, their accord with the figurative senses (*maǧāzāt*) is mandatory to preserve these quotations from the divesting of God of his attributes (*ta'ṭīl*). This is the true speech about this matter. We wrote a single book²⁵ about the affirmation of the transcendentalism (*tanzīh*) of God against anthropomorphism (*taǧṣīm*) and localisation (*makān*).²⁶ (Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr*, 16-17)

Not wishing to explore detailed theological issues here, I nonetheless need to make a clarification in order to understand better the viewpoints of al-Zamaḥṣarī, a Mu'tazilite, and al-Rāzī, an Aš'arite and strong opponent of the Mu'tazilites.²⁷ Asked whether God has limbs or not, Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī replies that, without evidence (*dalīl*), it is not possible to deny that he has, for example, a hand. The fact that 'right hand' has a figurative sense known and inscribed in common uses of the language is not a sufficient condition to make it implied in the understanding of the Koranic verse, even if the Koran itself contains other verses whose figurative sense of the given word is to be considered the intended meaning. This is the case with (Q 23:6), in which 'right hands' cannot refer to a limb and is therefore to be interpreted in its figurative sense. Recourse to the *dalīl* is therefore necessary to justify the interpretation deviating from the literalness of the Koranic text. However, whenever a *dalīl* is missing, the transition from proper to figurative is not possible. Or, better, the two meanings do not become mutually exclusive. This is the case with (Q 39:67), where the literal meaning is not to be considered to have been quashed by the figurative sense; rather, it is to be considered valid according to the theory of transcendentalism (*tanzīh*), which, although not attributing human characteristics to God, accepts the possibility that anthropomorphic expressions – such as the hand – refer to him. This explanation is subject to the principle of *bi-lā kayfa*, i.e. not questioning the nature of these elements attributed to God and merely accepting them as a principle of faith.²⁸ Not accepting this position is for Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī

²⁵ i.e. Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (*Asās*), see in particular pp. 123-134.

²⁶ On *kawn* and *makān*, see Gimaret (1990, 99-120).

²⁷ On Aš'arism see Frank (1989;1991), Gimaret (1990).

²⁸ On the *bi-lā kayfa*, see Abrahamov (1995), who presents the most relevant theories on *bi-lā kayfa* and provides an overview of the most important sources to show how the concept developed over time.

synonymous with *ta'tīl*, i.e. depriving God of his own qualities and characteristics. What does this reflection on the semantic level of the words *qabḍa* and *yamīn* cited in (Q 39:67) involve? In al-Zamaḥṣarī, the literal meaning functioned solely and exclusively to create an image, an idea, which within the *taḥyīl* process develops in the reader the consciousness of a figurative sense. Therefore, the literal meaning within this specific context does not exist, because the literal meaning, if applied to the verse, would lead to a wrong reading, since God cannot have limbs. It follows from this that *yamīn* in (Q 39:67) can, in al-Zamaḥṣarī's opinion, only lead to the sense *qudra*. If we think in terms of *ihām* and *tawriya*, we cannot but agree that this figure in these terms, in this verse, is not applicable. On the other hand, Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who categorically rejects al-Zamaḥṣarī's view since for him it leads to *ta'tīl*, admits the simultaneous presence of proper meaning and figurative sense within this verse, arguing that the two cooperate with one another and express two different but perfectly compatible senses. This is one of the possible forms of *tawriya*. Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's view is even more explicit in this *J'accuse* addressed to al-Zamaḥṣarī and his followers:

Al-Zamaḥṣarī said: 'It is said 'his grip' (*qabḍa*) means 'his dominion' (*mulk*) and 'his right hand' (*yamīn*) means 'his power' (*qudra*), and also 'folded in his right hand' means 'destroyed by his oath', for he swore to grip them.' When he mentioned these opinions, he went back to what has been said first, i.e. that they are weak opinions, and that to accord this speech with the pure analogy (*tamṭīl*) is more appropriate. He exaggerated in fixing this speech and passed the limit. I say: if this man turns away from engaging himself in improving his method and in rebuking the method of the predecessors, it will be very astonishing. Indeed, if his teaching were to permit to abandoning the literal meaning of the expression (*zāhir al-lafz*) and to proceed to the figurative sense (*maḡāz*) without any *dalīl*, it will be, thus, an attack on the Koran and its exclusion of being proof (*ḥuḡḡā*) for whatever. Moreover, if his teaching were that the basis in the speech is the proper meaning (*ḥaqīqa*), and that it is not permitted to him to abstain from it unless the presence of an adjunctive *dalīl*, it will be, thus, the method with which the predecessors agree. So, where is the speech he maintains to have the knowledge of? Where is the knowledge which nobody else knows? Nevertheless, he maintained difficult interpretations and weak assertions. If they say: 'The intended meaning (*murād*) is when the *dalīl* indicates that the intended meaning of the expressions 'grip' and

'right hand' are not the limbs, then it is mandatory for us to be satisfied with this decree and not engage in specifying the intended meaning. We commit rather its knowledge to God and say: this is the method of the unitarians (*muwaḥḥidūna*) who say 'Indeed we know that God's intended meaning by these expressions are not the limbs.' About the specification of the intended meaning, we commit its knowledge to God. This is the method of the early Muslims (*salaf*) who discarded these interpretations.²⁹ It has been established that these interpretations to which this man came are not based on anything of any use, but God knows better. (Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr*, 17-18)

Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī postulates clearly that interpreting this passage of the Koran as a mere figurative speech means denying the nature of the Koran itself. In doing so, the Koran will end up being an allegorical text and lose its status as proof (*ḥuḡḡa*). To avoid this, the interpretation should be both literal and figurative, for nobody has the knowledge of the transcendence of God to deny either of the two. So why did al-Zamaḥṣarī do this, and on what did he ground his thought, since he seems to be the only one who has this knowledge? Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī attributes this claim to the unitarians (*muwaḥḥidūna*), who pretend, in his view, to be aware of matters of which only God can actually be aware. The solution is ultimately *bi-lā kayfa*.

3.1.3 Later authors

Having examined two Koranic commentaries, I now want to return to the treatises on rhetoric and stylistics. The other sources quoting (Q 39:67) as an example of *tawriya-ihām* can be roughly divided into two categories. The first are those that support a vision closer to the interpretation of al-Ġurġānī, which therefore sees in *tamtīl* the solution of the interpretation of the verse. The latter are the partisans of al-Zamaḥṣarī, who will report what the Mu'tazilite scholar stated, making *tahyīl* a synonym of *ihām*, also on the basis of what had already been stated by Rašīd al-Dīn al-Waṭwāṭ (d. 578/1182-83) (*Ḥadā'iq*, 135).

²⁹ See Abrahamov (1995, 374), who quotes Ibn Taymiyya's (d. 728/1328) reference to the *salaf*, e.g. Mālik b. Anas (d. 179/796), who maintained the difference between knowing the action of God – such as his sitting upon a throne – and its modality, which is not known and never could be known by humans.

Among the most interesting of these sources are al-Qazwīnī (d. 739/1338) and his commentator Bahā' al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 773/1371-72),³⁰ who do not report this verse as an example of *tawriya*, but follow the way traced by 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī, placing it in the chapter on *mağāz murakkab* (composite figurative speech).

On the other hand, al-Sakkākī (d. 626/1229) limits himself to quoting (Q 39:67) together with (Q 20:5) in the *ihām* chapter of (*Miftah*, 537), without giving any explanation besides the definition of the figure.

3.1.3.1 al-Zanġānī

Another author who included (Q 39:67) in the *ihām* chapter is al-Zanġānī (d. ca. 660/1261-62),³¹ who draws on al-Zamaḥṣarī to explain why this verse is an example of *ihām*:

According to the scholars of eloquence, the *tahyīl* is the depiction of the proper meaning (*ḥaqīqa*) of something, as in the words of the Almighty (Q 39:67) “The entire earth will be His handful on the Day of Resurrection, and the heavens will be rolled up in His right [hand]”. Its aim is to make an image (*taṣawwur*) of his majesty and to put before our eyes the essence of his loftiness, without interpreting the words *qabḍa* and *yamīn* as proper meaning (*ḥaqīqa*), or figurative sense (*mağāz*). Like in his words ‘We are nothing but a handful among the handfuls of our Lord.’³² He has already treated the discourse about this topic exhaustively in what precedes. Al-Zamaḥṣarī said: ‘We do not see any category of the *‘ilm al-bayān* finer, nor more elegant than this category. Either [you see] anything more useful or more helpful to

³⁰ Bahā' al-Dīn Abū Ḥāmid Aḥmad b. Taqī l-Dīn 'Alī l-Subkī was born in 719/1319 and died in Mecca in 773/1371-72. He is best known for his commentary on al-Qazwīnī's (d. 739/1338) *Talḥiṣ al-Miftāḥ* entitled '*Arūs al-afrāḥ fī šarḥ Talḥiṣ al-miftāḥ*. See Schacht and Bosworth (2012).

³¹ 'Izz al-Dīn 'Abd al-Wahhāb b. Ibrāhīm b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Ḥaraġī al-Zanġānī. Little is known about him, even his date of death is situated around or after 660/1261-62. His works include the *Kitāb al-taṣrīf* on morphology, which was also commented on by al-Taftāzānī (d. 793/1390), and one of the first books available in a Latin translation; and the *Kitāb al-mi'yār*, a book on prosody and rhetoric which is divided into three sections covering '*ilm al-'arūḍ*, '*ilm al-qawāfī*, and '*ilm al-badī*. See al-Ḥafāġī's introduction to the edition of al-Zanġānī (*Mi'yār*).

³² *Inna-mā naḥnu ḥafnatun min ḥafanāti rabbi-nā*. Cf. Lane (*Lexicon*, s.v. ḥ f n) “We shall be but little, on the day of Resurrection, like a *ḥafna*, in the estimation of God; meaning we shall be but a small thing in comparison with the dominion and the mercy of God”. Attributed to Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq (d. 13/634), see Ibn Manẓūr (*Lisān*, s.v. ḥ f n).

undertake the interpretation (*ta'wīl*) of the ambiguous verses (*muštabihāt*) of the speech of God and in the speech of the prophets.' (al-Zanġānī, *Mi'yār*, 2:127)

Al-Zanġānī's words suggest a reflection. He calls this figure of speech *ihām* and the definition he gives does not deviate from the standard definition, which sees the figure composed of an expression, or word, with two meanings. The question that arises is why he indicates as an example of *ihām* a Koranic verse that he seems to interpret according to the thought of al-Zamaḥṣarī – so using *taḥyīl* – instead of conforming to the definition he has given. Indeed, he clearly states that in the thought of the 'ulamā' *al-bayān*, this figure is identified with the *taḥyīl* of which he provides an explanation borrowed from al-Zamaḥṣarī. What is odd is that, if one adopts al-Zanġānī's statement, that is to say that since the figure is based on a *taṣawwur* – *taṣwīr* in al-Zamaḥṣarī – then neither the word *qabḍa* nor the word *yamīn* can be understood in their *ḥaqīqa* or *maġāz* meanings. In this case, the *tawriya* - *ihām* would not exist at all, since the words in question do not really possess two meanings which the reader perceives as such; rather, they are only two words creating an image which conveys a different meaning, i.e. the one that is really intended. What we notice is that the author says that this kind of figure has already been dealt with, which is the reason that he does not provide more details. If we look at the *loci* mentioned in the work, we can find one similar to (Q 39:67): a line by Labīd (d. ca. 40/660-61) in which the poet uses the word *yad* 'hand':

وَعَدَاةِ رِيحٍ قَدْ كَشَفَتْ وَفِرَّةٍ * إِذْ أَصْبَحَتْ بِيَدِ الشَّمَالِ زِمَامُهَا³³

And many's the morning of wind and cold I've kept at bay when its reins lay in the fingers of the bitter north.³⁴

This line is quoted among the *loci* of *isti'āra* (metaphor), in particular as an example its second type. Al-Zanġānī divides *isti'āra* into two types:

³³ Labīd (*Dīwān*, 315), al-Zanġānī (*Mi'yār*, 2:33).

³⁴ Arberry's translation (1957, 146). On the metaphor 'The hand of the northwind' and the 'old' type of metaphor, see Heinrichs (1977, 1-15).

The first: the same [principle] of the simile (*tašbīh*) is purposed. It consists in two things sharing a quality (*waṣf*) and one of them has less of the quality than the other, so the one lacking is given with an adjunctive noun to intensify the affirmation of its quality. For example, when you say: 'I saw a lion' and you mean a man. (al-Zanḡānī, *Mi'yār*, 2:33)

As the example lion = man shows, this is the classic definition of *isti'āra*, in which two words share a common quality – in this case, bravery – but at a different level. To express and intensify the courage of a person (the metaphrand), the speaker has chosen the most courageous animal: the lion (the metaphier). The substitution of the word 'man' with the word 'lion' engenders a metaphor *in absentia* and, subsequently, the man acquires the feature 'bravery'. What is of more interest, however, is the definition of the second type. He says:

The second: its consequences (*lawāzim*) are purposed. It consists – when the kind of sharing (*ištirāk*) is a conventional meaning (*waq'*) – only in the fact that it is realised as it is in its metaphier (*musta'ār min-hu*) by means of another concept. Then the concept realises itself in the metaphrand (*musta'ār la-hu*) intensifying the actualisation of the sharing (*ištirāk*).

[...Labīd's line...]

Here, there is no alluded (*mušār ilay-hi*)³⁵ which makes possible to the noun *yad* to refer to it, as the lion refers to the man. Yet, it causes itself an image to be provoked (*ḥuyyila*) that the north wind, in the morning change of the winds, is in compliance with its nature, like the man who has authority (*mutaṣarrif*) disposes of the power having his reins and his means of leading in his hand, since the acting of the man is, at the best, only through his hand. Thus, the hand is like the instrument through which the strength of acting accomplishes itself. And when the aim was the realisation of the quality (*waṣf*) of the authority (*mutaṣarrifiyya*) – and this is among what does not accomplish itself unless the presence of the hand – it would have been necessary, to affirm the aim, that the north wind had the firmest hand; then the judgement (*ḥukm*) of the reins stands in the metaphor (*isti'āra*) for the morning and the judgment of the hand stands in the metaphor for the north wind. (al-Zanḡānī, *Mi'yār*, 2:33)

³⁵ I.e. the first element of the metaphor, the one replaced by a second element.

Unlike the first type, this second type of metaphor is not based on a transfer of qualities. If we consider the two words object of the figure (namely, ‘hand’ (*yad*) and ‘power’), the bond linking them is established by a conventional use of a word to express the other, or rather by the potential which a word has to evoke an image capable of describing the meaning intended by the speaker. The hand has the potential to evoke an image which associates the term ‘*yad*’ with possession and control over something. Just as in reality, control is often achieved through the use of the hand, for example to grasp or tighten. In the poetic line, the hand holds the reins tightly, as the north wind holds the morning, clutched in its authoritarian grip. This type of metaphor has the particularity of developing through an image (*ḥayāl*), and is therefore called *isti‘āra taḥyīliyya*.³⁶ If we consider the definition and example given by al-Zanḡānī in this chapter, we can say that they correspond to (Q 39:67) quoted as an example of *ihām-taḥyīl*, since in the Koranic verse the image of God’s strength is expressed in the image provoked by the ‘right hand’ (*yamīn*). It is important to note that, in al-Zanḡānī’s treatise, neither *taḥyīl* nor *tamṭīl* are treated as independent figures. The *taḥyīl* is in fact included in the category of the *isti‘āra taḥyīliyya*. Once again, we are faced with a discrepancy between a definition of *ihām* and one of the examples given to illustrate the figure. Al-Zanḡānī seems to follow the path of his predecessors in defining (Q 39:67) as an example of *tawriya-ihām*. But, in quoting al-Zamaḡṣarī, he seems to distance himself from ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurḡānī, who used the *tamṭīl* category, with al-Zanḡānī preferring instead the notion of *taḥyīl* and of image (*ḥayāl*), rather than *tamṭīl* and *maṭal*.

3.1.3.2 Ibn al-Zamlakānī

Al-Zanḡānī’s preference was taken up by Ibn al-Zamlakānī (d. 651/1253),³⁷ who borrowed from al-Zamaḡṣarī the concept of *taḥyīl*. We have seen that al-Zanḡānī,

³⁶ “The *isti‘āra takhyīliyya* is characterised by the lack of a substratum, as in ‘the claws of death’, where the metaphor ‘claws’ is not tied, as other metaphors often are, by an underlying simile to a part of death, because death does not have any part that could be likened to claws. But the metaphor creates an illusion that there is such a part. The technical term *takhyīlī* is thus apt, but it has little to do with al-Jurjānī’s notion” Heinrichs (2008, 13).

³⁷ Kamāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Wāḥid b. Ḥaṭīb Zamalkā Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Karīm b. Ḥalaf al-Anṣārī I-Zamlakānī I-Simākī I-Šāfi‘ī died in 651/1253 in Damascus. Very little is known about his life, but his

who was influenced by the work of al-Waṭwāt,³⁸ placed (Q 39:67) in the *ihām* chapter, stating that *tahyīl* is a synonym of *ihām*. Writing in his *al-Tibyān fī ‘ilm al-bayān*, his contemporary does not even count *tawriya* among the figures composing *badī‘*, and thus he classifies (Q 39:67) in the chapter on *tahyīl*, giving the following definition:

It is the depiction [through] the proper meaning of a concept (*ḥaqīqat al-šay‘*), so that it is imagined that it has a witnessing shape which is among what can be seen with the eyes, like in the words of God (Q 39:67) “When the entire earth will be His handful on the Day of Resurrection, and the heavens will be rolled up in His right [hand]” and (Q 37:65) “Its fruits are like the heads of the satans” (*ṭal‘u-hā ka-anna-hu ru‘ūsu l-šayāṭīni*). You cannot find a category of the *‘ilm al-bayān* more elegant than it, nor finer and more helpful to undertake [the interpretation] of the ambiguous verses (*mutašābihāt*).³⁹ (Ibn al-Zamlakānī, *Tibyān*, 178)

This is certainly not a detailed definition, but we can deduce two things from it. The first is that there is a distinction for Ibn al-Zamlakānī between *tawriya* – or, better, *tawriya* defined as a *muštarak* word – and *tahyīl*. In fact, he does not mention *tawriya*, nor a comparable figure of speech, in his work. Second, he borrowed the definition of *tahyīl* from al-Zamaḥṣarī by giving as an example the same Koranic verse and, as we have already seen, for al-Zamaḥṣarī, *tahyīl* is not comparable to an *ištirāk*-based *tawriya*. This clarification places this author – as already stated by Maṭlūb and al-Ḥadīṭī⁴⁰ – in the ‘oriental’ school (*madhab al-mašāriqa*), which has ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī and al-Zamaḥṣarī as its main exponents and which refers to their thought even if they treat *tamṭīl* and *tahyīl* in different ways. In particular, he refers to al-

biographers report that he was versed in *‘ilm al-ma‘ānī* and *‘ilm al-bayān* and in other sciences; he was a judge in Ṣarḥad and *mudarris* in Ba‘albak, but what he taught is not reported. For a list of his works, see the introduction by Maṭlūb and al-Ḥadīṭī in (Ibn al-Zamlakānī, *Tibyān*, 12-13). Cf. also al-Subkī (*Ṭabaqāt*, 8:370-371), Ibn al-‘Imād (*Šaḍarāt*, 7:438), (*GAL* G1:415, S1:736), al-Zirikī (*A‘lām*, s.v. ‘Abd al-Wāhid b. ‘Abd al-Karīm).

³⁸ Cf. Heinrichs (2008, 14).

³⁹ Cf. Badī‘ Ya‘qūb (2006, 4:288), Heinrichs (2008, 14). This same definition was taken up more than half a century later by Šihāb al-Dīn al-Ḥalabī (d. 725/1324-25) (*Ḥusn*, 65); about this author see al-Šawī (2011), and Bu‘aywī and al-Šawī (2016). The exact same quotation is found in al-Nuwayrī (d. 733/1333) (*Nihāya*, 7:132). On this author and his work, see Muhanna (2016; 2018).

⁴⁰ “Ibn al-Zamlakānī was a scholar and judge of Syria, who broadened his opinions and diffused them to the public through his book *al-Tibyān*, which was an ‘extension’ of the ‘oriental’ school by means of a finer explanation. It was actually an ‘extension’ of ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī’s school” (Ibn al-Zamlakānī, *Tibyān*, 9). It should be noted that Ibn al-Zamlakānī adopts al-Zamaḥṣarī’s classification, preferring *tahyīl* to *tamṭīl*.

Ğurğānī and his *Dalā'il al-i'ğāz* as a source for *al-Tibyān* and calls him the authority who set the norms of *'ilm al-ma'ānī* and *'ilm al-bayān* (*Tibyān*, 30). It is nevertheless important to underline how Ibn al-Zamlakānī adopts the opinion of al-Zamaḥṣarī and not that of al-Ğurğānī on the verse in question. From a general point of view, Ibn al-Zamlakānī's chapter on *taḥyīl* provides neither new information on or improvements to *ihām-taḥyīl* theory.

3.1.3.3 al-Qazwīnī and al-Subkī

The last two authors whom I quote are al-Qazwīnī and his commentator Bahā' al-Dīn al-Subkī, who both use (Q 39:67) as an example of *mağğāz murakkab*. I start with al-Qazwīnī's *Īdāḥ*:

Like that are the words of God (Q 39:67) "When the entire earth will be His handful on the Day of Resurrection", for the meaning – but God knows better – is that the metaphorical image (*maṭal*) of the earth, in its being controlled under the command (*amr*) of God and his power (*qudra*), is like the *maṭal* of the thing which is in the grip of a human being who collects it in his hand. As well as the words of God (Q 39:67) "And the heavens will be rolled up in His right [hand]", i.e. he attributes to them the quality of 'folding' so that you see like the papers folded in the single right hand. The right hand is particularly known for being higher and greater in rank for the *maṭal*, because it is the more noble and the stronger of the two hands, and that without which the other has no usefulness. Nobody can rejoice of anything unless he started it with the right hand and made it (i.e. the hand) ready to obtain it (i.e. something, whatever he wants to obtain). In case he aims to do something having care of it, he does it with the right hand. However, in case he aims the contrary, he does it with the left. (al-Qazwīnī, *Īdāḥ*, 5:110)

As we can see in this excerpt, al-Qazwīnī summarises in his explanation of the verse what has already been stated by 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Ğurğānī.⁴¹ It is clear that, for al-Qazwīnī, the authority to follow in the interpretative hypothesis of (Q 39:67) is al-Ğurğānī and not Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. In fact, if we examine the chapters devoted to

⁴¹ See the excerpt of *Asrār al-balāğā* quoted above; the part about the difference between the right and the left hand can be found in (*Asrār*, 334) and Ritter (1959, 389).

tawriya in both (*Talḥiṣ*, 97) and (*Īdāḥ*, 6:38-40), neither mentions (Q 39:67) among the *loci* of this figure of speech. He therefore shares the explanation of al-Ġurġānī, who had stated that the imaginative process underlying the understanding of this verse was none other than the *tamtīl*, bringing as an example the above-mentioned line by al-Šammāḥ (*idā mā ... bi-l-yamīn*), which al-Qazwīnī also quotes.

This rhetorical figure is once again described as functioning collectively and not in terms of a single word or expression. As in ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī, *tamtīl* is a figure which is constructed at the sentence level, and therefore at a higher and more complex level than that of the *tawriya*, which is usually based on a word or phrase.⁴² The resulting image is not attributable to a homonym, but rather to an imaginative effort on the part of the reader, who, stimulated by the lemmas and the relationship between them, imagines, figures, the meaning that the author of the utterance wants to communicate. This is the result of the process stimulated by the *maṭal*, the metaphorical image, on which the figure is based: “This is all called *tamtīl* ‘alā sabīl al-isti‘āra, generally called *tamtīl*. When its use in this manner becomes common, it is called *maṭal*. This is why the examples do not change” (al-Qazwīnī, *Īdāḥ*, 5:113).

Al-Qazwīnī’s thought was clarified by Bahā’ al-Dīn al-Subkī, who, while commenting on the *Talḥiṣ*, also mentions the *Īdāḥ* and this passage is a case in point. From a theoretical point of view, he did not add anything to what his predecessor had already stated. Rather, he focuses on explaining how *maġāz murakkab* and *tamtīl* function:

The confirmation thereof is that the speech in itself has a proper meaning (*ḥaqīqa*) in respect of its components. However, it is a *maṭal* of something else. The metaphor (*isti‘āra*) lies in its sum and differs from the *maġāz al-ifrād* (figurative speech in a single word) because the figurative telling (*taġawwuz*) in it lies in the single word. It also differs from the *maġāz ‘aqlī* (inferential figurative speech) – also called *maġāz murakkab* (composed *maġāz*) – since the figurative telling within it lies in the metaphorical attribution (*isnād*).

⁴² At least if we take the definitions found in the sources that I analysed in chapter 1. But, as we shall see in chapter 5, I am persuaded that *tawriya* can also play at the sentence level.

About the *tamtīl*, the components thereof are in their proper meanings (*ḥaqā'iq*), so there is no mutual metaphorical attribution (*isnād*); and the figurative telling lies in their sum. If you ask: 'If the *tamtīl* has a proper meaning (*ḥaqā'iq*) and you aimed its components, how is it possible that its sum results in a *maǧāz*?' I will reply: 'You are already aware of the speech about the metonymy (*kināya*) through what precedes. In what follows you will learn that the intention (*irāda*) is of two types: the intention towards the conventional meaning (*isti'māl*, i.e. the use of a word by the community of the speakers with a given meaning shared within it) and the intention towards the informative content of the sentence (*ifāda*). And the *tamtīl* is close to it, since your utterance 'Zayd moves forward with one foot and back away with the other' are used in their proper meaning (*ḥaqā'iq*), for it sought its significatum (*madlūl*) through a conventional meaning (*isti'māl*) and did not seek the informative content of the sentence (*ifāda*). What is sought by the informative content of the sentence is what creates a *maṭal* (*yumātīlu*) [conveying] its composite meaning through repetition. Nevertheless, the difference between them and the *kināya* is that the significatum (*madlūl*) by its expression (*lafz*) is real. For example, when you say 'Zayd has a lot of ashes', you aim to inform about the big amount of ashes to make understand its implicature (*lāzim*). The big amount of ashes is real, while the *tamtīl* does not have as condition the reality of what you inform about. (al-Subkī, 'Arūs, 2:292-293)

Al-Subkī states that here is a similarity between *maǧāz murakkab* (or, in this case, its synonym *tamtīl*) and *kināya*. Both figures play at the levels of *ḥaqā'iq* and *maǧāz*, given that in both of them a literal sense of the components corresponds to a figurative sense that the speaker wants to convey to his or her listener. The substantial difference lies in the fact that *kināya* ensures that the literal sense is in some way actualised, which can be seen in the example of the abundance of ash in Zayd's house. Since he is a very hospitable person (the figurative sense of the sentence), he cannot but have accumulated a great deal of ash (literal sense), which signals his hospitality. *Tamtīl*, on the other hand, does not ensure that the literal sense is actualised. If we consider (Q 39:67), its literal meaning (namely, the image of God who tightens the earth and folds the heavens in his right hand) is nothing more than an image that serves to convey the figurative sense: God's power and control over all creation. The fact that the literal sense is not actualised certainly does not mean that it is not possible.

This overview of (Q 39:67) has aimed to highlight the dynamics underlying the choice and classification of a Koranic verse as an example of *tawriya*. It is important to emphasise that (Q 39:67) is the least quoted among the Koranic verses when it comes to *tawriya*; yet, it was the first ever quoted, and this is the reason that it arouses interest. Only having recourse to works of rhetoric is often not enough to account for the nuances that led individual authors to support their points of view and to mention certain *loci* or not. Therefore, having recourse to religious works, and in particular to exegesis of the sacred text, can highlight features of the thought of individual authors that other works cannot highlight. The most appropriate example is the difference in thought between al-Zamaḥṣarī and Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. I will now turn to the line most quoted by premodern Arabic authors when speaking about *tawriya*: (Q 20:5), the famous verse of the throne.

3.2 (Q 20:5)

The verse in the Koran that is most immediately associated with *tawriya* is (Q 20:5): “*al-rahmānu ‘alà l-‘arši stawà*” (The Merciful is mounted upon the throne).⁴³ This verse suggests a kind of God’s anthropomorphism of the type that attributes to God a human action, in this case, the action of ‘sitting’. Although it was not the first verse to be associated with *tawriya* in chronological terms, it is the verse that has come to represent this figure in the Koran. This might be because it is only those authors who named this figure *tawriya* and not *ihām* who associated this verse with this figure. As with the previous verse, it is appropriate to approach (Q 20:5) by taking into account works not only of rhetoric and stylistics, but also of exegesis.

3.2.1 ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī

⁴³ This is not the only Koranic verse in which the word ‘throne’ (*‘arš*) appears; in total, there are 21 verses in which *‘arš* is mentioned in relation to God: (Q 7:54; 9:129; 10:3; 11:7; 13:2; 17:42; 20:5; 21:22; 23:86, 116; 25:59; 27:26; 32:4; 39:75; 40:7, 15; 43:82; 57:4; 69:17; 81:20; 85:15). On this topic, see Elias (2006).

I will begin my examination with ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī, who quotes (Q 20:5) only once in his *Asrār al-balāġa*. Contrary to what we might expect, al-Ġurġānī quotes the Koranic verse in the context not of investigating how a figure of speech functions, but rather of a wider discourse that is addressed to those who misrepresent and misinterpret the word of God, in particular some exegetes. Al-Ġurġānī begins by stressing the importance of the study of eloquence, especially for those who want to approach the understanding and interpretation of the divine word, given that ignorance in this field can favour the work of Satan in making the believer lose the right way. ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī identifies two attitudes which lead the reader to the error: the *ifrāt* (literally, ‘to go too far’, ‘to exaggerate’) and the *tafrīt* (literally, ‘to leave behind’, ‘to neglect’). These two attitudes are nothing more than an over-interpretation of the text (*ifrāt*), i.e. the crossing of the literal meaning, becoming lost in false interpretations, and an under-interpretation of the text (*tafrīt*). As an example of the latter attitude, al-Ġurġānī quotes three Koranic verses of which, one of which is (Q 20:5):

About the *tafrīt*, it is what you find in people who [interpret] God’s words (Q 2:210) “Do they expect [anything] but God to come” (*Hal yanẓurūna illā an ya’tiya-humu llāh*), (Q 89:22) “And your Lord comes” (*wa-ġā’a rabbu-ka*), (Q 20:5) “The Merciful is mounted upon the throne” (*al-raḥmānu ‘alā l-‘arši stawà*), and the like, in contrast with the statements of those who profess the truth (*ahl al-taḥqīq*) even when it is said to them that the ‘coming’ (*ityān* and *maġī*) is the moving (*intiqāl*) from a space (*makān*) to another space and is one of the qualities (*ṣifāt*) of the bodies (*aġsām*); and that the ‘sitting’ (*istiwā*), if it is accorded to its literal meaning (*zāhir*), is not admissible except in a body which occupies a given portion of a space (*ḥayyiz*) and a space (*makān*). God, however, is the creator of spaces (*amākin*) and times (*azmina*), he is the generator of everything on which movement (*ḥaraka*), translation (*nuqla*), fixity (*tamakkun*), steadiness (*sukūn*), separation (*infiṣāl*), unity (*ittiṣāl*), contact (*mumāssa*), and parallelism (*muḥādā*) are applicable. And that the meaning of ‘[Do they expect anything] but the command of God to come’ and ‘The command of your Lord comes’, must be interpreted in the light of his words (Q 59:2) “But God came upon them from where they were not expecting” (*Fa-atā-humu llāh min ḥayṭu lam yaḥtasibū*). As well as the speech ‘I come to you from where you do not notice’ meaning ‘I will send down to you adversity and

I will make what is a repayment for your evil action when you are not expecting it, and at a time you feel safe from its happening to you.' [...]

What is understood by it is that if he is not taking God's words (Q 12:82) "Ask [the people of] the town" (*wa-s'ali l-qaryata*) on their literal meaning (*zāhir*), because he knows that inanimate beings are not asked – even if one pretends to be ignorant and maintains that God created life in that village, and the village even understood the question, answered to it, and talked, he was not uttering a speech denying God, making known his falsehood about it, nothing more – then he should not stop himself at the literal meaning and not spread out the veil without hearing and seeing, so that he is not aware nor considers it. Moreover, whenever it is understood in its literal meaning, he is going to be exposed to perdition and to the fall into polytheism.⁴⁴ ('Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī, *Asrār*, 361-363)

In this extract, al-Ġurġānī strongly argues for the importance of going beyond the literal meaning of the Koranic verse, affirming that those people who pretend to understand God's action of sitting upon the throne – and in general the verses depicting God's actions in an anthropomorphic way, especially when they limit themselves to the literal meaning of these verses – are clearly misinterpreting the meaning intended by God's words: this is an under-interpretation. Curiously, al-Ġurġānī does not provide an explanation of what the Koranic passage means, and nor of the figures of speech in these verses. He merely and perfunctorily refutes the literal reading by stating that God cannot perform actions such as movement that only real bodies can perform, since God cannot be inextricably linked to a concrete space or to a limited time, both of which he created.

3.2.2 al-Zamaḥṣarī

An interpretation of this verse in terms of the opposition between literal meaning and figurative sense is provided by al-Zamaḥṣarī, who, in his Koranic commentary, clarifies the difference between the use of the word *istawà* in its proper meaning of 'sitting' and its figurative sense of sovereignty and possession:

⁴⁴ Cf. Ritter (1959, 420-422)
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Since the sitting upon the throne – i.e. the king’s chair – is among the synonyms of sovereignty (*mulk*), they have made it a *kināya* standing for the sovereignty. They said ‘So-and-so sat upon the throne’ meaning ‘he ruled’, even if he was not sitting upon the throne. They also said it (i.e. sitting upon the throne) because of its notoriety and equivalence with sovereignty (*mulk*) [to render] its significance, since it is clearer, simpler, and more indicative of the image of the command (*amr*). An analogous example is when you say ‘The hand of such a person is outstretched (*mabsūṭa*) and the hand of such a one is chained (*maġlūla*)’, meaning that he is generous (*ġawād*) or avaricious (*baḥīl*). There is no difference between the two expressions except in what you have said: even for whom who never stretched his hand to give a favour, or had not a hand at all, it would be said about ‘His hand is outstretched’ because they make no difference between this [expression] and their words ‘He is generous’. Of the same tenor are God’s words (Q 5:64) “The Jews say, ‘The hand of God is chained’” (*wa-qālati l-yahūdu yadu llāhi maġlūlatun*), i.e. he is avaricious, and (Q 5:64) “No! Both His hands are outstretched” (*bal yadā-hu mabsūṭatāni*), i.e. he is generous, without imaging (*taṣawwur*) a hand, nor a shackle, nor extension, and explaining with the grace and cunningly insisting to repeat for whom is narrow-minded. To turn away from the *‘ilm al-bayān* is the way of common people.⁴⁵ (al-Zamaḥṣarī, *Kaššāf*, 4:67)

Unlike al-Ġurġānī, al-Zamaḥṣarī does not provide any theological explanation to justify the interpreting (Q 20:5) in a figurative sense. In fact, he uses a rhetorical explanation, emphasising how the verb *istawà* can be used not only to express the act of being seated, but also to define a person who has a certain authority over something and someone, such as for example a sovereign. The proof for al-Zamaḥṣarī is the fact that being seated on a throne is not a necessary condition to define a person’s authority and that the quoted utterance ‘So-and-so sat upon the throne’ clearly expresses the authority of the subject, even if in reality he is not seated on any throne. The figure of speech in this verse is therefore a *kināya*, since the act of being seated on a throne serves to express the authority deriving from it.⁴⁶ The

⁴⁵ For another Mu‘tazilite commentary, see al-Ṭūsī (*Tibyān*, 7:159-160), who interprets this verse by arguing that the act of sitting is not possible for God because it applies only to bodies; this therefore anticipates al-Zamaḥṣarī’s explanation. There is no mention of (Q 20:5) is found in ‘Abd al-Ġabbār (*Mutašābih*).

⁴⁶ Al-Ṭībī (*Tibyān*, 155) recalls al-Zamaḥṣarī’s words about (Q 20:5) and (Q 39:67), and points out that this particular rhetorical figure is a type of *kināya* called *īmā*, i.e. an indication. He does not quote (Q 20:5) or (Q 39:67) in the chapter on *tawriya* (which he calls *ihām*) and only cites these two Koranic verses in this *kināya* context. See also Kuḥayl (2004, 175).

figurative sense of authority is therefore transmitted by this expression not through the evocation of an image (*taṣawwur, taṣwīr*) – as it was the case in (Q 39:67) – but through contiguity, i.e. being seated on a throne is the symbol of the possession of a certain authority, and therefore the use of this expression is appropriate to describe, for example, a person who exercises a certain authority over a place or group of people. To support his argument, al-Zamaḥṣarī quotes the example, ‘The hand of such a person is outstretched and the hand of such a one is chained’ connected with the interpretation of (Q 5:64). For al-Zamaḥṣarī, it is evident that this statement should be understood not in its literal, but rather its figurative, sense. In fact, if we wanted to interpret it literally, we would have to imagine God with his hands tied and chained, unable to act, which must be considered false. Therefore, as in the previous case, there is a logical derivation that leads to the figurative interpretation of the text: any man with chained hands is unable to give, just as avarice chains the hands of the miser. Similarly, having outstretched hands is a symbol of the propensity to give to others. In this case, too, the path to the figurative sense does not entail the formation of an image through which it is understood: thus, we will not imagine a hand outstretched or chained.

For both authors, the intended meaning of (Q 20:5) is the figurative sense. While ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī’s explanation is theological in nature, while al-Zamaḥṣarī’s is based on rhetoric.

3.2.3 Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī

The author who was able to combine both of these aspects into a single exhaustive treatment is Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who devotes ample space in his Koranic commentary to the explaining and interpreting this verse, and in doing so combining fine theological disquisition with the precision of rhetoric. I will translate the whole passage not only to demonstrate its logical rigour, but and also because it is an appropriate example of *dalīl*, the apodictic explanation, which for al-Rāzī is that the root of every interpretative effort.

The ambiguity (*mušabbaha*) in this verse is due to the fact that their deity is sitting upon the throne and this is rationally and traditionally untenable (*bāṭil bi-l-‘aql wa-l-naql*) for several reasons.

1) The first is that there was no throne and no space (*makān*) and when he created creation, he did not need any space, but was self-sufficient (*ḡanī*) from it. Thus, he is such an everlasting condition unless one does not assert that also a throne is everlasting together with God.

2) The second is that the one sitting upon the throne must be the actualised part (*al-ḡuz’ al-ḥāṣil*) thereof on the right of the throne and not the actualised on the left of the throne. Thus, he is himself composed and composite (*mu’allaḡ murakkab*), so anything like that needed the creator and the composer (*mu’alliḡ wa-l-murakkib*), which is impossible (i.e. that God had a creator).

3) The third is that the one sitting upon the throne is either able to go elsewhere (*intiḡāl*) and move (*ḡaraka*), or that is not possible for him. If it were the first case, he would become the place of the movement (*ḡaraka*) and the steadiness (*sukūn*), thus being necessarily created (*muḡdaṡ*). If the second, he would be like fastened, rather like the invalid, rather in a worse condition! Since the invalid, when he wants to move his head and pupil he can, but this is not possible to their deity.

4) The fourth is that their deity either exists in every space (*fī kull makān*), or in a space non-space (*makān dūna makān*). If he existed in every space, it would be necessary to them that he exists also in the space of impurities and evil dispositions, and this cannot be said by a rational man. If, however, he existed in a space non-space, he would be in need of a particularising entity which exclusively particularises him with that space, thus being in need (*muḡtāḡ*), but this is impossible for God.

5) The fifth is that his words (Q 42:11) “There is nothing like Him” (*laysa ka-miṡli-hi ṡay’un*) mean the denial of the equivalence under all aspects by means of the evidence (*dalīl*) of the soundness of the exception, since it is sound to say that nothing is like him except in the act of sitting (*ḡulūs*), except in the extent (*miḡdār*), and except in the aspect (*lawn*). Then the soundness of the exclusion implies the inclusion of all these concepts under him: if he were sitting, someone comparable to him in the act of sitting would exist, but in this case the meaning of the verse would have been untenable.

6) The sixth are his words (Q 69:17) “And they will bear the throne of your Lord above them on that Day – eight [of them]” (*wa-yaḡmilu ‘arṡa rabbi-ka faḡqa-hum yawma’idīn ṡamāniyatun*). If they are the porters of the throne and the throne is the space of their deity, it is necessary that the angels are bearing their creator and deity, but this is not reasonable

because the creator is he who preserves the creature, while the creature does not preserve, nor bear, the creator.

7) The seventh, if it were possible to the one settled in the space to be a divinity, how would it be known that the sun and the moon are not a divinity? Because our method to negate the divinity of the sun and the moon is that they are characterised by the movement and the steadiness. Whatever like that is created and is not a divinity. When you claim this method untenable, the door of the calumny [consisting in stating] the divinity of the sun and the moon will close up upon you.

8) The eighth is that the earth is a sphere, so the side (*ġiha*) which is above from our point of view is beneath from the point of view of the inhabitants of the other side of the earth, and the other way around. If the deity were specifically characterised by a side, that would be above for some people and would be beneath for others. However, by agreement of the rational people (*'uqalā'*), it is not possible to say that the deity is under anything.

9) The ninth is that the community of the believers agreed on the fact that his speech (Q 112:1) "Say: 'He is God, One'" (*qul huwa llāhu aḥadun*) is one of the clear verses (*muḥkamāt*) and not one of the ambiguous (*mutašābihāt*). If he were specifically characterised by space, the side which adjoins what is on his right would not be the same as the side which adjoins what is on his left. Thus, he would be composite (*murakkab*) and divided (*munqasam*) and not one and the same in the essence, and his words (Q 112:1) "Say: 'He is God, One'" would become false.

10) The tenth are the words of al-Ḥalīl (i.e. Abraham) (Q 6:76) "I do not love what vanishes" (*lā uḥibbu l-āfilīna*). If the deity were a body (*ġism*), he would be always transitory and always vanishing and would be classified under his speech (Q 6:76) "I do not love what vanishes". It is, therefore, established through this evidence (*dalā'il*) that it is impossible to apply to God the 'being settled' (*istiqrār*). About this, people have two opinions.

A) The first, we do not engage in the interpretation, rather we maintain that God transcends space and side, so we abandon the interpretation of the verse. Al-Ġazālī (d. 505/1111) reported from some companions of the *imām* Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) that he interpreted three traditions: "The black stone is God's right hand on the earth", "The believing heart is between two of the Merciful's fingers", and "Indeed I experience the essence of the Merciful through the right". Know that this speech is weak (*ḍa'if*) for two reasons.

A.a) First, if it is maintained that God transcends space and direction, it is maintained that God's intention is not the action of sitting (*al-istiwā' wa-l-ġulūs*). This is the interpretation. If

it is not maintained that God transcends space and direction, rather a doubt lasts, he is ignorant of God. O God, would he say 'I am maintaining that what is perceived from the literal meaning (*zāhir*) is not meant (*murād*) for God, rather what is meant is something else.' However, I do not specify what is meant fearing the error, and this will be near.

A.b) But it is also weak because the almighty, when he addressed us in the language of the Arabs it was necessary that he meant to express himself following the speaking conventions of the Arabs. Since there is no other meaning in the language for *istiwā'* than the 'being settled' (*istiqrār*) and the 'possession' (*istilā'*), and its accord with the 'being settled' has already been [judged] impossible, it is necessary to accord it with the 'possession'. If not, the expression will bear a divesting meaning (*ta'ṭīl*), which is not possible.

B) Second, it is a conclusive probative value (*dalāla*) that one must go back to the interpretation. That is, that the rational probative value (*dalāla 'aqliyya*), when it was furnished for the refusal of the 'being settled' and the signifier *istiwā'* denotes the meaning 'being settled', then or α) we put into operation each one of the two signs, or β) we leave them together, or γ) we prefer tradition (*naql*) over rationality ('*aql*), or δ) we prefer rationality and we interpret tradition. (α) is untenable, since otherwise the single thing must necessarily transcend space and exist in the space, and this is impossible. (β) is also impossible for it entails a contradiction, and this is untenable. (γ) is untenable, for rationality is the basis of tradition. Indeed, until the existence of the agent (*ṣāni'*), his knowledge ('*ilm*), his power (*qudra*), and his sending messengers (*ba'aṭatu-hu li-l-rusul*) was not established through the rational evidence (*dalā'il 'aqliyya*), the tradition (*naql*) was not established, either. So, the unsoundness in rationality (*al-qadh fī l-'aql*) entails the unsoundness of rationality and tradition together, so that we can only maintain the soundness of rationality and engage in the interpretation of tradition, and this is conclusive proof (*burhān*) of the meaning sought.

Once this established, we can say 'Some scholars said that the intended meaning of *istiwā'* is the possession (*istilā'*).' The poet said:

قد استوى بِشْرٌ على العراقِ * من غيرِ سَيْفٍ وِدمٍ مهراقٍ⁴⁷

⁴⁷ On the line, cf. Lane (*Lexicon*, s.v. s w y); see also Ibn Manẓūr (*Lisān*, s.v. s w y). Bišr b. Marwān b. al-Ḥakam Abū Marwān (d. ca. 73-75/693-695), son of the Umayyad caliph Marwān I (d. 65/685), see Veccia Vaglieri (2012). Ibn Kaṭīr (*Bidāya*, 9:7) attributes this line to the Christian poet al-Aḥṭal (d. ca. 92/710), but it is not mentioned in al-Aḥṭal (*Dīwān*). Ibn Kaṭīr also reports an anecdote about the encounter between the poet Ğarīr (d. ca. 110/728-29) and al-Aḥṭal: "Niftawayh (d. 323/935) reported that one day Ğarīr came to see Bišr b. Marwān while al-Aḥṭal was there. Bišr asked to Ğarīr: 'Do you know him?' Ğarīr replied: 'No, I do not, who is this, o prince?' He answered: 'He is al-Aḥṭal' then al-Aḥṭal said: 'I am the one who defamed your honour, who made your night sleepless, who harmed your

Bišr took possession of Iraq without sword or bloodshed

If it was said: this interpretation is not possible because of some reasons and notably:

x) The first is that the meaning of possession is the actualisation of gaining power after powerlessness, which is impossible in relation to God.

y) The second is that it is said 'so-and-so took possession of so-and-so' when he has a contender who contends him, and who possessed it was existing before that. But this is impossible in relation to God, for the throne came into existence only through his creation and his origination.

z) The third: the possession is actualised with reference to all the creatures and there is no benefit in mentioning the throne in particular.

The answer is: we, when we explain the 'possession' with the 'having the power' (*iqtidār*), all of these weaknesses disappear.

The writer of the *Kaššāf* said: "Since the sitting upon the throne – i.e. the king's chair – is used only in connection with sovereignty (*mulk*), they have made it a *kināya* standing for sovereignty. They said: 'So-and-so possessed (*istawà*) the country' meaning he ruled, even if he was not sitting upon the throne. With that, they asserted the existence of the sovereignty, since it is clearer, and stronger in indication (*dalāla*) than saying 'So-and-so is a king'. An analogous example is when you say 'The hand of such a person is outstretched and the hand of such a one is chained', meaning that he is generous or avaricious. There is no difference between the two expressions except in what you have said: even for he who never stretched his hand to give a favour, or had not a hand at all, it would be said about 'His hand is outstretched' because they make no difference between this and their words 'He is generous'. Of the same tenor are his words (Q 5:64) "The Jews say, 'The hand of God is chained'", i.e. he is avaricious, and (Q 5:64) "No! Both His hands are outstretched", i.e. he is generous without imagining (*tašawwur*) a hand, nor a shackle, nor extension, and explaining with the grace and cunningly insisting to call for whom is narrow-minded."

people.' Ġarīr replied: 'About your speech 'who vilified your honour', how could the sea be harmed by the vilification of he who is sinking in it? About your speech 'who made your night sleepless', if you had left me sleeping, it would have been better for you. About your speech: 'who harmed your people', how could you harm anyone, you who pays them the tax?' al-Aḥṭal was a converted Christian Arab whom God rendered shameful and to whom distanced the refuge." (*Bidāya*, 9:261). On the role of al-Aḥṭal within the Umayyad court, see Pinckney Stetkevych (2016).

I say: indeed we, if we had opened this door, the interpretations of the *bāṭiniyya*⁴⁸ would have emerged. They also say that the intended meaning of (Q 20:12) “So take off your shoes” (*fa-ḥlaʿ naʿlay-ka*) is ‘to be fully involved in the service of God’, without imaging an action. And his words (Q 21:69) “Fire! Be coolness and peace for Abraham!” (*yā nāru kūnī bardan wa-salāman ʿalà Ibrāhīma*), its intended meaning (*murād*) is to save Abraham from the hand of that wrongdoer without there being definitely any fire or speech. Akin is the discourse about everything found in God’s book, rather the principle is that every expression found in the Koran must be interpreted with its proper meaning (*ḥaqīqa*), unless a conclusive rational probative demonstration (*dalāla ʿaqliyya qaṭʿiyya*) exists, which forces us to deviate from it (i.e. the proper meaning). If only those who did not know anything would not have undertaken this path! This is the conclusion of the discourse about this verse. (Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr*, 22:5-7)

Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī devotes the first part of his analysis of the verse to the theological argument. His starting-point is to consider the verse in its literal sense, i.e. to attribute to the figure of God the act of being seated on a throne, with the throne is being understood as any throne or bench on which a human ruler can sit. For Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, the idea that God could be the agent of this action is completely impossible, and the arguments that he uses are the same as ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī’s, who argued that it is impossible to attribute human actions to God, if these actions are understood literally.⁴⁹ We can paraphrase Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s ten points by stating that, if God were really definable as being seated on a throne, then he should identify himself with the throne, and the act of being seated would become an identifying quality of God. If that were so, then, since God transcends time and space, and has therefore always existed, even the throne should share eternity with God. This statement is for Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī necessarily false given that the throne cannot be uncreated and eternal on the basis of (Q 42:11), which affirms the uniqueness of the nature of God. Likewise, the act of sitting can only be attributed to bodies, which, as

⁴⁸ *Bāṭiniyya* indicates here a negative general use: “Sunnī writers have subsequently used the term *bāṭiniyya* polemically to condemn any writers who, in their judgment, go beyond the recognition of a *bāṭin* meaning in scripture, to the rejection of the evident meaning of scripture in favour exclusively of such a *bāṭin*” Hodgson (2012). Cf. Walker (2009).

⁴⁹ These theses had already been proposed by the eponym of the Ašʿarite school, al-Ašʿarī (d. 324/935-6). See (*Ibāna*, 33-37).

such, are subject to rules without any exceptions, such as occupying a certain space and existing in a given time, being subject to a beginning and an end, and therefore deteriorating and continuously becoming, being created and comprising several parts, etc. This set of bodily characteristics cannot be attributed to the uncreated God, eternal and unique in its uniqueness and self-sufficiency.

Once the *tašbīh*, i.e. the comparison of the creator to the creatures, has been excluded, thereby avoiding the danger of attributing to God actions and qualities contrary to his divine nature, the next step consists in enabling an interpretation of the text which not only takes into account the literal meaning expressed in the verse, but also identifies its possible figurative sense.

So, what is the figurative sense? It can be identified starting from the assumption that the language of the Koran is Arabic, and that therefore the Koranic word must be understood according to the conventional meanings that the Arabs attribute to the expressions that they use in the language. In this way, we can identify two senses in which the verb *istawà* is used: 'being settled' (*istiqrār*) and 'possession' (*istilā*). The arguments listed above exclude the first, as it would lead to irrational arguments and contradictions. The need therefore remains to interpret the verse rationally in light of the 'possession' sense. To affirm the validity of this interpretation, Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī uses a poetic line showing how the verb *istawà* is used to mean someone's authority, possessed, or acquired, over someone or something. But it is precisely the sense of acquiring possession that could lead us to think to a change of state in God. Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī responds to this objection by suggesting that the meaning of possession should not be understood as a path of acquisition, but rather as 'having power over' (*iqtidār*), which is always true with regard to God. The relationship between proper and figurative is explained by al-Rāzī through the words of al-Zamaḥṣārī, with whom he agrees, with al-Rāzī warning, however, against the danger of the over-interpreting of the text. As we saw in the previous section, from a theological and logical-rational point of view, the choice of which interpretation of the word of God to adopt is based on an evidence (*dalīl*), rational proof leading to the correct interpretation; and, for Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, the *dalīl* forces us to prefer the figurative over the literal sense. It is important to emphasise that, while not affirming it explicitly, al-Rāzī seems to agree with the theoretical explanation of al-Zamaḥṣārī,

who explains with *kināya* the logical-rational mechanism through which the literal meaning leads to the figurative sense.

However, if this verse has so far been interpreted as an example of *kināya*, then why did it later become one of the most apt examples of *tawriya*?

3.2.4 al-Sakkākī

As we have seen for (Q 39:67), the rhetorical interpretation of a Koranic verse is inextricably linked to its theological interpretation. The first author to place (Q 20:5) and (Q 39:67) side by side as an example of *ihām* was al-Sakkākī (*Miftāḥ*, 537), who placed this verse in the *ihām* chapter, without (again) giving any precise information regarding his decision. What is of interest is that he cites this verse at the end of his book, too, in a subchapter of the *ḥātima fī iršād al-ḍalāl* (conclusion about the right guide to avoid error) entitled *maṭā'in al-ḍallīna wa-l-radd 'alay-him* (weaknesses of the wrongly guided people and the refutation of them). Once again, the aim is to reprimand those scholars who misinterpret God's word. The following extract does not present a rhetorical analysis, but is still interesting because it confirms the view explained above. He says:

They say about the ambiguous verses: they decided that it is appropriate to range them among what for the masters of eloquence are the figurative expressions (*mağzāt*), metaphors (*isti'ārāt*), allusions (*talwīḥāt*), indications (*īmā'āt*), etc. However, their aspects of beauty are – when they entail the contrary of what is sought by his revelation – the leading astray of the creatures, instead of leading the right way. Is this not a shame and the entailment the leading astray evident? That is that you say: 'Indeed, the Koran is a discourse with the humans and the jinns and you know that among them there are the truthful person and the liar, the wise and the unwise.' They say, when the anthropomorphic verse (Q 20:5) "The merciful is mounted upon the throne" is heard: 'Is it not assumed as a staff on which its untenability relies, while the leading right way, sought by it (i.e. the Koranic verse) is reversed, helping in the leading astray, aiding the erring, and strengthening the untenability? Does the same apply to the non-anthropomorphic, when what agrees with its literal meaning meets its untenability?' It is said to this similar teller: 'Your love for the matter makes blind

and deaf. Is it not, when the anthropomorphic verse is taken, used as evidence for his method?' It has been said to him: 'Perhaps God lied', he replies 'How is it possible that God lies?' It is said 'For a whatever need inducing him to the lie.' He says: 'How is it possible that God has needs?' It is replied to him: 'Is not God a body in your opinion? So which body has no need?'. Thus, he perceives his error and returns to a better righteous conduct and more eloquent guidance, as you see it with respect to the liar. About the truthful person, who hears him, he calls it nothing but speculation. He started acquiring the recompense for his speculation, then when his opinion is not satisfying, he submits it to the scholars. That causes for the profits no return and no go away. (al-Sakkākī, *Miftāḥ*, 714-715)

In this passage, al-Sakkākī, although not explicitly mentioning the rhetorical figure expressed in the verse, classifies it within the expressions of figurative language. Despite being more interested in stigmatising anthropomorphism, this passage shows us how the non-literal interpretation of the verse has become the accepted interpretation, and how from that moment the works of rhetoric and literary criticism will always cite (Q 20:5) as an example of *tawriya*.

3.2.5 Rukn al-Dīn al-Ġurġānī

It is thanks to an incisive voice that the connection with the previous tradition represented by al-Zamaḥṣarī, who explained the rhetorical artifice in (Q 20:5) with a *kināya*, and al-Sakkākī's arrangement in the *ihām* chapter, will be included in the *tawriya* theory, through an analysis which links them together. This author is Rukn al-Dīn al-Ġurġānī (d. 729/1329),⁵⁰ who places (Q 20:5) and (Q 51:47) in (*Iṣārāt*, 216) under the entry *tawriya*, stating that the double meaning in these two verses is corroborated by a *qarīna 'aqliyya*, namely a rational correlative.⁵¹ The nature and

⁵⁰ Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. Muḥammad al-Astarābādī l-Ḥillī l-Ġarawī died after 729/1329. Little is known about him. He was an *uṣūl* and *kalām* scholar born in Ḥilla. He studied with al-'Allāma l-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325), with whom he shared the Šī'ite creed. He translated Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274)'s philosophical work *al-Fuṣūl al-naṣīriyya* from Persian into Arabic. In the introduction to his work (*Iṣārāt*, 12), he clearly states that the reason for him to write this book is to emend and clarify the deviations, negligence, and forgetfulness of his predecessors who undertook the study of *'ilm al-balāġa*, and he commits himself to providing a clear and correct account of this fundamental science, adopting a polemical approach as described by Valle (2006). See al-Amīn (*A'yān*, 14:258-260 no. 9850), *Kaḥḥāla (Mu'allifīna*, s.v. Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. Muḥammad al-Ġurġānī), Valle (2006).

⁵¹ Rukn al-Dīn al-Ġurġānī and Ṣafī l-Dīn al-Ḥillī (*Šarḥ*, 135) both use the word *qarīna* rather than *lāzim*.
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function of this *qarīna 'aqliyya* are not explained in length in the short *tawriya* paragraph in which the author limits himself to giving a few examples of *tawriyas* arranged depending on whether there is a *qarīna 'aqliyya* or a *qarīna lafziyya* at play. To understand better what Rukn al-Dīn al-Ġurġānī means exactly by *qarīna* and how it plays a role in the understanding of the *tawriya*, we should go back in the chapter of *al-Iṣārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt* devoted to *maġāz*, where he explains at some length the difference between them and how they help or mislead the reader to decode a figure of speech:

The *maġāz*, if it is taken into account together with the correlative (*qarīna*), is implied (*malzūm*) for the intended meaning (*al-ma'nà l-murād*) through the mediation of the conventional meaning (*waḍ'*) and the reasoning (*'aql*) together. When you say 'I saw a lion shooting', the intellect makes a transfer from the acoustic form of the expression (*samā' al-lafz*) to the predatory animal by means of the conventional meaning (*waḍ'*); then it makes a transfer from it to the brave man by a rational transfer (*intiqāl bi-l-'aql*) through the mediation of the judgment (*ḥukm*) about the impossibility of referring the predication of 'shooting' to the animal. Also, when you say 'Ask the village', the intellect makes the transfer [from the acoustic form], because of the conventional meaning, to the meaning 'the village'. Then, by means of the impossibility of questioning the village, it makes the rational transfer a second time to its inhabitants. The same applies to the other types of *maġāz*. The reasoning, by way of the correlative (*qarīna*), makes the transfer from the known expression to the intended meaning by two transfers. The first is conventional (*waḍ'ī*) while the second is rational (*'aqlī*); this is the meaning of indication of the implication (*dalālat al-iltizām*).

The correlatives of the *maġāz*, although they are many, are united by a single thing: i.e. what leads to the impossibility of its accord with its proper meaning. [The first] is a diverting correlative (*qarīna ṣārifa*), which does not suffice to guide [the reader] to the intended meaning (*murād*), because the knowledge of the meaning intention (*irāda*) of something does not necessarily cause the [knowledge] of the meaning intention of anything else. Thus, a guiding correlative (*qarīna hādiya*) is necessary. The guiding attribute is one of the correlations (*nisba*) already mentioned between the proper meaning and the figurative sense. The reasoning, by means of the two correlatives, becomes rightly directed to the intended figurative meaning, so that the proper meaning is not intended: the more it is not intended, the more the figurative sense is intended. The first premise (*muqaddima*) is motivated through the diverting correlative and the second through the guiding correlative.

This is a type of acquisition because of which the figurative indication of implication (*al-dalāla l-iltizāmiyya l-mağāziyya*) has been preferred instead of the corresponding indication (*dalāla muṭābaqiyya*). The scholars of eloquence called the guiding *qarīna* relation (*‘alāqa*) incontestable in the technical usage. (Rukn al-Dīn al-Ġurġānī, *Išārāt*, 163-164)

This is an interesting explanation of how *mağāz* works in relation to the *qarīna*. Rukn al-Dīn al-Ġurġānī's purpose is to demonstrate how the figurative sense is a meaning deduced through the use of the intellect starting from the acoustic form of the word, i.e. from the act of utterance, after which the hearer is able, through the use of intellect and through the conventional meaning established and recognised in the language, to combine acoustic form with its proper meaning. Having recognised the proper meaning, the hearer notices at the level of the uttered text the presence of an element (*qarīna*) which refers to a word or phrase in the text with which it is, however, in apparent conflict. This conflict will lead the hearer to identify through a rational process the figurative sense of the word and therefore the final intended meaning of the utterance.

The first example that which Rukn al-Dīn al-Ġurġānī uses to support his argument is a typical metaphor (*isti‘āra*):⁵² ‘I saw a lion shooting’. The first process through which /ʔasad/ is associated with the meaning ‘predatory animal’ occurs through the knowledge of the conventions of the language which establish the connection between acoustic form and meaning. However, the presence of the *qarīna* ‘shooting’ (*yarmī*) reveals to the hearer the impossibility of agreement between this predicate and the proper meaning of the subject. This is therefore the factor which helps the hearer to decode the message through a rational effort that makes the transition from the proper meaning ‘predatory animal’ to the figurative sense ‘brave man’ possible. The rational effort allowing the transition from animal to human is the understanding of the quality shared by metaphrand and metaphier: namely, courage and bravery.

On the other hand, the second example based on (Q 12:82) is a classic example of *kināya*.⁵³ As with the previous utterance, the hearer connects through a process

⁵² See the chapter on *isti‘āra* in Rukn al-Dīn al-Ġurġānī (*Išārāt*, 164-182).

⁵³ See the paragraph *išāra ilà nisbat al-ziyāda wa-l-nuqṣān* in (*Išārāt*, 186-187).

guided by the convention established in the language, the acoustic form /qarja/ with the meaning ‘village’; subsequently, the imperative verb *sal – qarīna* referring to the village – allows the hearer to understand that the proper meaning is not the intended meaning, and therefore through a rational effort he or she will be able to reach the awareness that the word ‘village’ connotes nothing but its inhabitants. In Rukn al-Dīn al-Ġurġānī’s opinion, the presence of an attribute is necessary to lead the hearer to the understanding of the *maġāzī* sense of an utterance. He defines this very particular attribute as *qarīna hādiya*, since it is through it that the rational transfer is made, and the proper meaning is crossed. This kind of *qarīna* is opposed to another which he calls *qarīna šārifa*, namely a whatever attribute which can be addressed to a word or phrase, but which does not contribute in the rational transfer. In the examples above, there are two *qarīna hādiya*. The first is the verb *yarmī*, which cannot refer to a lion, but entails a human agent. The second is the imperative *sal*, which cannot refer to an inanimate being, but entails a human agent, too.

How, then, does this help us understand why (Q 20:5) is an example of *tawriya*? Rukn al-Dīn al-Ġurġānī (*Išārāt*, 216) quotes this verse, stating that a *qarīna ‘aqliyya* is at play, and that it is through this *qarīna ‘aqliyya* that the intended meaning of the verse is understood. This process is very similar to the one described with regard to the *maġāz*, given that we can recognise even in this case a series of transfers that the hearer makes, starting from the acoustic form of the word (in this case, the verb *istawà*) and coupling it with the conventional meaning. However, this verb has two conventional meanings: one proper (*ḥaqīqa*), i.e. to sit, and one figurative (*maġāz*), i.e. to have the authority, to possess. In this case, the discriminant that leads to the adoption of a *maġāzī* meaning of the verb instead of a *ḥaqīqī* is of a rational nature. In other words, rationality cannot deny that someone is sitting on a throne, yet rationality denies the possibility that the one seated on the throne is God, for theological reasons. Given these premises, the hearer will make a rational transfer from the conventional meaning of *istawà ‘alà l-‘arš* (is mounted upon the throne), attributing to this phrase a figurative sense (*maġāz*), namely the second meaning of *tawriya*, its distant and intended meaning (*ba‘īd*).

3.2.6 al-Qazwīnī and later authors

If the works of al-Sakkākī and Rukn al-Dīn al-Ġurġānī already mentioned (Q 20:5), it will be in al-Qazwīnī's treatise *Talḥīṣ al-miftāḥ*, and in its commentary *al-Īdāḥ*, that this verse will see its definitive systematisation in what will become the received *tawriya* theory. As we have seen, the acceptance of the figurative sense is for Rukn al-Dīn due to a rational process that excludes the proper meaning. This rational process is based on premises and causes that are outside the text itself, i.e. the rational judgment that leads to the exclusion of the predication of sitting in relation to the agent God is based not on the statement of (Q 20:5) itself, but on that set of knowledge and arrangements of the world available to the hearer which Eco ([1979] 2006) defined Encyclopaedia.

Due to the concise nature of his works, the vision of al-Qazwīnī (*Talḥīṣ*, 97; *Īdāḥ*, 6:38), is limited to classifying this verse as an example of *tawriya muġarrada* (bare *tawriya*) in which no correlative (*lāzim*) refers to one of the two meanings of the word. He provides no reason as to why one meaning is to be preferred to another. Neither does al-Ṣafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 75) provide more information, but only quotes (Q 20:5) as an example of *tawriya* without placing it in any category of *tawriya*.

3.2.6.1 al-Ru'aynī

To see a short explanation of the verse, we should consider al-Subkī's commentary *'Arūs al-afrāḥ* and al-Ru'aynī's (d. 779/1377) *Ṭirāz al-ḥulla*. The following extract is from the latter:

Because the *istiwā'* has two meanings: the first of them is the being settled (*istiqrār*) in the space and is its near meaning (*al-ma'nà l-qarīb*), according to the use. The second is the possession (*istilā'*) and the sovereignty (*mulk*) and is the distant meaning (*al-ma'nà l-ba'īd*), according to the use, the one intended (*murād*) here. No correlatives (*lawāzim*) are mentioned, nor for the first thing (i.e. the being settled) or the second (i.e. possession and sovereignty). Thus, it is a *tawriya muġarrada* (bare *tawriya*). Everything, be it a Koranic verse or a passage from a *ḥadīṭ* in which the *tašbīḥ* is evident is connected to this explanation. (al-Ru'aynī, *Ṭirāz*, 452-453)

It is not worth adding anything about the explanation of the *tawriya* of (Q 20:5) in al-Ru'aynī's *Ṭirāz*. The only remark that is to be made is that al-Ru'aynī states that the *mutašābihāt* in the Koran and *ḥadīṭ* should be interpreted by applying the *tawriya* scheme. This is a clear, but unacknowledged, reference to the *tafsīr* quoted above by al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Kaššāf*, 5:320-321), who, having commented on (Q 39:67), suggests that *taḥyīl* is the interpretative key for the anthropomorphic verses.

3.2.6.2 al-Taftāzānī

This non-explicit reference to al-Zamaḥṣarī allows us to move to another commentator on al-Qazwīnī's *Talḥīṣ*: al-Taftāzānī (d. 793/1390) and his commentary *al-Muṭawwal*. It is interesting to report his gloss on the *Talḥīṣ* because he brings together the theoretical framework of (Q 20:5) with that of (Q 39:67) previously seen, and applies it to (Q 51:47), i.e. “*wa-l-samā'a baynā-hā bi-aydin*” (The sky - We built it with [Our own] hands). As we will now see, he mixes the two frameworks, perhaps introduces some small inaccuracies, but closing his explanation with a clue, one that is very important for my research and one to which I shall return later. His commentary runs as follows:

If you say, the author of the *Kaššāf* has already stated about his words (Q 20:5) “The Merciful is mounted upon the throne” that it is a *tamṭīl* (*sic!*), for since the sitting upon the throne – i.e. the king's chair – is among the synonyms of sovereignty and they have made it a *kināya* standing for sovereignty. And since, in this place, the proper meaning (*al-ma'nā l-ḥaqīqī*) is refused, it becomes figurative (*mağāz*) like in his words (Q 5:64) “The Jews say, ‘The hand of God is chained’”, i.e. he is avaricious, (Q 5:64) “No! Both His hands are outstretched”, i.e. he is generous, without imagining (*taṣawwur*) a hand, nor a shackle, nor extension, and explaining with grace and cunningly insisting on repeating for whoever is narrow-minded. To abandon the *ilm al-bayān* is the way of common people. The same applies to his words (Q 51:47) “The sky – We built it with (Our own) hands” (*wa-l-samā' baynā-hā bi-aydin*), which are a *tamṭīl* and a depiction of his majesty and the putting before our eyes the essence of his loftiness, without recurring for the word ‘hand’ to either the proper meaning or the figurative sense. Instead, it leads to the understanding of the main point and the essence of the speech

without its single words being susceptible of having a proper meaning or a figurative sense. Strengthened is the rejection about the explanation of the hand with the grace (*ni'ma*), the hands with the power (*qudra*), the *istiwā'* with the possession (*istilā'*), and the right hand with the power (*qudra*). The *šayḥ* (i.e. 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī) stated in his *Dalā'il al-i'ğāz*⁵⁴ that if they were saying that the intended meaning of the right hand is the power, then this explanation is about the whole sentence and their aim is to quickly negate the meaning 'limb' fearing for the hearer of ideas befalling the ignorant and those who compare God to the creatures. All of this is [to be understood] by way of *tamtīl*. I said, the composer purposed to make these two verses two examples of *tawriya* based on what is well-known among the Zāhirite Koran commentators. (al-Taftāzānī, *Muṭawwal*, 652-653)

Al-Taftāzānī opens his explanation of (Q 20:5) by paraphrasing the words of al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Kaššāf*, 4:67) that we have seen above. It is curious to see that al-Taftāzānī claims that al-Zamaḥṣarī had defined (Q 20:5) as a *tamtīl*, since al-Zamaḥṣarī had in fact defined it as an example of *kināya*, as indeed al-Taftāzānī will later remark. In the second part, al-Taftāzānī continues to cite and paraphrase al-Zamaḥṣarī's words by attributing to the verse (Q 51:47) al-Zamaḥṣarī's (*Kaššāf*, 5: 320) interpretation of (Q 39:67).⁵⁵ In the same way, he reports the words of 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī (*Asrār*, 332) in relation to (Q 39:67), referring them instead to (Q 51:47). Although al-Taftāzānī's reading is somewhat imprecise, he must be credited with having (re)united *tawriya* with al-Ġurġānī's *tamtīl* and with al-Zamaḥṣarī's *taḥyīl*, since for al-Taftāzānī both (Q 20:5) and (Q 51:47) should be interpreted in the light of these two figures – although he quotes only *tamtīl*. This means that the interpretation is at the level not of the single words, but of the sentence. This applies not only for (Q 51:47), which he thinks can be interpreted in the same way as (Q 39:67), but also to (Q 20:5). For al-Taftāzānī, therefore, the figurative sense is conveyed only at the sentence level through a *maṭal* made possible by a process of reasoning based on a *kināya* conveying the cause – i.e. possession, authority, sovereignty – by means of the depiction of the consequence, i.e. the being seated upon a throne. But what makes us reflect on the nature of *tawriya* is the closing statement in which al-

⁵⁴ See the extract from *Asrār al-balāġa* quoted above. The verse (Q 51:47) is not mentioned in 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī (*Dalā'il*).

⁵⁵ See the translation of this passage at the beginning of this chapter.

Taftāzānī attributes to al-Qazwīnī the will to base his choice on a vision of the *mutašābihāt* inspired by the explanation given by the Zāhirite exegetes, whose opinions were well known according to al-Taftāzānī. It should be underlined that he is the first and only author who mentions the Zāhirite views, and this sibylline affirmation must not be underestimated, above all because we have so far considered the writings and theories of authors who are not strictly literalists, or who are even strong opponents of literalism. For this reason, the third section of this chapter will be devoted to the Zāhirite point of view on the two Koranic verses examined so far.

3.2.6.3 al-Suyūṭī

To conclude my investigation of (Q 20:5), I should mention two final authors. The first is Ibn Ḥiǧǧa l-Ḥamawī (*Kašf*, 51, *Ḥizāna*, 3:186, 3:534), who does not contribute to the discussion with a different view, but simply mentions al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Kaššāf*, 5:321), who he says is a *ḥuǧǧa*, and reports what has already been handed down by his predecessors. The second is al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), who quotes (Q 20:5) together with (Q 39:67) in two different chapters of his *Šarḥ ‘uqūd al-ǧumān*, a commentary on his own versification of al-Qazwīnī’s *Talḥīṣ*.⁵⁶ In the *tawriya* chapter, he reports as usual al-Zamaḥṣarī’s words and point of view, but what is of interest is that he also quotes (Q 20:5) in the *kināya* chapter. Al-Qazwīnī (*Talḥīṣ*, 91-92) argues that the *kināya* can be divided into three types, for which al-Suyūṭī gives the following gloss:

1) First: what is sought by it (i.e. *kināya*) is neither a quality (*šifa*) nor a correlation (*nisba*), but rather the depicted thing (*mawṣūf*) itself. To it pertains what is a single meaning, since the characteristic is made agreeing in one of its qualities with a given depicted thing. It (i.e. the *kināya*) is then mentioned to reach it (i.e. the depicted thing) through it (i.e. the quality), like your speech ‘hospitable’ which is a *kināya* for Zayd because of his characteristic.

⁵⁶ Al-Suyūṭī was also co-author together with Ǧalāl al-Dīn al-Maḥallī (d. 864/1459) of a Koranic commentary called *Tafsīr al-Ǧalālayni*, since both scholars have the same first name. It could be expected that in their *tafsīr* the two authors would have devoted much more space to explaining the ambiguous verses. However, they limit themselves to a brief gloss of the words *‘arš* and *istawà*, as the *sarīr al-malik* (the chair of the king, throne), and *istiwā’ yalīqu bi-hi* (the action of sitting suitable to him) respectively (al-Maḥallī and al-Suyūṭī, *Tafsīr*, 406).

2) Second: what it is sought by it (i.e. *kināya*) is one of its qualities (*ṣifa*) like the generosity, magnanimity, etc. It is of two categories:

2.1) Near (*qarība*), i.e. what the intellect transfers from it to what is sought without any mediator (*wāsiṭa*). It is of two types:

2.1.1) Clear (*wādiḥa*), i.e. the transfer stems from it easily, like their words '[A man] of long sword belt' (*ṭawīl al-niġād / niġādi-hi*) expressing metonymically tallness (*ṭūl*). [...]

2.1.2) Concealed (*ḥafiyya*), it is what bases the transfer from it on reflection (*fikr*) and consideration (*ta'ammul*), like in their words '[A man] of wide nape' (*'arīḍ al-qafā*) expressing metonymically stupidity. For the wideness of the nape is among what indicates stupidity. Stupidity is its implied [characteristic] (*malzūm*) according to the conviction, but the transfer from it is a kind of concealment.

2.2) The second category is what is transferred in it by a mediator, thus being distant (*ba'īda*), as in their words 'Abundant in ashes' (*kaṭīr al-ramād*) metonymically expressing the magnanimity, since it is transferred from the abundance of ashes to the abundance of wood coals under the pot; then from the abundance of coals to the cooking, to the abundance of meals; then to the abundance of meals to the abundance of guests and finally from it to the goal, i.e. magnanimity (*karam*).

3) Third: what is sought by it is its correlation (*nisba*), i.e. to affirm a concept with a concept or its negation, as in their words 'The glory is between his two clothes' (*al-maġd bayna ṭawbay-hi*) and 'The magnanimity is between his two garments' (*wa-l-karam bayna burday-hi*). It did not become clear to him through the affirmation of glory and magnanimity that he says that he is characterised by them or the like. Instead, it is expressed metonymically by their being between his two garments or clothes, then they are made to be among what characterises him and wraps him. (al-Suyūṭī, *'Uqūd*, 236)

These three *kināya* types are those described by al-Qazwīnī. However, al-Suyūṭī adds two more types to this subdivision:

4) It rests for the *kināya* a fourth type, which was not undertaken in the *Talḥīṣ* and which I have mentioned among my additions. What is sought by it (i.e. the *kināya*) is a quality (*ṣifa*) and a correlation (*nisba*) together, like in our words 'Ashes are copious in Zayd's court' (*kaṭura l-ramād fī sāḥa zayd*). It is a *kināya* about the correlation of his hospitality. It was said, in adducing an excuse for their non-abundance, that it is not a single *kināya*, but two *kināyas*. In the first, what is sought by it is the quality itself, i.e. the abundance of ashes is a *kināya* for

Zayd's hospitableness. In the second, what is sought by it is the correlation of Zayd's hospitableness, i.e. to add the word 'his court' to state its affirmation (i.e. of the hospitableness). This is the meaning of my speech 'It is the realisation of two *kināyas*'.

5) al-Zamaḥṣarī coined a fifth type of *kināya*, i.e. that in a sentence, the *kināya* purposes a meaning which is different from the evident meaning (*ẓāhir*). Thus, the essence is understood without considering its single words either in their proper meanings (*ḥaqīqa*) nor figurative senses (*mağāz*), so that the goal is expressed thereby. As you say, for example: (Q 20:5) "The Merciful is mounted upon the throne", indeed it is a *kināya* of sovereignty (*mulk*), for the sitting upon a throne does not exist unless there is sovereignty, so it has been made a *kināya* of it. The same applies to (Q 39:67) "When the entire earth will be His handful on the Day of Resurrection, and the heavens will be rolled up in His right [hand]", which is a *kināya* for the image of his majesty and the essence of his loftiness. (al-Suyūṭī, 'Uqūd, 237)

Al-Suyūṭī attributes this fifth type of *kināya* to the pen of al-Zamaḥṣarī, and in particular associates, like al-Taftāzānī before him, the analysis of (Q 20:5) with that of (39:67). In this case, it is evident that al-Suyūṭī suggests that there is substantial similarity of interpretation between the two verses, which could be read as representing a *taḥyīl* (if we want to adhere to the Zamaḥṣarian) that is to say, a representation of a mental image which suggests to the hearer the figurative sense of the whole utterance. In this specific case, the formation of the image is possible thanks to the metonymic operation, so that the effect (being seated on a throne) expresses the cause (possession, authority, sovereignty). The fact that the metonymic relationship is what links proper meaning and figurative sense confirms what Rukn al-Dīn al-Ğurġānī expressed in other terms, i.e. the rational transfer from a proper meaning to a figurative sense. Although al-Suyūṭī does not specifically mention the rational effort that the hearer has to make to carry out the transfer from proper to figurative, it is nevertheless the basis of the interpretation of these two verses.

This overview of the sources and different ways of interpreting (Q 39:67) and (Q 20:5) cannot be complete without first taking up al-Taftāzānī's suggestion and proceeding to an investigation of how Ẓāhirite scholars approached the definition and

theorisation of the Koranic *mutašābihāt*, especially from a perspective which develops in the sense of homonymy/polysemy (*ištirāk*).

3.3 The Zāhirite view

As we have seen in the preceding section, al-Taftāzānī suggests an interpretation of the Koranic *mutašābihāt* according to the Zāhirite view. If we can take for granted that, for al-Taftāzānī, the Zāhirite approach presented, at least for his contemporaries and for literary critics in general, a certain degree of homogeneity and recognisability, the view is for us less clear and easy to make out.⁵⁷ As Heinrichs (1968-69; 1994; 2008) has underlined, Bonebakker (1966) did not discuss at length the question of whether the rhetorical interpretation of these Koranic verses should be traced back to a specific theological school, and nor has any other contemporary scholar so far considered the possible Zāhirite contribution to the field of *tawriya*. The question which arises is whether an approach based on the writings of the Zāhirite scholars could help us ‘discover’ an approach which deviates from the explanations that we have already classified and discussed.

The first problematic that we face in answering this question is that the Zāhirite ‘school’ is far from being homogeneous, and the textual evidence that we have is quantitatively inferior compared to other theological and juridical schools. This problem becomes explicit when we are confronted with substantial interpretative differences among the various Zāhirite authors. Furthermore, the act of identifying the authors itself poses two substantial problems. First, there are a limited number of authors who openly identified themselves as Zāhirite, and their writings have not

⁵⁷ It is worth pointing out that the development and spread of Zāhirite ideas during the centuries is not homogeneous, and nor can we affirm without any doubt that Zāhirite ideas played a role in legal and hermeneutical discussions in the fourteenth century. As Wiederhold (1999, 206) notes when describing the intellectual environment of the Mamluk age: “Altogether, the sources available do not clearly indicate whether Zahirism – 500 years after its introduction as a doctrine into the legal-theological discourse of Islam – was still a significant factor of intellectual and social life. Different kinds of sources, including legal, historiographical, and biographical works, contain only scattered information suggesting that the Sunni elite rejected Zahirism in general. At the same time, individual representatives of the Sunni *madhhabs* occasionally referred to Zahiri tenets in legal argumentation without expressing any disapproval of the views cited.”

always survived. Secondly, not every author defined as 'Zāhirite' by his contemporaries or by later historiographers can be associated with the theological and legal thought of the 'Zāhirite school'. These two points have already been made by Wiederhold (1999), who, in describing the *fitna zāhiriyya* that occurred in Damascus in 788/1386 (and therefore at a time when al-Taftāzānī, who died in 793/1390, was still living), disagrees with Goldziher (1884) and suggests that the word 'Zāhirite' was used not only to refer to the legal doctrine, but also as an epithet which "could to some extent be understood as a label that was used in order to stigmatize them as scholarly rivals or political adversaries" Wiederhold (1999, 224). This is proven by the historical accounts that he provides about four scholars of the epoch who were labelled as Zāhirite. It is not possible to demonstrate that they were supporters and partisans of this school, and Wiederhold suggests that the accusation of being Zāhirite was during the epoch of the *fitna* most probably a way to discredit rival scholars, who were thereby accused of inclining towards a legal practice that the majority of the scholars rejected.

The second issue is that we cannot refer to the Zāhirite 'school' as being fundamentally theological; rather, it was a legal school. This is a point already made by Goldziher (1884), who affirms

Die Zāhirrichtung wird immer nur als Maḡhab fiḡhī, also als eine Abzweigung der muhammedanischen Orthodoxie erwähnt, welche sich nur in der praktischen Gesetzwissenschaft von den übrigen Richtungen des orthodoxen Islām unterscheidet. Unter den Maḡāhib kalāmijja begegnen wir der Zāhirschule nicht. Und in der That, wenn wir die uns bekannten Koryphäen der Zāhirschule in den verschiedenen Zeitaltern auf ihren dogmatischen Standpunkt hin einer vergleichenden Betrachtung unterziehen, so werden wir bald finden, dass die verschiedenartigsten, einander diametral entgegenlaufenden dogmatischen Richtungen sich mit ihrer Zugehörigkeit zur zāhiritischen Fiḡhschule vereinigen liessen. Da finden wir z.B. neben Ibn Ḥazm, der die Lehre von der Existenz göttlicher Attribute als Irrlehre verdammt, Al-Maḡrīzī, der die Attribute zulässt, aber nur in dem Sinne der voraś'arischen Orthodoxie der Imāme der traditionstreuen Schule, dabei mit Ibn Ḥazm das Ta'wīl d.h. die allegorische Auslegung der Schriftworte verwirft. (Goldziher, 1884, 131-132)

Goldziher is correct from the theoretical point of view. However, we cannot deny that the writings of Zāhirite intellectuals that have come down to us contain *de facto* important references to the theological thought of the person who wrote them. If we consider the two authors cited by Goldziher, i.e. Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064)⁵⁸ and al-Maqrīzī (d. 845/1442),⁵⁹ then neither focuses centrally on the aspect of theological disquisition. Nonetheless, as we will see later, we can trace some fundamental

⁵⁸ Abū Muḥammad ‘Alī b. Aḥmad b. Sa‘īd b. Ḥazm b. Ġalīb b. Ḥalaf b. Ma‘dān b. Sufyān b. Yazīd al-Fārisī was born in Cordoba on the 30 Ramaḍān 384/7 November 994, and died in Montija on the 28 Ša‘bān 456/15 August 1064. Known above all for being the great theorist of the Zāhirite school, he applied himself to many fields of knowledge, including, theology, law, history, philosophy, and literature. He grew up in a well-to-do family. His father was in fact vizier of the Amirid governors, which allowed him to embark on his journey towards knowledge, although he complained about the comfortable life which prevented him from real learning during his youth. This state of affairs lasted until his father lost his influence at court and was imprisoned after 400/1010 and died in 402/1012. Political instability and insecurity led him to move to various places on the Iberian Peninsula, including Almeria, Malaga, and Cordoba. During these journeys he was able to meet the scholars of the time and soon gained a reputation as a polemicist. In 408/1018, after supporting the claim to the caliphal throne of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān IV al-Murtaḍā (d. 408-1018), Ibn Ḥazm was imprisoned and subsequently released. It was in 412/1022 that he wrote the work for which he is still known today: *Tawq al-ḥamāma*, a treatise on love and on lovers in which many autobiographical notes can be found. Having been appointed as vizier twice, and having fallen into destitution both times, he devoted himself solely to intellectual work. In this period, he did not spare violent criticism of Mālikite jurists, who, in his opinion, were too accommodating and ready to support whomever had the power, against the legitimate caliphate abolished in 422/1031. From the point of view of the juridical thought expressed in the work *Kitāb al-muḥallā*, he strongly opposes what was established by the Ḥanafite and Šāfi‘ite jurists, and opposes even more strongly the Mālikite jurists. He rejected analogical reasoning (*qiyās*) altogether, and also placed strict limits on consensus (*iğmā’*), restricting it to the consensus handed down by the companions of the prophet. Ibn Ḥazm was also an expert in the history of religions and showed deep knowledge of the different theological rites and currents of Islam. This is evident from his *Kitāb al-fiṣal*, a work of historical, polemical, and heresiographical character in which he demonstrated a sound ability in theological and philosophical refutation. There are numerous sources and studies on the life and works of Ibn Ḥazm, of which the following are the most important: Asín Palacios (1927-1932, vol. 1), Arnaldez (1956; 2012), al-Ḥamd (1986), DeYoung (2011b), and Adang et al. (2013).

⁵⁹ Taqī l-Dīn Aḥmad b. ‘Alī b. ‘Abd al-Qādir b. Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Abū l-‘Abbās al-Maqrīzī was an Egyptian historian who was born in Cairo in 766/1364-5 and who died in Cairo on 26 Ramaḍān 845/7 February 1442. Although his father ‘Alā’ al-Dīn ‘Alī (d. 779/1378) was a Ḥanbalite scholar, al-Maqrīzī received a Ḥanafite education, thus following the *maḏhab* of his maternal grandfather Ibn al-Šā‘ig (d. 776/1375), whose classes he attended from an early age. It was only at the age of about 20 that he decided to opt for the Šāfi‘ite rite, most likely for career prospects, even if his theological positions were closer to the literalism of the Ḥanbalite school. He quickly gained the trust of the ruling class of the time and obtained several appointments in the administration – so much so that it earned him a position as ambassador to Tamerlane. After 815/1412, al-Maqrīzī experienced a decline in favour of the ruling class towards him, to the point of inducing him to retire to private life and devote himself to his writing activities. Al-Maqrīzī is undoubtedly one of the most important historians in the Arab-Islamic panorama, surpassed only by Ibn Ḥaldūn (d. 808/1406) who deeply influenced al-Maqrīzī. Among his most important works are his universal history *al-Ḥabar ‘an al-bašar*; and pioneering regional and local historical works such as *Itti‘āz al-ḥunafā’*, the first story of Fatimid Egypt, *al-Sulūk li-ma‘rifat duwal al-mulūk*, which covers the period of the Ayyubid and Mamluk rulers, and finally the monumental *Mawā‘iz wa-l-i‘tibār fī dīkr al-ḥiṭaṭ wa-l-aṭār*. On his life and works, see Rabbat (2003) and Bauden (2010; 2014).

aspects of Zāhirism to their interpretations of God's word and in this very case of the *mutašābihāt* and divine attributes. No Zāhirite author composed a commentary on the Koran from which we can isolate the individual verses and their explanations as I did previously. The analysis will therefore have to consider juridical and historical works in order to be able to extrapolate Zāhirite theological thought. There is one exception: Abū Ḥayyān al-Ġarnāṭī (d. 745/1344),⁶⁰ former Zāhirite who then embraced the Šāfi'ite rite. This author is universally known for having written the Koranic commentary *al-Baḥr al-muḥīṭ*, in which we can find some fundamental themes of the Zāhirite doctrine.

Third, affirming the presence of a Zāhirite 'school' suggests that it should be contrasted with the Mu'tazilite and Aš'arite schools at the theological level, and with the other four canonical juridical schools at the jurisprudential level. I have already mentioned how the accusation of being Zāhirite could be levelled at rivals to discredit them in the continuous struggle for well-paid places of influence and power. This raises the following question: why did al-Taftāzānī mention the Zāhirite view in order to explain the concept at the basis of *tawriya* in an epoch when 'being Zāhirite' was universally recognised as a disadvantage, when he could have used the notion of homonymy/polysemy (*ištirāk*) already advanced in al-Šafadī's treatise? The first and

⁶⁰ Abū Ḥayyān Aṭīr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Yūsuf b. 'Alī b. Yūsuf b. Ḥayyān al-Nafzī al-Ġarnāṭī al-Andalusī was born in Granada in 654/1256 and died in Cairo on 28 Safar 745/11 July 1344. There is no news about his family, nor much information has come down to us about his childhood in Granada where he began his studies. At the age of about 24 in 678-679/1280, he decided to leave the Iberian Peninsula and begin his journey towards the Muslim East. The real reasons why he left his country are unknown and in the next 20 years he travelled far and wide the *mašriq*. Returning later to Cairo, he was a disciple of the grammarian Ibn al-Naḥḥās (d. 698/1298), whom he replaced at the *Madrasa* Maṣūriyya after his death. He was also an expert in religious sciences and started to teach *tafsīr* from 710/1304. One event that more than anything else marked his life was the death of his daughter Nuḍār, to whom he dedicated a series of elegies; see (Homerin 1993). An intellectual and multifaceted writer, he applied himself to various fields of knowledge. He is recognised as an esteemed grammarian – it is said he knew the *Kitāb* of Sībawayhi by heart – and was nicknamed 'the prince of grammarians' by some of his contemporaries. Among his works on grammar are the *Manḥağ al-sālik*, a commentary on the famous Ibn Mālik's *Alfiyya*, see (Glazer, 1941; 1942) and Glazer's introduction to (Abū Ḥayyān, *Manḥaj*), (al-Ḥadīṭī, 1966); and a grammar of the Turkish language entitled *al-Idrāk li-lisān al-atrāk*, see (Bouvat, 1907), (Lancioni, 1996), and (Emers, 1999). He also excelled in the religious sciences. He authored one of the most important Koranic commentaries: *al-Baḥr al-muḥīṭ*, in which he demonstrates profound knowledge of his predecessors and extreme competence in the use of the *ḥadīṭ* of the prophet and the traditions of his companions. He was also the author of a poetic collection and renowned composer of *muwaššahāt*, see (Abū Ḥayyān, *Dīwān*, eds. intr.), (Homerin, 1991), and (Del Moral, 1995; 1998).

easiest answer is that he did not know al-Şafadī's work. But this cannot be proven and sounds very unlikely, especially since al-Şafadī's works were already widespread during his life and continued to be a reference for later scholars. The second possible answer is that al-Taftāzānī recognised the role of the Zāhirites in approaching the issue of the divine attributes from a point of view which did not question the literality of the sacred text. In their strict limiting of *ta'wīl*, Zāhirite scholars could not base their analysis on allegorical interpretation and, by doing so, they could not draw from the heritage of figures of speech as 'freely' as other scholars. The result is a specific attention to the semantics of words and, as Heinrichs (1968-69), drawing on Goldziher (1884) and Arnaldez (1956), has already suggested, to homonymy/polysemy. Therefore, it will be through the study of the texts, and limitedly to the purpose of this work, that an investigation of this proposal will be presented in this section. It is worth pointing out here that I use theological and juridical reasoning and arguments to identify why ambiguous Koranic lines should be interpreted from a rhetorical point of view differently than how schools and currents already seen interpret them. The three authors I will present in this section are Ibn Ḥazm, Abū Ḥayyān al-Ġarnāṭī, and al-Maqrīzī.

However, it is essential to stress that the only Zāhirite of the three from both a theological and juridical perspective is Ibn Ḥazm, who is universally recognised as the undisputed theorist of this school after its founder Dāwūd b. 'Alī b. Ḥalaf (d. 270/884). Why, then, should we also consider the other two authors?

Abū Ḥayyān was born in al-Andalus and studied there until he decided to leave his country at the age of 24. Even if the sources about his Andalusian life cannot confirm this supposition, it is very probable that he could have been in contact with Zāhirite scholars and he could have read Ibn Ḥazm's works. Once in Cairo, he adopted the Şāfi'ite rite, which he might have done because this *madhab* was the most widespread in Mamluk Egypt, and because it could help integrate him into the intellectual milieu of the country. Goldziher (1884, 187-193) quotes two of his biographers – al-Maqqarī (d. 1041/1632) and Ibn Ḥaġar al-'Asqalānī (d. 852/1449) – to highlight how he was perceived as a Zāhirite scholar, as it could be inferred from a passage in his last will in which he warns against Aş'arite and Mu'tazilite interpretations of the nature of God. Moreover, Ibn Ḥaġar claims that his Zāhirite

attitude was evident even in his work on grammar, i.e. Abū Ḥayyān respected the ‘authorities of the language’ like Sībawayhi (d. ca. 180/796) as he respected the prophet and his companions in the religious field. This is proven if we turn our attention to the Koranic *tafsīr al-Baḥr al-muḥīṭ*, in which his attention to the textual evidence and the use of the traditions of the prophet, as well as the accounts related about the interpretation of his companions, is at the basis of the explanations that he gives for the Koranic verses. Without a doubt, Abū Ḥayyān’s *tafsīr* is the best example at our disposal of a Koranic commentary with Zāhirite influences, and this is the reason why its inclusion among the sources of this study will prove rewarding.

As for al-Maqrīzī, if we consider his family life and the education that he received, we can see two distinct directions. The first was laid down by his father, who adhered to the Ḥanbalite juridical school, i.e. the school of the four Sunnite schools which applies principles most closely bound to a literal reception of the sources of law. The second is represented by the maternal side of al-Maqrīzī’s family, and in particular by the figure of his maternal grandfather Ibn al-Ṣā’ig, who pointed his young grandson to the path of Ḥanafite practice. Rabbat (2003) reports that al-Maqrīzī opted for the Ṣāfi’ite legal school in 786/1384 presumably for two complementary reasons: the desire for intellectual independence from his previous education, and the opportunity to join the intellectual milieu of the time. The Zāhirite sympathies attributed to him by contemporary and later biographers cannot be fully proven. As Rabbat (2003) points out, al-Maqrīzī, although never openly affirming adherence to Zāhirite principles, did not oppose them and in some ways sympathised with them. This hypothesis is corroborated if we consider the chronicle of the events of the Zāhirite revolt of 788/1386, which he does not define as *fitna*, and for which he provides the theological justifications that triggered it. Furthermore, if we dwell on the biographical account of the leader of the uprising, al-Ṣayḥ al-Burhān (d. 808/1406),⁶¹ we notice that, while not openly espousing the Zāhirite doctrine, al-Maqrīzī feels great respect and affection for him. Moreover, Goldziher (1884, 197) suggests that al-Maqrīzī may have deliberately omitted the Zāhirite *madḥab* from his work *al-Ḥiṭaṭ* to avoid having to speak openly in its favour. It is for this reason that I

⁶¹ Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ismā’īl al-Zāhirī, see Goldziher (1884, 193-196), Wiederhold (1999).

consider the work of al-Maqrīzī, who, as we will see, shares some features with the Zāhirite theological interpretation of the divine attributes, most probably due to the influence both of the Zāhirite opinions with which he came into contact, and of the Ḥanbalite ideas that he was given by his father.

Through the writings of these three authors, I will try to outline a third way to interpret the *tawriya* in the Koran – even though none of them actually used the term *tawriya*.

3.3.1 Ibn Ḥazm

As we have seen, the interpretation of the two Koranic lines (Q 39:67) and (Q 20:5) is often based on the difference between *ḥaqīqa* (proper meaning) and *mağāz* (figurative sense). Within this opposition, more than one solution is possible. For example, some authors resorted in the interpretation of the *mutašābihāt* to the figure of speech *kināya* (metonymy), while others preferred *isti'āra* (metaphor), and others still adopted the *tawriya-taḥyīl-tamṭīl* to the point that these two lines, together with (Q 51:47), became the canonical examples of Koranic *tawriya*.

We shall start with two clarifications of Ibn Ḥazm's thought. First, since Ibn Ḥazm did not compose any *tafsīr* in which the explanation proceeds line by line, I cannot limit myself to the two lines mentioned above. I have therefore broadened my focus to include the ensemble of the divine attributes (*ṣifāt*), especially because Ibn Ḥazm does not discuss all of them in the same way, nor proposes a unique solution to solve their ambiguities. Second, it is worth pointing out that the application of the *mağāz* sense is stricter for Ibn Ḥazm than for non-Zāhirite scholars. In his *al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām*, Ibn Ḥazm defines the limits to the recourse to the figurative sense in approaching the sacred word and the prophet's *ḥadīth*:

'Alī (i.e. Ibn Ḥazm) said: People have different opinions about the *mağāz*. Some of them allowed its application to the Koran and the *sunna*, whilst others prohibited it. What we say about it – and the success is in God – is that the noun, when a text (*naṣṣ*), or consensus

(*iğmā'*), or potentiality (*ṭabī'a*),⁶² make us incontrovertibly aware through evidence (*dalīl*)⁶³ that it is transferred from its conventional meaning (*mawḍū'*) in the language to another sense, then it is necessary to comply with it since God is he who taught Adam all the nouns and it is his prerogative to call whatever he wants as he wants.

On the other hand, as long as we do not find any evidence (*dalīl*) of the transfer of the noun from its conventional meaning in the language, it is not permitted for a Muslim to say that it is transferred, for God said (Q 14:4) “We have not sent any messenger except in the language of his people, so that he might make [things] clear to them” (*wa-mā arsalnā min rasūlin illā bi-lisāni qawmi-hi li-yubayyina la-hum*). Every message God or his messenger addressed to us is in its conventional meaning in the language and it becomes known in the language only by a text (*naṣṣ*), or consensus (*iğmā'*), or the evidence of the senses (*ḍarūrat ḥiss*). We witness that the noun has been transferred by God or by his messenger from its conventional meaning to another sense; if that takes place, we accept it as it has been transmitted. (Ibn Ḥazm, *Iḥkām*, 1:325)

This excerpt is essential to understanding the Zāhirite approach to the texts underlying Islamic law. Recourse to the figurative sense (*mağḏāz*) in explaining any passage of the Koran and the *sunna* of the prophet is not arbitrary, and nor is it established by the single exegete or jurist. As faithful to the word as it is expressed (i.e. to its manifest meaning), Ibn Ḥazm places strict restrictions to which one must

⁶² Arnaldez (1956, 41 n. 2) warns against understanding *ṭabī'a* as nature, and points out that in Ibn Ḥazm the meaning of *ṭabī'a* should be understood as “le caractère naturel d'un être”, i.e. the natural disposition. On the origin of the language and the *ṭabī'a*, Ibn Ḥazm (*Iḥkām*, 1:28-29) affirms: “It remains only to say that language is an action of the natural disposition (*fi'l al-ṭabī'a*). 'Alī said: This statement is made untenable by a necessary proof, i.e. that the natural disposition does only one action and not different actions. The composition of the language is a voluntary action, freely acting in different ways. Some [scholars] referred to a kind of confusion, i.e. to say that the places make necessary to their inhabitants by means of the natural disposition to speak in each one of the languages they speak. 'Alī said: This is impossible and forbidden because if the languages were due to what the natural disposition of the places makes necessary, the existence of every space would have been possible only through its language, whose natural disposition makes it necessary.” On Ibn Ḥazm and the conception of the divine creation of the language, see Arnaldez (1956, 37-47). Wolfson (1976, 576-577) – also mentioned in Haq (2012) – advances the translation ‘potentiality’ for the notion of *ṭabī'a*, i.e. the potentiality inherent to the natural disposition.

⁶³ It should be noted that Ibn Ḥazm uses *dalīl* differently to the authors we have seen so far, e.g. for Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, the *dalīl* is a rational argument; see above. As Arnaldez (1956, 158) points out, “Bien que le mot *dalīl*, soit employé techniquement en philosophie pour désigner un argument, nous ne pouvons ici le prendre dans ce sens. Ibn Ḥazm n'admet pas à proprement parler, un raisonnement sur les textes ou à partir d'eux. C'est dans le texte même que se trouve le *dalīl*. Il suffit de le voir, de l'expliquer là où il est condensé, de le souligner là où il est patent. En lui-même, il est donc un indice qui guide la compréhension et rien de plus.” For a wider discussion of the *dalīl* in Ibn Ḥazm's thought, see Arnaldez (1956, 158-165).

conform. First, the figurative sense can be preferred to the conventional meaning if and only if evidence (*dalil*) of the attestation of the use of a particular word in its figurative sense is provided by at least one of these three factors: textual evidence (*naṣṣ*), consensus (*iğmā'*) restricted to some authorities, i.e. the prophet and his companions, and the natural disposition (*ṭabī'a*). In the absence of at least one of these factors, the figurative sense cannot be adopted, as there is no tangible confirmation, i.e. there is no attestation in the language that the figurative sense is derived from a conventional meaning. As a result, if we applied a figurative sense which is not found in the language, then we would be adopting an innovation which is not expected by the language itself, thus attributing *de facto* a certain degree of obscurity to the sacred word such that interpretative speculation is justified. According to Ibn Ḥazm, interpretative speculation is completely denied by (Q 14:4), which affirms the absolute intelligibility of the Koranic word at the time of revelation for the people to whom it was addressed. This verse also explains why consent must be limited. According to Ibn Ḥazm, in fact, consensus must be limited to the companions of the prophet and not be based on the abstract and analogical reasoning of the individual jurists; it should therefore be grounded on the Koranic word and the sunna of the prophet, and can be considered valid only if it is not in contrast with them for, as it is stated in (Q 14:4), the explanation of the sacred word belongs to the prophet to whom it was given.⁶⁴

Let us now turn to how Ibn Ḥazm faces the problem posed by the verses that suggest an essence or behaviour of God in an anthropomorphic key. First of all, despite the fact that *Zāhirism* is linked to a literal interpretation of the texts, it also severely condemns the anthropomorphism of God. What is Ibn Ḥazm's solution to this problem? The excerpts that I will present now are taken from *Kitāb al-fiṣal*, which is not a Koranic commentary and thus does not allow us to investigate the two individual verses (Q 39:67) and (Q 20:5). I will begin this section by considering the broader discourse which Ibn Ḥazm proposes for the explanation of the divine 'limbs', and then move on to the *istiwā'* action.

⁶⁴ See Arnaldez (1956, 245-248).
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3.3.1.1 On God's hands, eyes, and foot

Ibn Ḥazm advances the following analysis of the verses in which God seems to attribute to himself limbs such as hands and eyes:

The Almighty said (Q 48:10) “The hand of God is over their hands” (*yadu llāhi fawqa aydī-him*), (Q 38:75) “What I created with My two hands” (*li-mā ḥalaqtu bi-yadayya*), (Q 36:71) “From what Our hands have made – livestock” (*mim-mā ‘amilat aydī-nā an-āman*), and (Q 5:64) “No! Both His hands are outstretched”. The messenger of God said about God's right hand ‘Both his hands are right’.⁶⁵ The anthropomorphists affirmed the untenable (*bāṭil*) statement we have already mentioned (i.e. limbs of flesh and blood). The Mu‘tazila affirmed that the hand is the grace (*ni‘ma*) and it has no sense either, for it is a pretension with no definitive proof (*burhān*). Al-Aṣ‘arī (d. 324/935-6) said: ‘The intended meaning of God's word ‘*aydī-nā*’ (our hands) is nothing but two hands (*yadāni*) and the mention of the ‘*a‘yun*’ (eyes) means nothing but two eyes (‘*aynāni*’).’ This is untenable as well, and leads to the claim of the anthropomorphists.

Rather, we say that this is a predication (*iḥbār*) about God through which he who mentioned the hand does not reduce [God] to anything similar to him (i.e. there is no *tašbīh*). We establish that God – as he said – has one hand, two hands, more than two hands; he has an eye and more than two eyes as the Almighty said (Q 20:39) “You might be brought up under My eye” (*li-tuṣna‘a ‘alā ‘aynī*), (Q 52:48) “Surely you are in Our sight” (*fa-inna-ka bi-a‘yuni-nā*). To nobody is permitted to describe God as having two eyes since the text did not refer to this. We state that the intended meaning of everything we have mentioned is God and nothing else. The Almighty said, reporting the words of someone, (Q 39:56) “Alas for me, in regard to what I neglected concerning God” (*yā ḥasratā ‘alā mā farrattu fī ḡanbi llāhi*). This is its meaning: in regard to what refers to God and about the obedience to him. The traditions ‘Both his hands are right’ and ‘The Merciful's right hand’ transmitted from God's messenger are sound. They are comparable to his words (Q 4:3) “Or what your right [hands] own” (*aw mā malakat aymānu-kum*) intending what you own. When the *yamīn* is considered in the language of the Arab, it means ‘the fortune is with the excellent man’, as al-Šammāḥ said [...]⁶⁶ meaning that he takes it with the utmost effort. The prophet's words were ‘Both his

⁶⁵ This *ḥadīth* is found in Muslim (*Ṣaḥīḥ*, no. 1827. In the edition I use book 33 no. 4721).

⁶⁶ Above-mentioned line by al-Šammāḥ.

hands are right', i.e. everything that emanates from him is a benefit and he is the most elevated.

Likewise, the tradition 'Indeed hell will not become full until he places his foot (*qadam*) in it'⁶⁷ transmitted from God's messenger is sound; as it is sound 'Until he places his foot (*riġl*)'.⁶⁸ Its meaning is what God's messenger has already elucidated in another sound *ḥadīṭ*, in which he informed that God says to paradise and hell: 'For each one of you two there is its filling'.⁶⁹ The meaning of *qadam* in the above-mentioned *ḥadīṭ* is nothing more than what the Almighty said (Q 10:2) "That for them [there is] a sure footing with their Lord" (*anna la-hum qadama ṣidqin 'inda rabbi-him*), intending sure ancestor (*sālif ṣidq*), being its meaning the community (*umma*) with which God already knows that he will fill hell. The meaning of *riġl* is likewise, for *riġl* in the language is the group of people (*ġamā'a*), i.e. he will place in hell the group of people whom he knew already that he will fill hell with.⁷⁰ (Ibn Ḥazm, *Fiṣal*, 2:166-167)

This text is based essentially on two points: the anthropomorphic attribution to God of the word 'hand' (*yad*, *yadāni*, *aydin*), and the equally anthropomorphic attribution of the word 'foot' (*qadam*, *riġl*). As for the first, the Koranic text in lines (Q 48:10), (Q 38:75), (Q 36:71), and (Q 5:64) attributes to God one and more than one hand. Ibn Ḥazm opens this section of his treatise by listing the explanations provided by his predecessors who belonged to other theological schools. First, the anthropomorphists (*muġassima*), whose claims he quickly rejects, not admitting at all the comparison between the creator and his creation. Similarly, Ibn Ḥazm does not accept the interpretation of the Mu'tazilite school, which interprets the word 'yad' with 'grace' (*ni'ma*), as we saw earlier in al-Zamaḥṣarī's *Kaššāf*. For Ibn Ḥazm, this interpretation cannot be correct and must therefore be rejected en bloc, since recourse to the figurative sense (*maġāz*) is not grounded on evidence, i.e. on a *dalīl* with the characteristics that I have described above. The third opinion which he rejects is that of al-Aš'arī, who reduces the predication about God of the plural words

⁶⁷ This *ḥadīṭ* is found in Muslim (*Ṣaḥīḥ*, 2846b. In the edition I use book 51 no. 7173), with variants in al-Buḥārī (*Ṣaḥīḥ*, no. 4848, 4849, 7449).

⁶⁸ This *ḥadīṭ* is found in al-Buḥārī (*Ṣaḥīḥ*, no. 4850), Muslim (*Ṣaḥīḥ*, no. 2846d. In the edition I use book 51 no. 7175).

⁶⁹ This *ḥadīṭ* is found in al-Buḥārī (*Ṣaḥīḥ*, no. 4850, 7449), Muslim (*Ṣaḥīḥ*, no. 2846, 2847. In the edition I use book 51 no. 7172, 7173, 7175, 7176)

⁷⁰ Summary in Asín Palacios (1927-1932, 3:213-214).

'hands' and 'eyes' (*aydin, a'yun*) to the dual meaning of them, namely by positing that, although they are plurals, they are intended to be dual. Thus, they indicate and attribute to God two and only two hands. Ibn Ḥazm can only strongly reject this explanation for two main reasons. The first is that the explanation tends dangerously towards the claims of anthropomorphism. The second is that there is little textual evidence to suggest that, by 'hands', God meant 'two hands'. At this point, we can recognise a pillar in Ibn Ḥazm's criticism of other theologians: namely, the attribution of a *ṣifa* to God in the absence of textual evidence in which God uses it to refer to himself; as we will see, this will be a topic also used to explain the ambiguous action of God '*istawà*'. So, how does Ibn Ḥazm solve this ambiguity? First, he argues that, in stating these *ṣifāt*, there is no risk of *tašbīh*. Second, as can be seen from the Koranic word, it is God himself who ascribes the nouns *yad, yadāni* and *aydin*, as well as the *ṣifāt* '*ayn* and '*a'yun*, to himself. For this reason, if God speaks of himself in these terms, then denying them is an act against faith. This, however, should not lead to analogical reasoning that, if God has one, two, or more than two hands, then each of these nouns expresses the same intended meaning, 'two hands', especially if one wants to apply the same reasoning to the nouns '*ayn* and '*a'yun*, causing the reduction of them to the meaning 'two eyes', which is necessarily false inasmuch as God does not predicate it of himself. The only possible solution in Ibn Ḥazm's view is to state that, when referring to these specific divine *ṣifāt*, their utterance refers to anything other than God himself, since they are not distinguishable from his essence. This interpretation is supported by Ibn Ḥazm through the verse (Q 39:56) where, for Ibn Ḥazm, the word *ḡanb* refers to God himself.

If, therefore, in Ibn Ḥazm, the hand of God is none other than God himself, the same cannot be said of the right hand (*yamīn*). On this matter, Ibn Ḥazm cites two *hadīṭ ṣaḥīḥ* attributed to the prophet, in which the prophet clearly predicates of God that he has two right hands. He explains, then, that the word *yamīn* can be glossed on the authority of the Koranic verse (Q 4:3), where an idea of possession corresponds to the word *yamīn*, the same idea conveyed by the line of al-Šammāḥ that we saw above quoted by 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī. By adopting this explanation, one is sheltered from any possible anthropomorphist drift which would attribute to the words of the prophet an affirmation of the 'carnal' nature of divine limbs. In fact, to explain the

prophet's *ḥadīṭ* supporting the presence in God of two right hands, Ibn Ḥazm adopts an interpretation according to which the right hand is a symbol of strength and possession. For this reason, there is no better metaphor to express the power and the benevolence of God.

This interpretation of the *ṣifāt* is counterbalanced by another explanation that he advanced for two other ambiguous nouns recurring in the *sunna* of the prophet: *qadam* and *riġl*, both meaning 'foot'. For these two words, Ibn Ḥazm presents an explanation that is based on the dichotomy not of *ḥaqīqa* and *mağāz*, but of homonymy/polysemy. While he does not say that these two words are *muštarak*, he makes clear that the meaning intended by these two *ḥadīṭ* is not linked to the more common, conventional meaning of the two words *qadam* and *riġl*, but to two other meanings – probably used less in common language – which are to some extent synonyms of each other, and homonyms with respect to *qadam* and *riġl*: 1) he who precedes in time, ancestor, and 2) a group of people. In both cases, the intended meaning leads back to the human being, i.e. to the unfaithful humanity of which God is already aware and which will be destined for the flames of hell. Once again, Ibn Ḥazm leans on textual proof, (Q 10:2), which testifies to the fact that the word *qadam* is used not only with the most common meaning of 'foot', but also in its meaning of 'footing'. Once again, he does not specifically state that these are homonyms.

In the first part of this text, then, Ibn Hazm openly contradicts the anthropomorphist, the Mu'tazilite and the Aš'arite perspectives. For Ibn Ḥazm, the hand of God is nothing but God himself, and he therefore proposes an exact identification according to the model $A = B$; not the Mu'tazilite model related to figurative speech of the type A stands for B , and nor the Aš'arite model based on the *bi-lā kayfa*. On the other hand, in analysing the right hand of God, a figurative meaning can be accepted on the basis of the Koranic text. Although not clearly stated, we can deduce from the words of Ibn Ḥazm that the underlying model is A stands for B in a metaphorical sense, i.e. the positive qualities of the right hand are transferred to God to describe goodness, munificence and strength.

Recourse to the homonymic explanation seems adequate when it applies to the prophetic *ḥadīṭ* in which the words *qadam* and *riġl* appear. Ibn Ḥazm sees these words from the perspective not of $A = B$ or of A stands for B , but of A and B ; that is, a

single signifier corresponds to two or more signifieds, which are linked neither etymologically, and nor by a figurative derivation. It should be noted that, despite the presence of two meanings, they are not mutually interchangeable within the sentence, since the signified 'foot', although conveyed by both signifiers, is from the theological point of view neither justified nor acceptable. On the contrary, it is only the second signified, which denotes the damned of hell, that can be adopted theologically. Thus, we face a mutually exclusive disjunction between the two.

We can impute to Ibn Ḥazm a certain lack of consistency⁷¹ from the viewpoint of theological disquisition. But what is of interest to us here is that Ibn Ḥazm was the first to 1) suggest an interpretation of some anthropomorphic passages based on homonymy/polysemy, and 2) provide an explanation whose definition of *tawriya* was based on two homonymous words. Does he adopt the same approach towards the action *istiwā'*?

3.3.1.2 On 'istawà 'alà l-'arš'

Which is the connection in Ibn Ḥazm's thought between the anthropomorphism proper that I have described above and the attribution of the action *istiwā'* to God? Let us now turn to his analysis of the famous line on the throne, and start with his words:

The discourse about the space (*makān*) and the *istiwā'*.

Abū Muḥammad said: (A) the Mu'tazilite affirmed that God is in every space and allege in support of this claim God's words (Q 58:7) "There is no secret talk of three men but He is the fourth of them" (*mā yakūnu min nağwà ṭalāṭatin illā huwa rābi'u-hum*), (Q 50:16) "We are closer to him than [his] jugular vein" (*wa-naḥnu aqrabu ilay-hi min ġabli l-warīdi*), and (Q

⁷¹ Which was already highlighted by Goldziher (1884, 167-168): "Wir sehen, dass Ibn Ḥazm in der Erklärung der anthropomorphistischen Stellen des Koran und der Tradition seinem eigenen Systeme untreu wird und an den Ausdrücken der Schrift dieselbe interpretative Willkür begeht, die er sonst den Mu'taziliten in schonungslosen Ausdrücken zum Vorwurf macht. Angesichts der grossen Anzahl von anthropomorphistischen Stellen, die der Koran aufweist, war es in diesem Punkte dem Ibn Ḥazm nicht möglich, jene in dogmatischer Beziehung unbequemen Stellen der Tradition, bei deren Interpretierung seine zāhiritische Worttreue zu Schanden wird, als unecht oder nicht genügend bezeugt zu verwerfen, ein Vorgang, den er sonst, wie wir selbst bisher zu wiederholten Malen sehen konnten, als ultima ratio in der Entkräftung der Argumente der Gegner anzuwenden liebt."

56:85) “We are nearer to him than you, only you do not see [Us]” (*wa-naḥnu aqrabu ilay-hi min-kum wa-lākin lā tubṣirūna*). Abū Muḥammad said: God’s speech must be accorded to its literal meaning (*zāhir*) [unless] anything that another text (*naṣṣ*) or consensus (*iğmāʿ*) or evidence of the senses (*ḍarūrat ḥiss*) prevented it. We have already apprehended that everything which is in a space occupies that space, it fills it, and it is shaped in the shape of the space, or the space is shaped in its shape: one of these two possibilities is necessary. We have also apprehended that everything that is in a space is limited by the finitude of its space and it has six or five sides limiting its space. All of them are attributes of the body and whereas what we have recalled is true, we apprehend that his words (Q 50:16, Q 56:85, and Q 58:7) are nothing but the control (*tadbīr*) over that and the all-encompassing knowledge of it. It is necessary to refute whatever deviates from it. Moreover, their statement that God is everywhere is an error because it is indispensable for this statement to be effective that he fills all the spaces, and [it is indispensable] that what is in the spaces [contains] God, [but] God is exalted above that and this is impossible. [...]

(B) Some other people affirm that God is in a space non-space, but this statement is unsound on the basis of what we have previously mentioned with no difference. Those adduced as proof the words of God (Q 20:5) “The Merciful is mounted upon the throne”. Abū Muḥammad said: the Muslims have provided four interpretations of this verse.

(1) The first of them is the statement of the anthropomorphists (*muğassima*) but we already clearly argued, by the power of God, about its unsoundness (*fasād*).

(2) The other has been affirmed by the *muʿtazila* and consists in saying that its meaning is (2.1) ‘to take possession/to possess’ (*istawlà*) as they composed ‘Biṣr took possession of Iraq’.⁷² Abū Muḥammad said: this is unsound (*fāsīd*) because, if it were so, the throne would not have been the worthier [space] to be settled on than all the other creatures, and it would have been possible to us to say ‘the Merciful is settled on the earth’ since he possesses the earth and everything he created. However, nobody says this. Thus, this statement is a pretension without evidence (*dalīl*) and becomes invalid.

(3) Some of the companions of the Kilāb tribe affirmed that the *istiwāʿ* (i.e. being straight) is an attribute of the essence, and its meaning is the negation of his bending (*iʿwiğāğ*). Abū Muḥammad said: this statement is of the utmost degree unsound for several reasons.

(3.i) First, the Almighty did not call himself *mustawī*, and nor is anyone allowed to call God with an epithet with which he did not call himself; for whoever does this loses the limit of God’s prescriptions about his names, i.e. he deviates from the truth. God settled some limits

⁷² Here, Ibn Ḥazm is referring to the above-mentioned line by al-Aḥṭal.

on how to call him, and said: (Q 65:1) “Whoever transgresses the limits [set by] God has done himself evil” (*wa-man yata‘adda ḥudūda llāh fa-qad ḡalama nafsa-hu*).

(3.ii) Second, the community of believers agrees that nobody invokes God, saying: ‘O the straight one, have mercy on me’; nor does anyone call his son ‘Abd al-Mustawī.

(3.iii) Third, [the logical principle for which] whatever is denied about God does not necessarily entail the actualisation of its opposite. Although we deny the steadiness (*sukūn*) of God, it is not allowed to call God moving (*mutaḥarrrik*). In the same way we deny the movement (*ḥaraka*), but it is not permitted to call him steady (*sākin*). We deny his being a body (*ḡism*), but it is not permitted to call him shares (*sihām*). Likewise, we deny from him the sleep (*nawm*), but it is not permitted to call him awake (*yaqzān*) nor wakeful (*muntabih*); nor is it permitted to call him upright (*mustaqīm*) because of the denying of the bending (*inḥinā*). This is valid for every divine attribute the text has not provided, so that the *istiwā*’ and the *i’wiḡāḡ* are together denied about him. God is exalted above that because all of them are attributes of the bodies and of the totality of the accidents (*ḡumlat al-‘arāḡ*), while God is exalted above the accidents.

(3.iv) Fourth, it is necessary for whoever affirmed this unsound statement to posit that the throne is such an everlasting condition together with God, for the *istiwā*’ is bound with the throne so that if the *istiwā*’ were everlasting, then the throne would be everlasting, too. This is heresy!

(3.v) Fifth, if the *istiwā*’ were the negation of the *i’wiḡāḡ*, there would not have been any meaning for its ascription to the *‘arš*, being indeed an unsound utterance with no sense.

If they object, saying: ‘You call him *samī*’ (hearing) and *baṣīr* (seeing) and this is an everlasting condition, so it will be necessary to you [to admit] that all the heard and seen things are everlasting, too.’ We will reply to them – and by God we strongly affirm it – it is not necessary for us [to admit the eternity of the heard and seen things] since we call God only with the epithets he used to call himself. So we say ‘God the hearing and the seeing said’, having said by this that the being hearing and seeing are everlasting in his very essence (*bi-dāti-hi*). We do not say that he does not hear nor see so we add nothing to what the text relates; we only affirm that God did not cease being hearing for what is heard neither seeing for what is seen. He sees what is visible and hears what is hearable. The meaning of this is that he is *‘ālim* (knowing) of all of that, as he said: (Q 20:46) “Surely I am with both of you. I hear and I see” (*inna-nī ma‘a-kumā asma‘u wa-arà*). All of this is the meaning of the *‘ilm* (knowledge), which does not necessitate the existence of everlasting known entities, rather [it means that] he knows – in its very truth – about what will exist that it will exist, he knows what is as it is, and he knows what was as it was. [...]

(4) The fourth statement about the *istiwā'* is that the meaning of his words (Q 20:5) "Is mounted upon the throne" is an action he did on the throne, i.e. the conclusion of his creation with it and after the throne nothing more has been created. This is demonstrated by the fact that God's messenger in mentioning the heavens (*ġannāt*) said: "Ask God about the most elevated paradise (*firdaws*). It is in the middle of the heavens, the most elevated of them, and on top thereof there is the throne of the Merciful".⁷³ It is true that beyond the throne there is no creation and it is the end of the body of the creatures of which its creation is not empty nor filled. Who disavows that the universe has an end at the levels of the surface (*misāḥa*), the time (*zamān*), and the space (*makān*), then he agrees with the statement of the *Dahriyya*⁷⁴ and abandons Islam. In the language, the *istiwā'* applies to the conclusion (*intihā'*). God said: (Q 28:14) "When he reached his maturity and established (himself), We gave him judgement and knowledge" (*wa-lammā balaġa ašadda-hu wa-stawā ātaynā-hu ḥukman wa-ʿilman*), i.e. when he attained force and goodness; (Q 41:11) "Then he mounted [upward] the sky, while it was [still] smoke" (*tumma stawā ilā l-samā'i wa-hiya duḥḥānun*), i.e. that he created and made it reaching the sky after having established the earth as it is, and the success is in God! This is the truth which we affirm by the soundness (*siḥḥa*) of its proof (*burhān*) and the untenability (*buṭlān*) of what deviates from it.

(C) The third statement about the space is that God is not in space nor in time at all. This is the statement affirmed by the majority of the Sunnite about which we say that this is [the only possibility, for] other statements are not possible because of the untenability of everything deviating from it and also because of his words (Q 41:54) "Is it not a fact that He encompasses everything?" (*a-lā inna-hu bi-kulli šay'in muḥiṭun*). This entails the necessity that he is not in space since, if he were in space, then the space would have encompassed him from one or more sides, but this is not applicable to the creator because of the text of the mentioned verse. The space is a thing without any doubt, and it is not possible that a

⁷³ The *ḥadīṭs* describing paradise and the throne of God are found in Ibn Māġa (*Sunan*, no. 4331), al-Tirmidī (*Ġāmi'*, no. 2530), al-Buḥārī (*Ṣaḥīḥ*, no. 2790, 7423).

⁷⁴ "Holders of materialistic opinions of various kinds, often only vaguely defined. [...] The relative *dahrī* will therefore have two philosophical connotations. It denotes, firstly, the man who believes in the eternity of the world whether in the past or in the future, denying, as a result of this opinion, resurrection and a future life in another world; secondly, the *mulḥid*, the man who deviates from the true faith. [...] The *dahriyya* are defined in the *Mafātīḥ al-'ulūm* (ed. Van Vloten, Leyden 1895, 35) as 'those who believe in the eternity of the course of time'; the *lkhwān al-ṣafā'* call them the *azaliyya*, those who believe in the eternity of the cosmos, as opposed to those who attribute to it a creator and a cause (ed. Bombay 1306, iv, 39; ed. Beirut 1376/1957, iii, 455). In this respect the *Mutakallimūn* are opposed to them, affirming the beginning in time of bodies and of the world created by God, and to this adding an affirmation of the divine attributes, God being alone eternal and alone powerful (*ibid.* Bombay 39-40 and Beirut 456)." Goldziher and Goichon (2012).

thing is in space being it encompassing its space. This is rationally impossible, and its refusal is known to be necessary, and the success is in God! Moreover, the fact that he could not have been in space unless he was a body or an accident in a body is what does not permit [the existence of] anything equal to him and what does not figure in the intellect and the thought anything other than him at all. When it is refuted that God is a body and an accident, then it is refuted that he is in space, and by God we are strengthened. About his words (Q 69:17), “And they will bear the throne of your Lord above them on that day – eight [of them].” (*wa-yaḥmilu ‘arṣa rabbi-ka fawqa-hum yawma’idīn tamāniyatun*) they are the truth and we certainly believe in them since God knows better the intended meaning of his words. Perhaps, he meant the seven skies and the chair which are eight bodies – at that time and nowadays – between us and the throne; perhaps, they also are eight angels, but God knows better. We only affirm what our Lord affirmed, and we declare that its literal meaning is the certain truth, but God knows better its signification and intended meaning.

About the superstitions, we have nothing to do with them, and nor do they contain any true account about the prophet, yet we say that they are undiscoverable mysteries (*ḡuyūb*) with no evidence for us about their intended meaning; rather, we affirm (Q 3:7) “We believe in it. All [of it] is from our Lord” (*amannā bi-hi kullun min ‘inda rabbi-nā*). Everything which God affirmed is true! In it, nothing is contradictory to rational [thought]; rather, all of it, before the Almighty informed us about it, was for us at the limit of conceivability. Then, when the Almighty informs about it, it becomes a certain mandatory truth. He said (Q 40:7) “Those who bear the throne, and those around it” (*allaḏīna yaḥmilūna l-‘arṣ wa-man ḥawla-hu*), it is certainly sound that there are carriers of the throne and they are the angels submitted to his command as we say ‘I bear this command’, i.e. I do it and undertake it. He said (Q 16:50, 66:6) “They do what they are commanded” (*yaf‘alūna mā yu‘marūna*), they acquiesce to the command. The bearer of everything and the holder of everything is God, who said (Q 35:41) “Surely God holds the heavens and the earth, or they would move. If indeed they moved, no one would hold them after him” (*inna llāha yumsiku l-samāwāti wa-l-arḏa an tazūlā wa-lā-‘in zālatā in amsaka-humā min aḥadin min ba‘di-hi*).⁷⁵ (Ibn Ḥazm, *Fiṣal*, 2:122-126)

In this chapter of the *Fiṣal*, Ibn Ḥazm deals with a fundamental theme of Islamic theology: the question of the space referred to God, or, rather, what is the relationship between the deity and spatiality, and whether in this he is comparable

⁷⁵ Summary in Asín Palacios (1927-1932, 3:175-177).

to a body or not. The discussion on spatiality originates from the divine word itself, as for example in verses (Q 58:7), (Q 50:16), and (Q 56:85), which suggest the closeness of God to creatures and his precise positioning in space. This is where Ibn Ḥazm begins his reflections, which then proceed, as we saw in the previous abstract, by presenting and refuting the theories of the other theological schools, before finally forwarding his own point of view with the demonstration that he considers conclusive. In total, he enumerates three different theses.

The first is advanced by the Mu'tazilite school, which, drawing on the verses quoted above, affirms the presence of God in every space. Ibn Ḥazm affirms the groundlessness of this thesis, developing his argumentation through logical reasoning. Recalling the criteria for accepting the literal meaning and the possible recourse to the figurative sense according to the principles explained at the beginning of this section, Ibn Ḥazm proceeds to dismantle the thesis of God's ubiquity, arguing that, since God is not a body, he cannot participate in physical limits intrinsic to bodies. From this, it follows that, if God occupied a space, he would be limited by the space itself as he would be contained within it, a limit that cannot in any way be asserted about God since the spatial dimensions would become the limits of God. Moreover, besides attributing to him characteristics typical of bodies, what is lost in the intrinsic quality of God, namely his unity, implicitly posits that God is divided into several places, thus resulting in his fragmentation and 'atomisation'. Ibn Ḥazm's argument is based on a deductive process, and it will be used by other theologians, such as Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who also argued against the spatialisation of God. It is clear that this first thesis must be rejected in its entirety. The solution proposed by Ibn Ḥazm is also in this case to adopt to a figurative interpretation, i.e. God's ubiquity, suggested by some verses such as (Q 58:7), (Q 50:16), and (Q 56:85), should be understood from the point of view not of space or physicality, but of his divine essence. By this, he means that God is everywhere, but not physically. Rather, he means that God's control (*tadbīr*) and power reach everywhere and act on every created thing; and that, in his all-encompassing knowledge (*'ilm*) of the facts and accidents of the world, he perceives every single thing.

The second thesis concerning the spatialisation of God is to situate the divinity in a non-space, a claim which Ibn Ḥazm considers indefensible and which he opposes with

the same reasoning as with the first thesis. According to Ibn Ḥazm, it is precisely in this discussion that (Q 20:5) is used by the supporters of the 'space non-space' theory to prove their claim.

The third and final thesis is the one with which Ibn Ḥazm agrees: namely, that God is not in space and time, but transcends them, a position that is similar to the one we saw earlier, but not yet formulated in terms of *tanzīh*. Once again, the argument which strengthens this thesis put forward by Ibn Ḥazm and by most of the Sunni school is based on the Koranic word, and specifically on line (Q 41:54), which describes God as 'encompassing everything'. This can be considered true if and only if transcendence is attributed to God in space and time, for otherwise one would err once again in comparing God to the creatures, assigning him attributes and characteristics typical of bodies, such as being in space and time. Bodies and things – such as space itself – are bound to the being and becoming; their being here and now prevents their being ubiquitous and rationally excludes the possibility that a limited body can be an encompassing entity just like God. Human reason cannot touch the knowledge and understanding of the transcendent being of God. The rational impossibility of transcendence in the created bodies of the world and the necessary transcendence of God are nothing other than the proof of what is stated in verse (Q 42:11), which makes explicit that nothing is similar to God. In this case, Ibn Ḥazm introduces the principle of unknowability of the true and profound meaning of some expressions recurring in the divine word, only saying that such expressions must be accepted in their literal sense as they were transmitted. The literal meaning of the divine word is for Ibn Ḥazm totally in accord with reason and cannot contradict it. However, its content cannot be conceived and understood starting from human reason, but becomes conceivable and understandable for humans only after God has given his revelation to which every believer must adhere. It is clear that the human mind's ability to understand is not sufficient to reach the knowledge of the divine essence, which is why the human being cannot grasp the transcendence of God.

We can now turn our attention back to the 'sitting upon the throne'. Ibn Ḥazm's analysis of (Q 20:5) is incorporated into the discourse on God's spatialisation as an argument leading to the demonstration of the fallacy of the thesis that God is in a space non-space. It is structured as a parenthetical element that begins by refuting

previous theories and closes by presenting his personal explanation. Ibn Ḥazm enumerates four different arguments in the interpretation of the action *istiwā'*.

As usual, the first is that of the anthropomorphists, which, as we already know, is unacceptable.

The second is the Mu'tazilite interpretation, which attributes to the action *istiwā'* the figurative sense of 'to possess, have possession, have control over someone or something' (*istawlà*), an interpretation which will find a true supporter in al-Zamaḥṣarī. Ibn Ḥazm rejects this interpretation, too, arguing that, if the Koranic verse had a figurative meaning, then the possession of the throne, or the exercising of possession on it/from it, would not conform to reality. That is, it would describe only a part of the reality, since God exercises his authority over all creation. For this reason, if interpreting the verb *istawà* as *istawlà* were correct, then the use of *istawà* should also be applicable to other things of creation, such as the earth: *istawà 'alà l-ard*. But, for Ibn Ḥazm, we cannot accept the use of this verb in this very figurative sense, since we have no textual evidence confirming it.

The third interpretation is the one that Ibn Ḥazm devotes more space to refuting, and it is also the interpretation that would find only little resonance later. According to this interpretation, the action *istiwā'* is the negation of *i'wiġāġ*, i.e. *istawà* is given the meaning of 'being straight, upright', which gives it the value of what it is opposite to (namely, 'being bent'). Ibn Ḥazm makes a five-point rebuttal of this interpretation: 1) One cannot attribute to God any attribute that he has not already attributed to himself, such as *al-mustawī* (the upright). 2) *Al-mustawī* cannot be an attribute of God also because in the common language no one turns to God using this epithet, and nor does this attribute identify with God as in the case of *al-rahmān*. 3) Nothing can be said of God if he has not already said it of himself. The mere fact that we must refuse an attribute to God does not entail having to accept its opposite. For example, even if we deny to God the being *mu'waġġ*, this does not entail his being *mustawī*. 4) If the being upright of God were linked to the throne, then the throne should also participate in the divine essence of eternity, which is undoubtedly impossible.⁷⁶ 5)

⁷⁶ Linked to this fourth point, Ibn Ḥazm relates an objection to two other attributes, namely the seeing (*baṣīr*) and the hearing (*samī'*). For Ibn Ḥazm, these two attributes are in no way considered to be related to the eternal presence of entities that can be perceived by sight and hearing, and therefore
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Finally, Ibn Ḥazm points out that, if the *istiwā'* action really were the opposite of *i'wiġāġ*, then there would be no reason to bind this action to the throne, since the resulting utterance would be complete nonsense.

The fourth and final interpretation that Ibn Ḥazm puts forward to explain the *istiwā'* action is his personal point of view, and it is therefore the one of most interest to us. According to Ibn Ḥazm, the throne of God is the last work of his creation; it is situated on top of the *firdaws*, the last and highest of the heavens, according to the authority expressed by the prophet in a *ḥadīth* whose transmission goes back to the prophet himself. It is precisely on the basis of this textual proof that Ibn Ḥazm states that creation has an end and is therefore limited in time and space, just as time and space are limited. The throne of God is on this limit, the last created object, the seal of his creation. The explanation of this interpretation is for Ibn Ḥazm a reading of the verb *istawà* in the meaning of *intahà*, i.e. 'to arrive at a conclusion, to conclude an act'. Once again, we can see that Ibn Ḥazm draws (albeit not explicitly) on homonymy/polysemy. Unlike the homonym interpretation which sees in *istawà* a verb expressing a state contrary to *i'waġġa*, Ibn Ḥazm justifies the homonym interpretation of *istawà* in the meaning of 'to conclude' by pointing to textual evidence found in the two Koranic verses (Q 28:14) and (Q 41:11). These attest to the use of this verb in the sense of 'to reach': specifically, (Q 28:14) is used to express the achievement of adulthood, the becoming mature, while in (Q 41:11) the verb is used in the sense of reaching a place, of heading towards a place. Thus, this is for Ibn Ḥazm the textual evidence which, according to his criteria, cannot be ignored and therefore invalidates any further speculation on the meaning of *istawà 'alà l-arš*. Together, these two pieces of textual evidence, i.e. the Koran and Sunna of the prophet, 'oblige' interpreting the line in relation to the act of creation. To paraphrase the line: God ended the act of his creation by creating the throne and placing it above the heavens, at the extreme limit of creation.

God does not need eternal objects and bodies which can be seen and heard, as God possesses these attributes independently of the objects at the mercy of becoming. In what sense is God then seeing and hearing? The answer given by Ibn Ḥazm is simple: these two attributes refer only to God's omniscient knowledge of all the facts of creation, past, present and future.

For Ibn Ḥazm, then, the use of homonymy/polysemy to explain some of the divine attributes does not apply to all the occurrences of the *mutašābihāt*. Although Ibn Ḥazm does not use the term homonymy/polysemy (*ištirāk*), the process by which he assigns one of the possible meanings of the word is clearly based on the semantic differentiation of the word and on the relationship of homonymy (between two words that are not related etymologically) or of polysemy. However, to what extent can this approach be seen as corresponding to the later Zāhirite view? How far did the approach spread and develop through the writings of later authors?

3.3.2 Abū Ḥayyān al-Ġarnāṭī

The second author whom I will discuss is Abū Ḥayyān al-Ġarnāṭī, a former Zāhirite who, once in Cairo, converted to the Šāfi'ite rite.

As with the previous authors, I will examine Abū Ḥayyān's key texts to understand his view of the *mutašābihāt* under analysis. Abū Ḥayyān is the only Zāhirite – or, better, former Zāhirite – for whom we have a complete and philologically very accurate Koran commentary, commonly known as *Tafsīr al-baḥr al-muḥīṭ*. If we look at his method, we can see how important tradition (*naql*) is to him, and how accurately he reports the interpretations of his predecessors. While certainly paying the greatest consideration to the explanations of the Koranic verses offered by the prophet's companions and by the authorities of the first Islam, Abū Ḥayyān also mentions later authorities in the field of Koranic exegesis, with two being particularly important in his *tafsīr*: the exegete al-Zamaḥšarī, who, as we have seen, belongs to the Mu'tazilite school and supports a 'rhetorical' approach in his interpretation of the Koran, and Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, an Aš'arite who was often in conflict with his predecessor al-Zamaḥšarī.

The second characteristic of Abū Ḥayyān's *Tafsīr* is the attention that he pays to lexicology and syntax, which, as we will see, he uses to explain and justify some readings rather than others, and to emphasise how assigning a different inflexion mark can give rise to different valid readings of the Koranic text.

Taking the two verses (Q 39:67) and (Q 20:5) as a starting-point, I will also draw on other verses to present the view adopted by Abū Ḥayyān.

3.3.2.1 On God's hand

I will begin with (Q 39:67) and the problem of attributing human limbs to God. At the beginning of his reasoning, Abū Ḥayyān (*Tafsīr*, 7:421-423) states that, since human beings – and in particular the Meccan unbelievers at the time of the revelation – cannot understand the essence and greatness of the power of God, revelation was brought down so that even mortals could understand these characteristics through a process of *taṣwīr* and *taḥyīl*. In this regard, he cites the passage of al-Zamaḥṣarī which I have already quoted and commented on, where he states that this line should be understood neither in its *ḥaqīqī* meaning nor in its *maḡāzī* sense, since the purpose is the creation of an intelligible image (*taḥyīl*). The second opinion that he cites (without attributing it to a specific author) is one that we have already encountered in Ibn Ḥazm and Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī: namely, that one must attribute to the revelation its literal meaning (*ẓāhir*), unless the presence of a *dalīl* clearly prevents doing so. In the case in question, the *ẓāhir* meaning refers to corporeality and is therefore to be rejected, with preference being given to the *maḡāz* sense instead. I will not dwell on what follows these two interpretations, as Abū Ḥayyān discusses the syntactic elements at play in the line, and this does not offer anything to our discussion – with the exception of a brief closing quote with no attribution: “It is said that ‘his grip’ means ‘his dominion’ without opponent or competitor. About ‘with his right hand’, it means ‘with his power’” (*Tafsīr*, 7: 423).⁷⁷

As can be seen from this overview, Abū Ḥayyān does not produce original ideas in explaining (Q 39:67), and nor is this passage of great help in attempting to reconstruct a hypothetical Zāhirite theory of *mutaṣābihāt*. For this reason, it is appropriate (as I have already done for Ibn Ḥazm) to broaden the focus of my research and to look at other passages that enable us to derive an approach closer to Zāhirism, or an approach tending towards interpretation through figurative language.

The first verse to consider is (Q 3:73): *qul inna l-faḍla bi-yadi llāhi yu'tī-hi man yaṣā'u* (Say: ‘Surely favor is in the hand of God. He gives it to whomever He pleases’), where

⁷⁷ Already in al-Zamaḥṣarī with no attribution, see above.

God is depicted as having a hand. Abū Ḥayyān has no doubts about this passage, and he actually interprets the verse as a *kināya*: “The favour is in the hand of God, i.e. controlled by him like something in the hand. This is a *kināya* expressing the power of the control and the mastery. The Creator is free from limbs” (*Tafsīr*, 2:521). He proposes the same analysis for verse (Q 51:47), stating that *bi-aydin* means *bi-quwwatin*, through a metonymical approach (*Tafsīr*, 8:140).

If we limit ourselves to the analysis of these three verses, we can say that Abū Ḥayyān’s interpretation is in accordance with that of the authors presented in the first section of this chapter: namely, that the interpretation of the ambiguous passages referring to the hand, or hands, of God is essentially a figurative use of the language, and is thus closer to Mu’tazilism than to Aš’arism. However, to understand Abū Ḥayyān’s point of view better, I will now turn to his analysis of another ambiguous line, since it clarifies his criteria for drawing on figurative language.

The verse in question is (Q 5:64): *wa-qālat al-yahūdu yadu llāhi maḡlūlatun ḡullat aydī-him wa-lu’inū bi-mā qālū bal yadā-hu mabsūṭatāni yunfiqū kayfa yašā’u* (The Jews say, ‘The hand of God is chained’, [May] their hands be chained, and [may] they [be] cursed for what they say! No! Both His hands are outstretched: He gives as He pleases). In commenting on (Q 5:64), Abū Ḥayyān first describes the position of the Jewish community as being fundamentally based on *taḡsīm*, for they describe God with human characteristics – such as having white hair, having limbs, and being subject to tiredness so that he has to rest at the end of creation. Abū Ḥayyān counters this position by quoting some Koranic verses which refute the anthropomorphic interpretation of God and which justify a non-literal interpretation of (Q 5:64), thereby excluding any possibility of interpreting the word ‘hand’ in its proper meaning of ‘limb’, since God cannot have a chained hand. He concludes by affirming the substantial transcendence of God and a figurative interpretation of the sacred text (*Tafsīr*, 3:533), which he endorses thus:

Those who profess the truth posit that God is not a body and has no limb, he does not resemble anything of the creature; he is not specified, nor is he occupying a space and the accidents do not occur to him. This matter is established in the *‘ilm uṣūl al-dīn* (i.e. *‘ilm al-kalām*, speculative theology). The majority maintains that this is an *isti’āra* (metaphor) about

his generosity (*ǧūd*) and his ample bestowal (*in'ām*). They also add that the hands shall be interpreted as the Arabs do in their words 'Such a one dispenses with both his hands'. Another example is

يداك يدا مجدٍ فكفٌ مفيدةٌ * وكفٌ إذا ما ضنَّ بالمالي تُنفِقُ⁷⁸

Your hands are hands of glory since one palm gives and the other dispenses [also] when it is stingy of money.

They claim that the word *yadayni* in this utterance means the bestowal (*in'ām*), correlative (*qarīna*) of the dispensation (*infāq*). Whoever considers the language of the Arabs will certainly become acquainted with the fact that the extension of the hand and its contraction are an *isti'āra* standing for generosity and avarice. (Abū Ḥayyān, *Tasfīr*, 3:534-535)

These words clearly show a predilection for the figurative interpretation of these particular *mutašābihāt*. According to Abū Ḥayyān, this interpretation is confirmed by the common use of figurative language in Arabic, for which he gives an example quoting the verse of al-A'šā (d. after 625), a pre-Islamic poet and therefore a reliable source on the use of specific linguistic constructs at the time of revelation. The hand of god is therefore neither chained nor outstretched, and cannot be a hand similar to that of human beings; these two expressions simply indicate in a figurative, metaphorical way generosity and avarice, as already postulated by other exegetes, including al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Kaššāf*, 2:265) and Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (*Tafsīr*, 12:44). In this sense and from what emerges from his commentary, Abū Ḥayyān embraces the argument that *mutašābihāt* of the type anthropomorphism proper are to be interpreted through the use of figurative language. This is even more evident if we consider how he closes his comment on (Q 5.64), where he argues that quoting authorities from the early days of Islam, such as Sufyān al-Ṭawrī (d. 161/778), is not sufficient to justify adopting a specific interpretative method.

⁷⁸ This line is found in al-A'šā (*Dīwān*, 225).

The majority of the community of the believers maintains that they (i.e. the ambiguous verses) are explained through the rules of the language and the trope of metaphor and other types [of figures] of the discourse. Some people – and among them the *qāḍī* Abū Bakr Ibn al-Ṭayyib – affirm that all these divine attributes are additional in the essence, permanent in God without *tašbīh* (comparison with the creature) or *tağdīd* (innovation). Some people – and among them al-Ša‘bī, Ibn al-Musīb and al-Ṭawrī – said: ‘We believe in them (i.e. the divine attributes) and confirm them as they appear in the text. We do not specify their explanation and the investigation (*naẓar*) has no precedence in their [explanation].’ These two discourses are the account of whoever did not examine closely the language of the Arabs and the proof regarding this issue is to be found in the science of *uṣūl al-dīn*. (Abū Ḥayyān, *Tasfīr*, 3:535)

We can conclude from the passages from Abū Ḥayyān’s commentary analysed so far that, when dealing with the Koranic passages in which this anthropomorphism proper appears, Abū Ḥayyān adopts the point of view of those who interpret *mutašābihāt* by resorting to figurative language. Certainly, this is an opening with respect to the conception of Ibn Ḥazm, who instead adopted the principle that divine attributes – such as hand and eye – are unquestionable because they are mentioned in the scriptures, while at the same time being beyond the comprehension of the human mind. In this case, Abū Ḥayyān does not prove to have true Zāhirite tendencies. On the contrary, he accepts an interpretation that Ibn Ḥazm would have rejected. Does this also apply to (Q 20:5), the line of the throne?

3.3.2.2 On ‘*istawà ‘alà l-‘arš*’

Contrary to what one might expect, Abū Ḥayyān’s comment on (Q 20:5) is not very helpful in understanding how an ex-Zāhirite jurist and theologian approached the interpretation of this line. In fact, he devotes more attention to reflecting on the different cases of inflection of the word *al-rahmān*, and on how a different syntactic interpretation of the phrase acts at the level of the whole sentence, i.e. lines (Q 20:4-6), resulting in a change of meaning. He does not mention the action ‘*alà l-‘arš istawà*. This is because Abū Ḥayyān refers to the discussion on this point which he has already presented while analysing a previous line in which this identical action is mentioned.

Specifically, it is (Q 7:54) “*Inna rabba-kumu llāhu alladī ḥalaqa l-samāwāti wa-l-arḍa fī sittati ayyāmin tumma stawà ‘alà l-‘arši*” (Surely your Lord is God, who created the heavens and the earth in six days. Then He mounted the throne). In his commentary, Abū Ḥayyān dwells in particular on the meanings of the words ‘*arš*’ and *istawà*, stating that they contain more than one meaning in themselves, and listing each of them. We can appreciate his analysis better by looking at the entire extract:

About his being sat upon the throne, some people accord to it its literal meaning (*zāhir*) of ‘being settled’ (*istiqrār*) in his essence upon the throne. The majority of the early Muslims (*salaf*): the two Sufyān – i.e. Sufyān al-Ṭawrī (d. 161/778) and Sufyān b. ‘Uyayna (d. 196/811) –, Mālik, al-Awzā‘ī, al-Layṭ, Ibn al-Mubārak, and others in the accounts of the divine attributes (*ṣifāt*) [claim] the faith in them and the going beyond what God intends without specification of the intended meaning (*murād*).

Some people interpreted them in many ways. Sufyān al-Ṭawrī said: ‘He did an action on the throne which is called *istiwā*’. It is reported from Abū I-Faḍl b. al-Naḥwī that he said: ‘*‘Arš* is the *nomen verbi* of ‘*arāša ya‘rišu ‘arš* (to build [a trellis, a wooden structure, a house, etc.]) and the intended meaning by ‘*arš* in his words (Q 7:54) “Then he mounted the throne” is this.’ What has been established in the *ṣarī‘a* conflicts with [what is said] that he is a particularised created body. The issue of the *istiwā*’ is mentioned in the science of *uṣūl al-dīn*. Al-Qaffāl and Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Rāzī devoted their efforts to the establishment of what can be established. This is also mentioned in the *Taḥrīr* and elucidated there.

The word ‘*arš*’ shares (*muštarika*) many meanings. ‘*Arš*’ means the king’s chair (*sarīr al-malik*) [as in the verses] (Q 12:100) “He raised his parents on the throne” (*wa-rafa‘a abaway-hi ‘alà l-‘arši*) and (Q 27:41) “Disguise her throne for her” (*nakkirū la-hā ‘arša-hā*). It is also the covering (*saqf*): everything which is high and provides shade is a ‘*arš*. It is also the sovereignty (*mulk*), the authority (*sulṭān*), and the might (‘*izz*), Zuhayr said:

تداركُتُما عَبَساً وَقَدْ ثَلَّ عَرَشُهَا * وَذُبْيَانَ إِذْ زَلَّتْ بِأَقْدَامِهَا النَّعْلُ⁷⁹

You relieved the ‘Abs, when their might was already destroyed; and the Ḍubayn,⁸⁰ since the sandals slipped with their feet.

⁷⁹ Zuhayr (*Dīwān*, 86 with variant: قد < قد، إذ < قد، عبسا وقد < الأجلاف قد، إذ < قد)، al-Ḥalīl b. Aḥmad (*al-‘Ayn*, s.v. ‘*r š*), al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Mustaqṣa*, 2:34), al-Maydānī (*Arabum*, 1:267, 1:587), Ibn Manẓūr (*Lisān*, s.v. ‘*r š*).

⁸⁰ On the two tribes mentioned in this line, see Fück (2012b).

Another said:

إِنْ يَفْتُلُوكَ فَقَدْ ثَلَّتْ عُرُوشَهُمْ * بَعْتَيْبَةَ بْنِ الْحَارِثِ بْنِ شِهَابٍ⁸¹

If they slay you, and you have already toppled their thrones (i.e. their authority) with

‘Uṭayba b. al-Ḥārīt b. Šihāb.⁸²

‘*Arš* is also the wood with which the well is cased after its bottom has been cased with stones.

‘*Arš* is also the name of four small stars situated in the lower part of *al-‘awwā*⁸³ which are called haunches of the lion and ‘*arš al-simāk* too.⁸⁴ ‘*Arš* is also the part linking the instep, where the toes are.

The verb *istawà* is also used meaning ‘to settle’, ‘to be settled’ (*istiqrār*), meaning ‘to be elevated’ (*‘alā*), meaning ‘to direct oneself’ ‘to be directed’ (*qašada*), meaning ‘to be or become equal’ (*sāwà - tasāwà*), and it was said having the meaning ‘to possess’, ‘to take possession’ (*istawlà*). A poet said:

هما استويا بفضلهما جميعاً * على عرش الملوك بغير زور⁸⁵

⁸¹ Without attribution in al-‘Askarī (*Ġamhara*, 2:92), Rukn al-Dīn al-Ġurġānī (*Išārāt*, 228), al-Šaybī (*Timtāl*, 2:406). Attributed to al-Rubayyī‘a Abū Du‘āb al-Asadī in Abū Tammām (*Ḥamāsa*, 150), al-Tibrīzī (*Šarḥ*, 1:545), Ibn al-Aṭīr (*Maṭal*, 1:293), Ibn Manẓūr (*Lisān*, s.v. *y m n*, with variant: ثللت عروشهم < هتكت بيوتهم).

⁸² Famous pre-Islamic hero, see Bosworth and Kindermann (2012).

⁸³ “Mondstation 13. Ibn Qutayba 60, 14: vier Sterne hinter *aš-šarfa* (= β Leonis), sie ähneln einem ungeteilten (*ġayr mašqūqa*) kāf oder auch einem unten ausgezogenen (*mamdūdat al-asfal*) alif. Šūfī 193, 2-8 (Yehuda XXVI, 2) fand in einem Teil seiner Quellen unter diesem Namen fünf Sterne verzeichnet, die er mit dem 5., 6., 7. [dieser steht *fī zāwiyat al-kāf*, an dem Winkel des (Buchstabens) kāf], 10. Und 13. Stern des ptolemäischen Bildes Jungfrau = $\theta\eta\gamma\delta\epsilon$ Virginis identifiziert; er fügt aber hinzu (193, 9), daß einige den von ihm mit dem 10. Ptolemäischen = δ Virginis identifizierten Stern fortließen und die restlichen vier *al-‘awwā* nannten. Die Bedeutung des Namens ist nicht sicher feststellbar; die arabischen Grammatiker selbst schwanken zwischen der Ableitung aus ‘*awā*, heulen, jaulen’ (und sehen hier vier bzw. fünf Hunde, die hinter dem Löwen herbellen) oder ‘*awā*, biegen’ (weil die Figur am unteren Ende umgebogen sei).” Kunitzsch (1961, 45). See also Kunitzsch (1959, 53-57; 78).

⁸⁴ “Thron des unbewaffneten *simāk*’. Ibn Qutayba 62, 11 (bei den unter Mondstation 14 mitbehandelten Sternen): *arba‘at kawākib bayna yaday as-simāk al-a‘zal munḥadira ‘anhu fī l-ġanūb murabba‘a ‘alā šūrat an-na‘š*, Vier Sterne vor *as-simāk al-a‘zal* [= α Virginis], schräg unterhalb im Süden im Viereck, wie die Form von *an-na‘š* [$\alpha\beta\gamma\delta$ Ursae Maioris]’; auch erwähnt 73, 5. Šūfī 321, 4 (Yehuda XLII, 3; auch 313, 5) identifiziert sie kurzerhand mit dem gesamten ptolemäischen Bild Rabe, das aus sieben Sternen besteht; genauer sind jedoch die vier Sterne $\theta\gamma\delta\epsilon$ Corvi gemeint.” Kunitzsch (1961, 44).

⁸⁵ I could not identify the poet.

Together, they took possession with their superiority of the throne of the kings without force.

Ibn al-A'rābī said: 'We do not know the verb *istawà* meaning *istawlà*.'

It is possible that the pronoun in his speech (Q 7:54) "Then he mounted the throne" refers to the *nomen verbi* which the verb *ḥalaqa* (to create) denotes: 'Then his creation settled upon the throne'. The same applies to the verse (Q 20:5) "The Merciful is mounted upon the throne". The accord of the pronoun in the utterance '*istawà*' with the noun '*al-rahmān*' is not mandatory, since it is possible that *al-rahmān* is a predicate of an elided inchoative and that the pronoun in the verb *istawà* refers to the creation (*ḥalq*) understood from his words (Q 20:4) "As a sending down from the One who created the earth and the heavens" (*tanzīlan mim-man ḥalaqa l-arḍa wa-l-samāwāti l-'ulà*). This is to say 'He is the merciful whose creation came to an end with the throne'. For he is the almighty, when he stated the creation of the heavens and the earth, he did it to state that he is bigger, greater, and wider than the heavens and the earth. This is what is possible about '*arṣ*', *istawà*, and the 'returning' pronoun.

The accord of the verse with its literal meaning is not mandatory and this is due to the rational evidence (*dalā'il 'aqliyya*) they have provided about its impossibility.

Al-Ḥasan said: 'He elevated his authority'. Mālik b. Anas asked a man about this verse, the man said: 'How did he sit?' Mālik bowed his head for a while because of the sweat of fever, then replied: 'The *istiwā*' is well known but how [it happens] is not rationally understandable (*ḡayr ma'qūl*) and having faith in it is mandatory, while asking about it is a heresy. (Abū Ḥayyān, *Tafsīr*, 4:310-311)

What immediately makes us reconnect the commentary of Abū Ḥayyān to a point of view tending to *Zāhirism* is the importance that he attributes to the authorities of early Islam, especially to the companions of the prophet, who are cited as the source of Koranic hermeneutics. What interests us in this excerpt is not the enumeration of the different interpretative theories, which do not differ much from the commentaries seen so far, but the more lexicological approach to the issue posed by the verb *istawà* and the noun '*arṣ*'. To sum up, he considers different possibilities, in the order: a) That the verb *istawà* is to be considered in its meaning of 'being settled' (*istiqrār*), and that this action is an attribute of the divine essence; b) That one must believe in this action of God as a dogma, in that the intended meaning is not

graspable by man. This will also be the point with which Abū Ḥayyān concludes the explanation of (Q 7:54) by stating the *bi-lā kayfa* principle on the authority of Mālik b. Anas; c) That the verb is a particular action that God performs on the *‘arš*, in this case similar to the vision of Ibn Ḥazm; d) The noun *‘arš* is actually the *maṣḍar* of a verb that means ‘to build’, and therefore the action can probably be interpreted as an act concluding the divine creation. In no case, however, must this action be put in relation to a spatialisation of God, whose rational denial is maintained by the author referring to the rational argumentation provided by Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.

That said, Abū Ḥayyān’s comment presents two interesting points for our analysis. The first is a lexicological approach to the question, while the second is a syntactic approach.

In the first case, the author clearly states that the words *‘arš* and *istawà* are *muštaraka* words, i.e. words that have polysemy and/or homonymy as an intrinsic characteristic. To demonstrate this property, he refers not only to the divine word, but also to the corpus of the poetic tradition. If we observe the progression of meanings and examples that Abū Ḥayyān provides for the word *‘arš*, we note that it is the same progression given, for example, in *Lisān* (s.v. ‘ r š). It is obvious that, due to the very nature of the dictionary, the *Lisān* provides a greater number of meanings and *loci* which Abū Ḥayyān summarises. Therefore, the first meaning reported by both is that of ‘throne’ (*sarīr al-malik*), and in both cases this meaning is supported by Koranic verses: in Abū Ḥayyān, (Q 12:100), referring to the story of Joseph, and (Q 27:41), referring to the story of the Queen of Sheba and Solomon. The second meaning reported in the *Tafsīr* is that of ‘covering’ (*saqf*), while the more general meaning of *bayt* reported in *Lisān* is not mentioned. The meaning of ‘sovereignty’ (*mulk*) follows – and also synonyms such as *sulṭān* and *‘izz* – for which Abū Ḥayyān proposes a line by Zuhayr and a line probably by al-Asadī. The central expression of the line that conveys the sense of sovereignty and might is the phrase *tulla ‘aršu-hu*, which is a proverbial expression cited in the major paremiological collections. For example, this phrase is glossed *zāla qiwām amri-hi* (the subsistence of his authority ceased) in both al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Mustaqṣà*, 2:34) and in *Lisān*, while it is glossed *wa-l-murād ḡahaba ‘izzu-hu wa-sā’at ḡālu-hu wa-l-‘arš yuṭlaqu ‘alā l-sarīr wa-‘alā l-bayt min al-‘aydān* (the intended meaning is: his might ceased and his condition

deteriorated. The *‘arš* is said meaning the throne or the abode made from hard palm wood) in al-Maydānī (*Arabum*, 1:267-268) and al-Aḥḍab (*Farā’id*, 1:129).⁸⁶ Although not explicitly mentioned in the sources, it is clear that the process by which the word *‘arš* acquires the meaning of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘might’ is of a metonymic type, according to the principle that the effect, i.e. being seated on a throne, expresses the cause, i.e. sovereignty and power, as we have already seen in al-Suyūṭī. Finally, Abū Ḥayyān mentions three last meanings of the word *‘arš*. The first is related to the building of a well denoting its wooden part; the second is related to astronomy and denotes the name of a star or a group of stars; and the third is related to anatomy and denotes a part of the foot.

Abū Ḥayyān’s second lexicological overview concerns the verb *istawà*. In this case, his progression also follows that found in *Lisān*. He does not report all the meanings recorded in the dictionary, but lists five, two of which are interesting for our purposes. Both are meanings that we have already encountered in the works of other authors. The first is ‘being settled’ (*istiqrār*), while the second is ‘to possess, to take possession’ (*istawlà*), for which he quotes a line of an anonymous poet. However, unlike other sources, he reports the judgment also mentioned in *Lisān* of Ibn al- A’rābī (d. ca. 231/846), for whom the meaning *istawlà* assigned to the verb *istawà* is not recorded in the Arabic language.

Abū Ḥayyān’s second approach is syntactic. He suggests a different reading of the verse involving the elimination of any reference to the *tašbīh* by simply linking a different subject to the verb *istawà*. To understand this step better, we must also consider the initial part of the verse and not only the phrase that we have analysed so far: (Q 7:54) “Surely your Lord is God, who created the heavens and the earth in six days. Then He mounted the throne” (*inna rabba-kumu llāhu llaḍī ḥalaqa l-samāwāti wa-l-arḍa fī sittati ayyāmin tumma stawà ‘alà l-‘arši*). Abū Ḥayyān suggests that the pronoun of the verb *istawà*, which is elided in this form, refers to the *maṣḍar* of the verb *ḥalaqa* (to create) uttered in the first phrase, i.e. *al-ḥalq* (the creation). According to Abū Ḥayyān, this reading is also possible in another Koranic passage, namely in (Q 20:4-5), where the depiction of the creation of the heavens and the

⁸⁶ For a longer description of the proverb and more *loci*, see al-Šaybī (*Timtāl*, 2:405-406).

earth immediately precedes God's sitting upon the throne. If we consider (Q 7:54), the substitution of the pronoun's referent of the verb from *huwa*/Allāh to *ḥalq* is possible, but from the syntactic point of view it is not entirely convincing. This is because, though possible, assigning as a new referent of the verb a noun that, as such, does not appear in the text is counterintuitive at least. The same problem of counterintuitivity is found in (Q 20:4-5), where not only must we assume for the verb *istawà* a different agent with respect to the more obvious noun *al-raḥmān*, but we must also justify the nominative inflection of this noun. The hypothesis presented by Abū Ḥayyān is that the noun *al-raḥmān* is actually a *ḥabar* referring to an elided *mubtada'*. It follows that the verb *istawà* should refer to an elided *nomen verbis* which is inferred from a previously uttered verb, while *al-raḥmān* would refer to an '*huwa*' also elided.⁸⁷ This is quite clumsy. The resulting reading is close to what was stated earlier by Ibn Ḥazm, who argued that this action can be seen as the last action in the series of actions with which God gave life to his creation: namely, the throne is the seal of the creation itself, the last of the created things.

This passage, together with the enumeration of the various meanings of the words '*arṣ*' and *istawà*, is what links Abū Ḥayyān's discourse to the Zāhirite school and his predecessor Ibn Ḥazm, without however making him an absolute supporter of this school. In fact, despite being a former Zāhirite, Abū Ḥayyān shows few or very few of the characteristics of the Zāhirite *maḏhab*. This is evident from the conclusion to the comment on this part of verse (Q 7:54), where he reaffirms the rational inconsistency of wanting to accept a literal reading of the verse. He does not give any particular explanations, but he might well be referring to what Ibn Ḥazm and Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī had previously expressed. The passage concludes with a quotation from Mālik b. Anas, one that will form the basis of the *bi-lā kayfa* theory.

Although Abū Ḥayyān expressed a clear interpretative position regarding anthropomorphism proper, we should note that we cannot find the same attitude regarding the verses on the throne. As we have seen in the commentary, Abū Ḥayyān does not take a real position, and nor can we say beyond any reasonable doubt that he embraces Zāhirite theories. However, he does not fully reject them, either.

⁸⁷ Cf. the explanation of (Q 20:4-5) in Abū Ḥayyān (*Tafsīr*, 6:214).

Indeed, he somehow leaves things open, perhaps inclining towards what he prefers and has expressed using the arguments of syntax, a science in which he was the master of his time.

3.3.3 al-Maqrīzī

Unlike the previous two authors, al-Maqrīzī is not mainly known as a theologian or a jurist, although he still had a profound knowledge of theology due to his study of Islamic sciences. He was a historian and his works are of fundamental importance both for the quantity of data that he presented and for the precision with which he presented them. But how can a historical work help us to approach the question of *mutašābihāt* in the Koran? Al-Maqrīzī focuses in *al-Mawā'iz wa-l-i'tibār fī dīkr al-ḥiṭaṭ wa-l-aṭār* (commonly known as *al-Ḥiṭaṭ*) on the history of Egypt and in particular of Cairo, especially from an urbanistic and architectural point of view. He also devotes two very detailed chapters of this work to the juridical and theological schools which had spread in the Egyptian land from the Islamic conquest until the diffusion and final adoption of the Aš'arite *maḏhab*. His treatise is very interesting because it describes in detail even those currents and schools of thought that had limited success, including those whose thought was and still is considered heterodox. From this point of view, al-Maqrīzī's work can be considered a reasoned exposition of the theological-judicial theories that had preceded him, and this can help us understand what an author of the fifteenth century thought of Zāhirism. An interesting trait of his approach is precisely that it provides us with an overview of his predecessors' theories and interpretations, as can be seen in this excerpt:

The Aš'arites are called the *ṣifātiyya* because of their affirmation of the eternal attributes (*ṣifāt*) of God. Then, they are divided about the expressions occurring in the book and the *sunna* – e.g. the *istiwā'*, the *nuzūl* (the descending), the *aṣbu'* (finger), the *yad* (hand), the *qadam* (foot), the *ṣūra* (form), the *ḡanb* (side), and the *maḡī'* (the coming) – into two groups. One group interprets all of that in different ways admitted by the expression. The other did not address the interpretation, nor resulted in *tašbīh*; they are called 'the *aṭarī* Aš'arites' (*al-aš'ariyya l-aṭariyya*).

On this topic (i.e. God's attributes), Muslims have five opinions. The first is the strong adherence to what is understood as it is in the common language. The second is the absolute abstention from speaking about them. The third is the abstention from speaking about them after denying that the meaning intention is the literal meaning. The fourth is to ascribe them to the *mağāz*. The fifth is to ascribe them to homonymy/polysemy (*ištirāk*). Each group argues with evidence and proof contained in the books of *uṣūl al-dīn*. (al-Maqrīzī, *Ḥiṭaṭ*, 4:446)

This excerpt embodies all the points of view and the different ways of interpreting that we have seen so far in this chapter. It is important to point out that al-Maqrīzī does not name the Zāhirite school in his list. A first and simple explanation is that, since the Zāhirite school never really took root in Egypt and has never played a leading role in theological-juridical discussions in Egypt over the centuries, it would have been pointless to mention it in a work focused on the history of Cairo and Egypt. A second explanation is that al-Maqrīzī intentionally refrains from mentioning the Zāhirite school so that, assuming that his Zāhirite sympathies were real, he does not have somehow to express his predilection towards it.

We can identify the following schools of thought in al-Maqrīzī's description: 1) the anthropomorphists, 2) the prophet's companions and the first Muslims, 3) those supporting the *bi-lā kayfa* principle, 4) the Mu'tazila, and 5) the Zāhirites. The fifth cannot be deemed completely valid and proven. As we have seen, Ibn Ḥazm, the only true Zāhirite of the three authors dealt with in this chapter, does not present a homogeneous treatment of divine attributes, but seems to assert convincingly that words denoting a divine attribute are often polysemic or homonymic, which is why the first meaning, the one most commonly used, is not always the one applicable in interpreting some passages of *mutašābihāt*. If we also see Abū Ḥayyān not as a real Zāhirite, but as a scholar who at least absorbed some Zāhirite ideas, we can notice a certain interest in his *Tafsīr* in providing an overview of the multiple meanings of an equivocal word, as is the case, for example, with the words *'arṣ* and *istawā*. We can therefore reasonably hypothesise that an explanation on the basis of polysemy and homonymy is closer to Zāhirite thought than it is to Aš'arite or Mu'tazilite thought. This is because Zāhirite thought greatly limits, if not completely rejects, drawing on

figurative language. The concept of polysemy and homonymy ascribes to a word more specific/proper meanings and does not derive them through a figurative process, thereby justifying a Zāhirite reading that is based on the exoteric form of the utterance and that does not have to draw on explanations based on figurative language. This, for example, is what Ibn Ḥazm does in his interpretation of *riġl* and *qadam*. However, the question now is why this alternative to the *ḥaqīqa/mağāz* dichotomy was really never adopted in theological works. Al-Maqrīzī's answer is very clear:

Those who affirm God's attributes strongly denied that they compare the loftiness of God to the bodies either literally or figuratively. They knew, however, that this utterance comprehends words used in an alternative way for both the creator and his creatures and they avoided calling them *muštaraka* (homonym/polysemic, 'shared words'), because God has no *šarīk* (associate). For this reason, the *salaf* (early Muslims) did not interpret anything of the accounts about the divine attributes. We know it definitely that for the *salaf* the divine attributes diverged from what the beliefs of the ignorant people understand regarding their resemblance to the attributes of the creatures.⁸⁸ (al-Maqrīzī, *Hiṭaṭ*, 4:448)

I shall emphasise two things in this excerpt. The first is that, according to al-Maqrīzī, the exegetes were reticent in using the word *ištirāk* because they were aware that a given word (for example, 'hand' (*yad*)) can refer to both God and the human being, but that to admit that it is *muštaraka* would open the way to the 'association' of the creature to the creator, which is pure heresy since God has no *šarīk* (associate). It is my opinion that in this precise passage al-Maqrīzī refers with the word *muštaraka* to the property of a word that can be assigned both to the creator and to the creature, and not to the abstract concept of polysemy and homonymy. This justifies the attitude of the *salaf* described by al-Maqrīzī, according to whom they did not interpret the sacred word, but merely accepted it as it was revealed.

The second is that al-Maqrīzī adopts an attitude very similar to that of Ibn Ḥazm, who pointed out that the *salaf* did not need to interpret the divine word, as nothing was hidden from them and there was nothing that they did not understand. They guarded

⁸⁸ Cf. Goldziher (1884, 200).

themselves from attributing an anthropomorphic appearance to God, as al-Maqrīzī reports:

The truth about which there is no doubt is that God's religion is *ẓāhir* (exoteric) without any *bāṭin* (esoteric meaning), and there is no secret beneath the substance (*ḡawhar*). It is mandatory for everyone, without any indulgence. God's messenger did not hide even a single word of the *šarī'a*, and nor did he reveal [only] to the people close to him – being them the wife or the cousin – anything of the *šarī'a*, which he hid to the white or the black man, nor to the common shepherds. He had no secret, and nor did he express himself by allegory. There is no *bāṭin* other than what summoned all the people to him. If he had hidden anything, he would not have delivered the message that he had been ordered to deliver. Whoever claims it, he is an unbeliever by unanimous agreement of the community of the believers. The origin of every innovation (*bid'a*) in religion is to move away from the words of the *salaf* and deviate from the faith of the early period of Islam.⁸⁹ (al-Maqrīzī, *Ḥiṭaṭ*, 4:449)

This is a clear statement which links al-Maqrīzī to Ẓāhirite thought and to Ibn Ḥazm's view, and puts him among the partisans of Ẓāhirism, for which there is no need to interpret the divine word since nothing can be concealed within. The proof that he advances is based on the fact that the revelation is in clear Arabic, so there is no need to resort to the stratagems of figurative language. Furthermore, to affirm the presence of an esoteric meaning would be tantamount to accusing the prophet of not having transmitted the revelation as it had been sent to him, and of concealing some of it from the community, making it a prerogative of a small circle of people. Now, it is evident that both al-Maqrīzī and Ẓāhirism acknowledge the importance of the *salaf*, with al-Maqrīzī attributing to them complete understanding of the revealed word. Every disagreement with their thought, e.g. an esoteric interpretation or an interpretation strongly conditioned by the recourse to figurative language, can only be a *bid'a* and must therefore be rejected.

3.4 Conclusions

⁸⁹ Cf. Goldziher (1884, 201).
Luca Rizzo

I have discussed in this chapter the relevant sources on Koranic *tawriya* and how theologians and scholars of rhetoric approached the Koranic *mutašābihāt*. I have enumerated a large number of sources to show that the decision made by many rhetorical treatises to place the two Koranic verses (Q 39:67) and (Q 20:5) in their chapter on *tawriya* was based on arguments encompassing the religious and linguistic sciences, so that to define these verses as a *tawriya* also means embracing both a rhetorical-stylistic and a purely theological analysis, both of which are essential to the other.

Therefore, what might seem a mere list of texts containing the most varied theological-rhetorical opinions is but the demonstration of how *tawriya* developed not only through derivation from poetic studies, with Rašīd al-Dīn al-Waṭwāṭ (d. 578/1181-2) and Usāma b. Munqid (d. 584/1188), who laid the foundations for the future development of *tawriya*, being the pioneers here, but also through study of the Koranic word. I have shown how *tawriya* solved an 'issue' already faced by most theologians: how to interpret the Koranic *mutašābihāt*. In fact, before Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī proposed including (Q 39:67) among the *loci* of the figure *ihām*, many explained these verses by applying different rhetorical devices and semantic derivations. This is summarised in Table 1.

1. 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī (d. 471/1078)
(Q 39:67): **tamṭīl**. Utterance must be *ḥaqīqa*,
maġāz engenders from it through the *maṭal*.
(Q 20:5): **∅**. Interpretation must cross
the literal meaning.

2. al-Zamaḥṣarī (d. 538/1144)
(Q 39:67): **taḥyīl**. Neither *ḥaqīqa*, nor *maġāz*,
image evocation in the reader engendering
a *maġāz* sense of the utterance.

al-Zamaḥṣarī (d. 538/1144)
(Q 20:5): **kināya**. *Istiwā'* > *mulk* like
yad mabsūṭa > *ġūd* without
taṣawwur of the hand.

Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209)
(Q 20:5): **kināya**. *Istiwā'* > *istilā'* = *iqtidār*.

Ibn al-Zamlākānī (d. 651/1253)
(Q 39:67): **taḥyīl**.

al-Zanġānī (d. 660/1261-2)
(Q 39:67): **ihām** ≈ *taḥyīl*.

al-Qazwīnī (d. 739/1338)
(Q 39:67): **muġāz murakkab**.

Bahā' al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 773/1371-2)
(Q 39:67): **maġāz murakkab** = **tamṭīl**:
components *ḥaqīqa*, result *maġāz*. The intention
(*irāda*) is in the content of the sentence (*ifāda*).

al-Taftāzānī (d. 793/1390)
(Q 20:5): **tawriya**. **Tamṭīl** (*sic!*) and **kināya**
(Q 51:47): **tawriya**. *Tamṭīl* = *taḥyīl*. No *taṣawwur*

Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064)
qadam: foot and ancestor **A and B**
riġl: foot and group of people **A and B**
(Q20:5): **istiwā'** **A and B**

3. Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209)
(Q 39:67): **∅** [*Tafsīr*], **ihām** [*Nihāya*]. *Ḥaqīqa*
and *maġāz* not mutually exclusive for a lack
of *dalīl*: *bi-lā-kayfa* principle.

al-Sakkākī (d. 626/1229)
(Q 39:67): **ihām**.
Istī'āra taḥyīliyya. (Q 20:5): **ihām**.

Rukn al-Dīn al-Ġurġānī (d. 729/1329)
(Q 51:47): **tawriya**.
(Q 20:5): **tawriya**. *Ma'nā qarīb* > *ḥaqīqa*,
ma'nā ba'īd > *maġāz*. *Qarīna 'aqliyya* and
rational transfer.

al-Qazwīnī (d. 739/1338)
(Q 20:5): **tawriya**.

Abū Ḥayyān al-Ġarnāṭī (d. 745/1344)
(Q 20:5): *istawā* and *'arš* are **muštaraka: A and B**

al-Šafadī (d. 764/1363)
(Q 20:5): **tawriya**.

Bahā' al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 773/1371-2)
(Q 20:5): **tawriya**.

al-Ru'aynī I-Ġarnāṭī (d. 779/1377)
(Q 20:5): **tawriya**.
(Q 51:47): **tawriya**.

al-Maqrīzī (d. 845/1442)
muštaraka words: used for both God and humans.

al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505)
(Q 20:5): **tawriya** through **kināya**.
(Q 39:67): **kināya**.
(Q 51:47): **tawriya** through **kināya**.

4. Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064)
yad and *'ayn* = God: **A = B**
yamīn > the best: **A > B**
istī'āra

Abū Ḥayyān al-Ġarnāṭī (d. 745/1344)
(Q 5:64): **istī'āra yad mabsūṭa** > *gūd*

Table 1

This Table organises the authors into four macro-sets divided into the four vertical columns representing the four models of analysis to which all the authors presented in this chapter belong. The first column represents the model headed by ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī, who took (Q 39:67) as his object of analysis, and was the first to provide an interpretation based on a rhetorical device: *tamtīl*. The other two authors who embraced the analysis of ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī are al-Qazwīnī and Bahā’ al-Dīn al-Subkī, who adopted the *maġāz murakkab* as an interpretative key for (Q 39:67). We can see in these three authors a real school of thought that develops the idea that the components of the utterance have their specific semantic value, i.e. their proper meanings (*ḥaqīqa*), the sum of which results in the enunciative intention (*irāda*): namely, the figurative (*maġāz*) content of the sentence. This is the essential peculiarity of ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī’s *tamtīl*, i.e. the fact that the individual elements are *ḥaqīqa*, while the *maġāz* sense is the meaning of the utterance given by the sum of the single terms and through the mediation of a *maṭal*, i.e. of a metaphorical image capable of creating in the reader an image conveying the intended meaning.

If we turn our attention to the second column of the Table, we note that al-Zamaḥṣarī offers a very similar analysis to that of ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī, with a small but fundamental difference. If for the former the individual terms have their *ḥaqīqa* meaning, for the latter they have neither their *ḥaqīqa* meaning nor their *maġāz* sense. The essential difference between Ġurġānian *tamtīl* and Zamaḥṣarian *tahyīl* lies in this very point. For al-Zamaḥṣarī, the only truly conceivable meaning of the utterance is its overall meaning, as it was also for ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī, given through the evocation in the reader of an image. Other authors will refer to this second approach of analysis, bringing nothing innovative to the theoretical discussion on this point. The only author who united the thoughts of ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī and al-Zamaḥṣarī was al-Taftāzānī. This scholar, although aiming to comment on al-Qazwīnī’s *Talḥīṣ*, gave an explanation of (Q 20:5) and (Q 39:67) taking up the words of al-Zamaḥṣarī, to whom, however, he attributes the definition *tamtīl* belonged to ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī. That is why in the Table he is ranged in a median position between his two predecessors.

Why, then, did this substantial similarity of analysis give way to *tawriya*? The reason is to be found in the work of Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Theologian and scholar of rhetoric, he is the originator of the third current of interpretation. He placed (Q 39:67) in the *īhām* chapter of (*Nihāya*) for essentially theological reasons, although in his Koranic commentary he does not use the word *īhām*. As the text of the *Tafsīr* shows, Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī does not support the version of his predecessors, for whom the only really intended meaning is the figurative one. Rather, he, so to speak, leaves the question open by using the theological principle of *bi-lā kayfa*, which also has repercussions on the level of rhetorical interpretation of the Koranic utterance. As a matter of fact, the rational undecidability of the nature of ambiguous words due to the lack of a *dalīl* results in a rhetorical ambiguity which can only be expressed through *tawriya*. By this, I mean that the ‘theological ambiguity’ whereby it cannot be incontrovertibly asserted that *yamīn* does not have a proper meaning – stressing however that one should not incur in *tašbīh* – results in a ‘semantic ambiguity’ expressed through *tawriya*, i.e. a figure which juxtaposes two meanings, but which does not lead to the mutual exclusion of them, allowing the existence of both within the utterance. This is the characteristic of *tawriya*: although the enunciative intention is aimed specifically at one of the two meanings of the word or phrase, it does not exclude a priori the fact that the other meaning could also be somehow actualised within the utterance. We can therefore attribute a real interpretative turn to Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. But is that really the case?

If we had to rely on what al-Taftāzānī said, the Zāhirite school would have suggested a similar explanation, which, although not enunciated as *tawriya*, suggested the presence of homonymous/polysemic words on which the interpretation of the whole utterance depended. As the Table shows, Ibn Ḥazm suggested that there is homonymy only for some specific cases: namely, specific words have a meaning A and a meaning B. However, the essential difference is that for Ibn Ḥazm the two meanings involved are mutually exclusive within the Koranic utterance. For example, although the word *riġl* has at least two meanings, i.e. foot and a group of people, it can have one and only one in this specific utterance, since one of the two meanings would lead to anthropomorphism, which is obviously unacceptable in Ibn Ḥazm’s eyes. He applies the same analysis to the action *istiwā’*, arguing that for this verb

more meanings are possible, but that rationality prevents applying the meaning that designates an action pertaining to created bodies. Once again, we face the principle of a mutually exclusive homonymy, and we therefore cannot speak for Ibn Ḥazm of an ante litteram *tawriya*, since the two different meanings of the homonym are not at play in understanding the text. It follows that, although a word, e.g. *riġl*, bears the meanings A and B, there is when it is applied to the Koranic utterance not a conjunction of meanings, but an absolute disjunction of the type A or B.

The difference between the approach taken by these two authors therefore seems to be based on the principle of mutual exclusion of the meanings of the homonymous word, which becomes all the clearer when we consider Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's analysis of (Q 20:5). Al-Rāzī embraces al-Zamaḥṣarī's analysis and explains the line of the throne through the use of *kināya* and not *ihām*, which, I think, is mainly because he provides a detailed rational explanation that renders inapplicable one of the two possible meanings of the verb *istawà*. If he had placed (Q 20:5) in the *ihām* chapter, he would have laid the foundations for excluding one of the possible meanings of the sentence, and specifically the literal meaning. Instead, he adopts the Zamaḥṣarian view, which claims that there is no *taḥyīl* in this verse, i.e. there is no metaphorical image formed in the reader's mind, but instead a simple metonymic process by which the effect means its cause.

In my opinion, this is the essential point which demonstrates how the approach to the revealed text influenced the development of *tawriya*, a development which saw al-Sakkākī as the first author to bring these traditions together. He was the first and only to quote (Q 39:67) and (Q 20:5) together in the *ihām* chapter of his treatise. From then on, *tawriya* began to assume its definitive formulation, especially in the contributions of his successors, until its final formulation in which the two meanings of the *tawriya*-word can be both *ḥaqīqa*, both *maġāz*, or one *ḥaqīqa* and the other *maġāz*. In the same way, we can witness in the works of the later authors the replacement of (Q 39:67) with (Q 51:67), the latter suggesting the applicability of the only sense *maġāz*, since the *ḥaqīqa* meaning, 'hands' (*aydin*), would be too close to anthropomorphism. This shows how in the later authors there is a clearer division of what can be considered *tawriya* and what not. For example, if we take al-Qazwīnī and his commentator Bahā' al-Dīn al-Subkī, we notice two things. On the one hand, how

the concept of *tawriya* develops mainly on the fact that single words or short phrases, such as in (Q 20:5) and (Q 51:67), become increasingly linked to the concept of *ištirāk*, which will form the basis of al-Şafadī's theory of *tawriya*. And, on the other, that verse (Q 39:67) is structurally more articulated in that it involves a process of complex semantic derivation and a greater commitment on the part of the reader. Therefore, this verse preserves its status as *tamṭīl-mağāz murakkab*. The inclusion of (Q 20:5) in *tawriya* marks the incorporation of the *mağāz* as a derivative method for the second meaning of the *muštarak* word. This is the precise difference between Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later authors, i.e. the fact that the *ḥaqīqa* meaning of (Q 20:5), excluded by al-Rāzī, is instead the point of departure of *tawriya* in later authors, not because it can be applied to God, but because it engenders in the reader the understanding of the second *mağāz* meaning through a process not of *tamṭīl-taḥyīl*, but of *kināya* – as can be seen, for example, in al-Suyūṭī's work.

What conclusions can be drawn from this investigation?

The first is that each author adopted a heterogeneous set of methods of analysis, based above all on their theological affiliations and backgrounds. This can be seen most clearly in the difference that we observed between the Mu'tazilite, the Aš'arite, and the Zāhirite adherents, who provided contrasting explanations for the same issues, which of course is a matter of how their theological creeds influenced their thoughts. On the one hand, the Mu'tazilites allowed to reasoning a wider interpretative space in their theological argumentations than the Zāhirites. The former used the figurative interpretation of the Koranic word, permitting a less strict approach based on the difference between *ḥaqīqa* and *mağāz*, while the latter rejected or strictly limited the figurative interpretation, asserting that the sacred text is fundamentally transparent – at least for the prophet and for those *salaf* to whom the Koran was revealed. On the other, the Aš'arites are in the middle, since they argue that a figurative interpretation is justified in those cases where a literal understanding of the holy scripture would lead to a meaning that a rational and apodictic demonstration could prove to be untenable, i.e. the *dalīl* that we saw in Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's exposition of (Q 20:5). It is clear that a different theological interpretation often results in a different rhetorical interpretation.

The second conclusion is that a series of ambiguous verses interpreted in different ways can be classified under a single rhetorical figure capable of accounting for all their possible nuances of meaning. Indeed, the different opinions regarding the figures of speech at play in these verses are all based on the dissolution of a semantic ambiguity through the use of figures based on the semantic shift from one level to another. The first level is that of the literality of the text as it is perceived by the reader, while the second is the semantic level hidden under literality, a level accessible only through the interpretation of the previous meaning, which returns a different, figurative sense. These two levels are interdependent. The transition from the first to the second takes place through a process of decoding of the intended message by means of a metaphorical or metonymic derivation, which connects the two levels of the discourse inferentially. Thus, for example, the enunciation of the words *qabḍa* and *yamīn* in (Q 39:67) contrasts the levels of literal meaning and figurative sense, i.e. the literal meanings 'grip' and 'right hand' are contrasted with the figurative meaning of 'God's power'. This is similar to the act of sitting on a throne, where the literal meaning of the utterance in (Q 20:5) takes the reader to the figurative sense of 'divine sovereignty over creation'.

Tawriya is therefore equivocal not only because it is based on the ambiguity of a word or phrase, but also because of how it functions. Or, rather, *tawriya* is equivocal in its being equivocal, since its ambiguity can be a semantic derivation developed through the use of other rhetorical devices which exploit the proper meaning to create a figurative sense. For example, the fact that the right hand of God connotes his 'power' is nothing more than a metonymic derivation of the initial denotation 'hand', and the same reasoning can be applied to the action of sitting on a throne. This derivation removes *tawriya* from the theories outlined by 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī and al-Zamaḥṣarī, leading it to its 'canonical' form. Moreover, *tawriya* allows us to explain the Koranic *mutaṣābihāt* in different terms than the mere dichotomy *ḥaqīqa* and *maġāz*. Besides being an ambiguous figure, the peculiarity of the *tawriya* is that it is a figure based on the double perception of the reader. This is another reason why this figure is particularly suited to being applied to ambiguous lines, since it is not only the homonymous nature of the word that is in question, but also the perception that the reader has of the expression. The focal point of *tawriya* is therefore the

reader's perception of the first, obvious meaning, which hides a second meaning, the meaning intended by the enunciator. In poetry, this results in an 'incorrect' perception on the part of the reader, which, after the reader has disclosed the intended meaning, leads in turn to the aesthetic enjoyment of the work of art. When it comes to the divine word, the perception of the first meaning is functional to understanding the second, i.e. to understanding the real value of the divine word. This is the very reason that *tawriya* became the 'umbrella' figure for heterogeneous figures and interpretations, ranged in the superordinate category of ambiguity.

4. *Tawriya* and poetry: a selection and study of *tawriya*-epigrams

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I intend to collect a representative sample of epigrams in which *tawriya* is the focal point of the narrative.¹ All epigrams are composed by authors who lived in the Mamluk era, particularly in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Why, then, should we choose the epigram and why authors of the Mamluk era to represent the functioning of *tawriya*?

As already pointed out by van Gelder (2012e), the epigram was a literary form used mainly from the early Abbasid period as a short and independent composition, and did not necessarily indicate a certain number of lines extrapolated from a longer composition – as the names *maqṭūʿ*, *maqṭūʿa* and *qitʿā* wrongly suggest. In a series of articles, Bauer (2003b; 2005b; 2007d; 2008c; 2013a) describes in minute detail how the literary form of the ‘epigram’ (*maqṭūʿ* pl. *maqāṭīʿ*) saw an unprecedented flowering precisely in the Ayyubid and Mamluk eras, when the first anthologies of epigrams – composed by a single author, or as thematic collections including poems by multiple authors – were composed and published. The first author to collect his own epigrams, which he wrote as stand-alone poems and did not extrapolate from longer compositions, and to order them thematically was Ibn Nubāta l-Miṣrī (d. 768/1366), who was followed by other authors such as Ibn Ḥābīb (d. 779/1377) and Ṣafī l-Dīn al-Ḥillī (d. 749/1348) (Bauer, 2008c). The reason why the epigram spread is not to be found in a simple passing fashion. Rather, as Bauer (2013a) argues, it is to be found in the nature of the epigram as a highly communicative form. In particular,

¹ With the term *narrative*, I refer to the French term *récit* as it was defined by Barthes ([1966] 1981), Bremond ([1966] 1981), Morin ([1966] 1981), and Genette ([1966] 1981), and as it will be subsumed in the definition of *text* provided by Marrone (2001; 2010). Although they are poetic texts, they share with other narrative texts the characteristic of presenting a Narrative Schema and an Actantial structure. Moreover, we can obtain a narrative sequence, a Fabula, even from non-narrative texts as already pointed out and described by Eco ([1979] 2006, 105-107).

he provides three specific reasons for its success. First, the epigram stimulates the production of other epigrams in both an oral and written context, creating a series of participated texts. Second, it is based on the interpretative cooperation of the literary text. In fact, in order to achieve its communicative purpose, each epigram requires the decoding effort of the reader, who must possess the necessary knowledge to interpret the text, as described by Eco ([1962] 2006; [1979] 2006; 1994). Third, precisely because of its communicative purpose, the epigram is linked to the extra-linguistic context of its enunciation, a peculiarity which is revealed in the language used in epigrams, i.e. a language that belongs to the social context of the person who utters it or of the person to whom it is addressed. These three reasons demonstrate how the essence of the epigram as a ‘pointed’ text is closely linked to the context of enunciation, one that reflects the changes in society in the post-Abbasid era, i.e. the participation of many more social classes in literary production and consumption, and the social mobility which mirrors an increased access to education for middle-class members of society (Behrens-Abouseif, 2011), (Herzog, 2013).² The result is what Bauer (2005b, 108) calls a “process of ulamaization of adab” and “adabization of ulama” on the one hand, and the opening up of the literary art to classes of craftsmen and professionals, to the “*Bürgertum*”, on the other (Bauer, 2013a, 7).

Another reason why the epigram is the literary form that I have chosen for my analysis is that it is a short text of a maximum of six lines, and contains a finished or finishable Narrative Schema. In a recent work, Talib (2018) has argued that most epigrams are based on a specific narrative structure: “*Maqāṭīʿ* begin with a proposition (or premise), which is then developed and fleshed out, and by the end of the poem, usually at the very end (the point), the premise is resolved, often with a witty turn of phrase (resolution)” (Talib, 2018, 23). This structure makes them particularly suitable for the use of the figure *tawriya*, which normally constitutes its final point, revealing its ambiguous semantic content in a double reading of the text, i.e. the reader’s discovery of alternative interpretations within the same text. But not only. As we will see in this chapter, and even more closely in the next chapter, *tawriya*

² On the other hand, Perho (2011) argues that social mobility was actually very limited, and only a few people born as commoners attained high ranks and became part of the ‘nobility’.

can give rise to multiple readings of the text through the development into the text of other texts engendered from the *tawriya*-word. Or, a *tawriya* can play on the level of a text embedded into another. This is the phenomenon defined by Genette (1982, 8) as intertextuality (Fr. Intertextualité).³ Moreover, the choice of the epigram is also justified by the need to find a short poetic form in order to be able to afford a greater sampling of texts, genres, and literary motifs, to give an account of the *tawriya*-literature of that time as accurately as possible, even in the awareness that this is only one of the many expressive means of literature.

For these reasons, the selection of epigrams that I present in this chapter will try to depict the *tawriya*-literature of the Mamluk era as fully as possible. Without pretending to analyse in depth each specific sub-genre and motif, I hope to provide the reader with a reliable guide to understand and appreciate the use of the figure *tawriya* in this specific poetic form. Furthermore, I will focus on the experience that the reader of that time had when enjoying a *tawriya*-epigram.

The selection, translation, and analysis of the epigrams were carried out mainly by relying on the works of the two authors of that time who best knew how to gather the best expressions of the use of this figure: al-Şafādī (d. 764/1363) and his *Faḍḍ al-Ĥitām*, and Ibn Ḥiġġa l-Ĥamawī (d. 837/1434) and his *Kaşf al-liṭām* and *Ĥizānat al-adab*. The latter two anthologies bring together around two thousand *loci* and poems as examples of good and bad uses of *tawriya*. Given this number, it is clear that a selection cannot account for every aspect and nuance of the pieces of poetry quoted. For this reason, I have selected the texts that seemed more suitable to describing the aesthetic taste expressed in the literature of that epoch, and to accounting for those changes at a social and artistic level that are the peculiarity of the Mamluk-era

³ In a broader discussion on transtextuality, i.e. the mutual relationship between the texts, Genette (1982, 8) defines the concept of intertextuality as “une relation de coprésence entre deux ou plusieurs textes, c’est-à-dire, eidétiquement et le plus souvent, par la présence effective d’un texte dans un autre. Sous sa forme la plus explicite et la plus littérale, c’est la pratique traditionnelle de la citation [...] sous une forme moins explicite et moins canonique, celle du plagiat [...] sous une forme encore moins explicite et moins littérale, celle de l’allusion.” I adopt Genette’s definition for reasons of convenience and brevity. Intertextuality was first postulated by Kristeva and Bakhtin. Subsequently, it became the subject of study of numerous linguists and semiologists such as Jenny, Riffaterre, and Barthes among others. An important contribution to the studies on intertextuality is the number 13 of *Cahiers de Narratologie* entitled *Nouvelles approches de l’intertextualité*. For the history of this term and how it developed, see in particular Martel (2005), Biagioli (2006), Gignoux (2006), and Limet (2006).

literature. To do so, I apply the Arabic theory of *tawriya* as formulated by al-Ṣafadī and the other theorists, with the aim of highlighting its strengths and, above all, its weaknesses, such as a certain theoretical rigidity towards literary practice, and sometimes a certain difficulty in describing those shared and widespread literary choices made by literati.

Some practical notes. There are several figures which create the complexity of a poem and participate in the aesthetic success of the composition. In every one of these epigrams, the figure *tawriya* is not the only figure at play. For the sake of brevity, I will not mention every single figure found in the text under analysis. Since this work is devoted to the *tawriya* only, I will only mention those figures which are directly involved in the textual development of this device, and only when necessary for the investigation into *tawriya*. The Arabic text between inverted commas indicates a *taḍmīn*, while the Arabic text underlined indicates an *iqtibās*. I will not provide minor variants of the epigrams quoted, limiting myself to quoting major variants and only if they change the text fundamentally.

4.2 Texts

1 ابن لؤلؤ الذهبي (٦٨٠/١٢٨١) من الكامل

البردُ قد ولى فما لك راقداً * يا أيها المدثرُ المزمَلُ

أوما ترى وَجَةَ الربيعِ وحُسْنَهُ * والروضُ يضحكُ والحيا يتَهَلَّلُ⁴

The cold passed, so why are you still sleeping o you the enwrapped, the cloaked?

Do not you see the face of the spring and its beauty, the smiling garden and the
delighting reviving rain?

In this two-line poem by Badr al-Dīn Ibn Lu'lu' al-Dahabī (d. 680/1281), the *tawriya* is actualised in the second hemistich of the first line, in which an *iqtibās* suggests a two-fold meaning of the words *mudattir* and *muzammil*. *Al-muzammil* is the opening verse of (Q 73:1), while *al-mudattir* opens (Q 74:1), both verses addressing the

⁴ Ibn Hiǧǧa (*Hiǧāna*, 3:261) credits this epigram to Ibn Lu'lu' al-Dahabī, but it has to be noted that it is also quoted in the *mulḥaq* section of Ibn al-Wardī's (*Dīwān*, 498).

prophet as the ‘cloaked’ and ‘enwrapped’ one, which refers to the act of the prophet of wrapping himself in a state of reverence after the revelation has come down to him, probably an act that recalls the preparation of the pre-Islamic *kāhin* (Buhl and Welch, 2012). Both epithets are among the seven names by which the prophet is called in the Koran.⁵ Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (*Tafsīr*, 30:171) lists five different possibilities for the epithet *al-muzammil*, of which I quote only those which are closely related to the content of the *sūra* and of the epigram. In both texts, there is a reference to the action of sleep. In particular in (Q 73:1), the angel Gabriel is said to have spoken to Muḥammad – who was sleeping enwrapped in his clothes – to wake him up and spur him to the *tahaḡḡud* (night vigil), i.e. the practice of praying and reciting the Koran during the night, a practice which became supererogatory after the five daily prayers had been set (Wensinck, 2012b). In the first line of the epigram, the scene depicts a sleeping man and is, in this respect, comparable to (Q 73:1). The difference is introduced at the very beginning of the line, where the word *al-bard* explains the cause of the being enwrapped and cloaked of the Subject of the narrative. Unlike the prophet, the Subject of the epigram is enwrapped because of the winter cold and not because he is in awe. The structure of the epigram is essentially a dialogue in which an Interlocutor addresses an Interlocutee with an exhortative question. The *tawriya* plays at the level of the first line, where the *iqtibās* introduces a two-fold meaning, i.e. the immediately understood Koranic meaning (*ma'nà qarīb*) referring to the prophet, and to the angel Gabriel exhorting him to perform the *tahaḡḡud*, and a second meaning of a cold sleeping one (*ma'nà ba'īd*) suggested by the word *al-bard* (*lāzim*), a meaning which will be disclosed in full in the second line where the co-text depicts a spring scene of a reviving nature. Since there is a *lāzim* referring to the *ma'nà ba'īd*, I propose to classify this epigram as an example of *tawriya mubayyana*.

2 مجير الدين ابن تميم (٦٨٤/١٢٨٥)، من المتقارب

نزلنا إلى العُورِ في جَحْفَلٍ * نُقَاتِلُ قوماً مِنَ المسلمينا
قَطَعْنَا الشريعةَ في حَرْبِهِمْ * وَخُضْنَا إِلَيْهِمْ مع الخائضينا⁶

⁵ The others are Muḥammad, Aḥmad, Ṭā Hā, Yā Sīn, and 'Abd Allāh.

⁶ Ibn Hiḡḡa (*Kašf*, 90-91; *Hiḡāna*, 3:246).

We descended to al-Ġawr with a numerous army and fought against Muslim people.

In fighting them, *we broke šarī'a law/we cut the way to the water* and we plunged towards them together with those who were plunging.

The scene depicted is a battlefield. As reported by al-Šafadī (*Wāfi*, 5:149-154) and Ibn al-'Imād (*Šaḍarāt*, 7:679-80), Muğīr al-Dīn Ibn Tamīm (d. 684/1285) was a soldier settled in Ḥamā in the service of its governor al-Malik al-Manšūr and most probably he took part in this battle.⁷

In this epigram, a first *tawriya* can be found in the phrase *qaṭa'nā l-šarī'a*, which has a two-fold meaning. Firstly, it can be understood as 'we broke *šarī'a* law' (*ma'nà qarīb*) supported by the phrase *nuqātilu qawman min al-muslimīna*, 'we fought against Muslim people' (*lāzim*). Secondly, it could be understood as 'we cut the way to the water' (*ma'nà ba'īd*), which in the context of a battle describes a military strategy.

A second *tawriya* can be found in the very last hemistich, where an *iqtibās* of (Q 74:45) introduces a two-fold meaning. As in the previous example, the *qarīb* meaning is the Koranic interpretation of the verb *ḥāḍa-yahūdu*, which in the context of (Q 74:45) must be interpreted as 'plunging in false and vain discourse' – cf. Lane (*Lexicon*, s.v.), and al-Rāzī (*Tafsīr*, 30:211), who glosses this verse with *al-abāṭil* – i.e. those people who spent their life lying and devoting themselves to unfaithful behaviour, people for whom the fire of Hell will be the last abode. The primary meaning of the verb, and second meaning of it in this epigram (*ma'nà ba'īd*), is 'to plunge', 'to wade', 'to enter into the water', and its *mağāz* derivation of 'plunging into something', i.e. plunging into the battle, rushing into battle. These two

⁷ Most probably, it is the battle of 'Ayn Ġālūt (Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir, *Rawḍ*, 63-66), (al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 1:422-35), which took place in 568/1260 and was fought between the mamluk troops commanded by Quṭuz al-Malik al-Muzaḥfar (d. 658/1260) and the future Baybars I (d. 676/1277) – who took power after murdering Quṭuz, (Khowaiter, 1978, 24-27), (Wiet, 2012), and (Little, 2012) – and the Mongol troops commanded by Kitbuğā (d. 658/1260), lieutenant of Hülegü (d. 663/1265) (Jackson, 2018). It must be said that, if on the one hand, the mention of al-Ġawr (Buhl and Sourdell, 2012) leads us to think that the battle in question opposed Muslim and Mongols, on the other, the first line states that the conflict was against Muslim people, and therefore cannot be 'Ayn Ġālūt. I could not find in the source a final answer to the question of whether the battle mentioned is this or not; it could also be a minor conflict against the other Syrian rulers of Aleppo, Ḥimş, or Damascus.

interpretations of the *iqtibās* mirror the two-fold interpretation of the first *tawriya* and proceed in parallel, actualising a double reading of the epigram. We thus have two texts in parallel, each relating a different narrative. On the one hand, the admission of reprehensible behaviour in having fought against coreligionists and the affirmation of eternal punishment by mentioning the Koranic verse. On the other, the description of a battle scene, during which the commander of the troops adopted a military strategy of blocking the way to the water supply. Here, the image of the troops conveyed by the poet is that of an impetuous plunging into the battle, probably crossing the course of a river, to defeat the enemy. If my interpretation is correct, the only *lāzim* in this epigram refers to the *qarīb* meaning, making these two lines an example of *tawriya muraššaḥa*, although both readings of the epigram return a correct interpretation of the text.

3 الشاب الظريف (٦٨٨/١٢٨٩)، من البسيط

لو لم تَكُنْ ابْنَةُ العُنُقودِ فِي فَمِهِ * ما كان فِي خَدِّهِ القاني أبو لَهَبِ
تَبَّتْ يدا عاذلي فِيهِ وَوَجَّتْهُ * حَمَالَةُ الوَرْدِ لا حَمَالَةُ الحَطَبِ⁸

If only the daughter of the bunch of grapes had not been in his mouth, there would not have been *Abū Lahab/the flame* in his blood-red cheek.

May the hands of the person who blames me about him perish! And may his cheek be the bearer of roses rather than *of firewood/ḥammālatu l-ḥaṭabi*.

See section 2.1.1.

4 ابن عبد الظاهر (٦٩٢/١٢٩٣)، من الكامل

إن كانت العَشَّاقُ من أشواقِهِمْ * جعلوا النسيمَ إلى الحبيبِ رَسولا
فأنا الذي أتلو لَهُمْ يا ليتني * كُنْتُ اتَّخَذْتُ مع الرسولِ سبيلا⁹

If the lovers, because of their desires, send the *sweet wind/Nasīm* to the lover like if he were an emissary,

⁸ al-Šābb al-Zarīf (*Dīwān*, 70), Ibn Ḥiǧǧa (*Kašf*, 116-17; *Ḥizāna*, 3:285), al-ʿAbdarī l-Šaybī (*Timṭāl*, 1:153).

⁹ Ibn Ḥiǧǧa (*Kašf*, 77; *Ḥizāna*, 3:224), al-Ġuzūlī (*Maṭāliʿ*, 1:68), Zaǧlūl Sallām (*Adab*, 2:415).

I am the one who recites to them “Would that I had taken a way with the messenger.”

As reported in al-Ġuzūlī (*Maṭāli‘*, 1:68-69), Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir (d. 692/1293) addressed this epigram – and several others – to a young singer called (al-)Nasīm, which is also the noun denoting the breeze, a soft and sweet wind. This is the first *tawriya*, in which the *qarīb* meaning is the wind, while the *ba‘īd* is the name of the beloved. Al-Nasīm/the wind is sent to his lover – *ḥabīb* denotes specifically the active partner of the relationship – and is compared to an emissary, a *rasūl*, which is the epithet with which the prophet Muḥammad is called (*rasūl Allāh*). This introduces the second line in which there is an *iqtibās* from (Q 25:27), where the word *rasūl* denotes specifically the messenger of God and relates the repentance of those who have not been able to embrace Islam and follow its prophet, so that on the day of judgment they will regret their deeds and will be sent to the flames of hell. This Koranic sense (*qarīb*) is paired by a more literal meaning (*ba‘īd*) connected with the first line, in which the *rasūl* is not the prophet, but rather the sweet beloved/wind who gives pleasure to the heart of the lover, and whom the poet wishes to follow in his path. The structure of this epigram is such that it should be considered an example of *tawriya muhayya‘a*, since the two-fold reading of the Koranic quotation in the second line depends on the presence in the first line of the word *nasīm* – which, being a homonym, cannot be a *lāzim* – and especially on the first utterance of the word *rasūl*, which refers to *nasīm*, qualifying it and allowing the shift of meaning between ‘messenger of God’ and ‘emissary of love’.

5 أبو الحسين الجزار (٦٧٩/١٢٨١)، من الرمل

مَعَشَرٌ مَا جَاءَهُمْ مُسْتَرْفِدٌ * رَاحَ إِلَّا وَهُوَ مِنْهُمْ مُعَسِّرٌ

أَنَا جَزَّارٌ وَهُمْ مِنْ بَقَرٍ * مَا رَأَوْنِي قَطُّ إِلَّا نَفَرُوا¹⁰

They are a community and whoever comes to them asking for their favour, he ends up being a poor person.

¹⁰ Ibn Hiḡga (*Hiḡāna*, 3:211).
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I am a butcher and they are *cattle*/[Banū] Baqar: whenever they see me, they run away.

This epigram is an appropriate example of how the production and fruition of literary works experienced a popularisation during the Mamluk era in comparison to the Abbasid era, and how literature is no longer only a means of expression of a literary elite created for the use and consumption of the same elite or of the ruling elite (Bauer, 2013a). As Bauer argues, the poet may also belong during the Mamluk era to the class that he defines as “*Bürgertum*”, as is the case with the author of this epigram, who – as the name by which he is known suggests – was a craftsman, a butcher. Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Ġazzār (d. 679/1281) brings into his poetry his daily life and profession, often showing a strong pride towards the latter, even though, as we will see, it did not give him enough to live a rich and carefree life. Indeed, he abandoned this profession and devoted himself completely to belles-lettres, but was then forced to resume it after finding it difficult to earn enough money to survive and having to rely on the benevolence of his patrons (Bauer, 2005b; 2016b).¹¹

This two-line poem depicts the poet-butcher’s spirit of revenge towards a group of people, a community (*maʿšar*) most likely the ruling elite or a specific class of people, e.g. the *kuttāb*, to whom the poet turned in the hope of finding a patron. The *tawriya* develops in the phrase *banū baqar* in the second line, whose meaning *qarīb* is ‘cattle’, which takes on a particular value if considered after the statement made by the author who qualifies himself as *ġazzār* (butcher), a *lāzim* connected to the *qarīb* meaning. The *baʿīd* meaning is the name of a tribe, the [Banū] Baqar, which settled in Egypt (Kaḥḥāla, *Qabāʿil*, 1:89), meaning that *maʿšar* in the first line is a *lāzim*. Since these lines have two *lawāzim*, each referring to a different meaning of the *tawriya*-word, they can be classified as a *tawriya muġarrada* with two *lawāzim* opposing each

¹¹ It is important to note that Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Ġazzār was not the only butcher who decided to devote himself to belles-lettres without obtaining the results desired. Pérès (1953, 291) – also quoted in Bonebakker (2002-2003, 27) – reports that another butcher in Muslim Spain faced the same situation as Abū l-Ḥusayn. He is Yaḥyà b. Muḥammad al-Saraqustī, better known as al-Ġazzār al-Saraqustī (d. 606 / 1202-1203?), who fiercely defended his profession by stating that, as a butcher, bands of dogs and cats were standing adoring in his presence. Moreover he describes himself as someone who could defeat alone entire tribes such as the Kalbs, the ʿAnzī, and the Ṭawrī, a word-play which, as we will see in the compositions of Abū l-Ḥusayn, is based on the name of those tribes and on the literal meaning of the expressions, i.e. calves, goats, and bulls (Ibn Bassām, *Daḥīra*, 3:905-906).

other. The two readings engendered by the *tawriya* interpenetrate each other, and the image developed by the epigram is that of the poet looking for a patron within a community that shuns not only the poet, but all those who turn to it in search of its favour. Its escape is in this case compared to the fear and stampeding of the cattle when faced by the butcher ready to slaughter them.

6 أبو الحسين الجزار، من الهزج

ألا قل للذي يسأ * ل عن قومي وعن أهلي
لقد تسأل عن قوم * كرام الفرع والأصل
ترجيهم بنو كلب * وتخشاهم بنو عجل¹²

Indeed, say to whom asks about my tribe and my family

‘Surely, you are asking about a tribe of noble descendants and ancestors.

The *Banū Kalb/dogs* hope for them and the *Banū ‘iǧl/calves* fear them.’

Ibn Ḥiǧǧa (*Kašf*, 68; *Ḥizāna*, 3:210) defines this epigram as an excellent *tawriya* (*samīn al-tawriya*), in which the poet plays with his profession. This is an example of how the poet translates the pride of belonging to the butchers’ ‘corporation’ into poetry. The epigram is essentially an excerpt of fictitious dialogue, in which the Interlocutor addresses a fictitious Interlocutee, describing his own people as an ancient lineage whose ancestors and progeny are noble, feared and respected. As in the previous epigram, the *tawriya* develops in two words in the last line. *Banū kalb* and *banū ‘iǧl* are both names of two tribes (*Kaḥḥāla*, *Qabā’il*, 3:991-92, 2:757) and their immediate meanings (*qarīb*) are suggested by the *lawāzim qawmī, ahlī, qawm, far’,* and *ašl* uttered in the two previous lines. Based on the *qarīb* meaning, the epigram leads us to interpret the affiliation of the poet to a tribe that has supporters in the Banū Kalb, while opponents or those subjugated are in the Banū ‘iǧl. However, the meaning that the poet wants to convey is linked to the *ba’īd* meanings of the *tawriya*-words, namely ‘dogs’ and ‘calves’. If we interpret the epigram according to the *ba’īd* meanings, we can understand that the tribe to which the poet refers is not composed

¹² Al-Ġazzār (*Dīwān*, 70), al-Ṣafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 46), Ibn Ḥiǧǧa (*Kašf*, 68; *Ḥizāna*, 3:210).
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of men and women descending from a common ancestor and connected by kinship. Instead he refers to the ‘tribe’ of butchers who feed dogs with their scraps (and hence the dogs place hope in the butchers), and inspire fear in the calves, whom they are ready to slaughter. In this way, al-Ġazzār raises his profession to the highest degree by comparing it with the ancestral roots of a tribe and dressing it with nobility, which is a clear example of the pride of a member of the productive *Bürgertum*. The presence of several *lawāzim* referring to the *qarīb* meaning classifies this *tawriya* as a *muraššaḥa*.

7 أبو الحسين الجزار، من البسيط

إِنِّي لَمِنَ مَعْشَرِ سَفْكَ الدَّمَاءِ لَهُمْ * دَأْبٌ وَسَلٌ عَنْهُمْ إِن رُؤْمَتَ تَصْدِيقِي

تُضِيءُ بِالدَّمِ إِشْرَافًا عِرَاصُهُمْ * فَكُلُّ أَيَّامِهِمْ أَيَّامٌ تَشْرِيقٌ¹³

I am a part of a community which has as custom the shedding of blood. Ask about them, if you desire to be sure that I’m truthful.

Their courts are shining, saturated with blood, and all their days *are days after the sacrifice/of meat cutting*.

As in the previous example, al-Ġazzār introduces an element of pride in describing his profession. In the first line and in the first hemistich of the second line, the tribe to which the poet belongs is characterised by the shedding of blood, a custom that can suggest the battle achievements of a tribe devoted to war. The *tawriya* is uttered in the last hemistich and plays with a religious meaning. The first meaning (*qarīb*) of the phrase *ayyām al-tašrīq* is linked to the rituals of the *ḥaġġ* and more precisely refers to the three days following the *īd al-aḍḥà* in the 10th of Dū l-Ḥiġġa, i.e. from the 11th to the 13th of Dū l-Ḥiġġa, a period during which the pilgrims stay in Minà and give themselves to worldly pleasures, besides throwing seven stones every day on each of the three positions that compose the *ġamra*. A possible explanation of the name *tašrīq* is that this refers to the slicing of the sacrificial meat in order to be able to dry it under the sun, an explanation not convincing for (von Grunebaum, [1951] 1976, 34), (Paret and Graham, 2012), or (Mittwoch, 2012), however. This *qarīb*

¹³ Al-Ġazzār (*Dīwān*, 58), al-Šafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 46), Ibn Ḥiġġā (*Kašf*, 68-69; *Ḥizāna*, 3:210).

meaning corresponds to the meaning intended by the author (*ba'īd*), i.e. the literal meaning of the expression 'days of meat cutting', referring to the profession of the butcher, a profession which justifies the custom of blood-shedding and its result, which is to make their courts, i.e. the courts where they practise their slaughtering, full of blood. Once again, the tribe to which the poet belongs is not composed of ascending and descending members, of blood relatives. Rather, it is a tribe of people who share a profession. And, in this way, he intends to make it rise to a compact group in which to place his pride of belonging. None of the words and phrases of the epigram can be correlated with one of the two meanings of the *tawriya*-word – the shedding of blood is connected with both meanings. Therefore, I list this example as a *tawriya muğarrada*, even if the presence of a technical term makes it possible to range it in the figure *tawğīh*₂.

8 أبو الحسين الجزار، من المنسرح

حُسْنُ التَّائِي مِمَّا يُعِينُ عَلَي * رَزْقِ الْفَتَى وَالْحُظُوظُ تَخْتَلِفُ

والعبدُ مذ صار في جزارته * "يعرفُ من أين تُؤكَلُ الكَتِفُ"¹⁴

It is a good way to act that which helps the man [to obtain] his livelihood. But
fortune alternates,

and the servant of God (i.e. himself), from the time he acquainted himself with
butchery, *he knows from where the shoulder is eaten/*he knows how to act.

This is al-Ğazzār's reply to an epigram that his friend Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ĥammāmī (d. 712/1312) had sent to him (al-Şafadī, *Wāfī*, 27:66; Ibn Ḥiğğā, *Kaşf*, 69; *Ĥizāna*, 3:212), both playing with their respective profession. Unlike the previous cases, we do not witness in these two lines the display of pride of belonging to a particular social and professional group, but we are introduced to the sphere of life and personal history of the poet. He describes his life as an alternation of good and bad luck that has seen in the art of the butcher an essential point of his existence. Through this art, he has been able to overcome adversity, since this very profession enabled him to earn the means of subsistence. *Tawriya* develops through the *tađmīn* of a proverb in the last

¹⁴ Al-Ğazzār (*Dīwān*, 56), al-Şafadī (*Fađđ*, 46, *Wāfī*, 27:66), Ibn Ḥiğğā (*Kaşf*, 69; *Ĥizāna*, 3:212).
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hemistich. The saying is (*inna-hu la-*) *ya'lamu min ayna tu'kalu l-katifu*¹⁵ (lit. he knows from where the scapula is eaten). This proverb is mentioned in paroemiac sources as a way of addressing someone who knows the right way to do things, who knows what he is doing. For example, al-'Askarī (*Ġamhara*, 2:328) reports that, when addressing a weak man, one says, "He is not able to eat a shoulder" (*lā yuḥsinu akl al-katif*). The use of this expression with this figurative meaning has its roots in the method used to separate the meat from the bone of the shoulder blade before eating it. Specifically, the sources report that, if the meat is separated from the scapula bone from the lower part, this is simpler as the meat separates from the bone without any effort; it is more difficult to separate the meat from above, due to the presence of cartilage tissue intertwined with the meat. Therefore, who more than a butcher is aware of how an animal's meat should be slaughtered and eaten? This is exactly the focal point of the epigram. The literal meaning of the expression and its figurative meaning cannot be easily categorised either as *ma'na qarīb*, or *ma'na ba'īd*. This is because we face in the epigram a perfect double reading of the *tawriya*. Al-Ġazzār, by virtue of his profession, knows the secrets of butchering meat, so the expression in its literal meaning is true, as it is in its figurative meaning, since it is his profession which allows him to face the ups and downs of life and earn his daily bread. The presence of the word *ġizāra* suggests that it is a *lāzim* of the literal meaning of the expression; in this case, it can be assumed that it is a *tawriya muraššaḥa* if we consider the literal meaning as *qarīb* and the paroemiac meaning as *ba'īd*, for we can hypothesise that the poet aimed more at transmitting pride in his profession than informing the reader of his qualities as a butcher, it being understood that both readings are valid and cooperate in the aesthetic success of the epigram.

9 أبو الحسين الجزار، من المجتث.

لا تَعَجَبِي من لباسي * فكلُّ أمري لبسُ

والله ما ثمَّ مالٌ * وإنما ثمَّ نفسُ¹⁶

¹⁵ Abū 'Ubayd (*Amṭāl*, 100), Zayd b. Rifā'a (*Amṭāl*, 288), al-'Askarī (*Ġamhara*, 2:328), al-Maydānī (*Arabum*, 1:63), al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Mustaqṣa*, 2:413), al-'Abdarī l-Šaybī (*Timṭāl*, 2:594), al-Aḥdab al-Ṭarābulusī (*Farā'id*, 1:37). A possible variant is *min ayna > min ḥaytu*.

¹⁶ Ibn Ḥiḡḡa (*Ḥizāna*, 3:204).

Don't be astonished by my clothes, since all my condition is *clothes/confusion*.

By God, there is no money, rather there is only the soul.

Here we have an example of a poem in which the poet complains about his condition and misfortune. According to Bauer (2014a), one can list this two-line poem as an example of the *muğūn* in the Mamluk age.¹⁷ More specifically, it finds its place in category B, i.e. "Poems about all different kind of misfortune: Things do no work as they should; trouble and embarrassments of all kind arise" (Bauer, 2014a, 165). As Bauer stresses, this kind of *muğūn* portrays "a certain degree of self-deprecation" (165), and this epigram seems to be a good example of how a poet and craftsman talks about his humble condition in a correspondence with his friend Šihāb al-Dīn al-Warrāq (d. 695/1296). Al-Ğazzār addresses his interlocutee, saying that nothing is left to him now except the clothes he is wearing, which are worn-out enough to cause amazement in the eyes of the beholder. *Tawriya* plays precisely on the ambiguity of the last word of the first line, which can be vowelled in two different ways. If it is vowelled 'libs', it means 'clothes', and the word *libāsī* in the first hemistich appears to be its *lāzim*. If, however, it is vowelled 'labs or lubs', it means 'confusion'. In this case, too, we have a perfect double reading of the epigram with both meanings of the *tawriya*-word returning a reading in line with the communicative purpose of the poet. To give a classification, I would suggest adopting *libs/clothes* as *ma'nà qarīb* and *libāsī* as its *lāzim*, while *labs/confusion* as the *ma'nà ba'īd*, thus a *tawriya muraššaḥa*. It is important to underline that this wordplay in which the *tawriya* is based on changing one or more vowels of a word – and is therefore essentially based on two words with two different *ṣiyaġ* – would have been classified by al-Şafadī as an example of erroneous homonymy (*fī-mā ḥaṣala min al-wahm fī l-ištirāk*), such as the two lines of Sayf al-Dīn al-Mušidd analysed in section 1.1.3.2.1.¹⁸

¹⁷ For a comprehensive study of *muğūn*, see Szombathy (2013), who proposes this definition for *muğūn*: "Mujūn is any text or behaviour which is meant or perceived to constitute a breach of ordinary norms of writing or conduct, and which is meant or perceived to be jesting rather than serious" (308).

¹⁸ Although al-Şafadī considers this use of *tawriya* an erroneous homonymy, al-Ğazzār is not the only one to make use of it. The most fitting example is the phrase *al-qaṭr al-nubātī/al-nabātī*, a theme used by Ibn Nubāta and which will also be the title of his collection of epigrams. As Bauer (2014a, 182) points out, it can mean "1. Sugar molasses, 2. Ibn Nubāta's drops, i.e. his epigrams, which are 'drops' compared to longer poems, and 3. It could refer to himself, who is the 'drop' = offspring of 'Abd ar-Raḥīm Ibn Nubāta." Other examples are epigrams no. 45 and 47.

10 أبو الحسين الجزار، من المنسرح

ما زلتُ في الدنيا من الهَمِّ * طولَ زماني وإفِرَ القِسْمِ
فالحمدُ لله الذي حُكْمُهُ * حَيَّرَ في أفقِ السما نَجْمِي
أصبحتُ لَحَامًا وفي البيتِ لا * أعرفُ ما رائحةُ اللحمِ
وليس حظِّي منه إلا اسمُهُ * قَنِعتُ من ذلك بالإسمِ
واعتَضْتُ من فقري ومن فاقتي * عن التِذاذِ الطَّعمِ بالنَّشَمِ
جهلتهُ فقراً فكنْتُ الذي * أضَلَّهُ اللهُ على علمٍ¹⁹

I have never ceased, during my worldly life, to feel a copious part of disquietude.
Praised be God whose judgment made my star wander until the remote side of the
sky.

I became a butcher, but at home I do not know the smell of meat.

I have no portion of it (i.e. meat) but its name, and I was satisfied with the name.
For my poverty and indigence, I received instead of deliciousness of food [only] the
smell.

In poverty, I was ignorant of it (i.e. deliciousness of food), since I was the one whom
God led astray knowingly/God made to miss it despite the knowledge.

This is another example of *muğūn* in which al-Ġazzār develops the theme of his misfortunes. He does so according to a technique that we have already seen, i.e. he introduces an *iqtibās* in the last line where the *tawriya* produces a re-semanticisation of the Koranic verse. Specifically in (Q 45:23), reference is made to those who have not followed the path traced by God, to those who have chosen worldly passions and desires, and to those who have been knowingly led astray, guided far from the right path, and to whom the heart has been sealed. The first interpretation linked to the Koranic text is to be considered the *qarīb* meaning. Within the entire epigram, we can see how the first two lines are somehow related to this meaning: in particular, the mention of earthly life and how God made the poet's star wander in the universe, perhaps linked to an astrological sense of bad luck due to a wandering star. In

¹⁹ Al-Ġazzār (*Dīwān*, 79), Ibn Hiǧǧa (*Hiǧāna*, 3:210).

contrast, lines three, four and five introduce the second meaning (*ba'īd*) of the Koranic quote, linked in this case to a more literal interpretation of the verse. Although the poet is a butcher and therefore has to work every day in his shop by slaughtering and selling meat, he has never been able to eat it because of his poverty and therefore knows only its smell and not its taste. The Koranic verse can therefore be read as the intervention of God, who prevents al-Ġazzār from tasting the delights of food despite butchery being his profession and granting him the knowledge of meat and its smell.

There are no specific words or phrases in the six lines of this poem that refer to one or the other meaning. In my opinion, the narrative consists of two parts: the first two lines suggest the Koranic meaning, while the next three open up the interpretation based on the nonsense of trading meat without being able to taste its delight. However, if the co-text had not introduced this interpretation, the Koranic verse would never have assumed its ambiguous meaning. For this reason, I think it is appropriate to classify this example as a *tawriya muhayya'a*.

11 أبو الحسين الجزار، من المنسرح

حَسْبِي حِرَاقًا بِحِرْزَفْتِي حَسْبِي * أَصْبَحْتُ مِنْهَا مُعَدَّبَ الْقَلْبِ
مُوسَّخَ الثَّوْبِ وَالصَّحِيفَةَ مِنْ * طَوْلِ اِكْتِسَابِي ذَنْبًا بِلَا كَسْبِ
أَعْمَلُ فِي اللَّحْمِ لِلْعِشَاءِ وَلَا * أَنَالُ مِنْهُ الْعِشَاءَ فَمَا ذَنْبِي؟
خَلَا فَوَادِي وَلِي فَمَّ وَسِخٌ * كَأَنَّي فِي جِزَارَتِي كَلْبِي²⁰

The quantity of misfortune due to my craft suffices me. Because of it, I became heart-tormented, dirty dressed. And *my income register/the records of my actions*, is/are without *gain/acquisition*, because of acquiring sins.

I work with meat until the night, and I do not obtain dinner. What is my sin? My heart became free of fault and I have a dirty mouth as if I were my dog in my butcher's shop.

²⁰ Al-Ġazzār (*Dīwān*, 30), Ibn Hiġġā (*Hiġāna*, 3:210-1).
Luca Rizzo

This epigram follows the precedents and is in some way a condensed example of the themes that we have seen. Once again, al-Ġazzār gives the reader a text focused on his condition of misfortune and indigence due to his profession, his *hirfa*. He takes up a theme that we have already seen in poem no. 9, in which he compared his condition to the only clothes he wears, clothing that in the first line of this epigram is dirty and filthy. The *tawriya* is presented to us immediately in the second line and is based on two words that have a double meaning. The first is *ṣahīfa*, whose literal and primary meaning is “A flat object, a plaque, a leaf, whence a surface or material on which one can write” (Ghédira, 2012). Of the various meanings it can assume, what is relevant in our case is that mentioned in the Koran. *Ṣuḥuf*, the plural of *ṣahīfa*, is mentioned in (Q 81:10), “And when the pages are spread open” (*wa-idā l-ṣuḥufu nuširat*), and refers to what in other verses of the Koran is mentioned as *kitāb* – (Q 17:71), (Q 18:49), and (Q 69:19) – i.e. the records of the deeds of every human, which must be presented on the day of judgment and which cannot contain any falsehood, but the true actions performed by each one. To this first meaning, the second meaning of ‘register’ is added, which is derived from the subsequent use of defining the sheets of paper *ṣahīfa-suḥuf*, too. In this epigram, it assumes the meaning of the register of revenue of al-Ġazzār’s butchery. A second *tawriya* is associated with this first one, which in its two meanings corresponds to the two meanings of the first *tawriya*. The word *kasb* essentially means ‘earnings, income’ and in this case the earnings from a business. On the other hand, the word *kasb* also takes on the theological meaning of ‘acquisition’ and ‘appropriation’ (Gardet, 2012b), i.e. “Appropriation ou imputation juridique, par laquelle Dieu ‘attribue’ aux hommes leurs actes” (Anawati et Gardet, 1948, 57), namely that human deeds are created by God and ‘attributed’ to humans upon whom is the juridical consequence of them. These two meanings pair together, whereby the theological meaning is coupled with the Koranic meaning of *ṣahīfa*, while the meaning of ‘earnings’ is coupled with the meaning of ‘revenue register’. Which of the two meanings is *qarīb* and which *ba‘īd* is not obvious. In the opening of the epigram, the poet clearly refers to his profession as the cause of his bad luck, preparing the ground for the ‘economic’ reading of the text. However, in the third line, the poet rhetorically wonders what sin he committed for now having to live such a grim life, a sin that the poet lets us understand he did not commit for there was no

acquisition of the sinful action. That is why he can say he has a heart free from sin. This reading takes us to a higher level than in previous epigrams. The blame for his failure is not entirely attributable to himself or, as we will see, to parsimonious patrons. Here, the guilt almost seems to be attributed to God, even if in a non-explicit and very attenuated way, since he, denying the attribution (*kasb*) of sinful actions, can be said to be sinless.

A double reading is possible in this poem, too. But, in my opinion, the immediate meaning (*qarīb*) deriving from the ‘economic’ reading serves to conceal the intended meaning suggested by a ‘religious’ reading (*ba’īd*), through which the poet proclaims his purity of spirit towards a situation of misfortune which he finds profoundly unjust. These two readings are linked and indissoluble: if one of the two *tawriya*-words had failed, the entire epigram would have lost its double reading. It should therefore be classified as a *tawriya muhayya’a*.

12 أبو الحسين الجزار، من الخفيف

لا تَلْمَنِي يَا سَيِّدِي شَرَفَ الدِّيدِ * نِي إِذَا مَا رَأَيْتَنِي قَصَّابَا
كَيْفَ لَا أَشْكُرُ الْجِزَارَةَ مَا عِشْتُ * مِتُّ حِفَاطًا وَأَرْفُضُ الْآدَابَا
وَبهَا صَارَتِ الْكِلَابُ تُرَجِّي * نِي وَبِالشُّعْرِ كُنْتُ أَرْجُو الْكِلَابَا²¹

Don’t blame me, my lord Šaraf al-Dīn, when you see me again as a butcher.
How can I not thank constantly butchery, as long as I live, and abandon belles-
lettres?

With butchery, the dogs were hoping for me, and with poetry I was hoping for the
dogs/parsimonious patrons.

This is one of al-Ġazzār’s best-known epigrams, and is the one which best embodies his sentiment of *ħirfat al-adab*. The term *ħirfat al-adab* means “to express the disappointment felt by a poet when he leads a life of poverty and full of uncertainties, even threats to his life” (Bonebakker, 2001, 147). As Bonebakker points out, the word *ħirfa* is a homonym, in that, besides meaning ‘ill-fate’ and ‘misfortune’, it also means

²¹ Al-Ġazzār (*Dīwān*, 30), Ibn Ĥiġġa (*Kašf*, 69; *Ĥizāna*, 3:211), Zaġlūl Sallām (*Adab*, 3:165), Bonebakker (2002-2003, 28).

a ‘profession’, a ‘craft’, the profession by which one obtains an income. When linked to the word *adab* (in its sense of literary activity, belles-lettres), the homonym leads us to have two intertwined meanings. Often, the profession of the literate – poet, prosateur, or secretary – corresponds to a certain difficulty in obtaining the means of subsistence. In a similar way to the previous epigram, the words *ḥirāf* and *ḥirfa* represent this duplicity of meaning. As already stated, al-Ġazzār left his job as a butcher for a period of time to devote himself to belles-lettres, but without success. In this sense, Bonebakker’s (2001, 159) description fits perfectly: “Whenever an author speaks of *ḥirfat al-adab*, he considers, or want us to consider, his dealing with *adab* to be an undesirable profession”. For, the reward promised for his services is often not given to him, as is the case for our author.

Addressing Šaraf al-Dīn b. Qalīġ or Qilīġ,²² al-Ġazzār explains his refusal to continue his ‘literary career’ and his return to his previous profession, and he uses the rhetorical device of *tawriya* to express his *ḥirfat al-adab*. The *tawriya*-word is in this case the word *kilāb*, which has as its first meaning (*qarīb*) ‘dogs’. As we saw in epigram no. 6, the dogs are always alert waiting for the butcher to give them some leftovers from his shop. A second, fully figurative meaning is added to this first meaning, one that resemanticises the word ‘dog’ to connote the parsimonious patrons whom the poet addresses (a meaning that is only linked to the context of this epigram). Hence, if the dogs wait for the butcher’s leftovers, the poet, while waiting for the ‘leftovers’ of the so-called patrons, is degraded to the role of a begging dog, whose survival is linked to the few scraps that he fights over with other dogs, to which the negative connotations of being an impure animal are added.

The nature of this *tawriya* is linked entirely to the context of enunciation and the context that surrounds the *tawriya*-word. The word *kalb*-dog/patron is not a homonym, and nor can the use of *kalb* to define parsimonious patrons be traced within the semantic sphere of figurative use, except in the use that al-Ġazzār makes of it, since it is linked to his personal history. As in previous poems, there are references within this three-line poem to the semantic spheres of both poetry and butchery. But is there a specific *lāzim* connected to one or both meanings? One hypothesis is that the

²² Al-Ġazzār (*Dīwān*, 30). I could not identify this person with any certainty. He perhaps belongs to the same family of Sayf al-Dīn b. Qilīġ (d. 643/1245-1246); see Ibn Kaṭīr (*Bidāya*, 13:171).

words *qaṣṣāb* and *ġizāra* are *lawāzim* of the *qarīb* meaning, while *ādāb* is a *lāzim* of the *ba'īd*. If this is true, then the sources do not discuss the case of three *lawāzim*. We should perhaps consider it as an example of *tawriya muġarrada* even if, as I have already stated, it depends much more on the extra-linguistic context than it does on the co-text.

13 أبو الحسين الجزار، من الخفيف

لا تَعْنِي بِصِنْعَةِ الْقَصَابِ * فَهِيَ أَذْكَى مِنْ عَنَبِ الْأَدَابِ
كان فضلي على الكلابِ فمُدُّ صرُّ * تُ أديبًا رَجَوْتُ فَضَلَ الْكِلَابِ²³

Do not blame me because of the art of the butcher, since it is more fragrant than
the perfume of amber of belles-lettres.

I offered my surplus to dogs, but since, when I became a literatus, I was hoping for
the surplus of *dogs/parsimonious patrons*.

This epigram closes my selection of al-Ġazzār's poetry and contains the motifs that we have already seen. The pride in his profession makes him assert that the perfume of the meat is even better and more fragrant than that of belles-lettres; and, as a butcher, he no longer has to beg for some leftovers at the court of the powerful on duty. Like the previous poem, this is an example of *tawriya muġarrada*.²⁴

14 سراج الدين الوراق (٦٩٥/١٢٩٦)، من الطويل

أَجَبْتُ بِعِيدِ النَّحْرِ مَنْ كَانَ سَائِلِي * عَنِ الْحَالِ فِي عَيْدِي وَقَدْ مَرَّ ذِكْرُهُ
إِذَا بَطَّلَ الْجَزَّازُ وَالْعَيْدُ عَيْدُهُ * فَلَا تَسْأَلِ الْوَرَّاقَ فَالْعُدْرُ عَذْرُهُ²⁵

I replied on the day of sacrifice to the person who was asking about my condition
during the festival – and he has already been mentioned:

²³ Ibn Ḥiġġa (*Kaṣf*, 69; *Ḥizāna*, 3:211), Bonebakker (2002-2003, 28).

²⁴ Another interpretation is given by Weintritt (2005, 383), who reads the *tawriya* in the word *faḍl*: "Tadle mich nicht wegen meines Schlachterberufs! Er richtet allemal besser als der Amber der literarischen Künste (*al-ādāb*). Vorrang (*faḍl*) hatte ich stets vor den Hunden. Doch seit ich ein *adīb* geworden bin, muß ich darum bitten, was die Hunde übriglassen (*faḍl*). (Oder: Ich muß die Hunde um ihre Güte (*faḍl*) beiiten)". Although a possible and correct reading, I do not think that it is the point of the epigram, and nor the *tawriya* intended by the author.

²⁵ Ibn Ḥiġġa (*Ḥizāna*, 3:200).

‘When *the butcher/al-Ġazzār* becomes unoccupied, though the festival is his festival, do not ask *the bookseller/al-Warrāq*, since he does have an excuse!’

This epigram is a response to an epigram by al-Ġazzār and is an example of the correspondence between literati and craftsmen of the time. Again, we are faced with an epigram in which the poet complains of his condition and does so by basing his narrative on a double reading of two *tawriya*-words, which denote both the professions and the protagonists of the exchange of letters. As stated in the first line, the occasion for this exchange is the *īd al-naḥr*, or *īd al-aḏḥà*, i.e. the festival of sacrifice on the 10th Dū l-Ḥiġġa, with which the ritual pilgrimage ends and precedes the *tašrīq*, which I have already described (von Grunebaum, [1951] 1981, 33-34). It is clear how this festival is linked to the butcher’s job precisely because of the sacrifice of cattle. For this reason, al-Warrāq turns to al-Ġazzār, calling it the day of his festival, the day of greatest profit for a butcher. The first *tawriya* is precisely the word *al-ġazzār*, which has as its first meaning (*qarīb*) ‘butcher’ and as its second meaning (*baīd*), the name of his companion. The second *tawriya* is in the word *warrāq*, which, in addition to ‘bookseller’²⁶ (*qarīb*), also designates the author of the poem (*baīd*). The narrative plays on the fact that the butcher-al-Ġazzār is unemployed, although the festival of sacrifice is the festival during which he should have the greatest amount of work. Al-Warrāq’s answer is joking but potent: why should the butcher investigate the condition of indigence of the bookbinder, when even the former is in a state of destitution despite the fact that this day should favour him? And why expect the bookbinder to do better than he does?

The two *tawriya*-words return an equivalent double reading and the professions are linked to the protagonists of the story. In this case, while noting that the co-text introduces a very precise temporal reference point (the day of sacrifice), I do not

²⁶ To translate *warrāq* as ‘bookseller’ is correct, but it should be stressed that this noun denotes a profession of someone ‘involved with paper’, i.e. papermaker, stationer, copyist, scribe, bookbinder. See Gacek (2001, 150). For this epigram, I have chosen ‘bookseller’, as it seems more appropriate for the context of buying and selling, while in the next epigram the co-text suggests that ‘bookbinder’ is a more appropriate translation. In epigram no. 16, I translate ‘copyist’, for the co-text suggests the idea of blackened paper, e.g. because of ink. However, it is very probable that Sirāġ al-Dīn al-Warrāq practised all these professions.

think that it can be considered a *lāzim* of the *qarīb* meaning of ‘butcher’. Therefore, I consider the *tawriya* in this epigram to be a *tawriya muğarrada*.

15 سراج الدين الوراق، من الكامل

نَصَبَ الحِشَا غَرَضاً ففَرَضَسَ إِذْ رَمَى * وَهِيَ القلوبُ سِهَامُهَا الأَحْدَاقُ
وَسَأَلْتُهُ وَضْلاً فَقَالَ يَحْجِنِي * يَا لَيْتَ شِعْرِي مَنْ هُوَ الوَرَّاقُ²⁷

Having as his aim the innermost, he hits the target when he shoots. They are the hearts; their arrows are the eyes.

I asked *to be together with him/a ‘paste connection’* and he answered arguing with me: ‘O, I wish I knew who is *al-Warrāq/the bookbinder*.’

Sirāğ al-Dīn al-Warrāq (d. 695/1296) is another example of that productive *Bürgertum*, the class of artisans and craftsmen who devoted themselves in the Mamluk era to literary activity, while not leaving their work but instead remaining rooted in the social context from which they came. As the name by which he is known suggests, he was a *warrāq*, a noun which brings together a profession with many facets, ranging from bookseller, to bookbinder, paper maker, and copyist. He often uses technical terms from his craft in his poetry, and this *gazal* epigram is an example. Al-Warrāq begins by describing his beloved’s eyes, which penetrate like pointed arrows, ready to hit the hearts of those who admire his beauty. This first line contains a motif typical of love poetry, as it is the first hemistich of the second line in which the poet asks his young beloved for a *waṣl*, i.e. a union of the lovers, the being together. And it is precisely in this word that the first *tawriya* of the epigram develops. However, if this word commonly used in the lexicon of love poetry had been used by any other poet, it could not have expressed its double meaning. As already said, the use of technical terms from a specific art is the distinctive sign of the poets-artisans especially of the Mamluk era. The use of this term by al-Warrāq is deliberately linked to his profession, since it designates: “1. Straight line (drawn with a ruler); 2. Connection (between two sheets when pasted side by side); line of paste (kollesis); 3. Piece, leaf (of parchment or paper forming an integral part of a roll, darj),

²⁷ Ibn Hiğga (*Kašf*, 62; *Hižāna*, 3:202).
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collema (Kollema)” (Gacek, 2001, 151).²⁸ If we look at the context of the epigram, it seems obvious that the poet did not want to ask the boy whose eyes had pierced his heart for a ‘paste connection’, nor anything else related to the *wirāqa*. The presence of this double meaning of the word *waṣl* is presented to us only when we read the boy’s answer. Unable or unwilling to express a clear refusal, the Interlocutee creates a wordplay linking *waṣl* to its technical meaning, replying to the Interlocutor that he is not the right person to ask for a *waṣl*, since he is not a *warrāq*, and thus has no acquaintance with this art. Of course, the word *al-Warrāq* is also meant as the name of the poet. And, if we look more closely at the first line, we can find three more words which, although not real *tawriyas*, recall the art of *wirāqa*. The verb *naṣaba* could recall the *naṣab*, i.e. “1. Straight line, stroke; the letter alif; 2. Pallet-like tool” (Gacek, 2001, 142); the noun *ḥašā* could recall the *ḥašw* or *ḥašwa*, i.e. “1. Decorative panel or geometrical figure (in illumination or book cover decoration); 2. Interpolation, parenthesis” (33) and also *ḥāšiya*, i.e. “1. Edge, turn-in; 2. Border (on a book cover); 3. Margin (of a page); 4. Also *taḥšiya* – marginal gloss, scholium, apostil; marginalia; collection of glosses; superglosses.” (33); and finally the verb *qartasa* could recall the word *qi(u-a)rṭās*, i.e. “Sheet of roll of papyrus, parchment or paper” (114). These three words provide a co-text in which a double reading of the term *waṣl* is suggested and made possible. It is not easy to answer the question of whether these ‘suggesting words’ can be considered *lawāzim* of the *ma’nà ba’īd*. If we base our speculation on the received theory of *tawriya*, we will not find an adequate answer. They are not *tawriyas*, because they are not homonymous words; and, by homonym, I mean here a word with two proper meanings, or with a proper and a figurative meaning, which broadens al-Ṣafadī’s positions. Not being homonymous, they could be *lawāzim*, but the suggested meanings are not the meanings of the words uttered, for those words have different *siyaġ*, or different *‘irāb*, to those that the words should have to convey these meanings. In my opinion, this is a case of what

²⁸ Of course, the use of the word *waṣl* as a technical term is not tied to the *wirāqa*. For instance, it means in prosody “A letter of prolongation following the *rawī* [...] The *waṣl* can also consist of a vowelless *hā’* preceded by a short vowel (as in *yaktuluh*, *yaktulih*, *yaktulah*) or a *hā’* followed by a letter of prolongation and preceded by a short vowel” (Bonebakker (2012d)); and, in grammar, in which *waṣl* and *šila* are used “to express the general idea of ‘connecting’ two linguistic units” (Versteegh (2009b, 4:235)). Neither plays a role in this epigram.

al-Şafadī calls *tawriya ba'īda* (far-fetched *tawriya*), for which I gave an account in section 1.1.3.2.3. None of the words in the first hemistich are *tawriyas* in the form that they are uttered, but they nevertheless have the power to lead the reader towards a discovery. I think that this shows how the context of the enunciation and the reader's encyclopaedic knowledge play a fundamental role in decoding the poetry. First, the reader must be acquainted with the art of *wirāqa* to detect the hints leading to the decoding of the two-fold meaning. Second, would this epigram have had the same effect if its composer had not been al-Warrāq/a bookbinder? The fact that the poet's instance enters directly into the narrative of the text creates the basis on which the reader develops his or her path through the text. In the absence of clear guidelines in the sources, I tend to consider these *tawriyas ba'īda* – or, rather, 'suggested meanings' created by the co-text – as an essential element for the development of *tawriya* in the second line, although they cannot be defined as *lawāzim*. The best solution seems to be to consider this epigram as an example of *tawriya ba'īda* and *tawriya muhayya'a*, since, if we only consider the two words *waṣl* and *warrāq*, they are dependent on each other.

16 سراج الدين الوراق، من الكامل

يا خجلتي وضحائفي سودًا غَدْتُ * صحائفُ الأبرارِ في إشراقِ

وَمَوْبِخٍ لِي فِي الْقِيَامَةِ قَائِلٍ * أَكْذَا تَكُونُ صَحَائِفُ الْوَرَّاقِ²⁹

O my shame! My *papers/records of actions* are/is black, while the records of the pious became shining.

Someone will say, blaming me at the final judgment: 'Are the *papers/records* of the *copyist/al-Warrāq* so?'

I will not elaborate on this epigram as it presents elements that we have already seen in the comment on epigram no. 11. It is clear that, in the context of the enunciation of the epigram, it is the poet who reports about his life, the *qarīb* meaning of the word *ṣahā'if* being 'sheets of paper', since it is the primary work tool of a *warrāq*. The

²⁹ Ibn Hiğga (*Kaṣf*, 62-63, 149; *Hižāna*, 2:308, 3:202).

ba'īd meaning of *ṣaḥā'if* is instead the Koranic meaning of the word *ṣuḥuf* in (Q 81:10), i.e. 'records of actions' containing the earthly actions of every human being. If one wanted to split hairs and apply al-Ṣafadī theory to the letter, one could say that the use of the plural *ṣaḥā'if* to mean *ṣuḥuf* is an example of erroneous homonymy, as the plural form *ṣaḥā'if* is not attested in the Koran with this meaning and therefore *tawriya* should not be considered as such, it is actually no *tawriya* at all. But, as we also saw in example no. 9, poets do not limit their inventiveness to perfect homographs and homophones; and this is a fundamental difference between theory and practice which demonstrates how the aesthetic aspect and the search for particular stylistic effects often transcend the limits imposed by a theory perhaps unable to depict all the nuances of literary production. The narrative therefore develops on two readings, both of which are valid. As a *warrāq*, the poet owns and works with paper and parchment, and the fact that they are blackened introduces an antithetical vision compared to the normal course of things. The poet's intended meaning is instead that of 'records of actions' supported by two *lawāzim*: *abrār* and *yawm al-qiyāma*. For this reason, *tawriya* is a *mubayyana*.

17 سراج الدين الوراق، من المنسرح

شعريتي مذ رمدتُ قد حبستُ * طرُفي عنكم فصرتُ محبوسا

فالحمد لله زادني سرفًا * كنتُ سراجًا فصرتُ فانوسا³⁰

Since when my eyes became inflamed, my veil debarred my sight from you, so I
became a prisoner.

Praised be God, who increased myself in dignity: I was *Sirāğ/a lamp* and I became a
lantern.

This epigram by al-Warrāq, as well as the previous and the following, perfectly represents the anecdote quoted by Ibn Ḥiğġa (*Kašf*, 59; *Ḥizāna*, 3:198) about the poetry of al-Warrāq: "It was said to Sirāğ al-Dīn al-Warrāq 'If it were not for your nickname and profession, half of your compositions would never have existed'". While the play on words in the previous epigrams was based on his profession, this

³⁰ Ibn Ḥiğġa (*Kašf*, 59-60; *Ḥizāna*, 3:198).

and the next are based on the ambiguity of his proper name: Sirāġ. In the first line, the poet compares his condition to that of a prisoner. His jailer is not a real person, but the inflammation of the eye, probably caused by his work as a copyist and bookbinder, makes him partially blind; this partial blindness forces him to wear a veil to protect his eyes, with this veil being the bars of his prison: he has to wear the veil to protect his sight, but the veil prevents his seeing the person whom he loves. In the second line, the unhappiness caused by not being able to see the beloved is mitigated by the fact that this lack has actually increased his inner virtue, because perhaps the beloved was male or because this relationship would have been illicit. This transforms the poet *Sirāġ* from the lamp he was in a lantern, therefore increasing the fire of his virtue, while the 'light' decreased. Fānūs is the *lāzim* of the *manà ba'īd* and the *tawriya* is *mubayyana*.

18 سراج الدين الوراق، من الخفيف

شاقني للنصير شعراً بديعاً * ولمثلي في الشعر نَقْدُ بصير
 ثُمَّ لَمَّا سَمِعْتُ بِاسْمِكَ فِيهِ * قُلْتُ نَعْمَ الْمَوْلَى وَنَعْمَ النَّصِيرُ³¹

A *badī'* (or: new) poem for the protector/by al-Naṣīr delighted me, and people like me have an acute criticism in poetry.

Then, when I heard your name on it, I said: 'What an excellent lord, what an excellent protector/al-Naṣīr.'

Here we have another example of correspondence between literati. As al-Ṣafadī (*Wāfī*, 27:66) and Ibn Ḥiġġa (*Kaṣf*, 65; *Ḥizāna*, 3:201) report, this epigram was recited by al-Warrāq after listening to a *qaṣīda* by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ḥammāmī (d. 712/1312) in praise of Tāġ al-Dīn.³² It is not the case of a written correspondence, but this epigram elicited the answer of al-Ḥammāmī (epigram no. 19). In analysing this epigram, we should keep in mind that it is a reaction to a recited *madīḥ* poem. The wordplay is based on the name of the poet, i.e. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ḥammāmī and the Koranic verse

³¹ Ibn Ḥiġġa (*Kaṣf*, 65-66; *Ḥizāna*, 3:201).

³² Whom I could not identify.

(Q 8:40) which refers to God as *mawlà* and *naṣīr*.³³ This example of *tawriya* is a textual intertwinement which plays on three levels of understanding.

The first *tawriya* is the phrase *li-l-naṣīr* in the first hemistich, which can be read as ‘for the protector’, i.e. addressed to the *mamdūh* Tāğ al-Dīn, or as ‘by al-Naṣīr’, i.e. the composer of the poem. Both readings are possible and equivalent, since the poet’s name is Naṣīr al-Dīn, and the poem which elicited the epigram was addressed most probably to a local lord. Of these two readings, I retain as *ma’nà ba’īd*, the intended meaning, the name of the poet, since I presume that al-Warrāq’s aim was to praise both the lord and the poet, but a little more his friend al-Ḥammāmī. The same *tawriya* can be found in the very last hemistich, for which the same analysis applies, if it were not for a phrase which introduces another reading for the *tawriya*. It is *ni’ma l-mawlà*, which is paired with *ni’ma l-naṣīr*, resulting in a string found in (Q 8:40), where those two epithets refer to God. It is difficult to say whether this Koranic meaning is a third meaning of a *tawriya* or a third meaning in the background which gives more strength to the two-fold meaning of the *tawriya*-words. In my opinion, it is not the case of a three-meaning *tawriya*. Instead, I suggest that the Koranic quotation provides a supporting sense for both readings of the *tawriya*. The result is a greater semantic scope for both real subjects that the two meanings refer to, and therefore both the *mamdūh* and the composer of the *madīh* poem are invested with a certain degree of sacredness, which brings them closer to the divine figure – although not explicitly compared to it. This example is interesting not so much for the discovery of the hidden meanings of the *tawriya*, but as proof of how *tawriya* can be intimately linked to the context of the enunciation and only actualised through it. The reading key is therefore external to the text; if we were not aware of the real context of enunciation in which this epigram was produced, and we are because of the paratext handed down in the sources of the time, then we would not have perceived the double meaning of the word *al-naṣīr* as such. This is because reference to the proper name, in contrast to what we have already seen, is not to the poet himself, but to a third person, as well as the *mamdūh* is a real person that is assumed and implied in the epigram. How to define such a *tawriya*? I think we should classify it

³³ It should be noted that al-Ṭa’ālibī (*Iqtibās*, 2:58) quotes another two-line poem as an example of a bad use of *iqtibās*, for the *mamdūh* is compared to God. Cf. also van Gelder (2002-2003, 7).

simply as *muğarrada* in that there is no *lāzim* referring either to the *qarīb* or the *baʿīd* meaning.

19 النصير الحمّامي (٧١٢/١٣١٢)، من الطويل

أ) وكذّرت حمّامي بغيبتك التي * تكدر من لذاتها صفو مشربي
 ب) وكذّرت حمّامي بغيبتك التي * تكدر فيها العيش من كل مشرب
 فما كان صدر الحوض منشراً بها * ولا كان قلب الماء فيها بطيب³⁴

A) You made *my ḥammām/al-Ḥammāmī* muddy by your absence; there the limpidity of my water became turbid whatever its pleasures [are].

B) You made *my ḥammām/al-Ḥammāmī* muddy by your absence and there the life became afflicted in every watering spot.

And the *surface of the basin/breast* was not pleased by it, nor had *the inner part of the water/heart* within any goodness.³⁵

This epigram is al-Ḥammāmī's reply to his companion al-Warrāq after hearing the words he spent about his composition in praise of the lord. In this epigram, the author expresses the displeasure that he feels for not having seen his friend for a while, and he describes this feeling by comparing himself to his *ḥammām*. In what follows, I develop the interpretation given only by variant A, which is reported by al-Ṣafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 48; *Wāfī*, 27:66), while variant B is reported by Ibn Ḥiğga (*Ḥizāna*, 3:214). This epigram is interesting precisely because there is a personification of a place, the *ḥammām*, which represents the feelings of the poet. The representation of the poet's

³⁴ Al-Ṣafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 48; *Wāfī*, 27:66), Ibn Ḥiğga (*Ḥizāna*, 3:214), Weintritt (2005, 383).

³⁵ Weintritt (2005, 383) bases his translation on the variant B and gives the following translation of the full epigram: "Du hast mein Bad (*ḥammāmī*) durch deine Abwesenheit getrübt in Ihr wollte kein Getränk mehr schmecken. (*takaddara l-ʿayšu min kulli mašrabī*) | Auch die Wasseroberfläche des Beckens (*ṣadru l-ḥawḍi*) konnte nicht mehr erfreuen. Und das Wasser hatte seine Wirkung verloren. (*wa-mā kāna qalbu l-māʾi bi-ṭayyibī*)". I disagree with this translation. I recognise that the word *mašrab* could signify 'beverage' and one must also point out that 'ayš could also be taken with a general meaning of 'food', but I do not think that this image is the one the poet wanted to convey. Is that another 'suggested meaning', a *tawriya nāqiša*? The reader certainly takes up those hints, too. There is another possible reading of the first line: A. *allatī tukaddiru min laḍḍāti-hā ṣafwa mašrabī* (ca.: which (i.e. the *ḥammām* or your absence) turns the limpidity of (my) water into turbidity whatever its pleasures [are].); B. *allatī tukaddiru fī-hā l-ʿayša min kulli mašrabī* (which (i.e. the absence) makes life unpleasant in it (i.e. the *ḥammām*) whatever the watering spot [is]).

persona with the *ḥammām* is uttered in the first line through the *tawriya ḥammāmī*, denoting both the poet and his workplace – for, as his name suggests, he was the owner of several bathhouses (Weintritt, 2005; Bauer, 2016c). He addresses his Interlocutee, saying that his being absent and not visiting him in his *ḥammām*/himself causes the water of the basins to become turbid. This is a metaphor for the innermost part of the poet, thus also the reading my water. Two other *tawriyas* in the second line reinforce this image by completing the personification of the place. The word *ḥawḍ* (the basin inside a *ḥammām*) is connected and recalls the word *mašrab* in the first line. The basin of a bathhouse contains water, whose surface (*ṣadr*) represents the breast of the poet, and the inner part (*qalb*) of it represents his heart. The personification of the place occurs not through a metaphorical or metonymic process, but through a *tawriya*, i.e. through a single expression denoting two distinct things. Hence, *ṣadr* and *qalb* do not stand for the poet, but are the poet himself; and they are the surface of the water and its interior at the same time. The interpretation of these two expressions is a branch issued from the main *tawriya* expressed by the word *ḥammāmī*, which denotes at the same time the place and the poet. In this case, the double reading is perfect since both meanings actualise an independent narrative schema. Nevertheless, it is from their union that the complex meaning of the epigram is intended, i.e. the description of a person's most intimate feelings, reached through the description of a place. And it is precisely the description of the place that is predominant in this epigram, although it is not the meaning intended by the poet (*ba'īd*), even if it is supported by the second hemistich of the first line, whose image of clear (*ṣafw*) water become turbid (*takaddara*) – a well-made example of *ṭibāq* – suggests and strengthens the *qarīb* meaning, i.e. the 'spatial' reading. For this reason, I will classify this *tawriya* as a *muraššaḥa*.

20 النصير الحماي، من مجزوء الرجز

لي منزلٌ معروفُهُ * يُنْهَلُ غَيْثًا كَالسُّحْبِ

أَقْبَلُ ذَا الْعُدْرِ بِهِ * وَأُكْرِمُ الْجَارَ الْجُنُبِ³⁶

I have a house whose favour gives rain to drink like the clouds.

³⁶ Al-Ṣafadī (*Fadd*, 48), Ibn Ḥiḡḡa (*Hizāna*, 1:431, 3:214).

In it, I receive who has an excuse, and I honour *the stranger neighbour/who needs to perform the total ablution*.

This last epigram by al-Ḥammāmī takes us once again to his working place, the *ḥammām*. The poet presents his bathhouse to us as a home, a place where one descends, and where the pleasure one feels inside is described as reviving rainwater, water that is the basis of the bathhouse's functioning and an essential element of the washing and purification process inside the *ḥammām*. These are in fact the two main purposes for which a *ḥammām* is visited.³⁷ The last hemistich refers precisely to this through a *tawriya*. The textual segment *al-ḡār al-ḡunub* is part of (Q 4:36) and in that context it means 'the neighbour not belonging to the same family, not related by kinship'. This meaning enters the epigram and is perceived by the reader as the *qarīb* meaning. The other side of *tawriya*, its *ba'īd* meaning, is linked to the aspects of ritual purity in Islamic law. More precisely, the term *ḡunub* refers to the state of major impurity (*ḡanāba*) in which the individual finds himself after practising coitus, and for which the major ablution (*ḡusl*) is prescribed, as it is mentioned in (Q 4:43). This is the meaning intended by the poet. At this point, an erotic reading of the entire epigram is possible. For example, we could trace the pleasure mentioned in the first line to sexual pleasure, while the life-giving water of the rains can be read as the effluvium of sperm after orgasm. This is the reason why the visitor of this house is in a state of impurity and needs to perform the ablution. Since there is no *lāzim* referring to any of the meanings, it is a *tawriya muḡarrada*.

21 صفي الدين الحلي (٧٤٩/١٣٤٨)، من الوافر

وَسَاقٍ مِّنْ بَنِي الْأَتْرَاكِ طَفُلٍ * أَتَيْهُ بِهِ عَلَى جَمْعِ الرِّفَاقِ
أَمَلَّكُهُ قِيَادِي وَهُوَ رِقِّي * وَأَفْدِيهِ بِعَيْنِي وَهُوَ سَاقِي³⁸

A tender Turkish cupbearer, with him I lose my way together with the companions.

³⁷ They are not the only aims, however. The literature about the *ḥammām* and its practices is vast and impossible to present here. See, for reference, Rizzo (2018), where I summarise the most important facts about *ḥammām* practice and how they play a role in the reader's understanding of poetry.

³⁸ Ṣafī l-Dīn al-Ḥillī (*Dīwān*, 315), Ibn Ḥiḡḡa (*Kaṣf*, 60; *Ḥizāna*, 3:524).

He is my slave, but I make him rule me. I ransom him with *my eye/myself*, but he is *my leg/‘my cupbearer’*.

Even if Ṣafī l-Dīn al-Ḥillī was the most well-known poet of the 8th/14th century (Heinrichs, 2012e), he was not considered the most versed in the use of *tawriya* (Ibn Ḥiǧǧa, *Ḥizāna*, 3:523-524). Nonetheless, he is still of major importance for the study of *badī* devices and for the poetry of the epoch, as we have already seen. It is therefore worth presenting a few examples of his poetry here.

This *ǧazal* epigram fits into the subgenre of compositions aimed at young professionals or servants, and does not have a particularly complex structure. The pun on which *tawriya* is based is the homonymous word *sāq*. In the first line, it is to be understood only as ‘cupbearer’, while, at the end of the second line, it assumes its double meaning of ‘cupbearer’ (intended meaning, *baʿīd*) and ‘leg’ (*qarīb* meaning). This doubling of meaning is made possible by another homonymous word in the previous phrase: namely, *ʿaynī*. As we have already seen, *ʿayn* is the classic example of homonymy, and it keeps this ambiguous aspect in this epigram by returning the *qarīb* meaning ‘my eye’ and the *baʿīd* meaning ‘myself’. Here, the reading based on the *qarīb* meanings therefore leads to the coupling of the words ‘eye’ and ‘leg’, a reading that does not return a full understandable meaning to the epigram. On the other hand, the reading based on the *baʿīd* meanings returns the image of a poet whose affection for the cupbearer led him to lose his mind and friends, to the point that, despite the cupbearer being his slave, the roles are inverted and the young man commands his master so much that he is ready to redeem his servant with his own person. This ‘improbable’ *tawriya*, i.e. the fact that the cupbearer is a poet’s leg, leads Ibn Ḥiǧǧa (*Ḥizāna*, 3:524) to suggest that Ṣafī l-Dīn al-Ḥillī’s attempt to use a *tawriya* was unsuccessful, and that this proves that the use of this figure was not his speciality.

Given the interconnection of the two *tawriyas*, this epigram can be classified as an example of *tawriya muhayyaʿa*.

22 صفي الدين الحلي، من الطويل

ولم أنسَ إذ زارَ الحبيبُ بروضةٍ * وقد غَفَلتُ عنَّا وُشاةٌ ولوأمُ

وقد فرشَ الوردُ الخُدودَ ونُسِّرتْ * لمقدّمه للسوسنِ العَضِّ أعلامُ
أقولُ وطرفُ النرجسِ العَضِّ شاخصٌ * إلينا وللنمّامِ حوْلِي إِنْمامُ
أيا رَبُّ حَتَّى فِي الحِداثِ أَعِينُ * عَلِينا وَحَتَّى فِي الرِّياحِينِ نَمّامُ³⁹

I have never forgotten when the beloved came to visit in the garden whilst
calumniators and blamers were neglectful of us.

The rose displayed on the cheeks and has been spread out, whilst banners
[announce] the arrival of the fresh *lily/beloved*.

I say, whilst the glance of the tender *narcissus/eye* was raising and around me there
was a dream vision of the *mint/calumniator*:

‘O my Lord! Even in the gardens there are spies watching me and even among the
aromatic plants there is *some mint/a calumniator*.”

Unlike the previous example, Ibn Ḥiğğā (*Ḥizāna*, 3:260) considers this epigram a good example of *tawriya*, even if he emphasises that the motif is inspired by an epigram of Badr al-Dīn Ibn Lu’lu’ al-Dahabī.⁴⁰ Although not a poem devoted entirely to nature and plants, the motif of the description of the garden and its flowers fits perfectly to frame a *ḡazal* epigram. This poem describes a typical theme of the *ḡazal* and of the *zahriyyāt*,⁴¹ the category to which Ṣafī I-Dīn al-Ḥillī’s *Dīwān* assigns these lines: namely, the meeting between the two lovers is disturbed by a spy, a slanderer, who ruins the love idyll. Unlike the previous example, this epigram actualises a double reading of the *tawriya*, the two readings being consistent with the co-text. The text opens by describing a loving encounter in a garden, which takes place away from the prying eyes of spies and blamers. A rose appears on the cheeks of the beloved, a metaphor for the redness of his cheeks due to the shame that he feels. Unfortunately,

³⁹ Ṣafī I-Dīn al-Ḥillī (*Dīwān*, 360), Ibn Ḥiğğā (*Kaṣf*, 60; *Ḥizāna*, 3:260).

⁴⁰ From which Ibn Nubāta (d. 768/1366) will also draw inspiration. Ibn Nubāta (*Dīwān*, 477), Ibn Ḥiğğā (*Kaṣf*, 97-98, *Ḥizāna*, 3:260).

وَأَهَيْفَ يَنْهَبُ أَرْواحنا * ووجهه كالروضِ بَسامُ
تَنْمُ حَداهُ بِقتلِ الورى * فَخَدُهُ وَرَدُّ وَنَمّامُ

A slender one plunders our souls while his face is smiling like the garden.

His cheeks reveal the assassination of the mankind; therefore, his cheek is rose and *mint/calumniator*.

⁴¹ The *zahriyyāt*, *nawriyyāt*, *rawḍiyyāt*, and *rabīyyāt*, i.e. poetic compositions devoted to the description of flowers, gardens, and spring, are a genre that had considerable development in Arabic literature, especially in the Abbasid era. In this regard, see Schoeler (1974, 2012).

this love idyll cannot last long. While the tender narcissus, which symbolises the gaze of the beloved, settles on his lover, the most nefarious vision of those who spy on the encounter appears: a hidden slanderer ready to betray the two lovers, hidden like a mint plant between the other fragrant flowers and grass. The use of the ‘rose’ metaphor to signify the cheeks of the beloved and ‘narcissus’ to signify his eyes is a widely attested use in Arabic literature (Heinrichs, 1991; 2012c), (Glünz, 2012). What makes their use interesting in the epigram is that their metaphorical interpretation takes on the role of the intended meaning (*baʿīd*) of a *tawriya*. In the same way, the lily, besides representing the flower, can be interpreted as the beloved. Finally, there is one last *tawriya* in the word *nammām*, i.e. mint and slanderer. Ibn Ḥiǧǧa’s positive judgment on the poem is certainly due to the perfect double reading of the epigram. The first reading is the description of the garden and the meeting of the two lovers represented by flowers, a meeting that is disturbed by mint, a strong aromatic plant grown amongst other sweet and fragrant herbs. The second reading is in contrast a ‘humanised’ reading of nature, with each flower and plant mentioned corresponding to human figures or sensory organs. It is precisely by virtue of this double reading that I consider the words ‘rose’ and ‘narcissus’, as well as ‘lily’ and ‘mint’, to be not simply metaphors, but real *tawriyas* that are capable of developing two independent, but also interdependent, textual readings. This is an example of *tawriya muǧarrada*, since the double meaning of these words is not suggested by any particular *lāzim*. Unless *rawḍa* in the first line is considered a *lāzim* of the *qarīb* meaning, and *wuṣṣā* and *lawwām* are considered *lawāzim* of the *baʿīd* meaning – in this case, too, though, it would be a *tawriya muǧarrada*.

23 إبراهيم المعمار (١٣٤٨-١٣٤٩/٧٤٩)، من البسيط

لَمَّا تَبَدَّى عِذَارُ الْخَدِّ قُلْتُ لَهُ: * رِفْقًا وَمَهْلًا عَلَيْهِ أَيُّهَا الْجَانِي
وَلَا تُخَسِّنْ فَمَا فِي ذَاكَ مُحْتَمَلٌ * بَأَنْ يُخَطَّ عَلَيْهِ عِرْقُ رِيحَانٍ⁴²

I said to him, when the cheek-down beard appeared: ‘Tenderness and gentleness towards it, *you who plucks his hair/you criminal!*’

⁴² Al-Mi‘mār (*Dīwān*, no. 579), Ibn Ḥiǧǧa (*Kaṣf*, 179; *Ḥizāna*, 3:413).

And do not be rough! Since doing it is unbearable, for the root of the basil should be written on it (i.e. on the cheek).

Ibrāhīm al-Mi'mār (d. 749/1348-49) was another representative of the productive *Bürgerium*. As his name suggests, he was a master-builder and well rooted in the productive fabric of Cairo. Indeed, this meant that his activity as a poet was not aimed primarily at obtaining the means of subsistence. Nonetheless, he was a valuable and appreciated poet in his time, and his poems were read widely. Like his predecessors, he introduced many technical terms from his craft into his compositions, often as *tawriya* (Bauer, 2002; Özkan, 2013). The epigrams that I will present by this poet belong mainly to the *ġazal* and *muġūn*-erotic genre, with the latter being especially prevalent in his *diwan*.

This first epigram is an example of *ġazal* and describes when the lover's attentions turn to a young man whose cheeks are beginning to grow hair, a sign that time is passing and that he is becoming an adult man, the external sign of which is a thick beard that will grow on his face (Bauer, 2014b). This early beard is the source of attraction, and the Interlocutor reprimands his Interlocutee and apostrophises him with the word *al-ġānī*, which is the *tawriya* on which the epigram is based. The two meanings of this *nomen agentis* are: 'the one who gathers', 'the one who plucks' (from the verb *ġanà*), which is its primary meaning; and 'criminal', i.e. the one who commits a *ġināya*. In this two-line poem, both meanings return a correct reading of the epigram, as the Interlocutor reprimands his Interlocutee and begs him not to touch the early beard because it is a sign of his beauty. He also compares it to the root of the basil (another well-known metaphor used in the *ġazal* genre), which writes on the cheek and makes it even more beautiful. Both meanings of the *tawriya* return a correct reading and no *lāzim* refers to either the *qarīb* or the *ba'īd* meaning. If we really wish to designate which one is the *qarīb* and which one is the *ba'īd*, I would prefer 'criminal' as the intended meaning, for it conveys a stronger meaning. It is therefore a case of *tawriya muġarrada*.

كَلْفِي بِطَبَّاحٍ تَنَوَّعَ حُسْنُهُ * وَمِزَاجُهُ لِلْعَاشِقِينَ يُوَافِقُ

لكن مَخَافِي من جَفَاهُ وكم غَدَّتْ * منه قلوبٌ في الصدورِ حَوَافِقُ⁴³

I loved a cook whose beauty is multiform, and his *mixture/temperament* is suitable for the lovers.

However, how many palpitating hearts in the breasts went away from him fearing his harshness.

This epigram is an example of the *ġazal* genre addressed to a young professional or craftsman – a topic which has many examples in the literature of the epoch (Bauer, 20013a; 2014b). The protagonist of this two-line poem is a beautiful cook, whose behaviour is so harsh that people, although attracted by his beauty, shy away from him. It is nonetheless precisely this characteristic that makes the cook charming. It is his *mizāġ* which distinguishes him from others, and the *tawriya* lies in this word. As the *qarīb* meaning, I adopt the reading ‘mixture’, which denotes the product of the cooking process, i.e. a drink or food mixture, as in (Q 76:5, 17) and (Q 83:27); as the *ba’īd* meaning, I adopt the technical term of medicine, which denotes ‘temperament’, i.e. the balance of the four fundamental elements constituting the human temperament (Sanagustin, 2012). The poet’s intended meaning was not to present a cook whose culinary qualities had an aphrodisiac effect that enabled him to trap his customers. Rather, he wanted to describe him as a man with a strong temperament, most probably dominated by fire, an element which is also linked to his profession as a cook. In this interpretation, the word *ṭabbāḥ* is the supporting *lāzim* referring to the *qarīb* meaning, and therefore the *tawriya* is *muraššaḥa*.

25 إبراهيم المعمار، من السريع

حَاكَمْتُ فِي شَرِّعِ الْهُوَى قَاتِلِي * وَلي دَمٌ طُلَّ عَلَى خَدِّهِ

فَانْتَهَمَ الْحَاكِمُ لِحَظًّا لَهُ * تَحَقَّقَ الْفِتْنَةَ مِنْ عِنْدِهِ

مَالَ إِلَى الْحَقِّ فَلَمَّا رَأَى * قَدَّ حَبِيبِي مَالَ مَعَ قَدِّهِ⁴⁴

⁴³ Al-Mi’mār (Dīwān, no. 333), Ibn Ḥiġġa (Kašf, 182-183; Ḥizāna, 3:414-415).

⁴⁴ Al-Mi’mār (Dīwān, no. 159), Ibn Ḥiġġa (Kašf, 183; Ḥizāna, 3:415).

I summoned to judgment my murderer before the law of love, and my blood was
shed unavenged on his cheek.

The judge suspected [him] just looking at him, then confirmed that the temptation
was caused by him.

He took the way of justice, but after he had seen the figure of my beloved, *he took
the side of his whip/*he took the side of his figure.

This epigram represents an interesting use of the legal setting – an example of literature called *fiqhīyyāt*⁴⁵ – to describe unrequited love or love with an unhappy ending. The lover is described as the victim of a murderer, who killed his love and his deepest feelings – so much so, in fact, that the victim’s blood is flowing unavenged on the beloved’s cheeks. This metaphor turns the image of the blood-stained red cheeks of the lover into evidence of the crime. In order to gain revenge, the lover goes to the judge, who cannot but confirm that the beloved was responsible for the fatal temptation, and the judge orders him to be punished. But a *tawriya* in the last line leads to a double reading. If we take the reading suggested by the meaning of *qadd* (‘whip’), which is a punishment adopted for both *ḥadd* and *ta’zīr* crimes (Carra de Vaux and Schacht, 2012; Dien, 2012), then the judge decrees immediately after seeing the figure (*qadd*) of the beloved that he be flogged. But it is the second reading that the poet wants to convey: namely, as soon as he sees the figure (*qadd*) of the beloved, the judge ‘takes the parts of his figure’ (*qadd*) and, like the lover before him, is struck by fatal attraction. There are numerous *lawāzim* supporting the reading of *qarīb* as ‘whip’ and recalling the legal setting: the verb *ḥākama* (‘to summon to judgment’), *šar’* (‘Islamic law’), *qātil* (‘murder’), *dam ṭulla* (‘unavenged blood’), *ḥākim* (‘judge’), *ḥaqq* (‘justice’), all of which support the *qarīb* meaning and make the *tawriya* an example of *muraššaha*.

26 إبراهيم المعمار، من السريع

وشادنٍ ليس له شاربٌ * ولا عذارٍ بل له طرّة

⁴⁵ For an introduction to the link that binds literature and legal discourse, and how these two spheres sometimes intertwine, see Szombathy (2018).

كِفَايَتِي مِنْ رِيْقِهِ سَرِيَّةٌ * وَآ حَسْرَتِي مِنْهُ عَلَى جَرَّةٍ⁴⁶

A young he-gazelle, who has neither moustache nor beard, but has a forelock.
A draught of his saliva suffices me. *O could I capture him in the trap! / O could I have
a jar of it!*

This *ġazal* epigram is a classic example of the genre. The beloved is described metaphorically as a gazelle, which is then humanised through the description of his being beardless. The beloved boy has neither moustache nor beard, but only a forelock that attracts the attention of the lover, who hopes to have at least one small drop of his saliva. The *tawriya* develops in the last hemistich, where a double reading of the word *ġarr* is suggested by two different *lawāzim* previously uttered. The first meaning (*qarīb*) is suggested by the *lāzim šādin* and is conveyed by the word *ġarr*, which in this case means ‘trap, snare’. Therefore, the image conveyed is that of the lover’s wish to be able to entrap the beautiful gazelle/beloved. The second meaning is suggested by the word ‘saliva’ (*rīq*) and is conveyed by the word *ġarr(a)* with its meaning of ‘jar’. This conveys the image of the lover who wants a jar full of the beloved’s saliva. This is a perfect double reading generated by a *tawriya muġarrada* and supported by two *lawāzim*.

27 إبراهيم المعمار، من الوافر

سَأَلْتُ وَصَالَ حُبِّي قَالَ: دَعْنِي * فَإِنَّكَ فِي افْتِقَارٍ لَا يُجَابُ
فَقُلْتُ لَهُ: حَبِيبَ الْقَلْبِ أَدْعَى * بِذِي فَقْرٍ وَفِي وَسْطِي نِصَابٌ⁴⁷

I asked for a meeting with my beloved, but he said: ‘Leave me alone since you are in
a state of need which will not be answered!’

I replied to him: ‘My sweetheart, I am called the one who is in need, and *at my
waist there is something on which one should pay the tax / there is a handle at my
waist.*’

⁴⁶ Al-Mi‘mār (Dīwān, no. 224), Ibn Hiǧǧa (*Kašf*, 190; *Hiǧāna*, 3:419-420).

⁴⁷ Al-Mi‘mār (Dīwān, no. 45), Ibn Hiǧǧa (*Kašf*, 187; *Hiǧāna*, 3:423-424).

With this epigram, we begin to venture into a terrain that is halfway between the genres of *ġazal* and *muġūn*. In this text, the explicit and questionable act is not uttered openly, but instead suggested somehow, and the reader is responsible for taking these clues to develop the meaning expressed by this play of spoken-unspoken. The epigram opens with the request for a meeting, i.e. the union of lover and beloved (*wiṣāl*), with the latter refusing the former's 'state of need'. The Interlocutor's answer is ambiguous because it admits two readings based on the double meaning of the word *niṣāb*. The first is introduced by and linked to the word *faqr* ('need, poverty'), which introduces the idea of a lover in need of daily sustenance. For this reason, this *lāzim* suggests reading *niṣāb* as a technical term of Muslim law, i.e. the minimum amount of wealth on which the *zakāt* must be paid (Zysow, 2012). The image conveyed by this reading is that of a poet in need, whose sole wealth hangs from his waist, a wealth large enough to pay upon it a share of alms. On the other hand, though, the second reading exploits the literal meaning of *niṣāb*, intended as a 'handle, e.g. of a knife' hanging from the lover's waist. This refers metaphorically to the penis, which assumes in itself the need previously attributed to the lover. The image is that of a man whose only need is to satisfy his sexual organ. Although both meanings develop two valid readings, I consider the legal meaning to be *qarīb*, and the sexual metaphorical meaning to be *ba'īd*. These two meanings develop from the *tawriya*-word, with the *lawāzim istiḳār* and *faqr* linked to the *qarīb* meaning. It is therefore a case of *tawriya muraššaḥa*.

28 إبراهيم المعمار، من مجزوء الرمل

رُبَّ جَزَارٍ هَوَاهُ * صَارَ بِي دَمًا وَلَحْمًا
فُزْتُ بِالْأَلْيَةِ مِنْهُ * وَاُمْتَلَا قَلْبِي شَحْمًا⁴⁸

What a butcher! My love for him became to me blood and flesh.

*I acquired from him some tail fat/*I gained his buttocks*, then my heart became full of bad fat.*

⁴⁸ Al-Mi'mār (*Dīwān*, no. 409), Ibn Hiġġa (*Kašf*, 183; *Hiżāna*, 3:415).
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With this two-line poem, we approach the *muğūn* genre, and it can be classified in the sub-category that Bauer (2014a, 164) defines as “highly explicit”. As in epigram no. 24, the central figure is a craftsman, in this case a butcher, and the lexicon used in this poem refers to his craft. The love expressed for this butcher is not spiritual, but carnal, to such an extent that the poet defines it as flesh and blood. The *tawriya* is found at the beginning of the second line, where the poet says that he acquired from the butcher some *alya*, which has as its first meaning (*qarīb*) the fat tail of a sheep or goat, which was considered a delicacy (Rodinson, 2012). On the other, the second meaning (*ba'īd*) conveyed by *alya* is that of ‘buttocks’, and refers to the butcher’s backside, suggesting that the poet had intercourse with him. This reading is all the more valid if we consider the last hemistich of the second line, where the poet reports that acquiring the *alya* resulted in the development of *šahm* in his heart, i.e. the fat that surrounds the internal organs, the eating of which is forbidden. The contrast is between the fat that is allowed (*alya*) and the fat that is prohibited (*šahm*), and the double reading of the *tawriya* yields two images. The first is that of the poet who buys a piece of fat tail and eats it, thereby increasing the fat inside his body, and the second suggests that, by eating *alya*, i.e. having intercourse with the butcher, the poet now has due to the sinful action a weight on his heart symbolised by the fat *šahm*. The epigram’s co-text contains *lawāzim*, which suggest the *ma'nà qarīb*, such as *ğazzār*, *dam*, and *lahm*, and the *tawriya* is therefore *muraššaḥa*.

29 إبراهيم المعمار، من مجزوء الكامل

أَطْعَمْتُ أَيْرِي كِي يِنَا * مَ وَقَلْتُ قَرَّ فَمَا اسْتَقَرُّ

بَل قَامَ يَسْعَى قَائِلًا * أَنَا مَن إِذَا طُعِمَ انْتَسَرُّ⁴⁹

I fed my penis so that it could sleep. I said: ‘Rest!’ But it did not.

Instead, it began being active saying: ‘I am the one which *goes after having eaten/becomes erected when it has been fed.*’

This epigram is an example of *muğūn* in which the *tawriya* is an *iqtibās*. The epigram is a dialogue between the poet and his insatiable penis, and is an example of the

⁴⁹ Al-Mi‘mār (*Dīwān*, no. 244), Ibn Ḥiğḡa (*Kašf*, 186; *Ḥizāna*, 3:423).

ayriyya genre, i.e. poems whose main character is the penis (Bauer, 2002). Despite having been fed (which most likely refers to masturbation), the penis shows no sign of losing its erection. The reason for this is expressed in the Koranic verse (Q 33:53), which refers to how diners should behave when invited to the prophet's table: after eating, they should leave (*intašara*) and not stay for idle chatter. The Koranic meaning is the *ma'nà qarīb*, while the *ba'īd* is based on the twofold meaning of the verb *intašara*, which, when referring to the penis, is understood as 'being erected'. If the subject were not the penis (*ayrī*), the twofold meaning of the *tawriya*-word would not have been understood, and the *tawriya* is therefore *muhayya'a*.

30 إبراهيم المعمار، من المنسرح

أيري مع المُرْدِ خَابَ مَنَجْرُهُ * مذ عاملوه المَعَارِ النَّصْبَةَ
فَضَّيَعُوا رَأْسَ مَالٍ حَاصِلِهِ * وَأَكْسَرُوهُ وَقَامَ بِالثُّقْبَةِ⁵⁰

The business of my penis failed with the beardless youths, since they made it
stumble in a snare.

They wasted the *residual capital/residual of the glans*, broke it, then it came to lie in
a hole/then it stood up in the anus.

This *muğūn* epigram is based on the use of a trade-related lexicon to convey a sexual sense. The protagonist is once again the penis, which unlike in the previous epigram, is not described as powerful, but instead as a loser, as it is unable to cope with young beardless boys, who have set a trap and deceived it. The reading could be improved if we see the term *murd* (sing. *Amrad*) as connoting 'rent-boy', as Bauer has already hypothesised (2014a, 179). The theme of business is mentioned in the first line in the word *matğar*, and is taken up again in the second line in the two *tawriya*-words. In the first hemistich of the second line, the *ra's māl* phrase has as its first meaning (*qarīb*) 'capital', suggested by the *lāzim matğar*. This word could also be interpreted as 'glans', which is suggested by the word *ayrī* in the first line. A second *tawriya* can be found in the word *tuqba*, which refers to the *qarīb* meaning if understood as a

⁵⁰ Al-Mi'mār (*Dīwān*, no. 37), Ibn Ḥiğğā (*Kašf*, 184; *Ḥizāna*, 3:420).
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‘hole in the capital’, but refers to the *baʿīd* meaning if understood as ‘the anus’ in which the broken penis lies. This is an example of *tawriya muğarrada*.

31 إبراهيم المعمار، من السريع

عُمَيْرَةٌ قَامَ يَبْتَغِي نَكْدِي * جلدتهُ ثمَّ قلتُ يا ولدي

ها أنت في قبضتي فطاوغي * وإن تُعاصي خُصاك تَحْت يدي⁵¹

The little ‘*Umar/penis* stood up desiring the last drop of my milk, so I flogged him/I masturbated, then I said: ‘Boy, you are in my *power/hand*, so comply with me. If you resist, [remember that] your testicles are *in my power/under my hand*.’

This *muğūn* epigram is an example of a perfect double reading in which the poet plays on the two levels of childish behaviour and sexual fulfilment. The speaker addresses ‘*umayra*, a noun which can be interpreted in two ways, either as the diminutive of the proper name ‘Umar, i.e. little ‘Umar, or as the penis. The whole epigram hinges on this ambiguity. In wanting and demanding to be satisfied, the boy/penis annoys the protagonist,⁵² whose response is a *tawriya* which continues the double reading of the text. The reaction that the boy/penis elicits after his/its request is to be flogged/masturbated, which is possible due to the twofold meaning of the verb *ğalada*, which conveys the sense ‘to flog’ when connected to the boy, but the meaning ‘to masturbate’ when applied to the penis. The epigram continues with a passage of direct speech addressed to the Interlocutee that warns the boy/penis to comply with the Interlocutor’s will and to stay quiet, since the Interlocutor keeps him/it in his *qabḍa*, a *tawriya*-word that, as we have already seen in chapter 3, can be understood in its proper meaning of ‘I grasp you in my hand’ when referring to

⁵¹ Al-Mi‘mār (*Dīwān*, no. 177), Ibn Ḥiğğā (*Kašf*, 186; *Ḥizāna*, 3:422).

⁵² The verb *nakida*, of which *nakad* is the *nomen verbi*, can be interpreted in this epigram as ‘to give little, to refuse to give [what one wants or requests]’, so the first line could run as follows: The little ‘*Umar/penis* stood up desiring what I refuse [to give him] [...]. On the other hand, this verb also designates ‘a camel which has scarce milk, or a well having little water’, which gives the reading I suggested in my translation. The alternative translation for the first line might be considered even better than what I have used in the text. However, I preferred to give an interpretation which strengthens the double reading of the epigram, providing the image of a child complaining about having more milk and that of the penis wanting to reach orgasm until every drop of sperm is spent.

the penis, and in its figurative sense of ‘you are in my power’ when referring to the boy. A similar *tawriya* closes the epigram, the expression *taḥta yadī* (the twofold meaning of *yad* has already been discussed in chapter 3) playing on the same opposition of proper meaning and figurative sense. The proper meaning of the expression refers to the testicles, i.e. the testicles are under my hand when masturbating, and the figurative sense is ‘under my power’, i.e. the boy is under my power. As already stated, the epigram yields a perfect double reading, with every element linked to the other, thereby creating a twofold interpretation in which the innuendo is preferred as the intended meaning. Hence, it is an example of *tawriya muhayya’a*.

32 إبراهيم المعمار، من السريع

صَغِيرٌ نَامَ عَلَى وَجْهِهِ * وَقَالَ حَكَّكَ قَلْتُ لَا فَائِدَةَ

فُمٌ وَاذْخِلِ الْعَامُودَ يَا سَيِّدِي * فَقَالَ لَا تَنْخَرِمُ الْقَاعِدَةَ⁵³

A little one (i.e. penis) was lying down, asleep. He said: ‘Rub it!’ I replied: ‘It’s no use!

Stand and let enter the *column/penis*, my lord!’ He replied: ‘The *capital/arse* is not pierced!’

I conclude this section on al-Mi‘mār’s *muğūn* epigrams with a two-line poem where the author uses two *tawriya*-words related to the specific terminology of his profession. The two *tawriya*-words are *‘āmūd* and *qā’ida*, which, like others, al-Mi‘mār often uses in his compositions (Bauer, 2002; 2014a; Özkan, 2013). Once again, the scene depicted is that of a sexual encounter involving a penis and a boy with his buttocks. Although limp, the penis, as soon as it receives the right impulse, is ready to do its duty and stands like a column (*‘āmūd*) to be inserted into its capital (*qā’ida*). The latter also represents the beloved’s buttocks, which are not pierced and cannot accommodate the column inside, however. The use of these two words without any *lāzim* makes the *tawriya* an example of *muğarrada*.

⁵³ Al-Mi‘mār (*Dīwān*, no. 173), Ibn Ḥiğḡa (*Kaṣf*, 186; *Ḥizāna*, 3:422).
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34 إبراهيم المعمار، من مجزوء الرمل

لابن فضل الله فضلٌ * عمَرَ الفضلَ ووَقَّى

كيف لا وهو عَلِيٌّ * عَلِمَ السِّرَّ وأخفى⁵⁴

Ibn Faḍl Allāh has a merit: he revived the donation and paid it in full.

Could it be otherwise since he is [such an] eminent person? He knows the secret and the more hidden.

Al-Mi'mār did not of course compose only *ḡazal* and *muḡūn*. This epigram and the next are two examples of *madīḥ* where *tawriya* plays an important role in reinforcing the praise that the poet wants to convey. As the editors of al-Mi'mār's (*Dīwān*, 107) maintain, the dedicatee of the praise is the *kātib al-sirr* 'Alā' al-Dīn b. Faḍl Allāh (d. 769/1368), to whom the poet dedicated and sent several poems. The opening line repeats the same word (*faḍl*) three times, each time with a different meaning: the name of the *mamdūḥ*, the merit and generosity of the *kātib*, and the favour or donation that he bestows upon people. This repetition is a figure of speech called *ḡinās tāmm* ('perfect paronomasia' (Cachia, 1998, no. 19)). The *tawriya* is at the end of the second line, when, having proclaimed the eminence of Ibn Faḍl Allāh, the poet utters a phrase taken from (Q 20:7). In the Koranic context, this expression refers to God, who knows whatever men utter secretly and even what is not spoken but concealed in the human soul. The *tawriya* plays on the word *sirr*, the whispered secret of the Koran (*qarīb*), which is intended as the role performed by the *mamdūḥ*, i.e. *kātib al-sirr* (*ba'īd*). In doing so, the poet attributes God's characteristics to the secretary, thus reinforcing his praise. As there is no *lāzim*, the *tawriya* is *muḡarrada*.

35 إبراهيم المعمار، من الوافر

أيا بدرَ المَحاسِنِ حُرَّتْ جُودًا * وفضلاً شاعَ بينَ العالمِينا

وَكُنْتَ مِنَ الكِرَامِ فَحُرَّتْ خَطًّا * فَصِرْتَ مِنَ الكِرَامِ الكَاتِبِينا⁵⁵

O full moon of the beauties, you embraced generosity, and your gift is spread all over the worlds.

⁵⁴ Al-Mi'mār (*Dīwān*, no. 321), Ibn Ḥiḡḡa (*Kašf*, 181; *Ḥizāna*, 3:417), Zaḡlūl Sallām (*Adab*, 3:374).

⁵⁵ Al-Mi'mār (*Dīwān*, no. 438), Ibn Ḥiḡḡa (*Kašf*, 181; *Ḥizāna*, 3:418), Zaḡlūl Sallām (*Adab*, 3:374).

You were among the generous and acquired the art of writing, so you became a part of the *writing angels/noble secretaries*.

Highlighting the word *badr* in the first hemistich, Zaġlūl Sallām (*Adab*, 3:374) suggests that this epigram was dedicated to a *kātib* named Badr. It is therefore a *tawriya*, too. Badr is described as possessing the art of writing and as belonging to a group of noble and generous men, the noble secretaries (*kuttāb*). The *tawriya* is in this last phrase, which is quoted from (Q 82:11) and brings its Koranic meaning into the epigram. The Koranic reference to the writing angels, i.e. to those who record human deeds, is the *qarīb* meaning, immediately perceived by the reader. This citation strengthens the efficacy of the praise sustaining the *baʿīd* meaning ‘noble secretaries’ by attributing to it a certain degree of holiness through an unspoken comparison between the *mamdūh* and the angels. The whole co-text suggests the interpretation of the epigram as a *madīh* directed to a secretary, and in particular the word *ḥaṭṭ* (writing) serves as *lāzim* of the *maʿnā baʿīd*, making the *tawriya* an example of *mubayyana*.

36 الوداعي (٧١٦/١٣١٦)، من السريع

تَعَجَّبُوا لَمَّا غَدَتْ أَدْمُعِي * بِيضاً وَرَاحَتْ كَالِدَمِ الْقَانِي

لَا تَعَجَّبُوا طَرْفِي وَرَبِّ الْهَوَى * فَكُلَّ يَوْمٍ هُوَ فِي شَأْنٍ⁵⁶

They marvelled when my tears were white in the morning and became dark red like blood in the evening.

Do not be astonished of my eye! By the Lord of desire: *every day it is engaged in some task/**every day it is engaged in crying*.

‘Alā’ al-Dīn ‘Alī b. Muẓaffar al-Wadā’ī (d. 716/1316) was another important figure who lived between the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century. Originally from Egypt, he lived in Damascus, where he was occupied in the *dīwān al-inšā’* a few years before his death. Ibn Ḥiġġa (*Ḥizāna*, 3:289-291) reports that he was talented in the use of *tawriya* and accused al-Şafadī of not having given space to his poetry and to Ibn Nubāta’s poetry in (*Faḍḍ*). It is worth pointing out regarding these

⁵⁶ Ibn Ḥiġġa (*Kaṣf*, 132; *Ḥizāna*, 3:304-305).

two poets that pre-modern sources, e.g. Ibn Ḥiğġa (*Ḥizāna*, 2:355, 3:291), mention how Ibn Nubāta was ‘inspired’ by al-Wadā’ī’s poetry and ‘borrowed’ many of his motifs – as Zaġlūl Sallām (*Adab*, 3:318) and Bauer (2008a, 16) also mention.

This epigram seems to be a cry of unhappiness uttered by an abandoned lover or a lover who could not be with his beloved. Tears fall from his eyes, which are clear in the morning, but which become tears of blood through suffering. His eyes never stop crying, but are always intent on shedding tears. The last hemistich is the one in which the poet expresses the industriousness of his eye through an *iqtibās* of (Q 55:29) used as a *tawriya*. The Koranic meaning of the phrase *kulla yawmin wa-huwa fī ša’nin* (Every day he [is engaged] in some task) refers to the incessant activity of God, who is never in a state of ‘doing-nothingness’, but is always occupied.⁵⁷ This Koranic meaning is joined by the meaning intended by the poet (*ba’īd*), who resemanticises the line and attributes to the eye the incessant activity that is nothing but constant crying, eternal like the activity of God. The *tawriya* is *muġarrada*, unless we want to attribute the role of the *lāzim* of the *ma’nà qarīb* to *rabb*, in this case making a *tawriya muraššaḥa*.

37 الوداعي، من الطويل

بروحِي غزالٌ راحَ في الحُسْنِ جَنَّةً * تَعَسَّقُتُهُ أَعْمَى فَهَمْتُ مِنَ الْوَجْدِ

إِذَا مَا تَبَدَّى قَائِدًا بِيَمِينِهِ * تَيَقَّنْتُ حَقًّا أَنَّهُ جَنَّةُ الْخَلْدِ⁵⁸

I would ransom with my soul a gazelle in whose beauty one perceived paradise. I fell passionately in love with a blind one and I have lost reason because of the passion.

When he shows himself leading with his right, I know the truth: it is *the garden of the blind rat/the heaven of eternity*.

⁵⁷ The interpretative traditions of this line are varied. As reported by al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Kaššāf*, 6:12-13) and Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (*Tafsīr*, 29: 109-110), a *ḥadīth* of the prophet reports that the occupations of God include listening to the believers, forgiving them, and giving them relief. Other traditions report that for God time is only divided into two, i.e. the creation – and therefore the life of the world – and the day of judgment. Other interpretations report that this line runs counter to the Jewish tradition that God rested on the seventh day.

⁵⁸ Ibn Ḥiğġa (*Kašf*, 125-126; *Ḥizāna*, 2:360-361, 3:296).

With this epigram, I want to show how two different figures are interconnected, with both playing a role in the aesthetic success of the poetic composition. This is a typical *gazal* text in which the object of love has a physical defect, a motif which was not foreign to the poetry of the time (Richardson, 2012). In addition to classifying it as an example of *tawriya*, Ibn Hiǧǧa also places this epigram in the *tawǧīh* chapter as an example of what I have already called *tawǧīh*₂. The technical terms on which the ambiguity of this two-line poem is based are *ǧazāl* and *ḥuld*. The first designates the gazelle (al-Damīrī, *Ḥayāt*, 3: 294-301), which is also a typical way of addressing the beloved, with the metaphor transferring the gazelle's beauty and elegance to the beloved. It could be considered *tawriya* if we wanted to assume metaphrand and metaphier as two meanings of the word, one proper and the other figurative. The true *tawriya/tawǧīh*₂ does not lie here, however. The word that releases the ambiguity is actually *ḥuld*, which in the technical terminology of zoology designates a blind mouse, a mole (al-Damīrī, *Ḥayāt*, 2: 234-242). The other meaning, related to the sense of the verb of which it is the *nomen verbi*, is 'eternity' as it appears in (Q 10:52) and (Q 32:14), where it refers to the eternity of punishment in hell ('*aḍāba l-ḥuldi*'), and in (Q 41:28) to hell itself, which is called *dār al-ḥuld*; or in (Q 20:120), where *šaǧarati l-ḥuldi* (the tree of eternity) is the tree of knowledge of good and evil; or in (Q 21:34), where it refers to the impossibility of eternal life in this world. But what is more important is that, in (Q 25:15), *al-ḥuld* qualifies *al-ǧanna*, i.e. the garden of eternity, paradise, the *ǧannatu l-ḥuldi*, quoted at the very end of the epigram and being an *iqtibās* within it.

Having specified the role of ambiguous words in the text, we can better understand the intertwinement of the themes and the different readings of the epigram and the images that they convey. The beloved is depicted as a gazelle whose beauty manifests the beauty of paradise. The words *ǧazāl* and *ǧanna* introduce in the first line the two isotopies on which the *tawriya* will be actualised: the first is inherent in the animal world and the second in the paradisiacal world. In the second hemistich of the first line, the beloved is qualified as blind, an epithet that reconnects to gazelle, giving the image of a blind gazelle and a beautiful and elegant beloved, who is also blind. In the first hemistich of the second line, the statement that the blind beloved advances with his right hand (*bi-yamīni-hi*) can be interpreted in two ways. Linking this information

to the blindness of the beloved yields the image of a blind boy/gazelle that advances by extending his right hand to feel where he is going, or perhaps to ask for alms. On the other hand, if we reconnect his advancing with his right hand to the paradisiacal setting suggested in the first line, then we obtain a reading recalling (Q 17:71), (Q 69:19), and (Q 84:7), which depict the moment on the day of judgment when those allowed to enter paradise are given the record of their deeds in their right hand, while all others burn in hell. This reference yields a paradisiacal reading, which sees the blind beloved advancing towards the gates of paradise with his right hand outstretched to receive his 'pass' to the eternal garden. These two readings will find their completeness through the *tawriya* in the very last hemistich, where the *qarīb* meaning of the word *ḥuld* ('mole, blind rat') reconnects to the animal isotopy coupled with *ġazāl* on the one hand, and to the blindness isotopy, when coupled with the word *a'mà* and the image of the boy who steps forward with his right hand, feeling the place or asking for alms, on the other. As for the *ba'īd* meaning of the *tawriya*, it is based on the paradisiacal vision put forward in the first line and recalls the Koranic word describing those who are upright entering paradise, and thus conveys the image of a man worthy of entering paradise.

The final statement can also be read as a double meaning conveying both a negative interpretation, i.e. the garden of the blind mouse, and a positive interpretation, i.e. the garden of eternity. Could this be a case of *tawġīh₁/ibhām*? This epigram certainly contains enough semantic density and intercorrelation of internal isotopies to make it an excellent example of *tawriya* and double readings. Given the presence of more than one *lāzim* referring to both meanings, it is appropriate to classify this epigram as an example of *tawriya muġarrada*.⁵⁹

38 الوداعي، من الخفيف

⁵⁹ As I have said, Ibn Nubāta was inspired by some of al-Wadā'ī's motifs and used them in his compositions. He did it with this motif, too, as quoted in Ibn Ḥiġġa (*Kašf*, 126; *Ḥizāna*, 2:361, 3:296). This epigram is found in his *dīwān*: Ibn Nubāta (*Dīwān*, 162).

أفديه أعمى مُعمداً لحظه * ليرتعي في خده الوردِي
تمكنت عيناَي من خده * فقلت هذي جنة الخلد

May I ransom a blind one whose glance is sheathed, that one may graze on his rosy cheek!
My eyes took possession of his cheek, so I said: 'This is the garden of the blind rat!'/ 'This is the heaven of eternity.

لي من الطرفِ كاتبٌ يكتبُ الشؤ * قُ إليه إذا الفؤادُ أمَلَّه
سلسلَ الدمعُ في صحيفةٍ حَدَّي * هل رأيتُم مُسلسلاتِ ابنِ مقله⁶⁰

There is a secretary in my eyes to whom desire writes when the heart dictates it.

The tears *interlocked/streamed* on the page of my cheek. Have you ever seen *Ibn Muqla's interlocked writing?/the pupil's rivulets?*

This epigram is a *ġazal* poem written to a beloved who was a *kātib* – or at least this is what one perceives in this two-line poem. As in the previous example, the intertwinement of isotopies makes this poem dense. In the first hemistich of the first line, the phrase *lī min al-ṭarf kātib* introduces two isotopies which will be the basis for the double meaning of *tawriyas*: the eye-and-sight isotopy, and the isotopy of the profession of the *kātib* (*kitāba*) and art of writing (*ḥaṭṭ*). Desire writes (*yaktubu*) to this *kātib* when the heart dictates (*amalla*), and these two verbs are a part of the *kitāba-ḥaṭṭ* isotopy. In the first hemistich of the second line, tears stream (*salsala*) on the page (*ṣaḥīfa*) of the cheek, where *salsala* is a *tawriya* having as its *qarīb* meaning a technical use of the term, i.e. *qalam al-musalsal*, which is “relative of *al-tawqī*’ script in which all letters are interlocked and the *alif* and *lām* look like links in a chain” (Gacek, 2001, 70). And the *ba’īd* meaning is ‘to pour’, ‘to stream’, referring to water or, in this case, to tears. Both readings of the *tawriya* are integrated into the two isotopies of *kitāba-ḥaṭṭ*, and eye-and-sight. The term *ṣaḥīfa* with which the cheek is described is a *lāzim* of the *ma’nà qarīb*, for it is connected with the *kitāba-ḥaṭṭ* isotopy. After this first *tawriya* has been uttered, we can look back at the first line and note that the words *kātib*, *yaktubu*, and *amalla*, pertaining to the *kitāba-ḥaṭṭ* isotopy, are *lawāzim* of the *ma’nà qarīb*, while the word *ṭarf*, pertaining to the eye-and-sight isotopy, is a *lāzim* of the *ma’na ba’īd*.

The epigram closes with another *tawriya* in the phrase *musalsalāt Ibn Muqla*. Its *qarīb* meaning is connected to a well-known *kātib*, Ibn Muqla (d. 328/940), whose full name was Abū ‘Alī Muḥammad b. ‘Alī Ibn Muqla. Despite managing to climb to the top government positions, he died in disgrace, in prison and having had his right hand and tongue cut off (Huart, 1908, 75; Sourdel, 2012). What interests us, though, is that

⁶⁰ Ibn Hiğga (*Kašf*, 130; *Hižāna*, 3:302).

he was a renowned calligrapher and innovator of writing styles. As Huart (1908, 74-79) points out, Ibn Muqla was responsible for abandoning *kūfī* writing and replacing it with *nashī*; he also formulated some rules and principles governing the harmony and proportion of letters. But he was not the only member of his family to enjoy such renown, since his brother Abū ‘Abd Allāh Ḥasan Ibn Muqla (d. 338/949) had a writing style whose beauty surpassed even that of his brother. The writing style that Ibn Muqla developed is called *al-ḥaṭṭ al-mansūb*, i.e. a “proportionate writing or scripts, which according to the Arabic tradition, use the principle of ‘*tanāsub*’ elaborated by Ibn Muqla” (Gacek, 2001, 42).

As for the *ba‘īd* meaning, it develops from the literal meaning of this expression, i.e. the rivulets. From this literal meaning, one understands that the son of the eye pupil is nothing but tears (already uttered in the preceding hemistich) streaming down the cheek like rivulets. In this sense, the word *dam‘* at the beginning of the second line is a *lāzim* of the *ma‘nā ba‘īd* of the expression *ibn muqla*. The overlapping and interpenetration of these two isotopies yield the image of a lover with a broken heart who writes to his beloved. He pours tears that form rivulets on his cheeks, these rivulets being so dense and interlocked that they resemble the splendid calligraphy of the famous *kātib* Ibn Muqla.

As stated, this epigram has a certain density of content within its structure, which is reflected in the intertwinement of the two isotopies and in the numerous *lawāzim* supporting the twofold meaning of the *tawriyas*. The *lawāzim* suggesting the *ma‘nā qarīb* are *kātib*, *yaktubu*, *amalla*, and *ṣaḥīfa*, while those suggesting the *ba‘īd* are *ṭarf* and *dam‘*. Given the preponderance of *lawāzim* referring to the *ma‘nā qarīb*, I propose to classify this example as a *tawriya muraššaḥa*.⁶¹

39 ابن نباتة (٧٦٨/١٣٦٦)، من المجتث

⁶¹ As Ibn Ḥiḡḡa (*Kašf*, 131; *Ḥizāna*, 3:302) reports, Ibn Nubāta took this motif too.

فَلْتُ لِلكَاتِبِ الَّذِي مَا أَرَاهُ * قَطُّ إِلَّا وَنَقَطَ الدَّمْعَ سَكَلَةً
إِنْ تَخَطَّ الدَّمُوعُ فِي الْخَدِّ خَطًّا * مَا يُسَمَّى فَقَالَ خَطُّ ابْنِ مُقْلَةَ

I said to the secretary who never showed himself unless the tears *had pointed a vowel/had fallen in drops on his figure*:

How is it called if the tears flow through the cheek writing lines? He answered: ‘*Ibn Muqla’s writing/the furrow of the pupil*’.

Another use of this motif is found in the poetry of Abū Ḥayyān al-Ġarnāṭī (d. 745/1344), see Del Moral (1985-1986, 24).

وَمَوْلَعٍ بِفِخَاخٍ * يَمُدُّهَا وَشِبَاكِ
قَالَتْ لِي الْعَيْنُ مَاذَا * يَصِيدُ قَلْتُ كِرَاكِي⁶²

Such a lover of snares and nets, he spreads them!

The eye asked me: 'What does he hunt?' I replied: '*Cranes/Your sleep*.'

There is no doubt that Ibn Nubāta I-Miṣrī was the most important poet of the fourteenth century. As Bauer (2008a, 2009a) reports, his contemporaries all agreed that his talent in poetry and prose was unmatched – only al-Ṣafadī, who also praised Ibn Nubāta I-Miṣrī's compositions, gave prominence to Ṣafī I-Dīn al-Ḥillī, most probably for personal reasons. Ibn Nubāta I-Miṣrī was also an excellent poet in the use of *tawriya* and also the first to collect his epigrams and to publish a collection containing only epigrams thematically arranged (Bauer, 2009a; 2014a). Thus, a selection of epigrams, though limited, cannot exclude such a figure.

This first epigram by Ibn Nubāta I-Miṣrī does not present a dense intertwinement, but is nonetheless an interesting example of a *ḡazal* epigram disguised in a 'hunting' poem. From the first line, the scene depicted is that of a hunt; the speaker is watching someone spreading nets and snares to capture wild animals. In the second line, a dialogic sequence begins, in which the eye of the speaker asks what prey the hunter is hunting. The speaker replies with a *tawriya*: *karākī*. Of the two meanings of the *tawriya*-word, the first and *qarīb* sense does not deviate from the hunting theme, for it is the plural of the word *kurkī*, i.e. crane (al-Damīrī, *Ḥayāt*, 3:572-581). As for the *ba'īd* meaning, it is this that develops the *ḡazal* reading of the epigram. In this case, the word *karākī* must be split into *karā* ('sleep'), to which the pronoun *-ki* is added, giving the reading 'your sleep'. This reply to the question asked by the eye makes us aware that the beauty of this hunter is such that the eyes of the person looking at him will no longer be able to sleep. The first line suggests only the hunting theme, with the *lawāzim*-words *fiḥāḥ* and *šibāk* suggesting the *qarīb* meaning, while no *lāzim* is uttered for the *ba'īd* meaning. This *tawriya* is thus a *muraššaḥa*.⁶³

⁶² Ibn Nubāta (*Dīwān*, 370), Ibn Ḥiḡḡa (*Kašf*, 137; *Ḥizāna*, 1:353, 3:311).

⁶³ Ibn Ḥiḡḡa (*Kašf*, 137; *Ḥizāna*, 1:353, 3:311) reports that al-Ṣafadī took this motif and composed a similar epigram; see also in al-Ṣafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 177):

أَغَارَ عَلَى سَرِّجِ الْكُرَى عِنْدَمَا رَمَى الْ* كِرَاكِي غَزَالًا لِلْبَدْوِ يُحَاكِي

40 ابن نباتة، من الرمل

قالتِ العُلَيَّا لِمَنْ حَاوَلَهَا * سَبَقَ الصَّاحِبُ وَاحْتَلَّ ذُرَاهَا
فَدَعُوا كَسْبَ المَعَالِي إِنَّهَا * حَاجَةٌ فِي نَفْسِ بَعْقُوبٍ قَضَاهَا⁶⁴

The lofty rank said to the one who is trying to attain it: 'The vizier has already reached it and occupied its top.

Do not try to reach elevated ranks, since they were/it was a need in Ya'qūb's soul which he satisfied.'

This is an interesting example of a *madīh* epigram where the *tawriya* is expressed with an *iqtibās*. Bauer (2008a) explains how social relations and ties with the ruling elite, as well as with members of the class of *kuttāb*, religious scholars, and powerful families, were fundamental to Ibn Nubāta throughout his life. For instance, this two-line poem is dedicated to Šaraf al-Dīn Ya'qūb (d. 729/1328-1329), who was *nāzir* of Aleppo (Bauer, 2008a, 33). The epigram begins by personifying loftiness, which addresses its interlocutee and warns him that the *mamdūh* has already reached the lofty rank, and that every attempt at acquiring a high rank will end in failure, since this is the exclusive preserve of Ya'qūb. This last hemistich is an *iqtibās* of (Q 12:68) used as a *tawriya*. The Koranic meaning (*qarīb*) is related to the story of Joseph, and specifically when Jacob tells his sons that, when they go to Egypt for the second time, they should enter the city through different gates and not in a group through the same door. In contrast, the *ba'īd* meaning is given by the word Ya'qūb, which is the given name of the *mamdūh*, so that the need which has been satisfied is not that of Jacob father of Joseph, but of Šaraf al-Dīn Ya'qūb. It should be noted that the word *al-šāhib* in the first line is to be coupled with *al-ma'ālī* in the second, resulting in *šāhib al-ma'ālī*, i.e. the title given to a high-ranking person. And those two words are two *lawāzim* of the *ma'nā ba'īd*, and the whole *tawriya* is a *tawriya mubayyana*.

41 ابن نباتة، من الكامل

فقلتُ اُزجِي يَا عَيْنُ عَنْ وَرْدِ حَسَنِهِ * أَلَمْ تَنْظُرِيهِ كَيْفَ صَادَ كِرَاكِي

He attacked during the course of sleep when a gazelle who resembles the full moons shot at the cranes.

I said: 'O eye, desist from the rose of his beauty, did not you see how he hunted *cranes/your sleep*?'⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Ibn Ḥiğga (*Ḥizāna*, 3:348)

لفلان في الديوانِ صورةٌ حاضرٍ * وكأنَّهُ من جملةِ الغُيَّابِ
لم يدرِ ما مخزومةٌ وجريدةٌ * سُبْحَانَ رَازِقِهِ بغيرِ حسابٍ⁶⁵

There is someone in the *dīwān* whose being present is as though he were among the multitude of the absents.

He did not know what a letter and a register are. Praised be God, he is providing him without reckoning.

If in the previous example Ibn Nubāta addresses an epigram of praise to a minister and *kātib*, this epigram is the opposite: the poet is mocking someone who works in the *dīwān*, and he does so by using an *iqtibās* as a *tawriya*. The *kātib* is depicted as someone whose incompetence in carrying out his duties in the *dīwān* is such that it is comparable to his total absence. He has no idea of the foundations of his profession and even ignores its basic tools such as a letter and a register. His incompetence is such that he gives money left, right, and centre without accounting for a single coin. To express this last idea, Ibn Nubāta quotes a phrase taken from (Q 2:212), (Q 3:37), and (Q 24:38), in which the subject who gives without reckoning is God, and the expression refers to immense and never-ending grace and generosity. To this *qarīb* meaning, a resemanticisation of the Koranic verse changes the subject from God to the *kātib*, and expresses the idea of an officer who spends money like water (*ba'īd*). The resemanticisation of the Koranic verse would not have been possible without a clear reference to another subject. This subject is uttered at the very beginning of the epigram: it is the *fulān*, who is the person that we will find out is a *kātib*. For this reason, the *tawriya* would not have been a *tawriya* at all if the resemanticisation could not be based on another text segment. Therefore, the *tawriya* is *muhayya'a*.

42 ابن نباتة، من المنسرح

باعَ صديقي لِحامِ بَعْلَتِهِ * ليشترى الخبزَ منه والأدما
واهاً عليه راحتَ جِرائتُهُ * فهو على ذاكِ يأكلُ اللُّجماً⁶⁶

My friend sold the bridle of his she-mule to buy bread and seasoning.

⁶⁵ Ibn Nubāta (*Dīwān*, 49-50), Ibn Ḥiḡḡa (*Ḥizāna*, 3:356).

⁶⁶ Ibn Nubāta (*Dīwān*, 481), Ibn Ḥiḡḡa (*Ḥizāna*, 3:360).

Alas for him! His provisions ended quickly and now he *is eating the bridles/became a slave*.

This is another jesting epigram by Ibn Nubāta. It does not have a dense structure, but is nonetheless a good example of the jesting genre. Someone who is suffering financially decides to sell what is perhaps his last remaining asset: the bridle of his donkey. From the sale, he buys himself something to eat. But the food does not last long, and he soon finds himself having to eat the bridle. If we consider the expression ‘eating the bridle’ in its literal meaning, we are faced with nonsense. How can he eat the leather of the bridle, especially as he has already sold it? This initial *qarīb* meaning serves precisely to confuse the reader, who will seek a solution in another figurative sense connected to the expression ‘eating the bridle’. The *baʿīd* meaning is therefore connected to the idea of tightening bridles and has nothing to do with eating them. The person who holds a bridle has power and command over something, while the person who eats a bridle, i.e. who bites the bit, is controlled and commanded by someone. Here, the protagonist of the epigram therefore has nothing more to sell to enable him to buy food, and finds himself forced to sell himself. This is the *baʿīd* meaning, the image of a man biting a bit like a donkey. The expression ‘*yaʿkulu l-luġum*’ has a twofold meaning – a proper and a figurative – and it does not require another element. But the word *liġām* in the first line can be seen as a *lāzim* suggesting the *qarīb* meaning. The *tawriya* is therefore *muraššaḥa*.

43 ابن نباتة، من الكامل

لي صاحب ترك المليخ وعاد في * حب المليحة من ذوي الأقدار
قد كان عبد الأشهل المنسوب في * حسن فأضحى وهو عبد الدار⁶⁷

I have a friend who left the handsome boy and pursued the love of the handsome young woman of the notable people.

He was ‘*Abd al-Ašhal/the slave of the beautiful eyed*, the one descending from beauty, then he became ‘*Abd al-Dār/the slave of the house*.

⁶⁷ Ibn Nubāta (*Dīwān*, 236), Ibn Ḥiġġa (*Ḥizāna*, 3:359).

This is another, and final, jesting epigram by Ibn Nubāta. Playing on the names of tribes in a way similar to al-Ġazzār's epigrams 5 and 6, it describes someone as having left a young handsome boy to pursue a relationship with a noble young woman, with this relationship changing the status of the protagonist. This change is described by way of two *tawriya*-phrases: *'abd al-ašhal* and *'abd al-dār*.

Kaḥḥāla (*Qabā'il*, 2:722) reports that the 'Abd al-Ašhal are an offspring of the Qaḥṭāniyya, the tribe which is said to be the root of the southern Arabs of the Yemen, while the 'Abd al-Dār b. Quṣayy (Kaḥḥāla, *Qabā'il*, 2:723), whose eponym is Quṣayy b. Kilāb (Levi della Vida, 2012), are an offspring of the 'Adnāniyya, the ancestors of the northern Arabs. Thus, the protagonist of the epigram belonged to the first tribe, but then joined the second tribe after beginning a relationship with the young woman. He is described as a member of the 'Abd al-Ašhal, a tribe that fought against the Aws to control Medina before the *hiğra* (Watt, 2012d), and the young woman is described as *min dawī l-aqdar*, i.e. part of a noble lineage that we discover to be the 'Abd al-Dār. This was a tribe based in Mecca, whose eponym Quṣayy protected the city and rebuilt the *ka'ba*, and was also considered the eponym of the Qurayš. It is evident that this reading suggests a union through which the protagonist could climb the social ladder and enter a noble family more prominent than his own, or perhaps he joined a family equal to his own. But at a price. This first reading is joined by a second reading provided by the second meaning of the *tawriya*. The literal reading of the two phrases *'abd al-ašhal* and *'abd al-dār* returns the image of the protagonist as a slave of the man with beautiful eyes (*ašhal*), where the word *ašhal* designates a man with eyes of a particular shade of blue.⁶⁸ Not only did this man have beautiful eyes; he could also boast that he was a descendant of beauty itself, its only ancestor. Yet, after abandoning this man, the protagonist then finds himself literally a slave in the house and family that he has joined. Both meanings of the *tawriya* return two readings that are compatible with the epigram and that are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they contribute to the semantic enrichment and aesthetic value of the text. I

⁶⁸ Lane (*Lexicon*, s.v. *šuhla*) "A tinge, or mixture, of *zurqa* [i.e. blueness, or grayness, or greenish hue] in the black of the eye less than *zaraq* and more beautiful than this, in the black of the eye. Or a tinge of redness in the black of the eye, not in lines, like *šukla*, but consisting in a paucity of blackness of the black of the eye, so that it is as though it inclined to redness; or a hue of the black of the eye between redness and blackness."

suggest assigning the role of *qarīb* to the ‘tribal interpretation’, and the role of *ba‘īd* to the literal interpretation. I also suggest assigning the role of *lāzim* of the *ma‘nā qarīb* to the phrase *min dawī l-aqdār*, and the role of *lāzim* of the *ma‘nā ba‘īd* to the phrase *al-mansūb fī ḥusn*. As two opposite *lawāzim*, the *tawriya* can be classified as *muḡarrada*.

44 ابن نباتة، من الرمل

مَلَأْتُ إِنْسَانَ عَيْنِي عَسْجَداً * من حدودٍ قد مَلَاها الحسَنُ صَبْغاً
 قَلْتُ الرِّدْفَ أَرِيْنِي فَأَنْتَنْتُ * ثُمَّ قَالَتْ هَكَذَا الْإِنْسَانُ يَطْغِي⁶⁹

From her cheeks filled by beauty with colour, she glutted the pupil of my eye with gold.

I said: ‘Show me the buttocks.’ But she turned away and said then: ‘In saying that the man/the pupil exceeds the limit.’

This is a *ḡazal* epigram where the *tawriya* is based on an *iqtibās*. The protagonist is watching a beautiful young woman, whose beautiful cheeks and face fill the pupil of his eye (*insān ‘aynī*) with gold. This idyllic vision of beauty is then interrupted when the protagonist brazenly asks to see the young woman’s backside, to which she replies by quoting (Q 96:6). The Koranic meaning (*qarīb*) conveys the idea that, despite the revealed signs, the human being continues to transgress and exceeds the limits by not accepting the faith in God. In the Koranic context, the word *insān* therefore means ‘man, human being’. The second reading of this line is based on the second meaning of *insān*, i.e. ‘eye pupil’, which reconnects to the first line in which the protagonist’s pupil is described as being full of the beauty of the young woman. In this case, it is the pupil that exceeds the limits by asking to see what modesty hides underneath the clothes. Both readings return a correct interpretation of the poem and both convey a similar meaning. *Insān ‘aynī* in the first line grants a double reading to the word *insān* at the end of the second line; without it, the word *insān* would not have a double meaning, since it is the co-text of the first line that makes possible the meaning of ‘pupil’ in the second line. Hence, this *tawriya* is *muhayya’a*.

⁶⁹ Ibn Nubāta (*Dīwān*, 322), Ibn Ḥiǧǧa (*Ḥizāna*, 3:344).

يا أَيُّ لا تَزْكُنْ لِعَلِّقٍ ولا * تَثِقُ بِهِ وَاتْرِكْهُ مَعَ نَفْسِهِ
ولا تُرَجِّحِ الْوُدَّ مَمَّنْ يَرَى * أَنَّكَ مَحْتَاجٌ إِلَى فَلْسِهِ⁷⁰

O Penis, do not rely on a rent-boy and do not trust him: leave him alone!

Do not hope to be loved by someone who thinks that you need his *money/anus*.

Bauer (2014a, 179) interprets this two-line poem as an example of *muğun* of the B “Poems about all different kinds of misfortune” and C “Poems about troubled friendship” categories, and as an epigram intended “to warn against relationships that are based on money”, since “they never lead to honesty and friendship” (Bauer, 2014a, 179). I agree, but I think that this analysis ignores the turning-point, since there is a *tawriya* in the last hemistich. For my analysis, I use the variant reported in Ibn Nubāta (*Dīwān*, 270), which is the same as that reported in Ibn Ḥiğġa (*Kašf*, 158-159; *Ḥizāna*, 3:354), and not that used by Bauer. I do so because this variant helps us understand the epigram and its *tawriya* better.

In the first hemistich of the first line, the narrator tells the penis that it should never trust a *‘ilq*, which is the word denoting the passive partner in a relationship, a catamite, or a rent-boy. Why should the penis not rely on a *‘ilq*? Because the rent-boy thinks that the penis is in need of money. But this does not make sense, for it is the passive partner who is more likely to sell his body to earn money from adult men, and not the other way around. That is why the word *fals*, besides meaning ‘money’, also means ‘anus’. This *ba‘īd* meaning could be a figurative sense derived from the proper meaning of the word *fals*, i.e. a coin made of copper or bronze. The figurative derivation is metaphorical, since the form and shape of the anus resembles the form and shape of a coin. Another possibility is based on Badawi and Hinds (*Dictionary*, s.v. *f l s*), who account for the use of the word *fils* to mean ‘anus, arsehole’, without connecting it to *fals* ‘coin’,⁷¹ making the use of *fals-fils* a case of what al-Šafadī called

⁷⁰ Ibn Nubāta (*Dīwān*, 270), Ibn Ḥiğġa (*Kašf*, 158-159; *Ḥizāna*, 3:354), Bauer (2014a, 179).

⁷¹ Although Badawi and Hinds is not a historical dictionary of the Egyptian dialect, it could be assumed that the term had already entered common use. Personally, I prefer the metaphorical explanation, Luca Rizzo

erroneous homonymy. This reading makes the epigram clearer. The intended meaning (*ba'īd*) is the anus, and the penis, which wants to perform anal intercourse, should not trust the rent-boy whom it pays, since the boy knows that the penis is in a state of need and that he can profit from this need. If we now try to classify this example of *tawriya* according to the received theory, we understand how much this variant of the first hemistich is fundamental to its double reading. The words *ayrī* and *'ilq* introduce the two concepts of 'sexual need of the genital organ', as it is the personified protagonist of the narrative, and 'prostitution'. Both words therefore refer to the *ma'nà ba'īd*, and the *tawriya* is *mubayyana*.

46 ابن نباتة، من السريع

يا راحلاً من بعد ما أقبلت * مخايلُ للخيرِ مزجوةً
لم تكتملِ حولاً وأورثتني * ضِعفاً فلا حولَ ولا قوة⁷²

O deceased one, after the hoped-for promising signs of excellence had appeared [in you];

you did not complete one year/you did not reached force and made me inherit weakness. There is *no year/no power* and no strength.

Ibn Nubāta was a poet who composed touching elegies (Bauer, 2003a) (Talib, 2013). The following epigrams are taken from those that he composed in which he used the figure *tawriya*. As we will see, these elegies contain a high narrative density, often developed in two or more isotopies and narrative images.

This epigram is a *riṭā'* that Ibn Nubāta wrote after his son's death before he had reached the age of one (Ibn Nubāta, *Dīwān*, 546), (Ibn Ḥiǧǧa, *Ḥizāna*, 3:364). The first line is an example of what Bauer (2003a, 60) describes as a narrative strategy characteristic of elegies addressed to a child: given that it is difficult to find accomplishments to praise in a child, "poets instead talked about what the child did not become". Despite the limited space of a line, Ibn Nubāta mentions the *maḥāyilu li-l-ḥayri marǧuwwa*, the hoped-for signs which had made the poet anticipate a great

even if we cannot exclude the other. For example, *fils* could be the result of a diachronic *fals>fils* transformation in the spoken language.

⁷² Ibn Nubāta (*Dīwān*, 546), Ibn Ḥiǧǧa (*Ḥizāna*, 3:364).

future had the child not died prematurely. These signs that made the poet hope to see his son as an adult were not enough to ward off his death in the first year (*ḥawl*) of life, which prevented the child from reaching the force and vigour (*ḥawl*) of an adult man. The sadness of the poet finds its expression in this first *tawriya*. The death of a young and defenceless child made the poet inherit nothing but weakness (*ḍuʿf*). This image is particularly touching, since the weakness inherited by the father mirrors the weakness of a baby, transforming the body of an adult man overcome by the sad event. Moreover, it reminds us of the fact that an inheritance should pass from father to son and not the other way around, as if the vigour of the poet should have passed to the young son. The image is strengthened by the *ṭibāq* of these two words, *ḥawl* and *ḍuʿf*, the first of which is repeated at the end of the epigram in the *ḥawqala*, where the *tawriya* plays again with its two meanings. It is difficult to say which meaning should be considered the *qarīb* and which the *baʿīd*, since they actually play the same role in the intertwinement of the text, providing two correct readings of it. I propose to consider ‘force’ as the *baʿīd* meaning, since its actualisation also plays a role in the *ṭibāq*, which is a pillar on which the communicative force of the epigram is based. The word *ḍuʿf* then becomes a *lāzim* of the *maʿnā baʿīd*, and the *tawriya* is thus *mubayyana*.

47 ابن نباتة، من السريع

آهًا لَشَمَلٍ قَدْ وَهَى سِلْكُهُ * وَكَانَ ذَا دَرٍّ بِعَبْدِ الرَّحِيمِ
فَلَيْتَنِي لَأَقِيْتُ عَنْهُ الرِّدَى * وَعَاشَ ذَاكَ الدَّرُّ دَرًّا يَتِيمٌ⁷³

Alas for the union of the string whose thread became weak and whose

pearl/achievement was ‘Abd al-Raḥīm.

Would I have met death in his stead, this pearl had lived like an *orphan pearl/an*
incomparable achievement!

This epigram was written after the death of Ibn Nubāta’s son ‘Abd al-Raḥīm in 734/1333-1334. He was not the only child who predeceased him, but Bauer (2008a) hypothesises that he might have been Ibn Nubāta’s favourite son, since he bore the

⁷³ Ibn Nubāta (*Dīwān*, 480), Ibn Ḥiǧǧa (*Kašf*, 161; *Ḥizāna*, 3:364).

name of Ibn Nubāta's famous ancestor 'Abd al-Raḥīm Ibn Nubāta (d. 374/984-985), who was the preacher (*ḥaṭīb*) of Sayf al-Dawla (d. 356/967).

There is a motif in this epigram that is similar to the motif in the previous epigram. To mourn his child, the father mentions what his son might have achieved, and he does so by using a *tawriya*. In the first line, the poet complains about the breakdown of a state of union symbolised by a weak thread, whose pearl (*durr*) was 'Abd al-Raḥīm. The mention of the pearl and the thread creates the image of a necklace of joined pearls which has 'Abd al-Raḥīm as the most important element. Death cuts the bond that symbolises the family's lineage, and snatches the child from his affections, leaving a desperate father. A second reading of the line is added to the first, penetrating and enriching it. If we read *darr* 'achievement' instead of *durr* 'pearl', then the image depicted is that of the familiar thread that had its completeness, its greatest achievement, in 'Abd al-Raḥīm. Although not described in detail, the achievement for which 'Abd al-Raḥīm was destined makes us imagine how the father had seen a great future in his son's eyes. These two images continue in the second line, where the father wishes that he could have died instead of the pearl of his son, a pearl (*durr*) that would have lived as an orphan (*yatīm*), or a pearl/boy that would have reached immeasurable achievements (*darr yatīm*). These two *tawriyas* return two readings perfectly integrated into the text, and both acting to create a discursive plot aimed at describing the deceased as a precious and irreplaceable object, and at the same time as a person destined for a great future. Again, saying which of the two meanings should be considered the *ma'nā qarīb* and which the *ba'īd* can be misleading. For sure, the image of the pearl is the first to be perceived, while the image of the child's future is perceived subsequently. If we want to adopt this hypothesis, then the 'pearl' reading is the *qarīb*, of which the union (*šaml*) and the thread (*silk*) are *lawāzim*, while the 'achievement' reading is the *ba'īd*. The *tawriya* is thus *muraššaḥa*.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ Ibn Nubāta wrote another *tawriya*-elegy on the death of his son 'Abd al-Raḥīm; see Ibn Nubāta (*Dīwān*, 18), Ibn Ḥiḡḡa (*Kašf*, 161; *Ḥizāna*, 3:364), Bauer (2003a, 89):

يا لَهْفَتِ قَلْبِي عَلَى عَبْدِ الرَّحِيمِ وَيَا * شَوْقِي إِلَيْهِ وَيَا شَجْوِي وَيَا دَائِي
فِي شَهْرِ كَانُونٍ وَأَفَاهُ الْجَمَامُ لَقَدْ * أَحْرَقْتِ بِالنَّارِ يَا كَانُونُ أَحْشَائِي

O grief of my heart for 'Abd al-Raḥīm, o my longing for him, o my distress, o my sickness.
Death took him in the month Kānūn and you, o *fireplace/Kānūn*, you burnt my inside with fire.

48 ابن نباتة، من مخلص البسيط

بدا وفي حاله توارى * فيا لها طلعة شريقه
جوهرة ما علمت إلا * دموع عيني لها عقيقه⁷⁵

He rose and right after he disappeared. O what a luminous appearance.

A precious gem, I knew anything but the tears of my eye *flowing in a rivulet/which is a carnelian/had a 'aqīqa*.

This epigram is dedicated to another dead child. The son that he is mourning died at the very beginning of his life, as we can understand it if we read the epigram carefully. In the first line, the child is described as a magnificent apparition, just like a bright sun which, however, disappeared immediately after rising. Birth and death are so close that the poet is unable to know anything about the baby but can only console himself with tears. At the end of the second line, the word *'aqīqa* hides a *tawriya*. One of its meanings is 'rivulet' and can be interpreted in connection with the word *dam* 'tears', returning the image of a poet whose cheeks are furrowed with tears. A second interpretation is linked to the meaning of the word *'aqīq* 'carnelian', a precious red stone. In this case, the interpretation is suggested by the word *ḡawhara* (precious gem) at the beginning of the line and defines the image of the poet crying tears of blood or having red eyes like carnelian because of his constant crying. A third interpretation is given by the meaning of *'aqīqa* as a social practice. *'Aqīqa* is a series of rituals performed after the seventh day of a baby's birth, the most important of which are shaving the baby's hair, giving him a name, and making a sacrifice (Juynboll

Another example is the following epigram: Ibn Nubāta (*Dīwān*, 51), Ibn Ḥiḡḡa (*Kaṣf*, 161; *Ḥizāna*, 3:365), Bauer (2003a, 49, 51).

قالوا فلان قد جفت أفكاره * نظم القريض فلا يكاد يجيبه
هيهات نظم الشعر منه بعدما * سكن التراب وليده وحبيبه

They said: 'Such a man whose thoughts kept him away from composing poetry, he barely answers.'
It is hard to believe that he can compose poetry after *his child/Walīd* and *dear beloved/Ḥabīb* has settled in the earth.

Where *walīd* refers to al-Walīd al-Buḥturī (d. 284/897) and *ḥabīb* to Ḥabīb b. Aws, i.e. Abū Tammām (d. 231/845 or 232/846).

⁷⁵ Ibn Nubāta (*Dīwān*, 356), Ibn Ḥiḡḡa (*Ḥizāna*, 3:365). In Ibn Ḥiḡḡa, there is the variant *'alimtu* > *'amiltu*, in this case the second line could be interpreted as: A precious gem, the only *'aqīqa* I could do was the tears of my eye.

and Pedersen, 2012). Aubaile-Sallenave (2007) points out that this ritual indicates the transition from foetal life to integration into society, which is why the baby's hair is cut. Lane (*Lexicon*, s.v. 'aqīqa) reports that this word is also used to denote the piece of foreskin cut after circumcision, which can take place from the seventh day after the birth onwards. The reading given by this meaning reconnects to the idea of the transience of life and the very short time that the child has lived on earth. His life was so short that his father could not even perform the 'aqīqa; only his tears could have had an 'aqīqa for they lasted well over seven days.⁷⁶ This epigram is a condensation of information on the life of the child who, through the *tawriya* and its *lawāzim*, conveys a lot of information on the poet's state of affliction. Of these three possible meanings, I consider *ba'īd* the meaning 'aqīqa-social rite, while the other two are *qarīb* and counted two *lawāzim*: *ğawhar* and *dam*'. For this reason, the *tawriya* is *muraššaḥa*.

49 ابن نباتة، من الطويل

مضى الأفضلُ المرْجُو للباسِ والندى * وصَحَّتْ على رَعْمِ العُفَاةِ وفائتُهُ
وما مات أو ماتتْ بحزنٍ نساؤُهُ * وماتت بأحزانِ البلادِ حَمائُهُ⁷⁷

Al-Afḍal, whose courage and generosity one hopes for, has passed away. His death proved to be true despite the seekers of his favour.

He died and so his women died for sorrow and his *mother-in-law*/Hamā died for the sorrows of the land.

In this epigram, Ibn Nubāta mourns the death of al-Malik al-Afḍal (d 742/1341). He introduces a small hint of facetiousness while depicting a sad event like the death of his patron. In the first line, he describes the death of al-Malik al-Afḍal, combining the astonishment at his death with the memory of his generosity. He died, and pain also killed his wives just as it killed his mother-in-law (*hamā*). Obviously, this last word is

⁷⁶ One could also notice that the word 'aqīqa is said to mean "a leathern water-bag" and "lightening which one sees in the midst of the clouds, resembling a drawn sword" (Lane, *Lexicon*, s.v. 'aqīqa). Although I do not think that these two meanings play a role in the epigram, they are in a way connected to the whole meaning of the text. For example, one can think about a water-bag full of tears, or about a fork of lightening in the clouds that is as transient as the newborn's life.

⁷⁷ Ibn Nubāta (*Dīwān*, 81), Ibn Ḥiğġa (*Ḥizāna*, 3:365).

a *tawriya*, with mother-in-law being the *qarīb* meaning, and the city of Ḥamā, where al-Afḍal was the governor, being the *ba'īd* meaning. The word *nisā'* serves as the *lāzim* of the *ma'nā qarīb* and therefore the *tawriya* is *muraššaḥa*.

50 برهان الدين القيراطي (٧٨١/١٣٧٩)، من مجزوء الرجز

كم عالمٍ قد اشتكى * في الفقرِ طولَ مكثه

وكلُّ ثورٍ سارحٍ * زيدَ له في حرثه⁷⁸

How many savants complained about staying in poverty for a long time.

While every *freely grazing bull/stupid man* has been given increase in its/his harvest.

Burhān al-Dīn al-Qirāṭī (d. 781/1379) presents in this epigram a theme that we have already seen, i.e. a complaint about one's condition, and points out that it is difficult for people of science and for literati to earn enough to live, while life is often easier for ignorant and stupid men, who possess more wealth than their intellectual capacity would merit. To express this idea, the poet utilises the *tawriya*-word *tawr*, which means 'bull' (*qarīb*), but is understood in its metaphorical meaning of 'stupid man' (*ba'īd*). To express the idea that stupid men are rewarded more than savants, he quotes (Q 42:20), where the harvest denotes the harvest in the hereafter and in this world. Whoever wants to enter paradise must commit himself during his life on earth to reaping the fruits of his deeds in paradise. Those who want to reap the fruits of a comfortable life on earth will have no chance of entering paradise. Quoting this verse within the epigram, al-Qirāṭī, while complaining about the indigence of the man of letters, reminds the reader that those who focus only on earthly goods will have to account for their deeds on the day of judgment. *Ālim* is the *lāzim* of the *ba'īd* meaning, and the *tawriya* is *mubayyana*.

51 ابن العطار المصري (٧٩٤/١٣٩٢)، من البسيط

أصبحتُ بَطَّالَ وَالْأَوْلَادُ أَرْبَعَةٌ * محمدٌ وثلاثٌ مَوْتُهُمْ يَجِبُ

⁷⁸ Ibn Ḥiḡḡa (*Kašf*, 177; *Ḥizāna*, 3:410).

فإن تحيّل في رزقي بمدحكُم * أبو محمد البطل لا عجب⁷⁹

I became *al-Baṭṭāl/unemployed*, and the sons are four: Muḥammad and death is incumbent for the other three.

There is no wonder, if *Abū Muḥammad al-Baṭṭāl/Muḥammad's father the unemployed* is tricking in praising you to obtain the means of subsistence.

Ibn al-ʿAṭṭār al-Miṣrī (d. 794/1392) was a poet who excelled in writing epigrams, some of them praising the powerful people of the time, and others criticising and mocking his rivals.

This epigram is another example of the difficulties experienced by men of letters to earn their livelihood, narrated in a playful way. In the first line, the poet says that he has become *baṭṭāl*, a word that reminds us immediately of the figure of ʿAbd Allāh al-Baṭṭāl (d. ca. 123/740), who was a general in the Umayyad army and fought against the Byzantines, and who became a sort of legendary Muslim hero (Canard, 2012) (Athamina, 2011). This *qarīb* meaning is joined by the *baʿīd* meaning of ‘unoccupied, unemployed’, and is supported by the rest of the first line, which says that he has three children, one of whom is called Muḥammad, while the other two are about to die. The solution to this catastrophe is to find a patron and praise him in the hope of receiving some money. And this is exactly what Abū Muḥammad al-Baṭṭāl – i.e. *qarīb* meaning referring to the hero by his *kunya* – / Muḥammad’s father the unemployed – the protagonist of the epigram called with his *kuniya* – does. This is an example of *tawriya mubayyana*, since the second part of the first line suggests the protagonist’s indigence, and thus refers to the *maʿnà baʿīd*.

52 ابن العطار المصري، من المجتث

عيسى ومَن مدحوهُ * ما شِمتُ فيهم رئيسا

وما رأيتُ أناسًا * لكن حميرًا وعيسا⁸⁰

ʿĪsà together with he who praised him, I did not see among them a chief,
nor did I see humans, but donkeys and [yellowish white] *camels/ʿĪsà*.

⁷⁹ Ibn Ḥiḡḡa (*Kašf*, 225; *Hizāna*, 3:481).

⁸⁰ Ibn Ḥiḡḡa (*Kašf*, 226; *Hizāna*, 3:481).

This is another example of how *tawriya* can be used to ridicule someone. Ibn Ḥaḡar al-‘Asqalānī (*Durār*, 1:340) reports that he exchanged *hiġā*’ with Šaraf al-Dīn ‘Īsà l-‘Āliya (d. 807/1405), who is the addressee of this epigram. The pun is very easy. The poet describes ‘Īsà and his adulators as stupid people without a real guide; they are not even humans, but donkeys and camels. The word ‘*īsà*’ denotes both the proper name (*ba‘īd*) and the collective ‘camels’ – a particular kind of yellowish-white camel – (*qarīb*) suggested by the *lāzim*-word *ḥamīr* ‘donkeys’. The *tawriya* is *muraššaḥa*.

53 ابن العطار المصري، من الوافر

تجادلَ شافعي مع مالكي * وهذا البحثُ عند الناسِ ظاهرُ
فقال الشافعيُّ الكلبُ رِجْسٌ * وقال المالكيُّ الكلبُ طاهرٌ⁸¹

A Šāfi‘ite and a Mālikite were involved in a dispute, and this investigation is obvious to people.

The Šāfi‘ite said: ‘The dog is impure’, but the Mālikite said: ‘The dog is *pure*/Ṭāhir b. Ḥabīb.’

The object of mockery in this epigram is Ṭāhir Ibn Ḥabīb (d. 808/1406), who was *kātib al-sirr* in Cairo (Ziriklī, *A‘lām*, s.v. Ṭāhir Ibn Ḥabīb). The poet plays on the proper name of his addressee through the legal language staging the dispute between two jurists, a Šāfi‘ite and a Mālikite, whose divergence lies in considering the dog an impure (*riġs*) or a pure (*ṭāhir*) animal. The *tawriya* is precisely in the word *ṭāhir*, which can be read as an adjective of the word *kalb* (‘dog’), returning the reading ‘the dog is pure’ (*qarīb*), or as a proper name, resulting in the reading ‘the dog is Ṭāhir’ (*ba‘īd*). The word *riġs* is the *lāzim* of the *ma‘nà qarīb* and therefore the *tawriya* is *muraššaḥa*.

4.3 Loans or plagiarism? Some examples

One of the characteristics of the literature of the time is the high degree of intertextuality and the exchange-loan plagiarism of poetic motifs from one author to

⁸¹ Ibn Ḥiġġa (*Kašf*, 226; *Ḥizāna*, 3:482).
Luca Rizzo

another. No author escaped the scrutiny of his contemporaries and later biographers, and often the elements of loan and plagiarism in poetic compositions are highlighted. Ibn Ḥiǧǧa does that in his work (*Ḥizānat*, 1:352-353; 3:310-311), where he underlines how Ibn Nubāta drew inspiration from his predecessor al-Wadā'ī, and how al-Ṣafadī drew inspiration from his master Ibn Nubāta, the latter having openly accused al-Ṣafadī of plagiarism.⁸² However, it should be remembered that he who lives by the sword shall die by the sword, and in fact Šams al-Dīn al-Nawāǧī (d. 859/1455), a contemporary of Ibn Ḥiǧǧa, did not miss the opportunity to write a treatise entitled *al-Ḥuǧǧa fī sarīqāt Ibn Ḥiǧǧa* (The proof of Ibn Ḥiǧǧa's plagiarism) (Bauer, 2009b). The following selection of epigrams aims to show how the circulation of poetic themes was part of everyday life, and how almost every author drew inspiration from his predecessors and contemporaries. Limited to those epigrams in which *tawriya* plays a role, the selection is not exhaustive.

1) The first motif is related to the toponymy of the city of Damascus. As we have seen in chapter 1, al-Ṣafadī considers a homonym a *tawriya* when it is understood by the public. This also applies in the case of the use of toponyms that need not be linked to a small reality and be unknown to most people. This is not the case with these four epigrams, whose *tawriya* is based on the twofold meaning of the words *ǧunk* and *daff* 'harp' and 'tambourine', but also two toponyms of the city of Damascus found in the area called Rabwa). Rabwa is a "pleasant place at the feet of the western mountain where there is a place which has the epithet of *miḥrāb*; it is said that it was Jesus' cradle which is visited and consecrated to him" (al-Badrī, *Nuzha*, 48). There, Duff and Ḥunk are located, where "Two mountains face each other and join together: the western mountain that has at its base an acclivity (*daff*) of saffron, and the eastern mountain, whose top resembles a harp (*ǧunk*). This is why the poets exerted themselves to describe it" (al-Badrī, *Nuzha*, 50).

54 الوداعي، من المجتث

⁸² The diatribe between Ibn Nubāta and al-Ṣafadī, and the former's accusation against the latter, is analysed by means of some poetic examples in Schallenbergh (2007).

يا رَبْوَةَ أَطْرَبْتَنِي * وَحَسَّنْتَ لِي هَتْكِي
إِذْ لَسْتُ أَبْرَحُ فِيهَا * مَا بَيْنَ دَفٍّ وَجَنْكِ⁸³

O Rabwa, it affected me with lively emotion and ameliorated my [state of] disgrace when I am still on it *among a tambourine and a harp/between Daff and Ğunk*.

Rabwa is a place of peace and tranquillity where refuge can be taken in the midst of nature. There, the poet can take shelter from his worries. It is his refuge, between the *daff*-tambourine and the *ğunk*-harp. The toponyms are the *ba'īd* meanings and the *tawriya* is *muhayya'a*, for the presence of the word 'Rabwa' makes it possible for the *tawriya*-word to acquire its twofold meaning.

55 ابن نباتة، من الكامل

بِالْجَنْكِ مِنْ مَغْنَى دَمَشِقَ حَمَائِمَ * فِي دَفٍّ أَشْجَارٍ تَشُوقُ بِلُطْفِهَا
فَإِذَا أَشَارَ لَهَا الشَّجِيُّ بِكَاسِهِ * عَنَّتْ عَلَيْهِ بِجَنْكِهَا وَبِدَقِّهَا⁸⁴

On the Ğunk of the abode of Damascus, there are doves on the side of trees which delight with their grace.

When the grieved one points at them with his glass, they sing *with their harp and tambourine/on their Daff and Ğunk*.

Ibn Nubāta's epigram has a more complex narrative structure. In the first line, the poet describes the image of a pleasant place, near Damascus, where the doves placed on the trees of the Ğunk and Daff cheer people with their songs. Especially those who are afflicted can find consolation in their singing on the Daff/with the tambourine and Ğunk/with the harp. The image of the singing doves is reinforced by the presence of the words *ğ*nk* and *d*ff*, which besides the meanings described above, can be interpreted in a third way. Specifically, the word *ğink* refers to dancers who, although not directly involved in the narrative development of the epigram, remain in the background and suggest the idea – especially after the utterance of the *tawriya* – of a group of joyful dancers dancing to the rhythm of the tambourine and harp, and

⁸³ Ibn Hiğga (*Kašf*, 128; *Hižāna*, 3:298-299), al-Badrī (*Nuzha*, 51).

⁸⁴ Ibn Nubāta (*Diwān*, 333), Ibn Hiğga (*Kašf*, 128; *Hižāna*, 3:299), al-Badrī (*Nuzha*, 50).

accompanying the singing of the doves. Similarly, the word *daff* recalls the world of ornithology if we interpret it as a *nomen verbi* of the verb *daffa – yadiffu*, meaning ‘to flap the wings’. This meaning is connected to the protagonists of the story (the doves in the trees), and conveys the idea of doves in movement and singing to cheer the hearts of the person afflicted.

In this epigram too, the toponyms are the *ba’īd* meanings, while tambourine and harp are the *qarīb*. I think that we can consider the word ‘Damascus’ as the indispensable element to trigger a *tawriya muhayya’a*.⁸⁵

56 الصفدي، من السريع

إنهض إلى الربوة مُسْتَمْتِعاً * تجد من اللذات ما يكفي
فالطيرُ قد غنى على عوده * في الروض بين الجنك والدَّفِّ⁸⁶

Rise towards the Rabwa seeking pleasure and you will find what suffices you of the pleasures.

The birds sang in the garden on their *lute/branch with the harp and the tambourine/ between the Daff and the Ğunk*.

In this epigram, al-Şafadī takes the motif not only of *ğunk* and *duff*, but also of the singing birds. In Ibn Nubāta’s epigram, the singing birds were the doves, while al-Şafadī uses a more general *ṭayr*. What is of interest is that the latter adds a third *tawriya* to those already mentioned: *ūd*, a word which means branch (where birds are perched) and of course the lute, which matches with *ğunk* and *duff*. The *tawriya* is *muhayya’a*, since the word ‘Rabwa’ is the indispensable element for the *tawriya*.

⁸⁵ Talib (2018, 126-127) translates the following variant of the epigram:

أحسن بوادي الجنك تشدو ورقه * في دفّ أشجار تمثيل يعطفها
فإذا تناول كأسه متنزه * غنت عليه بجنكها ودقها

How excellent that valley of harps: its doves sing sweetly on the sides (*daff*) of trees, which lean to the side (*itf*).

And if a relaxed one should take his cup in hand they sing for him with their cymbals and tambourine. [Talib’s translation]

This variant presents the same wordplay on the *tawriya*-words *ğunk* and *duff*, which are introduced by the phrase *wādī l-ğunk* referring to the valley between the Ğunk and the Daff.

⁸⁶ Al-Şafadī (*Faḍḍ*, 169), al-Ru’aynī (*Tirāz*, 466), Ibn Ḥiğġa (*Kašf*, 128; *Ḥizāna*, 3:299), al-Badrī (*Nuzha*, 51).

57 ابن الوردي، من السريع

دمشقُ قل ما شئت في وصفها * واخك عن الربوة ما تحكي
فالطيُّرُ قد غنى على عوده * في الروض بين الدفِّ والجنك⁸⁷

Damascus... say whatever you want in describing it! Relate about the Rabwa
whatever you report!

The birds in the garden sang on their *lute/branch between the tambourine and the
harp/between the Daff and the Ğunk.*

The last epigram in this group is a poem by Ibn al-Wardī (d. 749/1348-1349). It presents the same motifs and *tawriya*-words as in al-Şafadī's lines. We cannot say who wrote them first, but that is not the point here. As in the previous epigram, the *tawriya* is *muhayya'a*.

2) The second motif is the use of a resemanticised Koranic verse in the context of an epigram. I will present here the use of the phrase *idf' bi-llatī hiya aḥsan*, lit. repel with what is better, which appears in two Koranic verses: (Q 23:96) and (Q 41:34).⁸⁸ The Koranic meaning of this verse enters the epigram and assumes the function of *ma'na qarīb*, for the reader immediately recognises it and associates it with its Koranic context. In these two *sūras*, this verse is used to express the idea that a believer who follows the path of God must repel evil deeds (*sayyi'a*) and perform good deeds instead. For instance, one should be reconciliatory even towards those who behave wrongly.

58 ابن نباتة، من الكامل

يا عاذلي شمسُ النهارِ جميلة * وجمالُ فاتيتي ألدَّ وأزِينُ
فانظرِ إلى حُسْنَيْهِمَا مُتَأَمِّلاً * وادفعْ ملامك بالتي هي أحسن⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Ibn Hiġġa (*Hiġāna*, 3:299), al-Badrī (*Nuzha*, 51).

⁸⁸ The sole phrase *bi-llatī hiya aḥsan* appears in (Q 6:152), (Q 16:125), (Q 17:34), (Q 17:53), and (Q 29:46), too.

⁸⁹ Ibn Nubāta (*Dīwān*, 486), Ibn Hiġġa (*Hiġāna*, 1:355-356, 3:226, 314). In *Dīwān*, these two lines belong to a longer *qaṣīda* praising al-Malik al-Mu'ayyad, with the following variant:

ويلومني فيها حلِّي ما درى * الشمس أم تلك المليحة أزين
يا لائمي انظر حسن تلك وهذه * وادفع ملامك بالتي هي أحسن

O you who blames me, the sun of the day is beautiful, but the beauty of my girl is
more pleasant and charming.

Look at these two beauties in contemplation and repel your reproof with what is
better.

These two lines by Ibn Nubāta do not present a dense narrative structure. It is a *ġazal* in which the speaker addresses the almost omnipresent figure of the blamer, saying that his beloved young woman is more beautiful than the sun and summoning his addressee to contemplate both the sun and his beloved so that he can finally repel his blame with what is more beautiful (*bi-llatī hiya aḥsan*), i.e. his beloved. It is a case of *tawriya muhayya'a*, since the double meaning of the *tawriya* would not have been actualised without the co-text and the reference to the young woman, which provide a referent.

59 الصفدي، من الكامل

بأبي فتاةً من كمالِ صفاتها * وجمالِ بهجتها تحارُ الأعيُنُ
كم قد دفعتُ عواذلي عن وجهها * لما تبدتْ بالتي هي أحسن⁹⁰

Could I ransom with my father a young woman whose perfect qualities and
beautiful splendour make the eyes confounded.
How often did I repel my critics from her face when she showed herself with what
was better.

Ibn Ḥiġġa reports that al-Ṣafadī drew inspiration from Ibn Nubāta's motif when writing this epigram. In this *ġazal*, the poet praises the beauty of a young woman who enchants anyone who looks at her. Whenever she shows her beautiful face, the best of her, the lover needs to repel the eyes of the critics. As in the previous example, the *tawriya* is *muhayya'a*.

Is this a case where Ibn Nubāta took some of his poem and readapted it in the form of an epigram? I cannot answer this question, but I will take these two lines as an independent text for the sake of this analysis.

⁹⁰ Ibn Ḥiġġa (*Ḥizāna*, 1:356, 3:226, 314).

60 عز الدين الموصلي (١٣٨٧/٧٨٩)، من الخفيف

قد سَلَوْنَا عَنِ الْمَلِيحِ بِخَوْدٍ * ذَاتِ وَجْهِ بِهِ الْجَمَالُ تَفَنَّنُ

وَرَجَعْنَا عَنِ التَّهْتُّكِ فِيهِ * وَدَفَعْنَاهُ بِالَّتِي هِيَ أَحْسَنُ⁹¹

We found consolation from the pretty boy in a nice girl, whose face has a many-sided beauty.

We escaped the shame and we repelled it with what/whom was better.

This last epigram was written by ‘Izz al-Dīn al-Mawṣilī (d. 789/1387), who reports that he has left a handsome young boy to have a relationship with a tender young woman. In doing so, he has escaped the shame of having a love affair with a boy by choosing what is better, i.e. having a love affair with a young woman. The *tawriya* is *muhayya’a*, since, without mention of the ‘boy’ and the ‘girl’, there would not be a referent for the ‘better’ of the two.

3) The last motif that I will take into account in this selection of epigrams is the *muṭawwaq* dove motif, i.e. a ring-necked dove thus called because it has a black feather ‘collar’ at the back of the neck. This sobriquet comes from the word *ṭawq*, a neck-ring used as an ornament. Moreover, the word can also have a negative connotation when referring to a neck-ring on a prisoner or slave, but also a positive connotation when referring to a figurative neck-ring, which is a sign of the favour received by someone (Lane, *Lexicon*, s.v. *ṭawq*). There are many poems where this motif appears, and I have selected five to represent the use of this word as a *tawriya*.⁹²

61 الوداعي، من مجزوء الخفيف

قَالَتِ الْوُزُقُ إِذْ شَدَا * فَشَجَاهَا وَشَوَّقَا

مَا رَأَيْنَا مُقَرِّطَقًا * قَبْلَ هَذَا مُطَوَّقًا⁹³

⁹¹ Ibn Ḥiğga (*Ḥizāna*, 3:226).

⁹² For a selection of epigrams focused on the motif ‘dove’ – *ḥamām, warqā’, muṭawwaq* – see Talib (2018, 118-127).

⁹³ Ibn Ḥiğga (*Ḥizāna*, 3:301).

The grey doves said, when he sang and caused them to lament and rendered them desirous:

‘We never saw a tunicked one before this *ring-necked dove/neck-ringed one*’.

In this epigram, al-Wadāī makes the doves (*wurq*) speak and, contrary to what normally happens, they listen to a human and feel touched by his singing to such an extent that they say that they have never seen such a (talented) human, i.e. someone wearing a tunic,⁹⁴ before this ring-necked. This *tawriya* gives a double reading of the epigram that is mutually exclusive. If we take the *qarīb* meaning (namely, the dove), we have an image of a human who is animalised: since his singing is so moving and touching, she is compared to a ring-necked dove. On the other hand, we can understand the word *muṭawwaq* as it is applied to a man (*ba’īd*), which results in the image of someone singing out of grief at having been taken prisoner or because he is a slave, for example. The *tawriya* is *muğarrada*, since there are two *lawāzim*, each referring to one of the two meanings: *wurq* to the *qarīb*, while *muqarṭaq* to the *ba’īd*.

62 الوداعي، من مجزوء الرجز

يا جنةً كوثرها * رضابُهُ المُرَوِّقُ
وفوقَ عُصْنِ قَدِّهِ * عذارُهُ مُطَوِّقٌ⁹⁵

O paradise, his clear saliva is its river

and his cheek-down is a *ring-necked dove/neck ring* on the twig of his figure.

This is a *ğazal* epigram that plays on the image of the neck-ring and the sprouting beard of a youth. The lover describes his beloved’s saliva as the river of paradise, where on a twig there is a ring-necked dove (*qarīb*). The intended meaning (*ba’īd*) is

⁹⁴ On the word *qurṭaq*, Dozy (*Vêtements*, 362) reports, quoting Richardson (*Dictionary*, s.v. krtk): “Or le mot kartah ou kurtah désigne en persan, suivant le Dictionnaire de Richardson: une courte veste ou chemise, portée par le femmes, qui prend sur les épaules et qui va jusqu’au milieu du corps. Le mot persan kurtī semble avoir le même sens et le diminutif kartak désigne : une courte chemise qui va juste au corps, avec des manches qui vont jusqu’aux coudes.” Steingass (*Dictionary*, s.v. krtk) uses the exact words used by Richardson, who defined *kurtak* as “a short tunic close to the body like a cuirass, with sleeves reaching to the elbows. Feathers (of ostriches, cranes, or herons), which they wear in the head-dress. A species of sewing or embroidery.” See also Maṭlūb (1995, 96).

⁹⁵ Ibn Ḥiğğa (*Ḥizāna*, 3:301).

the image of a slender and beautiful boy (the twig image was commonly used to represent a beautiful, slim body) who has begun to grow hair (down) on his cheek, a soft beard similar to a neck-ring. As there is no *lāzim*, this *tawriya* is *muğarrada*.

63 الوداعي، من مجزوء الرجز

فديتُ مَنْ مَبْسِمُهُ * زَهْرُ لُعْصِنِ قَدِّهِ
وَصُدْعُهُ مُطَوَّقٌ * فِي رَوْضَةٍ مِنْ خَدِّهِ⁹⁶

May I ransom one whose teeth are blossoms on the twig of his figure.

And his lovelock is a *ring-necked dove/neck-ring* in the garden of his cheek.

The last *ġazal* epigram by al-Wadā'ī describes his beloved through two images. The first is a common simile in this genre: the teeth are flower petals and buds on a thin stem that symbolises his/her slim figure. The second is related to the *tawriya* and is that of the lovelock, which is a dove in the garden of his face (*qarīb*), or is similar to a neck-ring (*ba'īd*) in the garden of his face. The presence of elements that refer to the environment of the garden and botany can be considered as a *lāzim* of the *ma'nā qarīb*. The *tawriya* is therefore *muraššaḥa*.

64 ابن نباتة، من مخلص البسيط

طَوَّقَ جُودُ الْوَزِيرِ جِيْدِي * فَلَسْتُ عَنْ مَدْحِهِ أُعَوَّقُ
أَسْجَعُ بِالْمَدْحِ فِي عُلَاهُ * لَا غَرْوَأَنْ يَسْجَعَ الْمُطَوَّقُ⁹⁷

The munificence of the vizier conferred his favour upon my neck; yet I am not hindered from his praise.

I compose praise rhymed prose about his sublimity: there is no wonder that *the ring-necked dove coos/the neck-ringed composes rhymed prose*.

Ibn Nubāta was not new to this kind of *tawriya*: he titled one of his works *al-Sağ' al-muṭawwaq*, which means 'The cooing of the ring-necked dove' and 'The *sağ'* of the ring-necked one'. This epigram is based on the dichotomy presented at the beginning

⁹⁶ Ibn Ḥiğġa (*Ḥizāna*, 3:301).

⁹⁷ Ibn Nubāta (*Dīwān*, 356), Ibn Ḥiğġa (*Ḥizāna*, 3:301-302).

of this section: namely, the neck-ring can be used metaphorically to represent both the munificence bestowed on someone, and slavery. These two meanings sometimes overlap, and neither excludes the other, as exemplified by this epigram. Ibn Nubāta reports that he has obtained the vizier's favour, which is like a mark upon him, as if it were a neck-ring. It can also be interpreted in a negative way, though, as the neck-ring is a symbol of submission, therefore yielding the image of a poet forced to praise his benefactor-master. This image continues in the second line, where the poet states that 1. it is obvious that the dove coos (*qarīb*), and 2. whoever has a collar around his neck is obliged to praise his 'master'. Since the *ma'nà ba'īd* is suggested by the first hemistich of the first line, this is a *tawriya mubayyana*.

65 ابن حجة، من الكامل

نَاخَتْ مَطَوَّقَةُ الرِّيَاضِ وَقَدْ جَرَى * دَمْعِي الْمَلَوْنُ بَعْدَ فَرْقَةٍ حُبِّهِ
لَكِنْ بَتَلَوَيْنِ الدَّمُوعَ تَبَاخَلْتُ * فَعَدْتُ مَطَوَّقَةً بِمَا بَخِلْتُ بِهِ⁹⁸

The ring-necked dove of the garden cooed, and my [blood-] coloured tears had flowed already after the separation from its love.

But it became more and more stingy with blood-coloured tears that it became a *ring-necked dove/ring-necked* with what it was avaricious with.

This epigram is more complex than the others: besides the *muṭawwaq* motif (ring-necked dove/ring-necked person), there is also an *iqtibās*, which introduces the meaning that the word *muṭawwaq* has in the sacred text. The poem opens with an image of a garden in which a ring-necked dove, metaphor of the beloved, is cooing after seeing her lover weeping blood-stained tears due to the separation from her. But, while the lover cries tears of blood, the dove does not seem to want to give free rein to her emotions. Indeed, she seems to have the opposite attitude to the lover, and their separation does not seem to have the same effect on her: always assuming that she is touched as much as her lover by the separation, but her singing/cooing reveals that she is not. Despite her detachment, her lover's tears will have an effect

⁹⁸ Ibn Ḥiğga (*Kašf*, 126; *Hizāna*, 2:297). Variant:

نَاخَتْ مَطَوَّقَةُ الرِّيَاضِ وَقَدْ رَأَتْ * تَلَوَيْنِ دَمْعِي بَعْدَ فَرْقَةٍ حُبِّهِ
لَكِنْ بِهِ لَمَّا سَمَحْتُ تَبَاخَلْتُ * فَعَدْتُ مَطَوَّقَةً بِمَا بَخِلْتُ بِهِ

on the beloved/dove. The last hemistich contains the *tawriya* expressed through an *iqtibās*. The Koranic phrase *muṭawwaqa bi-mā baḥilat bi-hi* is taken from (Q 3:180), which is a verse warning the unbelievers not to be parsimonious with the grace given by God, for their avarice will result on the day of judgment in a neck-ring made of everything that they have been parsimonious with: “And let not those who are parsimonious with what God has given them of his favour think that it is good for them. No! It is bad for them. What they are parsimonious with will be hung about their necks on the Day of resurrection. To God [belongs] the inheritance of the heavens and the earth. God is aware of what you do”. The word *muṭawwaqa* takes on two meanings in the context of this epigram. The first is obviously that of a dove, which refers to the beloved cooing in the garden. The second is suggested by the Koranic verse, obviously resemanticised, where it is no longer God who confers his grace on men, who may be generous or parsimonious with what they have received, but the lover, who gives his beloved-dove his bloody tears of despair. Contrary to her lover’s wishes, the dove does not seem to experience the same emotions, and does not shed a single tear. She is therefore described as increasingly lacking in emotions and tears – to such an extent, in fact, that a spot shaped like a neck-ring has formed on her neck. It is her lover’s tears of blood; she has been so parsimonious with such tears that they have left their mark on her delicate neck, precisely like the misers in the Koranic text who have a collar around their neck comprising what they have been parsimonious with. I propose to classify this example of *tawriya* as a *mubayyana*, where the intended meaning is that suggested by the Koranic sense of the *iqtibās* and is introduced by the verb *tabāḥalat*, which is its *lāzim*.

4.4 Conclusions

I would like to close this selection by presenting some reflections on what the study of these epigrams shows.

First, the theory of *tawriya* does not always manage to describe the practice of the poetic discourse. If we look at the examples collected in these pages, we notice that the rigorous application of the theoretical dictates as they were formulated in works of rhetoric and stylistics is often not simple and is even sometimes counterintuitive.

It is misleading to see a dichotomy between *ma'nà qarīb* (immediately perceived) and *ma'nà ba'īd* (successively perceived), where only one of the two is the *ma'nà murād* (intended meaning). Indeed, as we have seen in these epigrams, both meanings of *tawriya* intertwine within the narrative structure of the poetic text, and cooperate in realising its aesthetic effect. One example is Ibn Ḥiğġa's judgment on epigram no. 21 by Ṣafī l-Dīn al-Ḥillī. As we can infer from the reading of Ibn Ḥiğġa's judgement, the failure to use this figure is mainly due to the lack of a double reading of the text. None of the sources that I have presented so far (chapter 1-3) gives particular emphasis to the importance of the double reading. However, if we compare the sources and the judgments made by the various authors (especially al-Ṣafadī and Ibn Ḥiğġa), then we can infer that a *tawriya* must admit the syntactic possibility of a double reading, and it is preferable if this also happens at the semantic level. The only author who clearly states that the condition for a successful use of *tawriya* is the ability to engender a double reading of the text is an Ottoman author: al-Nābulusī (d. 1143/1731), who in (*Nafaḥāt*, 197) – also quoted in Bonebakker (1966, 104) – states that “the condition for *tawriya* is that the discourse results are admissible for both meanings, as it is known by those who practise this art”.

Second, Al-Ṣafadī was the only author to introduce in his treatment of *tawriya* some sections on imperfect uses of this figure, and to describe them in a detailed way. As we saw in chapter 1, he distinguishes between α . Erroneous homonymy, β . *Tawriya nāqiṣa*, and γ . *Tawriya ba'īda*, stating that, in these three cases, the *tawriya* cannot be deemed successful. However, the study of poetic practice, and the numerous examples cited in anthological works, have shown that the use of *tawriya* is not strictly confined to what theory has made of it. Specifically, we have encountered in this selection some poems regarded as good examples of this figure that al-Ṣafadī would have considered as being infelicitous uses: for example, epigram no. 9, in which al-Ġazzār does not use a perfectly homonymous word, but only a homograph, to express the *tawriya*: *libs* vs. *labs*. This also happens in other poems that we have seen, such as epigrams no. 26 by al-M'mār (*ġarr* vs. *ġarra*); no. 45 (*fals* vs. *fils*), no. 47 (*darr* vs. *durr*) by Ibn Nubāta; and those epigrams where the wordplay is based on *Daff/duff* and *Ġunk*. The use of these words implies that the understanding of *tawriya* and the success of the work of art are strongly linked to the reader's ability to decode

the text, and therefore involve a wealth of knowledge that he/she can use for this purpose. The reader must therefore have an encyclopaedia provided with these means (Eco, [1979] 2006).

Third, if we assume that we are not the Model Reader to whom these poems are addressed, then one difficulty that we face is to look at the poetry of that time with the eyes of the reader for whom it was intended. For example, what distinguishes the ideas in a collective encyclopaedia from those in an encyclopaedia belonging to a specific class of individuals? What literary, scientific, and technical competences can be considered (almost) universal? Let us consider epigram no. 5, where the use of the phrase *banū baqar* as a *tawriya* implies that the Model Reader is able to understand that another meaning is added to the literal meaning, the interpretation of which requires that the reader is aware of the existence of a tribe called Banū Baqar. Can this information be considered part of the common encyclopaedia of the reader of that time? We could answer this question if we were aware of how much the Arab tribal 'system' was still considered an integral part of the social fabric in the Mamluk era. It could be assumed that belonging to an Arab lineage was a way for a person to detach himself or herself from a non-Arab power elite. Similarly, if we consider epigram no. 7, we can say that the *tawriya* based on the phrase *ayyām tašrīq* is completely understandable for a reader of that time, since this information is an integral part of every Muslim's encyclopaedia. The same is true where the *tawriya* is a Koranic verse or a proverb. If we shift our attention to epigram no. 15, can we say that the encyclopaedia of the average reader is provided with sector information for which he is able to recognise the technical terms of *wirāqa*? The answer is negative, since this sector information is something that only a limited number of people have and is assumed by the author in the Model Reader to whom he refers, i.e. a reader who has some technical notions that he or she shares with the author. However, this does not mean that the epigram cannot be understood even by a wider audience. In fact, the poem can be described as a text built on two levels whose understanding depends on the encyclopaedia of the reader. Those who do not have this information in their encyclopaedia will only have access to the first level of understanding of the text, i.e. an epigram in which the Subject wishes to be together with the Object (i.e. person) of quest. This will allow enjoyment of the poetic text that we could define as

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'standard-first-level'.⁹⁹ A second level of understanding and enjoyment of the text is given by the identification of the *tawriya*-word, which will open the possibility of a second interpretation, creating a second text – cf. chapter 5 – within the first in which it is enclosed, and with which it cooperates for the aesthetic success of the work of art. This is the peculiarity of this figure, which, unlike other tropes or figures, acts not only at the level of extra-textual reception, in the cognitive world – for example, a metaphor acts at an extra-textual level since the reader understands the information which the author wants to express through the comparison of a quality between metaphrand and metaphier. Rather, it also acts at a textual level. The double reading of the text provided by the *tawriya* generates another text within it which branches out from the first and develops new ramifications depending on the degree of understanding of the reader, i.e. from the match between empirical reader and Model Reader, i.e. an example of open work (Eco, [1962] 2006) and of interpretative cooperation (Eco, [1979] 2006; 1994).

Being strongly based on interpretative cooperation, a text in which there is a *tawriya* requires the reader to be hard-working. This is the fourth reflection. If the reader has to decode the text, then he or she becomes an integral part of the text itself, in the sense that I will explain. In the introduction to this chapter, I argued that the epigram in its brevity presents a finished or a finishable Narrative Schema, and, as we will see in chapter 5, the reader must interact with the text to reconstruct any phases missing from his or her narrative schema. One example is epigram no. 27, where the reader must derive a sexual meaning from the text. Obviously, not all poetic texts require a high level of interpretative cooperation on the part of the reader. This is the case, for example, with the *muğūn* epigrams presented in this chapter. The cooperation required is sometimes minimal, and the communicative purpose is nothing but a *divertissement*. It is precisely for these reasons that interpretative cooperation and poetic form are closely linked.

⁹⁹ “Any such text is addressed, above all, to a Model Reader of the first level, who wants to know, quite rightly, how the story ends (whether Ahab will manage to capture the whale, or whether Leopold Bloom will meet Stephen Dedalus after coming across him a few times on the sixteenth of June 1904). But every text is also addressed to a Model Reader of the second level, who wonders what sort of reader that story would like him or her to become and who wants to discover precisely how the model author goes about serving as a guide for the reader” Eco (1994, 27).

Fifth and finally, another essential characteristic of *tawriya* is based on these fundamental factors which, when applied to epigrams, turns out to be an expressive method in line with one of the principles of *balāgha*: *al-kaṭīr fī l-qalīl, al-īḡāz* (van Gelder, 1981; Simon, 2019). As we have seen, the use of a homonymous word allows a poet to express multiple concepts, and to develop them in one or more texts. The epigram is by nature a short text (most epigrams written in the Mamluk era consist of two or three lines), and it must adhere to the constraints of poetic art, such as rhyme and metre. For this reason, *tawriya* can be used to express a great amount of information in a limited text. Take, for example, epigram no. 48, in which Ibn Nubāta mourns the death of one of his children. In just two lines, the poet manages to transmit a great amount of information mainly due to the *tawriya* in the word *‘aqīqa*, which contains three possible meanings. In doing so, he not only expresses his pain, but also gives us information about his child’s death: namely, that it occurred just a few days after his birth.

In summary, *tawriya* perfectly reflects the spirit of the time when it was most widespread. It allows a direct interaction between author and reader, which reflects changes in society at the time. Poetry is no longer an elevated art, something to be used and consumed by an elite, and something totally detached from society and daily life. Instead, it is based on society itself, and draws from it themes, motifs, and expressive power. Poetic discourse develops within a network of literati, poets, craftsmen, *‘ulamā’*, clerks, etc., who communicate with each other and with the reader. This is the reason that *tawriya* saw its maximum development at that time: being rooted in the extra-linguistic context of enunciation, it is capable of transforming the reader from a passive into an active entity in the reception and production of the work of art.

5. Towards a semiotic approach to *tawriya*: the case of *taḍmīn* and *iqtibās*

5.1 Introduction

As we saw in the previous chapter, the theoretical framework as it is described in works of rhetoric and stylistics has proven to be insufficient to describe and understand the functioning of *tawriya* in poetical texts, which suggests a certain distance between poetic practice and the theory which describes it. For this reason, I propose in this chapter a new approach to analysing *tawriya*. To do so, I will apply semiotic theories to two case studies in which *tawriya* operates on the level both of the single word, and also of a text segment embedded in a poem. I refer here to the use of *taḍmīn* (quotation) and *iqtibās* (Koranic quotation). The sources showed that quotations – from the holy book, from the tradition of the prophet, from other poetical works, or from paroemic wisdom – can also contain, or be used as, a *tawriya*, and many examples of this use can be observed in Arabic literature. In particular, if we consider the encyclopaedia *Ḥizānat al-adab* by Ibn Ḥiǧǧa I-Ḥamawī (d. 837/1434), we notice under the entry '*tawriya*' that many pieces of poetry are introduced by the words *wa-qāla muḍamminan* or *wa-qāla muqtabisan*. The first refers to the quotation of a well-known utterance in the poem (for example, another line, a saying), while the second specifically refers to the incorporation of a Koranic utterance or a tradition of the prophet. Proof can be found in the selection of epigrams that I presented in the previous chapter, where many texts contain a verse of the Koran and one contains a saying.

When a quotation is introduced into another work, two narrative worlds come together which, born as separate and non-communicating entities, merge and share the narrative process. To account for this process, I adopt a semiotic analysis that aims to take into account all the factors constituting the literary work. The reason that I adopt an approach that is based mainly on the semiotic theories of the Greimasian and Echiian traditions is that they are able to describe the two

foundations on which the aesthetic success of *tawriya*-epigrams is based: the structure of the text and its intertwining, and the role of the reader in the interpretative cooperation of the work of art.

First, I aim to analyse the internal structure of the epigram and its narrative construction. The hypothesis that I will put forward will be to consider the epigram as a Text,¹ as it is conceived by Marrone (2001; 2014). I will apply the method of analysis to the concept of Text according to which each text can be considered as the development of a Narrative Schema whose protagonists are Actants in the theory outlined by Greimas (1966; 1970; 1983).

Second, I will focus on the role of the reader. As we saw in the previous chapter, much of the success of the poetic composition lies in the interpretative cooperation between text and empirical reader: namely, on the match between Empirical Reader and Model Reader. The description of how the reader perceives and contributes to the success of the work is taken essentially from the work of Umberto Eco ([1962] 2006; [1979] 2006; 1994), who outlines how the work of art is open to interpretation and how the reader plays a fundamental role in the success of the work itself.²

5.2 Methodological references

Stating that I will consider the epigram as a Text may seem a trivial clarification, but it actually points out that a Text is such because it has very specific characteristics, and not because it is an ordered set of words written on a sheet from right to left, or vice versa; nor is it such because it is conveyed by a linguistic code such as English, Arabic, or Kirundi. What, then, a Text? Marrone (2001, xx) argues that conceiving of a text in terms of a pure code/message dichotomy is misleading. The text is a complex organisation, a “conglomerato di senso complesso stratificato, coerente nelle sue varie parti e coeso come un tutto, esso è relativamente autonomo rispetto ai codici che lo hanno posto in essere: se da un lato esiste grazie a essi, dall’altro li deforma,

¹ The specific lexicon of semiotics will be annotated with a capital initial so that the reader can distinguish it from any generic use of the word.

² English translations of Eco’s, Greimas’, and Marrone’s works do not always respect their original versions. For this reason, I prefer using these sources in their original language (French and Italian).

costruendo microcodici finalizzati ai propri scopi comunicativi, i quali poi, grazie alla propria diffusione, si distribuiscono nel sociale riverberandosi sui macrocodici". For this reason, it cannot be said that the reading of epigrams, such as those collected in the previous chapter, only presupposes a reader capable of carrying out a simple decoding of the linguistic code used, and capable of understanding the message expressed by that code. The Text 'epigram' is a condensate of meaning produced in a specific culture to be enjoyed in a specific culture; it is a system of signification, the use of which increases the social reality in which the Text was produced, offering another model of signification that will enrich that set of Texts communicating with each other, which is culture. This is why the notion of Text becomes a notion that pertains to a wider field of knowledge and study: sociosemiotics. To describe this approach and help further development, Marrone establishes some criteria to define a Text and how it functions. First, the principle of negotiation by which "given certain conditions even a small sign, a symbol, a logo can become an actual text, as well as, in other given conditions, they can become just parts of a larger textual occurrence" (Marrone, 2014, 82). Second, its biplanarity, i.e. "the reciprocal presupposition of two planes, the one of expression and the one of contents, each of which is made up of a matter (quite irrelevant) and a form (constitutive)" (83). Third, a Text must be closed, which does not mean that it is impenetrable; rather, Textual closure indicates that the Text has its beginning and its end within given limits. Fourth, from an internal point of view, a Text is characterised by a principle of 'holding'. Like the Saussurian '*tout se tien*', "the holding of the textual whole generates at the same time the internal articulation of the text (its structure) and its boundaries" (85). The level of its internal articulation is nothing but a processuality and each Text "has its deep narrative organisation where a pragmatic/passionate program and a clash of subjects bring about a subjective transformation that can be both individual or common" (86). The last two remarks that define the Text as the basis of the sociosemiotics approach is that a Text contains multiple levels, both at the level of its profound structure and at the level of its enunciation. Finally, the relationship between a text and other texts, i.e. the intertextuality that relates a new text to its predecessors and to the cultural constructs in which the Texts are created. This is a fundamental notion that helps us understand how Texts are not stand-alone units with uncrossable borders. Rather,

while keeping their specificity and internal coherence, they are articulated in an interchange of intertextuality. This type of interchange and intertextuality means that there are no Texts which do not contain other Texts, even if at the minimum level of semantic entailment, e.g. every epigram in which a young man is described with an incipient beard (*'idār*) contains in itself an allusion to other previous Texts in which this motif has appeared, and the reader will – or should – be able to recognise and actualise them.

Now, given a Text, the person who uses it is the reader,³ who is the Empirical Reader, i.e. who materially reads a text at any given moment. The person reading these pages is an Empirical Reader, regardless of who, where, and when. To understand a Text, the reader must have the competences to actualise it. These competences are even more necessary since, as Eco ([1979] 2006, 51) points out, a text does not contain all the semantic information needed to actualise it, but is made up of a certain amount of 'unspoken' which must be actualised by the reader. Hence, Eco's well-known definition: "un testo è un meccanismo pigro (o economico) che vive sul plusvalore di senso introdotto dal destinatario [...] un testo vuole lasciare al lettore l'iniziativa interpretativa, anche se di solito desidera essere interpretato con un margine sufficiente di univocità. Un testo vuole che qualcuno lo aiuti a funzionare" Eco ([1979] 2006, 52). For this reason, the Text foresees its reader, i.e. the competences that the reader must have in order to interpret it. It therefore foresees also a Model Reader, i.e. "un testo è un prodotto la cui sorte interpretativa deve far parte del proprio meccanismo generativo" (54). The author of a Text is, then, a pragmatic entity, in the sense that he or she constructs the Text based on the competences that its Model Reader must have to interpret it, and to ensure that the Model Reader can actualise the Text through a cooperative act of interpretation. The Model Reader is not a subject in flesh and blood, but a textual strategy, i.e. "è un insieme di condizioni di felicità, testualmente stabilite, che devono essere soddisfatte perché un testo sia pienamente attualizzato nel suo contenuto potenziale" (62). The set of competences

³ 'Reader' is not understood in its primary meaning of one who reads a written text, but it could be understood also with a general sense of user. For example, a space can be considered a Text and it has its Model Reader/User.

that are required and presupposed in the Model Reader for the purpose of actualising the text are defined as Encyclopaedia.

The Text is therefore a participated Text generated within a given culture and built in a way that envisages a specific Model Reader capable of actualising its content. But while Eco highlights the aspects of the production and reception of the Text and the inferential walks that the reader must perform in order to actualise the Text (Eco [1979] 2006; 1994), Greimas (1966; 1970; 1983) turns his attention to the textual structure and the inner logic of a Text. In short, each text has a common structure, the Narrative Schema, which is conceived as a universal regularity.

The Narrative Schema consists of four distinct but interconnected phases. 1. Manipulation, i.e. the action of a Sender with regard to a Receiver, where the first is “the one which communicates to the Subject-Receiver (belonging to the immanent universe) not only the elements of modal competence, but also the set of values at stake. The Sender receives the communication concerning the results of the Subject-Receiver’s Performance; it falls to the Sender to sanction” (Greimas and Courtés, 1982, 294). 2. Competence, or the acquisition of the skills of ‘being’ and ‘doing’ to actualise the Narrative Path as it was expressed in the previous phase. 3. Performance, which is the Narrative Path by which what is expressed in the Manipulation phase is achieved. 4. Sanction, the last phase of the Narrative Schema. It is the sanction of the Sender towards the Receiver about what it did in the two previous phases. It may be a Pragmatic Sanction, i.e. “an epistemic judgement, passed by the judge-Sender, concerning the conformity of the behaviour and, more precisely, of the Narrative Program of the performing Subject”, or a Cognitive Sanction, i.e. “an epistemic judgement of the being of the Subject” (Greimas and Courtés, 1982, 267).

In a Text we can recognise universal figures which, independently of the actors who interpret them, are the basis of any narrative development and which play in the Narrative Schema. These figures are called Actants: functions existing regardless of the semantic investment actualised in the Text. The basic Actants of a Text are: 1. the Sender (Fr. *Destinateur*) and Receiver (Fr. *Destinataire*), whose definition I have already given. 2. The Subject, i.e. the actantial figure to whom the Sender communicates the Values at play, and who will have to acquire the Competence and

actualise the Performance. It can be a Subject of Being, which is defined by whether or not it is conjoined with the Object of Value; or a Subject of Doing, i.e. a Subject which performs certain actions in order to be conjoined with the Object. 3. The Object of value “is then defined as the locus wherein values (or qualifications) are invested and to which the subject is conjoined or from which it is disjoined” (Greimas and Courtés, 1982, 217).⁴

The function that leads the Subject of Doing to be conjoined with the Object of value – i.e. the realisation of a Subject of Being conjoined with its Object of value – takes the name of Narrative Program. The concept ‘Value’ is fundamental, for it is the Value with which the Object is invested that makes the Subject want to be conjoined (positive, euphoric value) or disjoined (negative, dysphoric value) with it. To better understand Greimas’ Narrative Schema and Actants, let us try to apply it to a narrative text like the fairy tale.

A terrible fire-breathing dragon kidnaps a beautiful princess from her castle and takes her to its dark cave. The king, father of the princess, assigns a daring knight in his shining armour to save the poor princess. To save the princess, the knight must learn the dragon language, and he manages to do so in a few days. After learning this extraordinarily difficult language, the knight journeys to the dragon cave, duels with the terrible beast and kills it; he frees the princess, and takes her back to her castle. As soon as the king sees his daughter safe and sound, he gives her as a bride to the brave knight. And they lived happily ever after.

In this very short text, we can see the phases of the Narrative Schema and the Actants involved in the narrative process. The dragon is the Opponent, an actantial figure who opposes the Subject; the princess is the Object of value; the knight is the Subject; and the King is the Sender. The Manipulation occurs when the Sender instructs the Subject to free the princess/Object. The competence is actualised when the knight

⁴ These are only the basic actantial figures that we will need for the analysis that I propose in this chapter. The theory developed over the years starting from Greimas’ writings (who developed Vladimir Propp’s morphology of the tale) has undergone evolutions and changes that are impossible to summarise. For this, I refer to the final bibliography.

has learned the dragon language. The killing of the dragon and the rescue of the princess is the Performance. The final wedding is the Sanction.

Such a scheme, which is intended to be universal, cannot always be depicted in a Text in its wholeness. In fact, there are Texts in which only a part of the Narrative Schema is depicted. The epigram is a short Text, and often does not actualise the whole narrative process of the Narrative Schema from its initial to its final phase. Usually only a part, or some parts, are actualised by the Text, while those missing can be implied, so that the reader can reconstruct them starting from Frames contained within his or her Encyclopaedia; or he or she can imagine them through his or her predictions. For example, in epigram no. 1, the only moment actualised is that of the Manipulation; epigram no. 20 describes the Performance; epigram no. 12, in which al-Ġazzār puts an end to his literary career, depicts the final moment of the Narrative Schema, the moment of the Sanction; and epigram no. 10 describes both the moments of the Performance and the Sanction.

This methodological introduction does not try to describe exhaustively the semiotic theories developed over the past half century. On the contrary, it is only a very brief summary for introductory purposes, so as to be able to clarify the starting-points of the analysis applied to the two case studies *taḍmīn* and *iqtibās*. Applying these semiotic theories to epigrams means accepting that they are universal, and therefore accepting that they are able to describe Texts with a high cultural specificity, such as *tawriya*-epigrams. The definition of Text as it is expressed in sociosemiotics provides an idea of a layered and complex Text, the characteristic of which is to be the expression of a specific cultural fabric. Given this assumption, approaching a Text on a semiotic level guarantees considering all the components that make this mechanism a mechanism that acts in the world. Specifically, the act of creating a new Text, its internal structure, the action that the Text exercises in the Reader, the action that the Reader exercises in the Text, and, above all, its being a part of an intertwinement of Texts, intertexts, allusions, rewritings, which are the literary culture of a society.

The two types of intertextuality that I will address in the next two sections are presented by pre-modern Arab critics as two types of figures of speech and inserted in the treatises as an integral part of the rhetorical devices. For this reason, before

proceeding to the semiotic analysis of the texts, I will briefly recall some essential points of the description provided by pre-modern Arab literary criticism.

5.3 The case of *taḍmīn*

5.3.1 Preliminaries

Al-Qazwīnī (d. 739/1338) (*Īdāh*, 6:137-143) discusses *iqtibās* and *taḍmīn* in the chapter devoted to *sariqāt* (plagiarism). According to him (*Īdāh*, 6:140), *taḍmīn* is when “the piece of poetry includes another piece of poetry by someone else, acknowledging it clearly if it is not known among eloquent people (*bulaḡā*)”, i.e. what Sanni (1989a) calls “rhetorical *taḍmīn*”.⁵ Al-Qazwīnī also points out that *taḍmīn* is not limited to the quotation of a whole line, but can also be a hemistich or part of a hemistich. What is of interest is that he underlines how a successful *taḍmīn* occurs when the incorporation of the poetic segment brings a semantic change from the meaning of the segment in its original context through the use of *tawriya* or *tašbīh* (simile) (*Īdāh*, 6:143). In general, the use of *taḍmīn* is not considered as *sariqa* as far

⁵ *Taḍmīn* is a technical term which refers also to other phenomena which are not the topic of this work. It could refer to the enjambment, i.e. the “grammatical *taḍmīn*” (Sanni, 1998, 1-7) as it is described in van Gelder (1982), and Sanni (1989a; 1998, 1-7); or to the concept of “hermeneutical *taḍmīn*” as it is called by Sanni (1998, 17-19), or “implication of meaning” as it is called by Gully (1997). See also Fudge (2007). Of course, the concept ‘*taḍmīn*’ experienced a theoretical development in works of rhetoric and stylistics. Sanni (1998, 7-17) retraces the history of *taḍmīn* from its first appearance in Ibn al-Mu‘azz’s (d. 296/908) (*Badī*, 64), where this figure is called *ḥusn al-taḍmīn*, i.e. good quotation, but who did not spend a word on its theoretical foundations. A later systematisation is due to al-Ḥātimī (d. 388/998) (*Ḥilya*), who, however, does not apply to ‘quotation’ the name of *taḍmīn*, but differentiates between a good quotation (*iḡtilāb* and *istilḥāq*) and a bad quotation, i.e. when the aim of the poet is to sell other people’s lines as his own (*iṣṭirāf*) (Sanni, 1998, 8-9). The author who will devote much more space to *taḍmīn* is Ibn Rašīq (d. 456 or 463/1063-4 or 1071) (*‘Umda*, 2:702-710). Sanni (1998, 10-11) underlines that for Ibn Rašīq it is better to use a *taḍmīn* in a context different from the original one, and to use it as an *iḥāla* (insinuation) or *išāra* (allusion) to the original segment in a new text. The first who included the use of paroemias as *taḍmīn* was Ibn Ḥalaf (d. 455/1063 ?). Successively, authors like Ḍiyā‘ al-Dīn Ibn al-Aṭīr (d. 637/1239) (*Maṭal*, 3:200-205) and Ibn Abī I-ṣḡba‘ (*Taḥrīr*, 140-142) will use the term *taḍmīn* also for quotations from the Koran and the *ḥadīṭ* instead of the term *iqtibās*. This use did not prevail and two different terms are used in rhetoric to refer to poetic and paroemiatic quotations (*taḍmīn*), and Koranic and *ḥadīṭ* quotations (*iqtibās*), e.g. al-Qazwīnī’s (*Īdāh*, 6:137-143). For two studies of *taḍmīn* in poetic practice, see Wagner (2010) and Orfali (2011).

as it is recognisable, and the poet who makes use of it does not sell it as his own poetry.⁶

Al-Ṣafadī devotes the final section (*tatimma*) of the first *muqaddima* of his treatise *Faḍḍ al-ḥitām* to the use of *taḍmīn* together with *tawriya*. In doing so, he adopts in (*Faḍḍ*, 91) – cf. Bonebakker (1966, 86) – the definitions of his predecessors, and states that *taḍmīn* is the insertion of either a line of poetry, or a well-known saying, into another piece of poetry or prose, and judges it worth when it is subject to a resemanticisation. For this reason, he deals at length with the topic of *taḍmīn* and *tawriya*, providing some interesting examples of how a *tawriya* resemanticises a whole text and reconnects it to the new one in which it is embedded. The examples that al-Ṣafadī cites in this section are poetic extracts in which *tawriya* always acts at the level of the single word; it is contained in the quoted text, and is in co-reference with the new co-text that surrounds it. Ibn Ḥiǧǧa (*Kaṣf*, 41) will not spare himself from criticising al-Ṣafadī for inserting a section on *taḍmīn* in a work devoted to *tawriya*. This is because, in his opinion, among those things to reproach al-Ṣafadī, there is that of having delved into topics of little interest for *tawriya*, and among those the use of *taḍmīn*, which is judged by Ibn Ḥiǧǧa as a misplaced digression. Nonetheless, we notice that he includes in his two works (*Kaṣf*; *Ḥizāna*) many cases of *taḍmīn* among the examples of successful *tawriya*.

In the previous chapter, I presented an epigram by al-Ǧazzār (no. 8) where there was an insertion of a well-known saying. In this section, I will analyse an epigram where the insertion is a hemistich of a *raǧʿaz* composition. My aim is to show how the use of *tawriya* and *taḍmīn* implies the capability of the reader to understand the given

⁶ The literature about *sariqa* (plagiarism, theft, borrowing) is wide and worth being briefly recalled. A seminal study of it is due to von Grunebaum (1944), who reports all the theoretical contributions of premodern Arab critics, from the first formulation of *sarq al-šīʿr* by Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī (*Šināʿatayni*), to the scholastic rhetoric of al-Qazwīnī (*ʿĪdāh*), punctually analysing every definition and every difference in the terminology adopted by the authors. Heinrichs (1987-1988), however, focuses on the practical level of the poetical production, explaining the relation between *sāriq* (the plagiariser) and *masrūq min-hu* (who is plagiarised) through an analysis of some of al-Mutanabbī's (d. 354/955) *sariqāt* as they are discussed by al-ʿAmidī (d. 433/1042). Mainly referred to the terminology used and its different use by different authors, the two contributions by Bonebakker (1997a-b; 1999) purpose the analysis of this terminological labyrinth with reference to the work of al-Ḥātimī (*Hilya*). Contrary to the contributions cited so far, Naaman (2011) proposes an investigation not centred on the theoretical discussion, but offers an interesting contribution in terms of poetic practice, in particular by addressing his attention to the figure of al-Šāhib Ibn ʿAbbād (d. 385/995). For sake of exhaustiveness, I refer here to other two studies which I could not consult: Bonebakker (1986), and Sanni (1989b).

epigram, in the light of the previous textual evidence and his or her own Encyclopaedia. The whole understanding of the literary work is closely related to the definition by the Empirical Author of his Model Reader, who, through a series of inferential walks (Eco, [1979] 2006; 1994), should be able to trace back the quotation to its 'Ur-model'.

The use of *taḍmīn* is a process realising intertextuality through a recontextualisation of a given phrase or sentence, taken from a first text in which it appeared, and inserted into another text. This brings us to a fork on the road: either the quotation does not experience any resemanticisation, and its meaning remains unchanged; or the quotation experiences a resemanticisation through its recontextualisation, which causes a shift from a first meaning to another. The use of *taḍmīn* resemanticised through *tawriya* leads to an enrichment of the text, which deserves to be studied more deeply. In this sense, I can say that I am more Ṣafadian than Ibn Ḥiġġān. That is why I will analyse in this section the relationship between these two figures and I will do so through a case study of an epigram by Ibn Ḥiġġā, with all due respect to his criticism of al-Ṣafadī.

The epigram is the following:

ابن حجة، من الرجز

سِرْنَا وَلَيْلُ شَعْرِهِ مُنْسَدِلٌ * وَقَدْ غَدَا بِتَوْمِنَا مُضْفَرًا
فَقَالَ صُبْحُ ثَغْرِهِ مُبْتَسِمًا * "عند الصباح يَحْمَدُ الْقَوْمُ السُّرَى"⁷

We travelled, while the night of his hair was falling down on the shoulders, and it became plaited in our sleep.

The smiling daybreak of his teeth said: 'At the break of dawn, people praise the night journey.'

5.3.2 The reader's path

⁷ Ibn Ḥiġġā (*Kaṣf*, 247; *Ḥizāna*, 3:512). For the embedded text, see Abū 'Ubayd (*Amṭāl*, 231), al-Ġāḥiẓ (*Ḥayawān*, 6:508), al-Mufaḍḍal al-Dabbī (*Fāḥir*, 199-200), Zayd b. Rifā'a (*Amṭāl*, 162), al-Maydānī (*Arabum*, 2:70-71), al-'Askarī (*Ġamhara*, 2:38), al-Zamaḥṣarī (*Mustaqṣā*, 2:168), and al-Ṣaybī (*Timṭāl*, 2:473-474). These sources will be analysed in depth in section 5.3.3.

What happens when someone reads these two lines? And what is the interpretative effort that he/she must make to understand this text? The first thing the reader does when entering a text is a pragmatic action of identifying the Topic. This action can be summed up in plain words in the question, 'what is the text about?'. Eco ([1979] 2006, 87-92) describes this action as basically aimed at formulating an interpretative hypothesis of the text on the one hand, and on the other as a method to limit the possible interpretations of the text, following a familiar path by resorting to internalised Frames, i.e.

when one encounters a new situation (or makes a substantial change in one's view of the present problem) one selects from memory a structure called a Frame. This is a remembered framework to be adapted to fit reality by changing details as necessary. A frame is a data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation, like being in a certain kind of living room, or going to a child's birthday party. Attached to each frame are several kinds of information. Some of this information is about how to use the frame. Some is about what one can expect to happen next. Some is about what to do if these expectations are not confirmed. (Minsky 1974)⁸

For example, the reader of all times in reading one of al-Mutanabbī's *Sayfiyyāt* recognises a series of textual elements and co-textual recurrences which direct the interpretation towards a well-defined poetic genre, activating in the reader the '*madīh*' Frame. Therefore, it is not expected to find in the Mutanabbian poem an ode to the penis similar to epigram no. 29 that we saw in the previous chapter. Of course, we must not forget that the poetic form 'epigram' is by its nature short, and therefore the process of identifying the Topic as an interpretative hypothesis will be immediately put to the test by the imminent conclusion of the text. What, then, is the interpretative hypothesis formulated by the reader of this epigram? Reading the text allows us to formulate two interpretative hypotheses:

- (1) Description of a night journey
- (2) Description of a night tryst

⁸ Which Eco, ([1979] 2006, 80) calls sceneggiature.

Once the two interpretative hypotheses have been established, we can approach the analysis of the text in its components to identify the narrative Isotopies and establish a first cooperative interpretation. The term Isotopy (Fr. *Isotopie*) has been borrowed by Greimas (1966; 1970) from natural sciences, and it has been applied to semiotics to indicate “un ensemble redondant de catégories sémantiques qui rend possible la lecture uniforme du récit, telle qu’elle résulte des lectures partielles des énoncés et de la résolution de leurs ambiguïtés qui est guidée par la recherche de la lecture unique” (Greimas, 1970, 188).⁹ The concept of Isotopy experienced a development during time, and its use widened from simply signifying an iterativeness of *Classemes* (Fr. *Classèmes* (Greimas, 1966, 50-51); It. *Selezioni Contestuali* (Eco [1979] 2006, 15-19)).¹⁰ It became a concept applied to various semiotic phenomena, which pushes Eco ([1979] 2006, 93) to define the Isotopy as an umbrella-term indicating “la coerenza di un percorso di lettura” (the coherence of a reading path).

Let us now turn our attention to Ibn Ḥiǧǧa’s epigram. The *Classemes* actualised in the co-text suggest four main Isotopies: A. Travel, B. Night, C. Day, D. Tryst, which mutually cooperate within the text, and whose lexemes are in a mutual co-reference. The first line opens with the Actant Subject speaking in the first-person and reporting events that are perceived as finished by the reader. The first verb (*sirnā*) introduces the Isotopy of travel. The verb is immediately followed by the description of the hair of the beloved – the Actant Object – which is compared to the night (*laylu ša’ri-hi*), a common metaphor which associates the beloved’s hair with the night, i.e. associating the image of tender dark hair flowing on the shoulders (*munsadil*) like the drapes of a dark night. This phrase is in a co-reference with the previous verb and leads us to the fusion of the two Isotopies ‘travel’ and ‘night’, bringing the first image of travelling by night, i.e. the Isotopy ‘night journey’. This is all the more the case in the

⁹ Cf. also Greimas (1966, 69-101) and Greimas and Courtés (1982, 163-165).

¹⁰ Eco ([1979] 2006, 17) distinguishes between contextual and circumstantial selections: “Una selezione contestuale pertanto registra i casi generali in cui un dato termine potrebbe occorrere in concomitanza (e quindi co-occorrere) con altri termini appartenenti allo stesso sistema semiotico. Quando poi il termine concretamente co-occorre con altri termini (quando cioè la selezione contestuale si attualizza) ecco che abbiamo un co-testo. Le selezioni contestuali prevedono dei possibili contesti: quando si realizzano si realizzano in un co-testo. Quanto alle selezioni circostanziali esse rappresentano la possibilità astratta (registrata dal codice) che un dato termine appaia in connessione con circostanze di enunciazione.”

second hemistich, where the Isotopy of the night is even closer to the Isotopy of the travel experience. Here, *bi-nawmi-nā* is in a co-reference with the travel and develops two alternative but complementary readings, i.e. 'night journey' and a 'night dream-sleep'. In the same hemistich, a co-reference between *mudaffar*, *mundasil* and *ša' r* invokes the image of the night, linking it with the hair of the beloved which, in turn, becomes like a rope tying the lovers together. These two images merge together in a tableau where the night envelops the lovers and intertwines their bodies like scented hair in a tress. The final image in the first line can be developed in a Macro-proposition opening to the interpretation of the second line:

P₁: During the night, my beloved and I engaged in a love travel, and while sleeping the night enveloped us in a union.

Let us now turn our attention to the second line.

The beloved is depicted by a metonymy-synecdoche: *ṣubḥu tağri-hi*. Here the beloved is identified by his smile (a part for the whole, synecdoche), which is described as bright and shining by the use of *ṣubḥ*, i.e. a metonymy describing the effect by mentioning the cause. By these words, we discover a third Isotopy, that of 'day'. The relation between 'night' and 'day' is one of opposition, and it is expressed in the two first hemistichs, which create together an opposition on the semantic level. This is why the new Isotopy introduces a change in the course of the event: if the action depicted so far was a night journey/tryst, now daybreak leads the lovers to the end of their union. The negative value of dawn becomes evident in the very last hemistich, in which the beloved Object voices his grief for the end of the 'night journey' he spent with his lover/Subject. In saying this as dawn broke, the lovers' journey came to an end, and they are left with only the tender memory of their intimacy. Within this line, there is a second opposition between the words *ṣubḥ* and *ṣabāḥ*. In the first hemistich, *ṣubḥ* had a positive connotation describing the splendour of the beloved's smile; but in the second hemistich the arrival of *ṣabāḥ* has a negative connotation because it indicates the end of the love idyll. The final image in the second line can be developed in the following Macro-proposition:


P₂: Dawn broke, shining in its splendour like the smile of the beloved. However, the lovers are aware that it means the end of their union, like a dream which vanishes at the very moment of awakening and leaves only grief and sorrow.

If we join together P₁ and P₂ we obtain the Fabula of the epigram, namely its narrative development, which confirms the second Topic as a solid reading hypothesis, but then restricts the first Topic to the role of metaphor by which the second Topic is depicted and understood. It must be said, however, that both reading hypotheses are mutually connected and work together in constructing the semantic image conveyed by the epigram, as we will see.

From the point of view of the Actantial Figures, the internal narrator is the Subject, who is from the beginning of the Narrative conjoined with his Object of value, the beloved. Since Subject and Object are from the beginning joined together, the whole Narrative Trajectory, which made possible the union of the lovers, is not depicted: the first step of the Narrative Schema with which the epigram begins is the Performance, in which Subject and Object are conjoined. However, as we have seen, this union is not destined to last, for dawn brings the end of the tryst with the words of the beloved-Object '*inda l-ṣabāḥ yaḥmadu l-qawmu l-surà*'. He states by his own words a Cognitive Sanction, namely the very last step of the Narrative Schema, i.e. an epistemological judgment which can be paraphrased as follows: 'our state of union cannot last and our being conjoined came to an end.'

At this point we can draw this scheme of the epigram's levels of enunciation:¹¹

¹¹ Inspired by those drawn in Eco (1994).
Luca Rizzo



As Empirical Author, Ibn Ḥiǧǧa builds his epigram. On the one hand, he gives the role of the Narrator to the Actant Subject, who narrates in the first person. On the other, the very last hemistich is the direct speech of the Actant Object, who, to express his grief, utters a well-known saying.

This is, in fact, the turning point of the whole epigram: *‘inda l-ṣabāḥ yaḥmadu l-qawmu l-surà.’*

5.3.3 The *maṭal*

The turning point of this epigram is in the last hemistich, where the text segment *‘inda l-ṣabāḥ yaḥmadu l-qawmu l-surà* is inserted as a *taḍmīn*. This is a case of a well-known saying (*maṭal*)¹² listed in almost every paroemic source. The first who quoted this *raǧaz* hemistich in his collection of sayings was Abū ‘Ubayd (d. 224/838).¹³ He provides two explanations for this half-line:

1. “During their night, they endure the struggle and the suffering of the night journeying without any rest. But when they find themselves in the morning, and they have already left the distance behind them, they praise what they did at that time.” (Abū ‘Ubayd, *Amṭāl*, 170);

¹² Among the contributions on *maṭal*, the article in *EL*² is at present the most accurate and detailed study: Sellheim (2012b). On the topic, see also Rosenthal (1989), about whose work I will talk later; al-Dhubaib (1973) who carried out a taxonomic research on al-Maydānī’s collection of *amṭāl*; Pellat (1976) and Ruiz Moreno (1998) who investigated the origins of the paroemic expressions.

¹³ As a reference for the authors of anthologies of *amṭāl* that I use in this section, see Sellheim (2012b).

2. “Its meaning is: they strove themselves during the night in a sleepless and restless journey, but when they find themselves in the morning, and they have already covered the distance, they praise what they did at that time.” (Abū ‘Ubayd, *Amṭāl*, 231)

Both explanations refer to the same meaning, which takes us back in time when the night journey, especially in the desert, was harbinger of dangers and terror: one crossing in the dark with the only companions – if not alone – and mounts. But the night journey is also a literary *topos* and a means often used by poets from the pre-Islamic era onwards to underline their physical and moral strength.¹⁴

Al-Ġāḥiḡ (d. 255/868-869)¹⁵ (*Ḥayawān*, 6:508) reports a line of poetry attributed to Bakr b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Muzanī (d. 106/724-725) running as follows:

عند الصباح يَحْمَدُ القَوْمُ السُّرَى * وتنجلي عنهم غياباتُ الكرى

At the break of dawn, people praise the night journey and the veils of the sleep vanish.

However, al-Mufaḍḍal al-Dabbī b. Salama (d. 291/903) (*Fāḥir*, 199-200) provides another attribution for this last line, one linked to an anecdote about the origin of the *maṭal* and about the first person who uttered it. The anecdote runs as follow:

The first who uttered it was Ḥālīd b. al-Walīd (d. 21/642). Abu Bakr (d. 13/634) sent for him while he was in al-Yamāma. Abū Bakr ordered him to travel to Iraq across the desert. Rāfi‘ b. ‘Amr al-Ṭāṭī said to al-Walīd: ‘I have already crossed it in pre-Islamic time (*ġāhiliyya*), and it is a four-day journey without water¹⁶ for the camels to arrive, I do not think that you can afford it without carrying the water with you.’ Ḥālīd replied: ‘Thus, carry a huge amount of water.’ He bought one hundred old she-camels

¹⁴ On this topic, see Papoutsakis (2009) in particular chapter 2 and 3, where she provides an excursus of the main topics of ‘travel’ and ‘desert’ in ancient poetry, with particular reference to Ḍū l-Rumma (d. ca. 117/735).

¹⁵ Abū ‘Uṭmān ‘Amr b. Baḥr al-Fuḡaymī l-Baṣrī was born in Baṣra around 160/776, where he died in 255-868-869. He was a prolific writer known above all for *Kitāb al-ḥayawān* and *Kitāb al-buḥalā’*, see Pellat (2012b). For two recent studies, see Behzadi (2009), and Hefter (2014).

¹⁶ *Ḥims*, i.e. “The drinking of camels on the fifth day, counting the day of the next preceding drinking as the first” Lane (*Lexicon*, s.v.).

and made them thirsty. After that, he watered them until they had drunk enough; he made them kneel down and muzzled their mouths. They departed to cross the desert, but after two days have gone by, the people and the horses feared the thirst and feared also that what was inside the camels' bellies would perish. [To prevent it] he slaughtered the camels and took the water that was inside their bellies to give it to drink to the people and the horses; then, they pursued the travel. During the fourth night, Rāfi' said: 'Look! Do you see enormous lotus trees? Do you see them or are they nothing but the result of exhaustion?' The people looked at them, saw the lotus trees then informed him and exalted God. They rushed to the water, and Ḥālīd said:

لله دُرٌّ زَافِعٍ أَنَّى اهْتَدَى * فَوَزَّ مِنْ قُرَاقِيرٍ إِلَى سُوى
عند الصبّاحِ يَحْمَدُ القومُ السُّرى * وَتَنَجَّلِي عَنْهُمُ غِيَابَاتُ الكَرَى¹⁷

How great has Rāfi' been: he found the right way through the desert from Qurāqir to Suwà.

At the break of dawn, people praise the night journey and the veils of the sleep vanish.

If the attribution of the line to Ḥālīd b. al-Walīd as reported by al-Mufaḍḍal al-Dabbī is correct, the origin of this expression, and its subsequent reception until it became part of the proverbial expressions, will have to be predated by about a hundred years compared to what is reported by al-Ġāḥiẓ, and therefore to be placed in the earliest times of Islam. But is it really so?

Authors such as Zayd b. Rifā'a (d. 373/983) (*Amṭāl*, 162) do not try to find a hypothetical 'first author' of this expression; others, such as al-Maydānī (d. 518/1124) (*Arabum*, 2:70-71), embrace al-Mufaḍḍal al-Dabbī's attribution and quote the anecdote about the crossing of the desert made by Ḥālīd b. al-Walīd and Rāfi'; and others still, such as al-'Askarī (d. ca. 395-400/1005-1010) (*Ġamhara*, 2:38), do not conform to either al-Ġāḥiẓ, or al-Mufaḍḍal al-Dabbī, and go for another origin of the line/*maṭal*. For example, al-'Askarī maintains that this line is found in a poem by the

¹⁷ Al-Aḥḍab al-Tarābulusī (*Farā'id*, 2:2) adds a line in between:

خمساً إذا سار به الجيشُ بكي * ما سارها من قبله إنسٌ يرى

A four-days-waterless distance! The army was lamenting when marching towards it. Nobody before him has ever done this!

pre-Islamic Iranian poet al-Ġumayḥ (d. 571) and quotes six lines of a *qaṣīda*, of which I report the last three:

بكي وقال هل تَرُونَ ما أرى * أَلَيْسَ للسَّير الطويل مُنْقَضِي
فُلْتُ أُعْزِّي صاحبي أَلَّا بلي * عند الصباح يحمد القوم السرى
وتنقضي عنهم غياباتُ الكرى

He shed tears and said: ‘Do you think what I think? Is there no end to the long journey?’

I said: ‘I exhort my companion to endure: certainly, at the break of dawn people praise the night journey, and the veils of the sleep vanish.’

He closes his quote with a brief explanation of the meaning of the *maṭal*: “It is a saying quoted when one is affected by affliction and exhaustion” (*Ġamhara*, 2:38).

According to this last author, the origin of the line is therefore to be found in the pre-Islamic era. But this is not the end. Al-Zamaḥṣarī (d. 538/1144) (*Mustaqṣa*, 2:168) quotes only two and a half lines of a 20-line *urġūza* attributed to al-Ġulayḥ b. Šumayḍ, a coeval of al-Šammāḥ (d. ca. 30/650) with whom he was traveling (al-Šammāḥ, *Dīwān*, 353 n.4; 377-384):

إني إذا الجبس على الكور انثنى * لو سئل الماء فداءً لافتدى
وقال كم أتعبتُ قلتُ قد أرى * عند الصباح يحمد القوم السرى
وتنجلي عنه عمايات الكرى¹⁸

Indeed, when the lazy man is bent on the saddle, if he had been asked for water as ransom, he would have ransomed himself.

He said: ‘How I exhausted myself’, I replied: ‘I see’. At the break of dawn, people praise the night journey, and what is left of the sleep vanish.

¹⁸ It must be noted that this *urġūza* is quoted in *Dīwān aš-Šammāḥ* and many lines of it have not been quoted by al-Zamaḥṣarī, thus the whole meaning can be slightly different.

Later sources do not add anything to what I have presented so far. The only author worth mentioning is al-Šaybī (d. 837/1433), who reports al-Maydānī's anecdote, and adds some quotations of later poetry based on the motif *al-surà*, and also two poetic examples in which the *maṭal* is not quoted with its wording, but there is only an allusion to it (*Timṭāl*, 2:473-474).¹⁹

This short overview shows how the *maṭal*'s authorship is dubious. On the one hand, it is attributed to Ḥālid b. al-Walīd, one of the commanders of the Islamic army at the time of Abū Bakr and 'Umar. On the other, to two pre-Islamic poets.²⁰ This conflict of attribution is very similar to that described by Rosenthal (1989), who tried to establish the birth of a saying, and its linked anecdote, which describes the circumstances of its first enunciation.²¹ In his analysis, he argued that it is unlikely that the saying and the anecdote to which it is associated are coeval, but it is more probable that an addition has been made at a certain point during transmission. This statement seems to be applicable also for our *maṭal*, since it could explain why in al-Balāḡurī's (d. ca. 279/892)²² (*Futūḥ*, 1:131-133) there are only these two lines at the end of Ḥālid's anecdote, without any mention of the *maṭal*:

لله دُرُّ رافعٍ أتى اهتدى * فَوَزَّ من قراقِرٍ إلى سُوى
ماءٌ إذا را مه الجِيسُ انثنى * ما جازها قبلك من إنسي يُرى

¹⁹ For example, a line by Ibn Sanā' al-Mulk (d. 608/1211) (*Dīwān*, 157-161) praising al-Qāḍī l-Fāḍil (d. 596/1200). The whole *qaṣīda* is of 67 lines, I quote only that reported by al-Šaybī – no. 30 in the *Dīwān*:

آنستُ نازَ الخدَّ لا نارَ القرى * وحمدتُ صبحَ الثغر لا صبحَ السرى

I cheered the fire of the cheek and not the fire of the entertainment. I praised the dawn of the teeth and not the dawn of the night journey.

This is a case of *taḍmīn* where the wording of the original segment is not respected, but it is still clearly recognisable in the new text where it is embedded.

²⁰ I do not consider the attribution provided by al-Ġāḥiẓ which seems to be the less probable.

²¹ He investigates a well-known saying: *inna l-balā' muwakkal bi-l-manṭiq* and the related line of poetry with which it is commonly associated:

احفظ لسانك لا تقول فتبتلى * إنَّ البلاء موكلٌ بالمنطق

Guard your tongue from speaking and thereby suffering affliction! Indeed, affliction may come from talk. (Rosenthal's translation).

²² Aḥmad b. Yaḥyà b. Ġābir b. Dāwūd al-Balāḡurī. Despite his importance as historian, there is not much information about his life. He is known for his *Futūḥ al-buldān* and *Ansāb al-ašrāf*. See Becker and Rosenthal (2012).

How great has Rāfi' been: he found the right way through the desert from Qurāqir
to Suwà.

A water well, when the coward seeks it, he turns away. No human being before you
has ever done it.

Irrespective of whether Ḥālīd b. al-Walīd, al-Ġumayḥ, or al-Ġulayḥ uttered it or not, we can describe the meaning of the saying as an encouragement for someone to endure the difficulties of life, for only with patience and abnegation can one succeed and, at the end, he/she will praise his/her own efforts.

If we compare these sources, we can deduce that the saying has entered common use only in its first part: a hemistich in *raġaz* metre extrapolated from an entire line, i.e. the first hemistich *'inda l-ṣabāḥ yaḥmadu l-qawmu l-surà*. This segment of text became enough to convey the meaning that the whole expression wants to convey. This kind of elliptical form is often a consequence of the widespread reception of a saying having become commonly used in the language. An example of a non-Arabic expression, which is understood and used almost all over the world, is the Latin proverb *de gustibus non est disputandum*, which is commonly used in the elliptical form *de gustibus* and which, like the expression *'inda l-ṣabāḥ yaḥmadu l-qawmu l-surà*, has not a real 'inventor' and, in the case of the Latin proverb, it may not even be of classical origin (Bartels, 2014).

5.3.4 The structure of the *maṭal*

How does the *maṭal* fit into the epigram? To answer this question, I adopt the analysis advanced by Milner (1969),²³ who argues that the characteristic of a traditional saying²⁴ is "the symmetrical structure of its form and content" (200) and that the overall value of a traditional saying is given by the ability of the form to reproduce the background. His analysis is based precisely on the distinction between traditional

²³ A revised and expanded version has been published in French: "De l'armature des locutions proverbiales. Essai de taxonomie sémantique", in *L'Homme*, 9 iii (1969), pp. 49-70.

²⁴ In the French version, traditional saying is translated as "locution proverbiale", which in my opinion fits to this kind of Arabic *maṭal* better.

sayings and other paroemiac utterances, stating that a traditional saying is a quadripartite utterance.²⁵ By this definition, he intends that a traditional saying “consists of four quarters (minor segments), standing in a balanced and structured relationship to one another both in their form and content, and that it is the exact nature of the relationship between the separate parts which determines the force and meaning of the saying as a whole” (200). The words or phrases that constitute a traditional saying are placed within these four quarters. To each of them, Milner assigns either a positive (+) or a negative value (-), depending on their semantic value within the saying. Each quarter is in turn divided into two halves, which Milner defines as “major segments” (200). He assigns to each primary segment a value (+) or (-) according to the component of the traditional saying inside the quarter, obtaining that for each quarter there are two values (+) (+), or (-) (-), or (+) (-), or (-) (+). The internal sum of these values can give a positive value to the quarter, when the sum is of two equal poles (+) (+), or (-) (-); or a negative value, when the sum is of two opposite poles (+) (-), or (-) (+). For this reason, Milner distinguishes between an initial part, which he calls head, and a final part, which he calls tail, whose assignment of positive and negative values, and their sum, gives rise to 16 different combinations. I will spare the reader the list of all the different possibilities and I will immediately pass onto the practical application of this theory.

Let us consider the form *عند الصباح يحمّد القوم السرى* as an ellipsis, which is used instead of the whole expression *عند الصباح يحمّد القوم السرى * وتنجلي عنهم غيابات الكرى*. If we assign to every component of the paroemia a sign (+) to the positive elements and a sign (-) to the negatives, we obtain the following result:

²⁵ It is important to emphasise that this analysis does not apply to any type of paroemiac utterance. It is particularly suitable for the *maṭal* object of this study, but it could hardly be used for many of the proverbs of the Arabic tradition which have another type of structure. For a taxonomic classification of Arabic *amṭāl*, see Al-Dhubaib (1973).


		عندَ الصبَاحِ يَحْمَدُ القَوْمُ السُّرَى
	-	- + + +
+		- +
		وَتَنْجَلِي عَنْهُمْ غِيَابَاتُ الكَرَى
	-	- +

The first part of the line is its head. I have assigned to the element *qawm* a positive pole, for it stands for the human beings all together. Then, I assigned a positive pole to the verb *yaḥmadu*, since it denotes, in this specific text, a positive action. *Al-ṣabāḥ* is clearly a positive pole, for it contrasts with *al-surā*, which, in turn, is the negative pole, for it is charged with all the negative aspects of the night journey. Regarding the elements of the tail – the second hemistich – I assigned to *ḡayābātu l-karā* a negative pole, since this phrase bears the negative traits of something impeding the view and creating difficulties for people, which is balanced by the positive verb *tanḡālī*. We have as a result a negative head and a negative tail, which, when summed up, give a positive meaning for the whole *maṭal*. It should be noted that, even if only the first part of *the maṭal* is uttered as ellipsis for the complete sentence, this does not change its positive sense, since the meaning conveyed is recognised as such even if the second half is not uttered (Milner, 1969, 201-202), and since it has been extensively demonstrated by the reception of the saying in the paroemic collections that I have described in the previous section.

5.3.5 Text packing

In comparing the saying with the epigram, we notice that it plays with two Isotopies: ‘night journey’ and ‘human affliction’. Their bond is metaphoric. In other words, ‘night journey’ is the metaphier by which the metaphrand ‘human affliction’ is understood; the first Isotopy denotes a ‘night journey’ and connotes the second Isotopy of human ‘affliction’. This raises the question of how the epigram’s Fabula and *the maṭal* merge in the text of the epigram.

Greimas (1960, 57) defines a proverb (Fr. *proverbe*) as “un système de signification fermé”. He views the proverb as a Signifier which has a global Signified (according to the well-known definition given by Saussure ([1916] 2005, 99)), and postulates that a proverb is a connotated element, where connotation is a semantic shifting that occurs in the proverb. This first approach has changed over time, while maintaining a fundamental coherence. A better definition is one that considers proverbs as examples of Discursive Configurations, which are defined by Greimas and Courtés (1982, 49) as “kinds of micronarratives with an autonomous syntactic-semantic structure, which can be integrated in larger discursive units and acquire thereby functional significations corresponding to their positions in these larger units”. This definition of Discursive Configuration accurately emphasises the nature of the proverb and how it acts when it is inserted into another Text, for a Configuration “does not depend on its context, that it can be extracted from it and manifested in the form of a self-sufficient discourse” (50). Thus, we can postulate that a proverb is, in its wholeness, an independent Text with its own level of expression and meaning, both levels being codified in a given socio-linguistic environment and becoming part of common wisdom, morals, and ethics – in other words, of the *Doxa*, which is “the body of established or unquestioned attitudes or beliefs held generally within a particular society, community, group” (*OED*, s.v.). Therefore, to quote *a maṭal* in an epigram is to insert a Text into another Text: namely, a ‘meaning box’ inside another ‘meaning box’. At this point, we can modify the enunciative scheme previously outlined:



Compared to the first scheme, this shows how there is within the epigram (the first Text (T₁)) another Text (T₂), which is based on common knowledge (the Doxa). It is evident that, by using a well-known saying, the author expects his Model Reader to know it and to understand its conventional meaning, especially its whole positive signification, as we have seen above. Moreover, to enjoy the whole epigram, the reader should be able to connect the Isotopies in the Texts. Firstly, in T₁, the two Isotopies ‘night journey’ and ‘tryst’ are in a metaphoric mutual relation, for the denotation-metaphier ‘night journey’ stands for the connotation-metaphrand ‘tryst’. Secondly, in T₂, the two Isotopies ‘night journey’ and ‘human affliction’ are in a metaphoric mutual relation, too, in which the denotation-metaphier ‘night journey’ stands for the connotation-metaphrand ‘human affliction’. In both Texts, the phrase *‘inda l-şabāh* (at the break of dawn) represents the end of the previous state of affairs, i.e. the turning point in the Narrative Schema. It is negative in relation to the Fabula of the epigram, and positive in relation to the *maṭal*.

But let us go back to my first hypothesis of reading: namely, the Topics. Regarding the epigram’s Topics, I listed two possibilities:

T₁

(1₁) Description of a night journey

(2₁) Description of a night tryst

If we consider the *maṭal*, we can list two similar Topics:

T₂

(1₂) Description of a night journey

(2₂) Description of human affliction

But how do the two Isotopies of each Text interact with each other based on the interpretative hypotheses formulated in the Topics? And how do the Texts interact with each other?

Let us consider for a moment the Texts separately, starting with the *maṭal*. The Reader can interpret the *maṭal* according to the interpretative hypotheses that he or she has already formulated, based on the Topics that he or she has chosen. Thus, if the reader is a Bedouin, a caravan driver, a traveller, etc. he or she will interpret the *maṭal* according to the denotation conveyed by the components of the paroemiatic utterance. This means that, being aware of how a night journey is a harbinger of dangers, and a night journey as such being part of his or her Encyclopaedia, this will allow him to adopt the interpretative hypothesis formulated in the Topic (1₂) 'night journey'. If, on the other hand, the reader has not experienced night journeying, his interpretative hypothesis would be guided by the Topic (2₂) 'human affliction', especially if his or her Encyclopaedia provides a set of data for 'human affliction' or if he has personal experience of it. Should we therefore interpret the resolution of the *maṭal* as an utterance in which we are faced with an either/or disjunction? In this case, the disjunction should be considered inclusive. The two Isotopies within the *maṭal* are of the type that Eco ([1979 2006, 98) defines as "Isotopie narrative vincolate a disgiunzioni isotopiche discorsive che generano storie complementari" (Narrative Isotopies bound to discursive Isotopic disjunctions which create complementary stories), i.e. given the Isotopy 'night journey' and the Isotopy 'human affliction', both are possible based on the interpretative hypotheses formulated by the Topics. This classification is capable of describing the informative content of the *maṭal* as the above analysis has shown. In this case, it is a Text which goes beyond the level of the sentence and where the reading of its components does not proceed by Isotopic disjunction, but, as Eco points out, by semantic implication. Indeed, as we have seen, the link between the two Isotopies is based on the denotation 'night

journey' that connotes 'human affliction' through a metaphorical process. In Eco's words, "l'espressione connota il senso *y* proprio perché denota il senso *x*" (99). By their nature, they cannot be mutually exclusive, but must be complementary: "nel senso che il testo sopporta di essere letto contemporaneamente in due o più modi, e un modo rafforza l'altro anziché eliminarlo" (99).

Let us now examine the epigram.

We have assumed two Topics for the text of the epigram: the two interpretative hypotheses (1₁) 'night journey' and (2₁) 'night tryst'. As in the *maṭal*, these two interpretative hypotheses are related and based on the reader's Encyclopaedia, which allows the hypotheses to be activated and interpreted. It should be reaffirmed that the Model Reader is a reader who is supposed to have within his or her Encyclopaedia the two Frames that should be activated by the reading of the epigram, i.e. the Frame 'travelling by night' and the Frame '(difficult) tryst'. This is an assumption based on the abundance of texts containing these Frames in the literature. As a matter of fact, they are literary *topoi*, acquired within the Encyclopaedia of the Model Reader – precisely like the Frame 'school prom with election of king and queen of the party' is assumed in every Model Reader of any US-teenage comedy. This is why the narrative starts at the very moment of the Performance, the penultimate moment of the Narrative Schema, for there is no need to recall a series of events which should already be known by the Reader. These Frames are thus ghost chapters composing the Narrative World. Therefore, our reader, approaching the epigram, formulates two interpretative hypotheses that are both supported by the lexical elements of the text. He may prefer the 'night journey' hypothesis or the 'tryst' hypothesis, but they, as we have seen for the *maṭal*, are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, just like the *maṭal*, they are linked by a metaphorical relationship, whereby the entire first hemistich denotes a nocturnal journey and connotes a tryst. But we should not forget that the epigram (T₁) has another Text embedded within it (T₂). The latter is a text in its own right, but fits into the narrative fabric of (T₁) into which it is inserted, carrying its semantic load expressed by its interweaving of Isotopies.

T ₁	l ₁ T ₁ night journey
	l ₂ T ₁ tryst
T ₂	l ₁ T ₂ night journey
	l ₂ T ₂ human affliction

As we can see, (l₁T₁) and (l₁T₂) are the same Isotopy, while (l₂T₁) and (l₂T₂) are two different Isotopies. What interests us for the narrative development of the epigram is that the union of these two Texts, and the resulting aesthetic effect, is based on the union of Isotopies with opposite values. If we consider (l₁T₁) and (l₁T₂), the nocturnal journey denoted by the first Isotopy has a positive value because it connotes a 'tryst', while the nocturnal journey denoted by the second Isotopy carries a negative connotation of 'human affliction'. Likewise, if we compare (l₂T₁) and (l₂T₂), the first is a positive Isotopy, while the second negative – remember that the positive value expressed by the *maṭal* is given by the ending of the night journey and not by the night journey itself. In this way, we can explain how the epigram plays on a fundamental contrast of positive and negative values linked to the ending of an action, which is nothing but the Performance of the Narrative Schema. The Subject and the Object are conjoined, the Performance takes place, and the night journey becomes a positive symbol of the union of the lovers. This union is interrupted at the break of dawn, and the Sanction, the last step of the Narrative Schema, is a cut: the night journey has come to an end and the lovers are separated. This Sanction is expressed through a *maṭal*, which, in its original context, gives the end of the night journey a positive accent and not a negative one, as it should be intended, however, if it is meant as a meeting of lovers. Here, therefore, the ambiguity is provided not only by the narrative cooperation of three different Isotopies, but also by their contrast of values, actualised by the resemanticisation of a Text (T₂) embedded in another Text (T₁). The result is that the night journey, whose end is a symbol of relief for those who have undertaken it, just as it is a symbol of the end of afflictions, becomes a negative moment, for it leads to the end of the meeting of the two lovers.

So where is *tawriya* as we have so far seen it?

This epigram is certainly an example of the complex use of two rhetorical figures: *taḍmīn* and *tawriya*, or rather *taḍmīn* used as *tawriya*. By this, I mean that embedding one Text in another makes the embedded Text bring with it a semantic load that will not be lost. However, it may be subject to change. The opposition of the Isotopies is produced by the resemanticisation of the Text of the *maṭal*. This resemanticisation is, then, actualised in the attribution of a positive value to the night journey, which would otherwise have had a negative one. This is due to the double meaning attributed within the epigram to the word *surà*: ‘night journey’ and ‘tryst’. But it is also true that it retains its double meaning inherited from the *maṭal* in which it appears, i.e. ‘night journey’ and ‘human affliction’. The *tawriya*-word is an Isotopic Connector, i.e. “a unit of the discursive level, which introduces either a single reading or several different ones. This phenomenon corresponds, for instance, to the ‘rhetorical coding’ found by Lévi-Strauss in myths which simultaneously play upon the ‘literal meaning’ and the ‘figurative meaning’” (Greimas and Courtés, 1982, 52). In addition to *surà*, the phrases *laylu ša‘ri-hi* and *ṣubḥu tağri-hi* could also be considered a *tawriya*: on the one hand, they denote the beloved, and, on the other, their metaphorical use connotes the night and sunrise. But the central point of the epigram is the last hemistich in its wholeness, which has to be considered the *tawriya*: the *maṭal* enters the epigram with its semantic charge; its recontextualisation entails its resemanticisation: its positive meaning has been transformed into a negative meaning, for the night journey was the joy of the lovers and the rising of dawn, their sorrow.

5.4 The case of *iqtibās*

5.4.1 Preliminaries

If *taḍmīn* can raise doubts about a poet’s use and possible self-attribution of some lines by someone else, *iqtibās* poses other problems that were discussed by pre-modern Arab theorists.

Al-Qazwīnī (*Īḍāḥ*, 6:137) defines *iqtibās* as inserting into a speech a quotation from the Koran or the tradition of the prophet, without acknowledging it. He does not

provide many theoretical details, but only some *loci* in which the quotation still bears its Koranic meaning, or in which it has been resemanticised – as we have seen in the previous chapter, where Koran was quoted in the epigrams. A more detailed description of this figure is in Ibn Ḥiğğā (*Ḥizāna*, 4:357), who provides a detailed categorisation and subdivision of the possible use of a Koranic, or *ḥadīṭ*, segment in a piece of poetry or prose.²⁶ He posits that *iqtibās* is divided into three categories:

1. *Maqbūl* (recommended): “what is used in sermons (*ḥuṭab*), admonitions (*mawāʿiẓ*), contracts (*ʿuhūd*), and in praise of the prophet (*madḥ al-nabī*).
2. *Mubāḥ* (permissible): “what is used in *ḡazal*, in letters (*rasāʿil*), and stories (*qiṣaṣ*).”
3. *Mardūd* (rejected): which is of two types: A. “The first of which is [the use of] what God almighty attributes to himself, and God save us from the person who attributes it to himself”. B. “The other is the quotation of a noble verse [turning it] in a jocular meaning, and God save us from that!” (Ibn Ḥiğğā, *Ḥizāna*, 4:357).

To these three main categories, Ibn Ḥiğğā (*Ḥizāna*, 4:359) adds a fundamental distinction on the use of *iqtibās*, explaining that a text segment of the Koran can be inserted into another text, either keeping its original meaning, i.e. the Koranic meaning carried to another text, or through a resemanticisation of it, i.e. keeping the same wording of the Koran verse – or slightly modified – but making it bearing a new meaning within the text where it is embedded. This classification has to be understood as inclusive, for the quotations belonging to the three categories of *maqbūl*, *mubāḥ*, and *mardūd* can be rearranged into the two types in which semantics plays the role of a discriminating factor. That is to say, every type of *iqtibās* can be either a faithful quotation, in which the original meaning is respected and conveyed by the author, or a resemanticisation of the original word, or phrase, or verse, which introduces into the text a new meaning – serious, figurative, parodistic, satirical, etc.

It is clear that Ibn Ḥiğğā’s judgment is completely unfavourable to the use of *iqtibās* in a frivolous context inappropriate to the Koranic word or to the prophet’s tradition.

²⁶ This categorisation had been already posited by Ṣafī l-Dīn al-Ḥillī (*Šarḥ*, 326-327). Cf. also MacDonald and Bonebakker (2012), van Gelder (2002-2003), and Orfali (2018).

This judgment is not surprising. Indeed, it would not be possible, or imaginable, that a theorist also engaged in jurisprudence (Szombathy, 2018, 284) as Ibn Ḥiǧǧa was, would have allowed the use of *iqtibās* where there was a change of the enunciating subject from God to any other entity, nor a use of the sacred word in licentious contexts. However, as we saw in the previous chapter, rhetorical and literary theory are often unable to describe all the nuances and phenomena found in literary practice. And the other way around, i.e. literary practice does not always conform to literary theory. Indeed, if what Ibn Ḥiǧǧa reported about the use of Koranic verses in literature were really strictly binding, then most of the epigrams that I commented on in the previous chapter should not have enjoyed the success that they had; indeed, they should never have been written at all. Many studies have been devoted to the use of Koranic quotations in the most varied contexts. Van Gelder (2002-2003) in particular shows that Koranic quotations are also found in those more explicit poetic genres such as love poetry, jesting literature, and *muǧūn*, as we saw in the previous chapter.²⁷

The type of *iqtibās* I will address in this chapter is a resemanticisation of a Koranic verse operated by the presence of a *tawriya*, which enables a twofold reading of the text. The epigram I will analyse in this section is a two-line poem by Ibrāhīm al-Mi‘mār (d. 749/1348-49):

إبراهيم المعمار، من السريع

قَدِ بْتُ مِنْ كَرْبِي لِقَقْدِ النِّسَاءِ * أَفُورٌ كَالْتَتُّورِ مِنْ نَارِيهِ

وَقَدْ طَغَى الْمَاءُ فَمَنْ لِي بِأَنْ * أَحْمَلَ بِالْجُودِ عَلَى جَارِيهِ²⁸

I spent the night in grief because of the absence of women, boiling like an oven for my fire.

²⁷ To the bibliographical references given in van Gelder (2002-2003, 4 n. 4), it is worth adding Marino (2016), who emphasises the use of Koranic quotations in jocular literature; Orfali and Pomerantz (2017), who provide an in-depth study of the first treatise entirely devoted to *iqtibās*: al-Ṭa‘ālibī (*Iqtibās*). I should also mention Orfali (2016), who addresses the topic of the legitimacy of the use of Koranic quotations in *adab* works and provides us with an edition of a treatise by the Ottoman scholar Šams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī l-Luṭf (d. 993/1585), and Orfali (2018).

²⁸ Al-Mi‘mār (*Dīwān*, no. 486), Ibn Ḥiǧǧa (*Kašf*, 187; *Ḥizāna*, 3:423). A possible variant is *بالجودي* < بالجود>. Another reading of the second is: ‘and the water overflowed. Who will drive me through the heavy rain on a ship?’ This reading is comparable to the first reading of the *tawriya*-word that I have adopted, and it is that which is referring to the Koranic meaning of the *iqtibās*, as we will see in this section.

And the water/sperm overflowed. Who *will take me with a ship upon the mountain*
al-Ġūdī/will kindly let me mount a young woman?

5.4.2 The Koranic quotation

In this epigram, the Koranic excerpt is not a full quotation of a verse, but rather the citation of four phrases: *afūru ka-l-tannūri, ṭaġà al-mā', uḥmala bi-l-ġūdī*, and [*ḥamalnā-kum fī l-*] *ġāriyati(n)*. Compared to the Koranic text, there are small changes in the extracts quoted in the epigram, but the addition or the removal of some words, as well as a change to the verb tense, is allowed in the use of *iqtibās* (Ibn Ḥiǧǧa, *Ḥizāna*, 4:359). The Koranic verses which are recalled in the epigram are: (Q 11:40) “Until, when our command came and the oven boiled, we said ‘Load into it two of every kind, a pair, and your family – except for the one against whom the word has (already) gone forth” (*ḥattà idā ġā'a amru-nā wa-fāra l-tannūru qulnā ḥmil fī-hā min kullin zawġayni ṭnayni wa-ahla-ka illā man sabaqa 'alay-hi al-qawlu*); (Q 11:44) “And the waters subsided, and the command was accomplished, and it came to rest on al-Ġūdī” (*wa-ġīda l-mā'u wa-quḍiya l-amru wa-stawat 'alà l-Ġūdī*); (Q 23:27) “So we inspired him: ‘Build the ship under our eyes and our inspiration, and when our command comes and the oven boils, put into it two of every kind, a pair, and your family – except for him against whom the word has already gone forth” (*fa-awḥaynā ilay-hi an iṣna' al-fulka bi-a'yuni-nā wa-waḥyi-nā fa-idā ġā'a amru-nā wa-fāra l-tannūru fa-sluk fī-hā min kullin zawġayni ṭnayni wa-ahla-ka illā man sabaqa 'aly-hi l-qawlu*); (Q 69:11) “Surely we – when the waters overflowed – we carried you in the running [ship]” (*in-nā lammā ṭaġà l-mā'u ḥamalnā-kum fī l-ġāriyati*).

The Koranic story to which this epigram refers is that of the prophet Noah (Nūḥ),²⁹ which is narrated in several *sūras*. Specifically, in *sūra Hūd* (Q 11: 25-49) and in *sūra al-Mu'minūn* (Q 23:23-30), the water of the deluge is described as boiling like an oven, but only in (Q 11:44) is the mountain upon which the ark rested called al-Ġūdī.

²⁹ On the figure of Noah in the Koranic text, see for reference Heller (2012), and Brinner (2003). For an accurate account of the prophet Noah in the Islamic tradition, see Canova (2001). For an in-depth study of the biblical prophets mentioned in the Koran, and therefore also of the prophet Noah, see Tottoli (2002, 21-23, *passim*).

These are not the only *sūras* which report the story of the prophet Noah. Brinner (2003) points out that Noah is mentioned in 26 *sūras*, and there is a *sūra* that is entirely devoted to him: *sūra* Nūḥ (Q 71). Among all the various mentions of Noah and his history, I mention only *sūras* al-A'rāf (Q 7:59-64), Yūnus (Q 10:70-73), al-Šu'arā' (Q 26:105-120), al-'Ankabūt (Q 29:14-15), Yā' Sīn (Q 36:41-42). The word that is commonly used to designate Noah's ark is *fulk*, except in (Q 29:15), where the word *safīna* ('ship') is uttered in its stead. In this epigram, the referent 'ark' is expressed by the word *ġāriya*, which is mentioned in (Q 69:11) to refer to Noah's ship – the only occurrence of this word associated with this meaning – together with the phrase *taġà l-mā'* – the only occurrence where the verb *taġà* refers to the water of the deluge. Were these Koranic references part of the Encyclopaedia of the reader of the time? I assume that these Koranic verses were chosen by al-Mi'mār to set the level of his Model Reader, and that they should therefore have been well-known to the audience of the time, a part of their Encyclopaedia, even to those who did not know the Koran by heart. The verses are not quoted in their original wording, but rather the poet refers to them by using some keywords – such as *tannūr* and *al-ġūd(ī)* – which should be considered a common heritage in the Encyclopaedia of the reader of the time, as well as a precise narrative strategy used by the poet. In this epigram, knowing the precise wording of the Koranic text is not necessary; it is enough for the reader to be able to recall in his/her mind the story of Noah, to own in his/her Encyclopaedia the Frame 'Noah's story'.

5.4.3 Narrative Worlds

As I said at the beginning of this chapter, the analysis that I propose is based on the concept of Text and on the assumption that the Narrative Schema as it is described in Greimasian theory also applies to these epigrams. In the section on *taḍmīn*, I demonstrated how a Text can contain another Text, and how the latter retains its original meaning even after being embedded in another Text. Or, rather, it retains its original meaning even when it is resemanticised, obtaining a new meaning but keeping the previous meaning in its background. Can we apply the same analysis of *taḍmīn* to *iqtibās*? *Iqtibās* presents a greater degree of difficulty. In the case of our

epigram, the Koranic quotation refers to various *sūras*, and, as a whole, to an articulated story such as that of the prophet Noah. This means that citing even a few words summarising an entire story means inserting another Text of high intertextual density into another Text, i.e. to embed the entire story of the prophet Noah, as it is known from the Koranic text, into the text of the epigram.³⁰ At this point, it is no longer enough to talk about Text in Text.

The Text of the epigram with its informative content, Narrative Schema, Actantial roles, etc. can be defined as a Narrative World (W_N). Similarly, the Koran as a whole can be defined as a Narrative World (W_Q) in which each *sūra* is another Narrative World ($W_{S1} \dots W_{S114}$), such that each *sūra* is an element of the Koranic Narrative World ($W_{S1\dots114} \in W_Q$). The story of Noah is not limited to a single *sūra* of the sacred text, but is recalled in several parts and with the same fundamental characteristics – only some terms vary, but the properties of the protagonists of the story do not vary, remaining unchanged in every occurrence. For this reason, I will in my analysis not take into account every single occurrence of the name ‘Noah’ in the Koranic text, and nor will I analyse each *sūra* separately. Rather, I will consider the story of Noah as a unique narrative belonging to the Koranic Narrative World as a whole. Given these premises, what, then, is a Narrative World?

Eco ([1979] 2006, 122-173) borrows the concept of possible worlds from modal logic.³¹ Contrary to what is discussed in logic, where the concept of possible worlds refers to problems of an ontological nature, i.e. the existence or nonexistence of possible worlds, and of their respective objects, Eco proposes to borrow this definition and limit its application to literary theory. In doing so, the possible world will no longer be an indefinite set of indefinite entities, but will be linked to the Text that it describes and represents. Moreover, it will contain the semantic load of the Text itself, i.e. its characters, the actions that take place in it, etc. This possible world is therefore the world of the Text, the Narrative World (W_N). A possible world, and

³⁰ Obviously, the figure of Noah does not appear only in the Koran. For example, he is also mentioned in the *ḥadīth*, a topic that I will not deal with in this section, limiting myself to the Koranic text. See, for reference, Canova (2001, 1-2).

³¹ The concept of possible worlds, especially in logic, was and is hotly debated. For a history of the debate, see Kracht and Kutz (2007).

therefore also a Narrative World, is nothing but a world inhabited by ‘individuals’, ‘characters’ who have properties, or predicates. A Narrative World contains a limited number of characters who have a limited number of properties. Property assignments can be, on the one hand, consistent with the ‘real’ world – namely, with the world of our experience, so if in an epigram there is the description of the incipient beard (*‘idār*), it is assumed that the beard grows on a man’s and not a woman’s cheek. On the other, properties can only be valid for the individuals to whom they are ascribed in a given Narrative World – for instance, the case of a speaking penis. Individuals belonging to a Narrative World are defined on the basis of their properties, some being clearly stated in the Text, while others being presupposed. For instance, if in an epigram we refer to the *yawm al-tašrīq*, we take for granted, i.e. we presuppose, those properties that define the rite of pilgrimage as they are formulated in the real world (@); in the same way, if one of the characters is defined as a boy (*amrad* pl. *murd*), it is assumed that he is a human being with two legs and a head, unless explicitly stated otherwise in the Text. For this reason, a Narrative World derives a large part of its internal structure from the Encyclopaedia of the Reader, which is a cultural basis on which the beliefs of the reader are built. For example, the existence of prophets is to be considered part of the Encyclopaedia of the believing reader of the Mamluk era (and also of our days), who therefore considers true this state of affairs not only in the Koranic Narrative World (W_Q), but also in the real world (@). Let us now try to apply these theoretical principles to our epigram.

A Narrative World (W_N) is defined as the world within which the predicates ($P_1...P_n$) about the characters ($x, y, z...$) are actualised. For example, the proposition ‘Noah is a prophet’ $P(n)$ – where (n) is Noah and P is the predicate ‘is a prophet’ – is true in the Narrative World of the Koran (W_Q) and expressible as a quantification: there was exactly one person such that he was Noah and he was a prophet.

As pointed out by Eco, a Narrative World (W_N) is a cultural construction based on our knowledge of the real world (@), which allows us to take for granted a certain amount of redundant information, unless it differs in the (W_N). However, when talking about the Koran, it is also true that this specific Narrative World (W_Q)

influenced and influences the perception and understanding of the real world (@); that is to say, it is part of the Encyclopaedia of the reader, which applies to (W_Q) and (@) alike. For example, the proposition for which 'Noah is a prophet' is true in (W_Q) and (@). Consequently, one can affirm that it is true in the Koranic Narrative World (W_Q) that there was exactly one person (x) such that he was Noah and he was a prophet, and it is true in the real world (@) that there was exactly one person (y) such that he was Noah and he was a prophet, and they are the same person ($x = y$).

According to Eco ([1979] 2006, 154-156), a Narrative World as a whole is nothing but a sequence of chronologically ordered states of affairs, so in (W_Q) the construction of the ark, the beginning of the flood, the sailing, and its ending on mount al-Ġūdī are happenings chronologically ordered, and characterise the prophet Noah. In the epigram (W_E), the sleepless night spent in sexual arousal, the masturbatory act, and the rhetorical question are states of affairs ordered chronologically. Other possible narrative worlds are expressed by the empirical reader through his conjectures derived from the reading of the text. The actors that compose a Narrative World can give rise to another Narrative World, which is that of their propositional attitudes, a world thought by a certain actor (W_{Nc}), i.e. the Narrative World as it is imagined by the actor (c). For instance, in W_{Ec} , where (c) is the male human actor who assumes the Actantial role of Subject, we can assign to (c) the propositional attitude of hope in an external intervention to satisfy a need of his. Eco underlines that these conjectures originate a Narrative World of the Reader (W_R); they are paths that the Text foresees for its Model Reader, in order to direct its interpretative effort. For example, the reader of (W_E) can imagine a world (W_R) in which the Subject of (W_E) will find the means to be conjoined with his Object, or perhaps another (W_R) where the Subject will not be conjoined. One last possible world that Eco describes is that of predictions about a character's beliefs (W_{Rc}), i.e. the world of beliefs that the reader attributes to a character.

How, then, can we describe the intertwining of Narrative Worlds in our epigram?

5.4.4 Merging Worlds

Let us now return to our epigram and try to determine which individuals form its Narrative World, and which properties are ascribed to them. First, we should summarise its Fabula in a Macro-proposition:

There is a man who spent the night alone. He was sexually aroused, because he had no woman with whom he could have sexual intercourse. Thus, he masturbated, and made his sperm overflow like the flood, wondering if anyone can help him to conclude his orgasm on top of a young woman.

The Narrative Schema of this epigram is easily reconstructed. We can recognise the figure of an Actant Subject – symbolised by the first-person pronoun ‘I’ – and an Actant Object – represented by the young woman. The Narrative Trajectory of the Subject, namely the path which has to be followed in order to obtain the conjunction with the Object of quest, is unachievable unless with the help of a third Actantial figure called Helper,³² the Actantial figure which helps the Subject acquire the necessary Modal Competencies,³³ in order to achieve the Performance. Therefore, the Actantial figures within this epigram are of two types. On the one hand, we have the Actant Subject and the Actant Object that are referential – namely, they are semantically actualised, i.e. the pronoun I and the young woman. On the other, an Actant Helper which is not semantically actualised; i.e. it is suggested in the epigram in a vague way without being actualised.

Having said that, how do *iqtibās* and *tawriya* play in the epigram at the level of Actantial figures? In the second hemistich of the first line, there is a simile – *afūru ka-l-tannūri* – which links the Narrative World of the epigram with the Narrative World of the Koran. The simile compares the sexual arousal of the Subject with the boiling water of the flood of Noah’s story. This figure introduces a comparison of the two worlds, setting similarities between two states: the condition of the Subject and the water of the flood. Moreover, in the second line, the metaphor gives way to a

³² “Helper designates the positive auxiliant when this role is assumed by an actor other than the subject of doing: it corresponds to an individualized being-able-to-do which, under the form of actor, brings its help to bear on the carrying out of the Subject’s Narrative Program” (Greimas and Courtés, 1982, 141).

³³ “A hierarchical organization of modalities (it will be based, for example, on a willing-to-do or having-to-do, governing a being-able or a nowing-how-to-do” (Greimas and Courtés, 1982, 45).

tawriya: *ṭağà l-mā'*, which has to be interpreted as a fork in the road, since it makes the epigram develop in two parallel ways. The first is the overflowing of the flood's water, a meaning immediately perceived by the reader (*qarīb*); and the second is the effusion of sperm due to sexual arousal (*ba'īd*). Another *tawriya* closes the epigram with another reference to the Koran: *uḥmala bi-l-ğūdi 'alà ġāriya*. This Koranic segment is introduced into the text of the epigram in the form of a rhetorical question – namely, the Subject wonders who will ever be able to help him achieve his goal. This question is nothing but another figure of speech, which is defined by the Arabic tradition as *tağāhul al-‘ārif* ('feigned ignorance'),³⁴ for the Subject already knows the answer to his question, i.e. no-one can help him to attain his goal. *Tawriya* allows a redoubling of the Subject's goal. On the one hand, we can interpret the subject's aim in finding a woman with whom he can give vent to his sexual drive. This interpretation is suggested by the word *ğāriya*, which denotes among other things a '(slave)girl'. It is in co-reference with the verb *ḥamala 'alà*, which means 'to mount', conveying the Subject's intention of 'mounting' a woman to satisfy his need. On the other, as I have already shown in the section on *taḍmīn*, the insertion of a Text within another Text, and its resemanticisation, does not result in the loss of the semantic load of the embedded Text. This is even more valid when the embedded text is the Koranic text, which brings and keeps its semantic load, despite being resemanticised. Hence, the second 'aim' of the Subject is connected to the Koranic meaning of the phrase, with particular reference to (Q 69:11), where Noah rescues himself on a ship (*ğāriya*) after the water of the flood has overflowed (*ṭağà l-mā'*). In addition, the word *al-ğūdi* suggests mount Ğūdī on which the ark rested, as described in (Q 11:4). It is clear that this second aim is nothing but the *ma'nà qarīb* of the *tawriya*-phrase.

As already said, a number of individuals are distinguished within a Narrative World, and also in the real world, by a number of predicates ($P_1 \dots P_n$) that are assigned to them. These predicates are Properties. Eco ([1979] 2006, 142) borrows Rescher's

³⁴ This figure was already mentioned by Ibn al-Mu'tazz (*Badī'*, 62-63). As reference, I report Ibn Ḥiğğā's (*Ḥizāna*, 2:299) definition: "it is the expression conveyed by the question of the speaker about something he knows [as] a question of a person who does not know." On this figure, see also Cachia (1998, no. 135).

classification into Essential Properties and Accidental Properties, to which he adds the S-Necessary Properties. An Accidental Property is a Property which does not play a fundamental role within the Fabula. For instance, in the Koranic Narrative World (W_Q), we are not told the exact number of animals that Noah brought inside the ark, or the age of any of them. Essential Properties are those which are essential for a given object, such as the property of being a man to be able to produce sperm in the Epigram's Narrative World (W_E). Finally, S-Necessary properties are those Essential Properties which are structurally necessary for the Fabula. The property of Noah of being a prophet is a S-Necessary property in the Koranic Narrative World (W_Q).

Let us consider the properties of Actants in (W_Q) in a simplified way. Noah, (n_Q) has the S-necessary properties of being a prophet (P), and of sailing in the ark (A). In addition, he has the accidental property of landing upon mount al-Ġūdī (\check{G}), for the place of arrival does not play a fundamental role in (W_Q). The properties (P) and (A) are dependent on each other, since if they were separated, they could refer to another actor of (W_Q), for Noah is not the only prophet, and nor the only living being to have been saved on the ark, but he is the only prophet who sailed in the ark. Then, the *ġāriya* (\check{g}_Q) has the S-necessary property of being Noah's ark (B).³⁵ We can order these properties in the following chart (square brackets indicate S-necessary properties):

W_Q	P	A	\check{G}	B
n_Q	[+]	[+]	+	-
\check{g}_Q	-	-	-	[+]

Let us now consider the properties of the actants in the epigram.

The Subject (s_E) has the S-necessary properties of being sexually aroused (X), of having spent his sperm (S), of looking for a Helper to achieve the union with his Object of quest (L); the spending of sperm entails the essential property of being a man (M). The Object *ġāriya* (o_E) has the S-necessary properties of being a woman (W) or the

³⁵ Of course, this assignment of properties applies only to the occurrence of *ġāriya* in Noah's story and not to all the occurrences of the word in the Koran.

alternative S-necessary property of being a ship (*I*). The Helper (*h_E*) has the S-necessary property of being able to provide a woman to the Subject (*H*), or the alternative S-necessary property of being able to drive the Subject upon al-Ġūdī (*D*). Having alternative properties is expressed by a logical disjunction (*v*). Moreover, in addition to the Actants of the epigram, the presence of the Koranic quotation within the text entails that the prophet Noah is meant, even if he is not openly mentioned, for there is no real loss of semantic load through the resemanticisation. Therefore, we should assume all the S-necessary properties of Noah in (*W_Q*) and in (*W_E*).

We can order these properties in the following chart:

<i>W_E</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>W V I</i>	<i>H V D</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>Ġ</i>
<i>s_E</i>	[+]	[+]	[+]	-	-	-	-	-
<i>o_E</i>	-	-	-	[+]	-	-	-	-
<i>h_E</i>	-	-	-	-	[+]	-	-	-
<i>n_E</i>	-	-	-	-	-	[+]	[+]	+

The Narrative Schema of this epigram is not fully accomplished, since it ends in suspense, so that the reader can, at this point, exercise his inferential power and imagine a Narrative World (*W_R*) capable of depicting *W_E* on the one hand, and also of accomplishing the Narrative Schema according to his/her encyclopaedia on the other. The reader faces the epigram's Fabula, and, thanks to the *tawriya*, can infer properties to be assigned to a possible Helper to continue the Narrative Schema. One possibility is to represent the Helper as Noah (*n*), which is a reading strategy made possible by the Koranic quotation, which introduces in the epigram an embedded Narrative World (*W_Q*). In doing so, we are faced with another Narrative World, this of the Reader's predictions (*W_R*), in which Noah is the Helper, the one who should be able to take the Subject to a safe place, or to provide him with a woman.

A representation of this World will be as in the following chart:

<i>W_R</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>W V I</i>	<i>H V D</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>Ġ</i>
<i>s_R</i>	[+]	[+]	[+]	-	-	-	-	-

O _R	-	-	-	[+]	-	-	-	-
h _R	-	-	-	-	[+]	-/+	-/+	-/+
n _R	-	-	-	-	-/+	[+]	[+]	[+]

In this chart, we see how, if we associate Noah with the Actantial figure of the Helper, the Actantial figure – in addition to keeping its S-Necessary properties (that is, of being able to provide a woman (*H*) to the Subject, or the alternative S-necessary property of being able to drive the Subject to a safe place (*D*)) – also acquires alternative properties which are those of the prophet Noah. The possibility of identifying the Helper with Noah is not a mandatory association, but only a possible interpretative choice among others.³⁶ For this reason, the properties of being a prophet, of having sailed on the ark, and of having stopped on mount al-Ġūdī are not S-Necessary properties, but possible associations. These properties keep, however, their status of S-Necessary properties only when attributed to Noah.

These three co-penetrating worlds can be summarised with three propositions:

1. In the Koranic Narrative World (W_Q), there is an individual such that he is a prophet, he sailed in the ark, and he landed upon al-Ġūdī: Noah.
2. In the Epigram's Narrative World (W_E), there is an individual such that he is a prophet, and he sailed in the ark, and he landed upon al-Ġūdī: Noah.
3. In the World of the Reader's predictions (W_R), there is an individual, who is a Helper and such that he is able to provide a woman to the Subject or to drive him to a safe place. If it is Noah, then he is prophet, he sailed in the ark, and he landed upon al-Ġūdī.

The Narrative Worlds of the Koran (W_Q) and of the Epigram (W_E) present the same representations for the individual Noah – namely, the properties attributed to Noah are the same, which is not in the World of the Reader's predictions. If we now

³⁶ For example, one could associate God with the figure of the Helper, for he is actually he who permitted Noah to save himself, and so he could save the Subject or provide him with a woman. Or one could associate no one with the Helper, for he/she has no interest in the interpretation of the Text. Or why not both?

compare all these Worlds, we notice that (W_E) can be constructed starting from (W_Q), since the individual Noah (n) has the same S-Necessary properties in both worlds. When an individual has the same S-Necessary properties in two different (Narrative)Worlds, it is the same individual. In this case, there is a dyadic relationship between these two Worlds, which is called R -accessibility: $W_Q R W_E$, i.e. the Narrative World of the Epigram is accessible from the Koranic Narrative World. This kind of relationship is dyadic but not symmetrical (Eco, [1979] 2006, 146), since, starting from W_Q , I can build W_E but not the other way around.

If we consider now the World of the Reader's representations (W_R), we see that the assignment of properties differs from the previous worlds. This different assignment of properties is due to the influence of *tawriya* as a resemantising word within the Koranic verse. Again, *tawriya* is a Connector for Isotopies. The first Isotopy is linked to the Koranic figure of Noah and is based on the Koranic interpretation of the cited verses; it is an Isotopy that we can call 'religious'. The second Isotopy is a reading of the verses in a sexual way actualised by two *tawriya*-words: *mā'* and *ġāriya*, turning the meaning to a 'sexual' Isotopy. If we associate the figure of the Actant Helper with Noah, we obtain two possibilities. On the one hand, the Helper is the one who leads the subject onto the mountain al-Ġūdī through a ship. In this case, the properties of Noah in (W_Q) and (W_R) coincide, and Noah is not resemantised. He is therefore an identical individual between those worlds, which acts in the 'religious' Isotopy. If, on the other hand, the property actualised in the Helper is to provide the Subject with a woman, then its association with Noah leads to a resemantisation of the figure of the prophet in the 'sexual' Isotopy that is incompatible with the (W_Q). This example of *tawriya* is what Eco ([1979] 2006, 95) defines as "Isotopie discorsive transfrastiche a disgiunzione paradigmatica" (Trans-phrastic discursive Isotopies based on a paradigmatic disjunction): namely, Isotopies that are denotatively exclusive, and whose (non-)understanding derives from a different selection of the Frames of reference.

5.5 Conclusions

The analysis conducted here has shown how a *tawriya* applied to a text such as an epigram is the focal point to create two or more Texts out of one. Each of these Texts represents a different Isotopy that has its roots in the text and that only the presence of the *tawriya* can trigger. For this reason, I associated *tawriya* with the notion of Isotopic Connector, as it is defined by Greimas and Courtés (1982). In their dictionary, they highlight how an Isotopic Connector generates a double reading of a text. But, as we saw in the previous chapter, and even better with the two case studies in this chapter, talking about a double reading is not enough. In fact, as I have shown, we are not faced with a double reading, but with a textual doubling. This is even more evident if we consider the two epigrams presented in this chapter. *Taḍmīn* and *iqtibās* are the case in point of what we can define as intertextuality, i.e. the introduction of a text into another text in the form of a quotation, plagiarism, or allusion (Genette, 1982). The intertextuality given by these two figures is developed to a greater degree by the resemanticisation due to *tawriya*. On the one hand, resemanticisation is the use for the purposes of a text A of a distorted meaning of the text B, which, however, retains its original meaning in addition to the new meaning it acquires. If this did not happen, text A could not ‘work’, since its interpretation is not based so much on the resemanticised meaning of B, but on the perception of the resemanticisation of B in A by the reader. Having two meanings (or, rather, Text-doubling) is the consequence of the perception of the discordance of the two meanings of B realised through the *tawriya*-connector. Without *tawriya*, text A would still be decodable, but not interpretable. The *tawriya* is therefore part of the textual strategies and its understanding is postulated by the author and therefore must be assumed in the Model Reader. Both epigrams presuppose an interpretative impulse on the part of the reader who is not in a passive receiving position, but becomes, so to speak, a world builder. The inferential walks (Eco, [1979] 2006; 1994) that the reader is encouraged to do by reading the epigrams make him a participant in the narrative fabric of the story. Although he cannot manipulate the text *stricto sensu*, he can build the world of his predictions by acting through the reception that he has of the text, writing ghost chapters that precede or follow the moments of the Narrative Schema described in the text.

And it is precisely in the amalgam of Narrative Worlds and possible worlds that the *tawriya* characteristic of generating estrangement in the reader acts. One possible definition of this effect is that *tawriya* puts into relationship Narrative Worlds and the Worlds of the Reader's predictions. The greater the R-Accessibility between the Worlds, the less the estrangement effect will be. If the depicted Narrative World of the Epigram were perfectly superimposable onto the real world, there would be no estrangement effect. As we saw in the second epigram, the different attribution of properties between individuals of the Worlds diminishes R-Accessibility to the point that individuals that were identical become variants between the worlds. This is the case of the prophet Noah, who, according to the attribution of properties by the reader, maintains or does not maintain his identity between worlds.

Is it therefore appropriate to keep the definition of intertextuality? As Gignoux (2006) points out, intertextuality and the aesthetic enjoyment that derives from it depend largely on the reader and his culture – Eco would say from his or her Encyclopaedia – highlighting how intertextuality is linked to the act of reception. She establishes a fundamental difference between intertextuality and rewriting (Fr. *réécriture*, which she differentiates from *réécriture*, i.e. the reworking of a text by its author). For instance, quotations, allusions, and reminiscences of the reader with regard to another text when reading a text are what can be called intertextuality. On the other hand, rewriting presupposes a certain regularity of occurrence within the new text. Gignoux speaks of concrete marks (Fr. *Marques concrètes*) of a certain relevance within the entire new text. In adopting this definition, she highlights how rewriting, unlike intertextuality, must be a phenomenon linked not only to the act of reception, but also to the act of production of a text. Unlike intertextuality, the understanding of the rewriting process is necessary in order to make gain something from the text. This analysis is compatible with what I have described in this chapter, as the introduction of external text segments is not limited to the suggestion of a scenario, but acts at the textual level as an interpretative strategy. The rewriting process must necessarily be understood, i.e. it must be decoded by the reader, the embedded text must belong to the reader's Encyclopaedia. This is the only way for him/her to complete the author's work. This last analysis does not apply only to texts in which there is the use of a *tawriya*.

The phenomenon of intertextuality and rewriting is a common device in Arabic poetical practice, especially if we consider the figures of *taḍmīn* and *iqtibās*. An interesting study on intertextuality in the Arabic literature of the Mamluk era is Bauer (2013b, 35-44), who stresses that this phenomenon is found not only in the literature of that time but is one of the cornerstones of Arabic literature in general. Alongside the general notion of intertextuality (Genette, 1982), he describes two other phenomena which he calls “shared intertextuality” and “cross intertextuality” (Bauer (2013b, 36). The first “denotes cases in which an existing text is used by two or more participants as the basis of a literary exchange” (36). The second is taken from Genette’s (1982, 10) metatextuality (Fr. *métatextualité*), which is described by Bauer (2013b, 39) as a relationship between two texts by two different authors, where the author of the second text wants the relationship between his text and the text of the other author to be evident for the other author and the public alike. In all those cases, both production and reception are involved, and the recognisability of the rewriting is the basis for the success of the text.

When rewriting meets *tawriya*, the operations at the level of reception imply that, in addition to recognising the embedded text, the reader is also able to decode the *tawriya*-word. At this point, we can recognise a structure of the reception of those cases on three levels. The first is a standard level. It represents a reader whose Encyclopaedia is not provided with specific information in order to understand the rewriting within the text. The reader of this type can only access a first degree of understanding of the text that we can identify with the sum of the information given by his lexemes. The second is an intermediate level. It represents a reader who has information about the text cited in the process of rewriting. He will therefore be able to associate the two texts and actualise the meanings of text A and text B. The third is the optimal. The reader of the text has an Encyclopaedia provided with all the information to identify text B embedded in text A, and, above all, he/she also has the information to decode the *tawriya* and therefore resemanticise text B. The reader is then able to understand and actualise text A through the actualisation of both B and its resemanticisation. This is what distinguishes *tawriya* from the other figures of speech.

6. Conclusion

This work is divided into two parts: the first focuses on the theory of *tawriya*, and the second on the poetic practice. The purpose of this choice was to highlight the relationship between two sides of a same coin, placing them side by side in order to demonstrate how one (the theory) endeavoured to describe the other (the practice), the former sometimes adopting a certain degree of complexity that has not always proven suitable in describing the output of poets and writers. From a theoretical point of view, this work aims at deepening our knowledge of the theorising of *tawriya* through the analysis of sources not yet studied, and, above all, its close relationship with the Koran. From a practical point of view, the choice to analyse *tawriya* in the Mamluk era reflects its diffusion during this period. To do so, the research has been carried out on the textual form, which saw wider diffusion during this epoch: the epigram.

The investigation detailed in the previous pages has shown that semantic ambiguity is a topic that embraces, on the one hand, both the needs of the exegesis of the sacred text, and on the other hand, the need to describe the rhetorical device that saw its greatest diffusion in the Ayyubid and Mamluk era. What we can call the 'canonical' formulation of *tawriya* is due to the work of al-Şafadī, who first devoted a whole treatise to this figure. In doing so, he emphasises the theoretical discussion over the study of the poetic practice. In his attempt to catalogue and categorise every phenomenon related to this figure, he builds a rigid system, from which he tends to exclude nuances. But nuances are what underlie the poetic art. The excessive 'theoreticism' of al-Şafadī was offset by the work of Ibn Ḥiġġa, who, while criticising al-Şafadī, adopts his theoretical framework. Nonetheless, he was able to provide a picture of the poetic practice thanks to his 'anthologising attitude', and collected a wealth of precious loci. However, it should be pointed out that although the theory of *tawriya* was accepted in its quadripartite formulation, none of the premodern

authors who discuss this figure felt compelled to describe all the literary examples that they provided according to the type of *tawriya* they belong – except for the only few loci which are mentioned in the theoretical sections. The reason for this lack of interest can be captured by two hypotheses: 1. The category to which *tawriya* belongs was obvious to a critic of the time; 2. Critics were aware that such a narrow theory was not able to account for all the phenomena found in the poetic practice. Research has shown that the second hypothesis is correct, although not contradicting the first for which a true answer is impossible to formulate.

First, not all of the theoretical postulates of al-Ṣafadī will be embraced in the later works of literary criticism, such as what al-Ṣafadī called the “infelicitous cases” of the use of *tawriya* and *ištirāk*. Moreover, the theoretical disquisition presents a too narrow dichotomy between *qarīb* vs *baʿīd*, meaning a strict constraint that literary practice often does not respect, instead preferring a coexistence of the two meanings within the text, both cooperating even where one is preferred over – N.B. preferred, not excluding – the other.

Second, premodern literary critics, in judging whether or not a *tawriya* is used well in a work, state that the example in question represents the ‘good taste’ (*al-dawq al-salīm*), without specifying what this ‘good taste’ is, nor the criteria to be able to judge whether a line of poetry is an example of that good taste. Of course, it is difficult, if not impossible, to say exactly what good taste is. Studying the sources leads one to deduce that a successful *tawriya* must have these requirements: given a word with at least two meanings used in a literary context: 1. Both meanings must be syntactically correct, regardless of the meaning that is attributed to the word or phrase – this must be acceptable according to the syntactic position that the word or phrase occupies, thus the sentence must be *mufīda*. 2. The meanings expressed by the word or phrase must be understandable to the reader. The difference between *qarīb* and *baʿīd* is expressed in terms of which of the two is immediately perceived, and not in terms of current use. That is why a *qarīb* meaning may also be the least used meaning, but the first suggested by the context and co-text. In any case, both must be able to be easily identified by the reader, lest the aesthetic effect be lost. 3. The quality of *tawriya* depends on the possibility of a double reading. A successful *tawriya* is a *tawriya* which provides a double reading of the whole text and not only

of the homonymous or polysemic word or phrase. The compositions in which the double reading is not actualised, or is only partially actualised, are not considered a successful use. However, talking about double reading is not always enough, as it has been shown.

This last statement leads us to consider the role played by *tawriya* within a literary text. In this work, the analysis focused on two specific texts: the Koran and the epigram.

Contrary to poetic texts, the Koran is a revealed text and does not change according to the literary taste of the time; but whose interpretation has changed over time. The use of *tawriya* to explain some of the *mutašābihāt* has its roots both in the theological and rhetorical fields. This is evident if we consider the different interpretations that have been given to the ambiguous verses such as (Q 39:67), (Q 20:5), and (Q 51:47). In general, we can distinguish three fundamental approaches according to the theological schools to which exegetes and critics belonged. As already described in the third chapter, *tawriya* has been adopted as an explanation of the Koranic *mutašābihāt* because the ambiguity that it conveys goes beyond the simple dichotomy *ḥaqīqa vs mağāz*. *Tawriya* makes possible how in a Koranic verse, the perception of a first meaning of the verse could hide a second, without necessarily excluding the first – e.g. the case of God's hand. The ambiguity of *tawriya* is functional to the degree of ambiguity of the verse; it allows to preserve both meanings of the ambiguous word or phrase where, obviously, one of the two meanings is not untenable from the theological point of view – e.g. God's act of sitting.

On the other hand, if we consider the functioning of *tawriya* in poetic text, such as the epigram, it can be said that this figure of speech depends on a textual cooperation that needs the reader in order to achieve its aesthetic effect. What emerged from the study on the use of *tawriya* in epigrams is that *tawriya* is an active element within the text and not a passive one. This characteristic is known to premodern Arab critics. Indeed, if we consider one of the precursors to *tawriya*, i.e. the *muğālaṭa ma'nawīyya*, we note how the concept of interdependence of the elements of the sentence was essential for the success of the figure. This figure will be reabsorbed later within the *tawriya* theory, most likely becoming its fourth type: *tawriya*

muhayya'a. Each type of *tawriya* (and not only *muhayya'a*) is strongly linked to its co-text and context of enunciation, whether accompanied by a *lāzim* or not. If we take as an assumption that a text must have a certain internal organisation, and that it is thought of as a product for a given Model Reader capable of interpreting it through the specific notions of his or her Encyclopaedia, then the duplicity, the ambiguity created by the *tawriya* is evident. With textual duplicity, I refer to the ability of the *tawriya* to engender a double reading of the text and often to create a second text out of the first. A similar analysis has already been proposed by Morin ([1966] 1981), who analysed the *histoire drôle* (joke, pun), a text which presents a semantic disjunction. In this type of text, she posits the presence of a 'disjunctive' element which connects two different isotopies, allowing the passage from one to the other. This first approach will be adopted in the field of semiotics, where the element of connection between two isotopies is called isotopic connector (Greimas and Courtés, 1982). It applies to the functioning of *tawriya* and describes it as a duplicating element which enables not only a double reading of the text, but also a creation of a second text parallel to the first. This is because *tawriya* allows the internal elements of the text to communicate with each other by linking them, and, at the same time, function as an element of disjunction within a structure in which, as Saussure would say, *tout se tient*. Eco ([1979] 2006) lists various types of isotopic disjunctions based on the unit on which the isotopies are built. *Tawriya* can work either at the level of the single sentence, or even at the level of a larger text. We will therefore distinguish:

A. A *tawriya* whose action is limited to a single word, capable of connecting two different isotopies, such as epigrams no. 1, 16, 26, 32, 45, 53, etc. in which the *tawriya* creates a double reading of the text.

B. A *tawriya* that acts through a word or a phrase and is capable of connecting not only two isotopies, but also two different frames, as in epigrams no. 13, where the two frames are 'butchery' vs 'belles-lettres', or no. 25, in which the frames 'legal speech' and 'love speech' are intersected. In this case, we do not only have a double reading, but the intersection of two discourses belonging to the cultural construct of the reader. The ability of *tawriya* lies therefore in making two frames dialoguing and relating even if they do not belong to the same field, which are normally perceived as distant to each other.

C. The *tawriya* can also function as a text connector, especially when it is used as a connector within the intertextuality/rewriting figures, i.e. *taḍmīn* and *iqtibās*. In this case, *tawriya* acts as a connector of narrative worlds that intertwine in the text, and result in a structure through which the reader can imagine alternative texts. It acts on the textual level, i.e. by modifying the text in which it is embedded; and in the extra-textual level alike, i.e. acting on the reader and stimulating his inferential walks. Precisely for these characteristics, *tawriya*, even more than the other figures of speech, shows its need to be decoded and interpreted by an active reader, who is capable of entering the textual fabric of the epigram and drawing the necessary information from it, to be able to (re)build part of his Narrative Schema. An active *tawriya*-reader is able to explore the narrative world of the text, and he or she is all the more able to imagine new ones starting from the information contained in the text, and developing an inferential path that will lead him to create the world of his or her own predictions. The reason for the success of *tawriya* in the Ayyubid and Mamluk era is to be found precisely in its ability to involve the reader in the discovery of the ambiguity of the sentence, then in its decoding, and finally in the interpretative process through which he or she will be able to enjoy the work of art.

Like any research work, it must have an end; and like any research work, it could be continued almost indefinitely. I take the freedom of borrowing the words of Genette (1982, 7-8): “L'inconvénient de la ‘recherche’, c’est qu’à force de chercher, il arrive qu’on trouve...” And I admit that much more could be found, just digging. For example, the relationship between *tawriya*, *isti’āra*, and *kināya* remains to be investigated, both at a theoretical level – e.g. the adoption of the terminology *muğarrada* and *muraššaḥa* – and at a practical level, such as the poetic quotations mentioned in the works of literary critics before introduction of *tawriya* – e.g. Ibn Rašīq (*‘Umda*). Moreover, the range of investigation should be extended to other textual forms in order to verify the results obtained in this work in more complex texts. For instance, does *tawriya* show the same characteristics in a polythematic *qaṣīda*? Does it play a role of connector between the various themes? Of course, *tawriya* should be investigated as well in prose texts by answering to questions like: what is the role of *tawriya* in textual forms such as *maqāma*, *risāla*, etc.? Given a

complex text such as a *qaṣīda* or a *maqāma*, what is the role of *tawriya* in developing different readings, in generating new texts, in creating new worlds? Can the semiotic approach outlined in these pages be applied in other literary works too?

While being aware of the limits of this work, I hope to have suggested a method of analysis for *tawriya*, which may prove useful in understanding the link between literary production and its reception also when applied to other literary forms and genres.

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VIII. Glossary

This glossary is based on the translations given in the text. Many of these technical terms have more than one possible translation depending on the context of use and on the art or science which make use of them. In this glossary, I do not mention all the possible translations, but I will limit myself to those strictly related to the sources I have consulted and used for this work.

<i>Amāra</i>	Hint
<i>Badal</i>	See <i>ibdāl</i> .
<i>Bāṭil</i>	Untenable.
<i>Bāṭin</i>	Esoteric meaning.
<i>Bi-lā kayfa</i>	‘Without asking how’, referred to the transcendence of God.
<i>Dalīl</i>	Evidence. Apodictic demonstration.
<i>Fāsid</i>	Unsound.
<i>Ġinās</i>	Paronomasia.
<i>Ġinās tāmm</i>	Perfect paronomasia.
<i>Ḥads</i>	Derivation (lit. conjecturing).
<i>Ḥaqīqa</i>	Proper meaning opposed to <i>mağāz</i> .
<i>Ḥaqīqī</i>	Related to <i>ḥaqīqa</i> .
<i>Ḥazr</i>	Guessing.
<i>Ḥuğğā</i>	Authority. Proof.
<i>Ibdāl</i>	Letter substitution.
<i>Īdā‘</i>	Depositing.
<i>Ifāda</i>	Informative content of the sentence.
<i>Īhām</i>	See <i>Tawriya</i> .
<i>Iḥbār</i>	Predication.

<i>Īmā'a</i>	Indication, also synonym of <i>išāra</i> , allusion.
<i>lq̄tibās</i>	Quotation from Koran or <i>Sunna</i> .
<i>Irāda</i>	Intention.
<i>Isnād</i>	Predication; metaphorical attribution.
<i>Isti'āra</i>	Metaphor.
<i>Isti'māl</i>	Use, conventional meaning.
<i>Istidlāl</i>	Demonstration.
<i>'Iwaḍ</i>	Compensation.
<i>Kināya</i>	Metonymy.
<i>Lafẓ</i> pl. <i>alfāẓ</i>	Expression.
<i>Lāzim</i> pl. <i>lawāzim</i>	Regarding <i>tawriya</i> : correlative referred either to the <i>ma'nà qarīb</i> or to the <i>ma'nà ba'īd</i> . Regarding <i>kināya</i> : necessary consequent intended by the <i>kināya</i> expression.
<i>Luġz</i> pl. <i>algāz</i>	Riddle.
<i>Mādda</i>	Radical.
<i>Maġāz</i>	Figurative sense opposed to <i>ḥaqīqa</i> .
<i>Maġāzī</i>	Related to <i>maġāz</i> .
<i>Ma'nà</i>	Meaning. Motif.
<i>Maṭal</i>	Proverb, example. Regarding <i>tamṭīl</i> : figurative description.
<i>Mu'ammà</i>	Enigma.
<i>Muġālaṭa ma'nawīyya</i>	Semantic misleading.
<i>Musta'ār</i>	Metaphier.
<i>Musta'ār la-hu</i>	Metaphrand.
<i>Muṭābaqa</i>	See <i>ṭibāq</i> .
<i>Mutašābihāt</i>	Ambiguous verses, anthropomorphic verses.
<i>Nisba</i>	Correlation
<i>Qalb</i>	Mutation.
<i>Qarīna</i>	Frame of reference. Correlative.
<i>Sariqa</i>	Plagiarism.

<i>Şifa</i>	Quality, in general e.g. in the theory of metaphor. Attribute when referred to God
<i>Taḍmīn</i>	Quotation.
<i>Tafsīr</i>	Explanation. In religious sciences: explanation of the Koran, Koran commentary.
<i>Tağawwuz</i>	Figurative saying.
<i>Tağnīs</i>	See <i>ğinās</i> .
<i>Tağsīm</i>	Anthropomorphism.
<i>Tahmīn</i>	Guessing.
<i>Tahyīl</i>	Image evocation.
<i>Talwīḥ</i>	Allusion.
<i>Tamṭīl</i>	Lit. provide a <i>maṭal</i> , analogy.
<i>Tanzīh</i>	Transcendentalism.
<i>Ta'rīḍ</i>	Euphemism.
<i>Tašbīh</i>	In rhetoric: simile. In religious sciences: the act of comparing the creator to the creatures, anthropomorphism.
<i>Taṣwīr</i>	The depict, to give an image, the making of a picture.
<i>Ta'wīl</i>	Interpretation.
<i>Ta'tīl</i>	The act of divesting God of his attributes.
<i>Tawriya</i>	Double entendre. Ambiguity, obscurity.
<i>Tawriya ba'īda</i>	Far-fetched <i>tawriya</i> .
<i>Tawriya mubayyana</i>	Explained <i>tawriya</i> .
<i>Tawriya muğarrada</i>	Bare <i>tawriya</i> .
<i>Tawriya muhayya'a</i>	Supported <i>tawriya</i> .
<i>Tawriya muqtarana</i>	Combined <i>tawriya</i> .
<i>Tawriya muraššaḥa</i>	Prepared <i>tawriya</i> .
<i>Tawriya nāqiṣa</i>	Imperfect <i>tawriya</i> .
<i>Ṭibāq</i>	Antithesis.
<i>Uḡḡiyya</i> pl. <i>aḡḡī</i>	Quiz.
<i>Waḍ'</i>	Coinage. Conventional meaning.

<i>Wazn</i>	Pattern.
<i>Zāhir</i>	Manifest, literal meaning. In religious science: exoteric meaning.
<i>Ziyāda</i>	Letter augmentation.

IX. Abstracts

English

My research aims to investigate the figure of speech *tawriya* with particular reference to its use in the epigram (*maqṭūʿ*). Starting from Bonebakker's study published in 1966, my goal is twofold. First, to broaden the theoretical discussion; and, second, to investigate in depth how *tawriya* functions in literary texts.

In the first part, I will discuss the 'canonical' formulation of *tawriya* (first chapter), with particular reference to the work of al-Ṣafadī (d. 764/1363) and of his contemporaries al-Ruʿaynī I-Ġarnāṭī (d. 779/1377) and Ibn Ḡābir (d. 780/1378). In the second chapter, I pay particular attention to the theoretical discussion of *muġālaṭa maʿnawiyya*, a figure of speech that is a precursor to *tawriya*. In the third chapter, I will analyse the close relationship between *tawriya* and the Koran, and investigate in particular how scholars of rhetoric and exegetes applied the theoretical work on *tawriya* to the anthropomorphic verses of the Koran.

In the second part, I deal with the practice of *tawriya*, focusing on the role of the context of enunciation in the construction of the poetic text, and the role of the reader in decoding the message to achieve aesthetic enjoyment from the literary work. In the fourth chapter, I present a selection of epigrams from the Mamluk period, which I translate and comment upon, with the aim of showing how *tawriya* was at that time a privileged vehicle for poetic motifs and how it enriched the aesthetic value of the poetic compositions. Comparing theory and practice will sharpen our understanding of the functioning of this stylistic device. In order to broaden our understanding even further, my work ends (fifth chapter) by analysing *tawriya* in selected epigrams. To do so, I use modern semiotic theories that highlight the construction of the narrative world and the role of the reader in its reception. In particular, I will focus here on two figures, *taḍmīn* and *iqtibās*, and their connection

with *tawriya*, thereby highlighting the concepts of intertextuality and semantic ambiguity.

Italiano

Il lavoro mira a studiare la figura retorica *tawriya* con particolare riferimento al suo uso nell'epigramma (*maqṭū'*). A partire dallo studio di Bonebakker pubblicato nel 1966, il mio obiettivo è duplice. Innanzitutto, ampliare la discussione teorica e, in secondo luogo, indagare a fondo il funzionamento della *tawriya* nei testi poetici.

Nella prima parte, discuterò la formulazione 'canonica' della *tawriya* (primo capitolo), con particolare riferimento al lavoro di al-Ṣafadī (m. 764/1363) e dei suoi contemporanei al-Ru'aynī I-Ġarnāṭī (m. 779/1377) e Ibn Ḡābir (m. 780/1378). Il secondo capitolo è dedicato alla *muġālaṭa ma'nawiyya*, una figura retorica precursore della *tawriya*. Nel terzo capitolo, analizzerò la stretta relazione tra *tawriya* e Corano. Nello specifico, l'analisi mira a chiarire in che modo gli studiosi di retorica ed esegeti hanno applicato le discquisizioni teoriche sulla *tawriya* alle *mutašābihāt* del Corano.

Nella seconda parte, mi occupo della pratica del *tawriya*, concentrandomi sul ruolo del contesto dell'enunciazione nella costruzione del testo poetico e sul ruolo del lettore nel decodificare il messaggio per ottenere il godimento estetico dall'opera letteraria. Nel quarto capitolo, presento una selezione di epigrammi del periodo mamelucco, tradotti e commentati, con l'obiettivo di mostrare come la *tawriya* fosse un veicolo privilegiato dei motivi poetici e come arricchisse il valore estetico dei componimenti. Il confronto tra teoria e pratica migliorerà la nostra comprensione del funzionamento di questo dispositivo stilistico. Per ampliare ulteriormente la nostra comprensione, il mio lavoro termina (quinto capitolo) analizzando la *tawriya* in due casi studio. L'analisi sarà condotta applicando allo studio dell'epigramma le moderne teorie semiotiche, al fine di evidenziare la costruzione del mondo narrativo e il ruolo del lettore nella sua ricezione. In particolare, mi concentrerò su due figure, *taḍmīn* e *iqtibās*, e sulla loro connessione con la *tawriya*, evidenziando in tal modo i concetti di intertestualità e ambiguità semantica.

Deutsch

Meine Forschung zielt darauf ab, die Stilfigur *Tawriya* unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer Verwendung im Epigramm (*maqṭū'*) zu untersuchen. Ausgehend von Bonebakkers 1966 veröffentlichter Studie habe ich zwei Ziele. Erstens, die theoretische Diskussion zu erweitern; und zweitens eingehend zu untersuchen, wie *Tawriya* in literarischen Texten funktioniert.

Im ersten Teil werde ich die ‚kanonische‘ Formulierung der Stilfigur *Tawriya* (erstes Kapitel) unter besonderer Bezugnahme auf die Arbeit von al-Şafadī (gest. 764/1363) und seiner Zeitgenossen al-Ru'aynī l-Ġarnāṭī (gest. 779/1377) und Ibn Ġābir (gest. 780/1378) darstellen. Im zweiten Kapitel beschäftige ich mich mit der theoretischen Diskussion über *Muġālaṭa Ma'nawiyya*, eine Stillfigur, die ein Vorläufer der *Tawriya* ist. Im dritten Kapitel werde ich die enge Beziehung zwischen *Tawriya* und dem Koran analysieren und insbesondere untersuchen, wie Rhetoriker und Exegeten die *Tawriya*-Theorie auf die anthropomorphistischen Verse des Korans anwendeten.

Im zweiten Teil beschäftige ich mich mit der Praxis der *Tawriya*, wobei ich mich auf die Rolle des Kontextes bei der Konstruktion des poetischen Textes und auf die Rolle des Lesers bei der Decodierung der Äußerung konzentriere, um einen ästhetischen Genuss aus dem literarischen Werk zu erzielen. Im vierten Kapitel stelle ich eine Auswahl von Epigrammen aus der Mamlukenzeit vor, die ich übersetze und kommentiere, um zu zeigen, wie *Tawriya* zu dieser Zeit ein privilegiertes Vehikel für poetische Motive war und wie sie den ästhetischen Wert der poetischen Kompositionen bereicherte. Der Vergleich von Theorie und Praxis wird unser Verständnis der Funktionsweise dieses Stilmittels schärfen. Um unser Verständnis noch weiter zu erweitern, endet meine Arbeit (fünftes Kapitel) mit der Analyse der Stilfigur *Tawriya* in ausgewählten Epigrammen. Dazu verwende ich moderne semiotische Theorien, die die Konstruktion der narrativen Welt und die Rolle des Lesers bei ihrer Rezeption hervorheben. Insbesondere werde ich mich hier auf zwei Figuren konzentrieren, *Taḍmīn* und *Iqtibās*, und ihre Verbindung mit *Tawriya*, wodurch die Konzepte der Intertextualität und der semantischen Ambiguität hervorgehoben werden.